e - CIFAS

.. GOVERNMENT
IN ZAZZAU THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT ::oil
(d) The Interrelations ofPolitical and Administrative SY$tems
This discussion raises certain points of considerable significance
for our later analysis. F"U'stly, the analytic distinction between
administrative and political action must not be taken to exclude
varying degrees ofoverlap intheir personnel and structures. Every
political unit, or power-oriented group, has its own administrative
structure, and the greater the pennanence and complexity of the
unit. the greater are the tasks and responsibilities allotted to its own
administration. The converse is equally true. Every administrative
structure haa its own internal political system, that is a system of
groups and individuals competing for power to decide certain
matters; and the more extensive and Less precisely defined the
authority content and roles of the administrative personnel, the
more developed will be its internal system of political competition.
Where the administration is charged simply with ruling, this internal
political competition is indistinguishable from the political
system of government, and it may be the source or object of rebellions,
palace revolts, and the like. In controlled administrative
systems, the units of such internal political competition may be
kinship groups, cliques, patron-client teams, religious, economic,
or other interest groups, or simply individual competitors for
promotion, prize, office, etc. ~n both these contexts the policy
decisions are contested by units defined byadministrative position.
The multiplicity ofpolitical objectives withwhich an administrative
structure presents its staff is closely related to the hierarchic
devolution ofauthority which defines that structure. In systems of
hierarchic authority, superordinate authority is conceived as power
by the subordinate, and i8 wught after as such. This conception of
superior authority reflects its capacity to act effectively in circumstances
outside the subordinate's control, notably of course on the
subordinate himself. Thesuperior's abilityto make decisions which
intimately affect his inferior is therefore regarded by the latter as
an index of the power attaching to the superior office, and is desired
by the subordinate for its own sake as well as for protective
or other instrumental ends. This inescapable byproduct of their
hierarchical organization partly explains the tendency of complex
governmental administrations to give priority to their own internal
problems as a prerequisite for their efficient operation, and indeed
for the maintenance ofthe structure itself.
Administrative action embodies the authority from which it
,derives, while political action embodies the power which is its focus
and source. But relations between the political and administrative
\eystems may also themselves form part of the content of policy•
.; Hence differences of policy with regard to the treatment of
'; official authority structures involve political competition and
rconflict, and may promote revolutionary action. Whether the
.1'. power which informs policy is or is not constitutional, policies
which involve extreme departures from the prevailing systems of
administration are correspondingly revolutionary in content:
limilarly policies which maintain these administrative systems and
Jtructures are to that extent conservative, whatever the constitu­
.tiona! character of the power behind them.
In this context it is also necessary to distinguish between the
;,'objects or ends of policy and the means. An extreme departure
"from prevailing policy normally involves fundamental changes of
~.. objectives or ends. Changes of means are usually instrwnental,
although on occasion they form objectives in their own right;
~:'wheresuch instrumental changes developwithout any revolutionary
;changesofpolicy aims, then although revolutionary intentions may
'be lacking, the consequences may be revolutionary none the less.
::The close interdependence of political and administrative relatioJl8
;within a governmental system implies that achange ineithersystem
~will normally promote changes within the other, and in this way
"chain reactions' may sometimes develop through which the system
f government as a whole may be radically transformed. For this
on, revolution is not the only process by which governmental
;.ystems are transformed, nor is it necessarily the most significant.
~ he normal forms of political competition may themselves pro­
)iuee a different system, and without rebellion or revolution, un­
, reseen developments may occur despite efforts to prevent it. On
other hand, where the ends and the means of political ado.
ation are identical with preceding practice, it would be a
__rious error to suppose that there is no policy and hence no
titical action. On general grounds it can be expected that the
·ntenance of a completely static order, that is, a literally peridentity,
is both a frequent object of policy, and one that
.-.nnot be realized except by continuous and highly diversified
:political action.
. A rebellion seeks to change the ruling personnel while maintain.