e - CIFAS

a6
GOVERNMENT IN ZAZZAU
roles to redefine, abolish, or reconstitute the former political system,
as well as the simple replacement ofpersonnel. Either of these
alternatives may endanger the atability of the pre-existing system,
and eitherofthese developments is likely in proportion to the overlap
of administrative and political functions within the system.
Hence the importance which is attached to the explicit differentiationand
mutual insulation of these activities within cenainsystems
of government, as a precondition of the continuity of these
systems: and hence also the critical analytic value ofthese differentiations,
and of the relations between the administrative and
political systems in the comparative study of government.
Al!. indicated above, administrative authority and structures are
differentiated from. political action by rules and procedures which
govern and detail the conditions of administrative action, its func~
tions and tasks. No comparable framework of roles positivdy defines
or limits the scope and functions of political activity. In
English law, this point is expressed in the principle that the Crown
cannot bind itself. In effect this means that Parliament cannot act
ultra wes, whereas administrative agents obviously can, frequently
do, and are often reprimanded for such action. The British rule
against civil servants indulging in political action is a simple
corollary of the preceding principle.
To point this up, let us consider briefly conditions such as
conquest, rebellion, or revolution. In any of these situations
governing power is appropriated on the basis of force. In all such
situations, the appropriation of power is illegitimate, in the sense
that it is inconsistent with the conditions of legitimacy which de~
fine thesystem ofgovenunentoverthrown. Inthe case ofconquest,
the governing power is appropriated by an external group, whose
rights to govern if previously admitted would have made the conquest
unnecessary. In the case of rebellion or revolution, the same
point holds, although the appropriators are themselves members of
the unit. In either of these events, governments are constituted on
bases which do not adhere to previous conditions oflegitimacy, but
do reflect the distributions of power. In either ofthese events, the
pre-existing authority structure may be retained or revised or replaced.
These situations show clearly how self-defeating it is to
conceive ofgovernment either in terms of authority or in terms of
legitimate power solely.
Such consequences follow from the fact that aU political action
" THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT a7
'{and any political system is, by its very nature as a mode ofcompeti­
",tion, inherently segmentary in process and form. Segmentation as
?tbccharacteristic way inwhich political relations are expressedand
·;';develop is implicit in the definition of these relations by the com­
:petition for power, and also in the definition of a political system
lISa system ofsuch competition. Competitionofthis sortnecessarily
involves the contraposition of co-ordinate units at any level, and
units are defined as co-ordinate by virtue of their competition.
The composition of competing political units varies widely from
one society to another, and this variation provides an important
reference point in the comparative study ofgovernmental systems,
as we shall set. Moreover, within any society, the composition of
co-ordinate political units will vary as a function of the issue,
occasion, and situation with respect to whichthey are mobilized, in
much the same way as happens in lineage systems where segmentary
organization and processes were first studied in detail directly.
As a general rule the more variable the constitution of segmentary
political units, the greater the degree of social differentiation, and
the more complex the system of government.
(li!) Centrali:ration and Decentralization
Political action has been defined in terms of policy-making processes,
and these are further defined by the fact that they involve
decisions which can neither be subject to authority nor allocated as
simple rights. Such processes provide a field within which administrative
and political systems often overlap. Under certain
conditions initially administrative functions may come to have a
primarily political significance in consequence of their policymaking
capacities. No code of administrative procedure can be
devised which wilt lay down in advance rules governing the actions
ofits agents under all possible circumstances; and no administrative
code can of itself guarantee faithful reports from subordinates, or
vigilant and impartial supervision by superiors. Inevitably, administration
is confronted by situations in which the administrator
must either act first and seek authority after, or enjoys opportunities
for ultra vires action which his superior may never know
fully about. 1 Inevitably, also, at any level of an administrative
1 This. includu the opportunity for Ildmini&tnrtive officeu to influ~ the
deciaions taken by thOBe who hold power. Indeed, the senior echelons of an
expanding bUIeIl-UCnlCY may lIOmetimes openly claim that their fLJnCtions include
the formation and guidance of policy.