Money Laundering: Review of the Reporting ... - Dematerialised ID

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kpmg Review of the regime for handling Suspicious Activity Reports Report of recommendations KPMG LLP recover criminal assets can then be used alongside prosecutions for the relevant criminal offences. 3.4.8 The SAR regime also has to be linked in to the objectives and desired outcomes identified and addressed in the National Policing Plan and the NCIS National Intelligence Model. 3.5 Existing successes of the SAR regime LEA successes using SARs 3.5.1 Despite the weaknesses identified in this report, the existing SAR regime has contributed to a number of successful LEA operations over recent years. These clearly demonstrate the fundamental role that SARs can play in initiating investigations. The system can work well and does have an impact on crime. The challenge is to make it work more effectively. 3.5.2 We tracked 600 SARs disclosed between January 2000 and June 2002 to determine whether they had played a role in any investigations or prosecutions. 11% of the total either contributed to a successful outcome or are still being worked on. This represents 34% of the 193 SARs in the survey where LEAs could identify the outcome related to a particular SAR. More detail on the results of our survey can be found in section 4.7 below. • The successful cases in our sample included 18 PoCA related operations and subsequent cash seizures that took place after 30 December 2002 (when the relevant provisions came into force). The SARs in question arose at least six months prior to then (i.e. before 30 June 2002, the cut-off date of the sample). These cases included nine in the London region that led to cash seizures totalling £614,995. They indicate the further value that will be derived from SARs once the powers of PoCA are fully exploited. • Our sample of 600 included one SAR which had been one of a series of three SARs made by two institutions. This led directly to the disruption of an attempted “advance fee” fraud. The SAR related to a proposed transfer of funds overseas and was fasttracked to the relevant LEA, an urban police force. The LEA made contact with the Money Laundering Reporting Officers (“MLROs”) and visited the institution making the principal disclosures. Following discussions with the MLRO and a number of representatives of law firms present at the institutions, and advice given by the LEA, the institution made a commercial decision to close the account. The subjects of the SAR had attempted to transfer US$760,000 in total. 3.5.3 Over the last two and a half years the AML unit of one urban police force has carried out restraint and/or confiscation actions in 38 cases. Eight of these were linked to SARs through which a total of £71 million has been restrained. 3.5.4 Sanitised versions of certain of the successes identified by various LEAs are given below: • In July 2001 as a result of a SAR (and following a joint operation between two LEAs during which a total of 25 further SARs were disseminated) eight people were arrested and charged with money laundering offences. Cash totalling £52,000, jo/fh/519 30
kpmg Review of the regime for handling Suspicious Activity Reports Report of recommendations KPMG LLP cannabis and 2kg of cocaine were seized and a hydroponics factory was dismantled. The total amount of money laundered was £9.6m. • Following receipt of a fast-tracked SAR, an investigation into “high yield investment frauds” led to US$25m being restrained in conjunction with the US authorities. Two defendants extradited from Spain stood trial with a third and all received prison sentences ranging from 18 months to 8 years. • An LEA contacted a law firm following the receipt of a telephone call from The Law Society seeking advice. The law firm were instructed to submit a SAR in respect of £3.1m being held in their client account. The matter transpired to be an advance fee fraud in Austria. £3.1m was identified and restrained and three individuals were arrested. • A revenue agency passed details to us of 16 successful recent cases which originated from SARs including four that have already led to settlements totalling £9m. This included one case where a SAR was submitted after £6,000 was paid into a Personal Equity Plan (“PEP”) although the investor had limited earning power. This resulted in an investigation into off-shore arrangements and numerous transactions being made by a very large metals dealer. The resulting case terminated with a settlement of more than £6m. • A SAR started a revenue agency investigation into the affairs of a UK partnership. By October 2001 the aggregate balance within the partnership accounts had risen to more than £3.5m. Cheques were made payable by the partnership to a European supplier (which in turn was using false invoices) before being endorsed for onward payment into an account in another European country. A settlement of over £2m was recently made. Characteristics of successful LEAs using SARs 3.5.5 The successes noted above have tended to be concentrated in revenue agencies and a small number of urban police forces. Our analysis has shown that, in the main, these LEAs: • Apply a greater amount of manpower resource to handling SARs than the majority of LEAs nationally. • Place both a high level of importance and priority on SARs within the Financial Investigation Unit (“FIU”) and a medium to high level of priority on SARs as an organisation, appreciating the contribution that SARs can make to investigating and recovering the proceeds of crime. • Have a close working relationship with ECB, either through secondments or regular telephone contact with the Duty Desk. jo/fh/519 31
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