State v. Henderson and the New Model Jury Charges - New Jersey ...

a-8-08.opn.html
The remaining two factors “come to the forefront” when the rule’s
purpose alone does not resolve the question of retroactivity. Knight, supra, 145
N.J. at 252. As to the second factor -- the degree of reliance on the prior rule --
the central consideration is “whether the old rule was administered in good
faith reliance [on] then-prevailing constitutional norms.” State v. Purnell, 161
N.J. 44, 55 (1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in
original). The third factor -- the effect on the administration of justice --
“recognizes that courts must not impose unjustified burdens on our criminal
justice system.” Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 252. When the effect is unknown but
undoubtedly substantial, that weighs in favor of limited retroactive application.
See State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 142-43 (2003); Purnell, supra, 161 N.J. at 56;
State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 409-10 (1980).
The Court can apply a new rule in one of four ways: (1) “purely prospectively .
. . to cases in which the operative facts arise after the new rule has been
announced”; (2) “in future cases and in the case in which the rule is announced,
but not in any other litigation that is pending or has reached final judgment at
the time the new rule is set forth”; (3) “‘pipeline retroactivity,’ rendering it
applicable in all future cases, the case in which the rule is announced, and any
cases still on direct appeal”; and (4) “complete retroactive effect . . . to all cases.”
Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 249 (internal citations omitted).
Applying the relevant factors, we first note that defendants have been able to
challenge identification evidence under Manson and Madison and present
arguments both before and at trial. Second, both the State and trial courts have,
without question, relied in good faith on settled constitutional principles in
applying the Manson/Madison test for many years. Last, there is no doubt that
applying the new framework retroactively would affect an immense number of
cases -- far too many to tally -- because eyewitness identifications are a staple of
criminal trials. To reopen the vast group of cases decided over several decades,
which relied not only on settled law but also on eyewitness memories that have
long since faded, would “wreak havoc on the administration of justice.” State v.
Dock, 205 N.J. 237, 258 (2011).
We therefore apply today’s ruling to future cases only, except for defendant
Henderson (and defendant Cecilia Chen, the subject of a companion case filed
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