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6+ GOVERNMENT IN ZAZZAU<br />

household officials and the public orders were heavily buttressed<br />

by other factors, such as rank-order and precedence, functional<br />

differentiation, and especially, perhaps, by the promotional linkages.<br />

Through this promotional system, all holders ofsubordinate<br />

office including slaves were motivated to regard their present<br />

appointment as a stepping-stone to higher positions in which their<br />

economic independence wouW increase together with their rank<br />

and responsibilities, whether these were civil or military in character,<br />

or political or administrative in form. Of themselves these<br />

promotional arrangements coIl8iderahly reduced the dangers which<br />

faced the governmental structure through the development of an<br />

unbridled competition for economic reward among its officials.<br />

But the way in which the distribution of political and administrative<br />

functions was associated with this economic differentiation<br />

of offices was of equal significance for the continuity of the<br />

system.<br />

In Ahuja, as freemen the king's household officials were eligible<br />

for promotion firstly to the Tafl.lUna rank, and thence to the principal<br />

office of Madawaki: hut, so long as they remained household<br />

officials they were completely dependent on the king for official<br />

rewards. None the less, in M. Hassan's words, 'the whole country<br />

was theirs, as they appointed the other (i.e. public) officials'.l This<br />

implies that the household officials shared in the king's official<br />

income, and had no need of separate remuneration, since their<br />

control of appointments itself guaranteed their income. As noted<br />

above, the vote of these household officials was decisive in council,<br />

and their leader, the Sarkin Fada, had the power to veto proposals<br />

made by the Madawaki on behalf of the public orders. Only in<br />

cases of deadlock: between his public and household councils was<br />

the king free to act summarily; otherwise he was obliged to take<br />

counsel first with the household officials, and whether or not agreement<br />

was reached, in matters of public interest, with the public<br />

orders also. In this way the king couLd appeal to the public orders<br />

under the Madawaki. and the GaJadima for support against the<br />

advice of the household officials under the Sarkin Fada. At the<br />

same time, as M. Hassan tells us, the Madawaki and the Sarkin<br />

Fada would sometimes arrange privately beforehand to override<br />

the king with joint proposals.<br />

The position of the household officials in this political system<br />

1 M. Haesan, pe11Ional communication. See Appendix A.<br />

GOVERNMENT IN NINETEENTH~CENTURYABUJA 6s<br />

under their head, the Sarkin Fada, was certainly a strategic and<br />

noteworthy one. It cannot be explained simply in terms of a tripartite<br />

division of political power. In such a system agreement<br />

between two ofthese three political units would be both necessary<br />

and decisive for policy formation. But even within the tripartite<br />

political structure of Abuja there was room for a wide variety of<br />

alignments, consequent on the multiplicity of segmentary principles<br />

which entered into its constitution. Moreover, the :Madawaki's<br />

council coIl8isted of two orders, the rukuni and Tawuna,<br />

whereas the Sarkin Fada's consisted of only one. Yet, apart from<br />

the royal succession, we are informed that whatever the issue, the<br />

Sarkin Fada, as head of the household officials, had power to veto<br />

proposals by the public orders directly, and was indirectly able to<br />

thwart the king's policy. This means that the household officials<br />

exercised an inftuence over official appointments and also over<br />

promotions and dismissals, which had definite policy implications.<br />

Thus although the economic conditions under which they held<br />

their offices were apparently unrewarding, the order of household<br />

officials, as the dominant political order within the state, had the<br />

least need of such economic prescriptions, and may have enjoyed<br />

the greatest security of official tenure. None the less, despite their<br />

political dominance in council, these household officials were<br />

economically dependent on the throne, and the king, by agreement<br />

with the public orders under the Madawaki, could promote<br />

individual members of this household order out of their strategic<br />

position, or simply dismiss them from otlice. On the other hand,<br />

these household officials occupied positions which allowed them to<br />

secure their own appointments to higher offices of rawuna or<br />

rukuni rank. These promotions involved a certain loss of political<br />

power, but they also carried high rank and prestige, substantial<br />

administrative responsibilities, increases in official income and<br />

economic independence. To obtain these individual goals, the<br />

household officials, especially their leaders, had to maintain good<br />

relations with their counterparts in the public administration, and<br />

also to keep in favour with the king. In this way, the promotion<br />

of these household officials was contingent on restraint in the use<br />

of their privileged political position.<br />

Differential political power and administrative responsibilities<br />

were linked with this economic differentiation of office in a significant<br />

manner. Under the king, those offices which exercised

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