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The Dalits of Nepal and a New Constitution - ConstitutionNet

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Dalits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Nepal</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

a <strong>New</strong> <strong>Constitution</strong><br />

7<br />

to “proper work practices” (Art. 30(a)). Cultural rights <strong>of</strong><br />

minorities receive greater protection than in the old<br />

constitution (Art. 17). <strong>The</strong>se rights are reinforced by various<br />

state responsibilities <strong>and</strong> policies, <strong>and</strong> directive principles<br />

(especially Article 33(d) to (i)). Consequently the regime<br />

<strong>of</strong> the rights <strong>of</strong> minorities <strong>and</strong> disadvantaged communities<br />

is a big improvement on previous constitutions.<br />

<strong>The</strong> IC was prepared <strong>and</strong> adopted by the seven parties<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Maoists, who dominate the Constituent Assembly.<br />

<strong>The</strong> values <strong>of</strong> the IC outlined above have strong support<br />

among a large proportion <strong>of</strong> the people. <strong>The</strong> Dalit agenda<br />

is already widely accepted <strong>and</strong> endorsed. So one may<br />

assume that these provisions would be retained, even<br />

strengthened in the new constitution. <strong>The</strong> real struggle<br />

for <strong>Dalits</strong>, as is argued later, may not be in incorporating<br />

suitable provisions in the constitution but in making them<br />

a working reality. Nevertheless, as papers by Jill Cottrell<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Center for Human Rights <strong>and</strong> Global Justice show,<br />

it is important that the provisions be formulated precisely,<br />

without internal contradictions or coherence 5 , <strong>and</strong> be<br />

capable <strong>of</strong> implementation easily, without requiring a<br />

lot <strong>of</strong> new laws <strong>and</strong> regulations, or dependent on the<br />

initiatives <strong>of</strong> the government. As materials in the<br />

Collection show, there were fundamental weaknesses<br />

in this regard in the 1990 constitution, where the<br />

commitment to inclusion was qualified by provisions<br />

designed to maintain the ideology <strong>and</strong> rule <strong>of</strong> traditional<br />

elites, <strong>and</strong> diluted by the legal status <strong>of</strong> provisions which<br />

promised progressive policies.<br />

As an example <strong>of</strong> the last point, the 1990 <strong>Constitution</strong><br />

acknowledged the importance <strong>of</strong> social justice (Art.<br />

25(3)), public participation <strong>and</strong> decentralisation (Art.<br />

25(4) <strong>and</strong> the special rights <strong>of</strong> women <strong>and</strong> children (Art.<br />

26(7) <strong>and</strong> (8) respectively). Relatively little was done<br />

about these goals, <strong>and</strong> it was not possible for the<br />

potential beneficiaries to seek the assistance <strong>of</strong> the courts<br />

to enforce them (as these provisions appeared as<br />

directive principles or policies <strong>of</strong> the state). Ankit Dhakal’s<br />

note on the role <strong>of</strong> courts shows how judges sympathetic<br />

to directive principles were h<strong>and</strong>icapped by the fact that<br />

they were not enforceable in the courts. And indeed, as<br />

Jill Cottrell shows, even if a provision appears in the bill <strong>of</strong><br />

rights, it may actually not be enforceable on its own, without<br />

more. <strong>The</strong> public may have no means to ensure that “more”.<br />

<strong>The</strong> availability or the scope <strong>of</strong> some rights is to be<br />

determined in accordance with the law. This can have two<br />

consequences. <strong>The</strong> first is that whether the right is available<br />

or not depends on whether a law has been made. <strong>The</strong><br />

second, the law may also set qualifications on the right. Jill<br />

Cottrell draws attention to the fact that although Article 16<br />

<strong>of</strong> the 1990 <strong>Constitution</strong> guarantee every person’s right<br />

“to dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> receive information on any matter <strong>of</strong> public<br />

importance”, the law which operationalised the right was<br />

not passed until 2007, <strong>and</strong> regulations under the Act were<br />

being drafted in mid-2008. It is therefore extremely<br />

important that provisions to meet the needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>Dalits</strong> (<strong>and</strong><br />

other marginalised communities) should be as far as possible<br />

be included as enforceable, for example by inclusion in the<br />

bill <strong>of</strong> rights or by expressly statement if elsewhere, <strong>and</strong><br />

that its language should not leave its implementation to<br />

the discretion <strong>of</strong> the legislature or the executive. If for some<br />

practical reason, a provision cannot be enforced immediately,<br />

a deadline for its implementation should be stated in the<br />

constitution, <strong>and</strong> perhaps the institution responsible for the<br />

implementation should be identified. Nor should the<br />

availability <strong>of</strong> a right be based on complicated conditions or<br />

procedures. <strong>The</strong>se considerations are <strong>of</strong> particular<br />

importance to the <strong>Dalits</strong> for it is likely that their ability to<br />

influence the legislative or executive process will diminish<br />

after the CA, even if they can secure special representation<br />

in future legislatures.<br />

An innovation in the IC for <strong>Nepal</strong> is the transformation<br />

<strong>of</strong> some directive principles <strong>and</strong> policies into enforceable<br />

rights as well as to include entitlements to social <strong>and</strong><br />

economic rights in the bill <strong>of</strong> rights. Jill Cottrell shows by<br />

reference to the provisions <strong>and</strong> jurisprudence <strong>of</strong> the<br />

International Covenant on Economic, Social <strong>and</strong> Cultural<br />

Rights <strong>and</strong> under national constitutions, what rights to<br />

water, education <strong>and</strong> health mean <strong>and</strong> how they can be<br />

implemented. Not in all cases does the state have to<br />

provide all these basic needs. It can discharge its<br />

obligations by encouraging or supporting private<br />

institutions or the initiatives <strong>of</strong> families, not placing<br />

obstacles but facilitating access to them. But in a poor<br />

<strong>and</strong> unequal society like <strong>Nepal</strong> with weak institutional<br />

infrastructure, the state may have to play an important<br />

role in promoting social <strong>and</strong> economic rights.<br />

5<br />

A major criticism by the CHRGJ paper <strong>of</strong> the relevant provisions <strong>of</strong> the 1990 <strong>Constitution</strong> is that they contain “several deficiencies, inconsistencies, <strong>and</strong> imprecise uses <strong>of</strong><br />

language”.

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