private-schools-full-report

4. Outline and assessment of the evidence
there are also concerns about private sector provision being promoted through
collaboration without adequate regulation and quality controls. A positive unintended
consequence has been identified in the literature, that despite ineffective or negligible
enforcement, state regulation can set a benchmark for standards which may act as a proxy
for quality in the market.
Counter evidence
In some contexts an absence of regulation is noted. For example, in Malawi the Education
Act does not have any specific legislation governing the private sector and so there is no
current framework for regulation of private schools. Plans to engage with the Private
Schools Association of Malawi (PRISAM) to develop a basis for regulation and private sector
expansion have not yet been acted upon (Chimombo 2009).
However, the key finding across a range of countries is that there are severe difficulties
with enforcing existing regulations. Sommers (2013) reports negligible enforcement of
the national curriculum in private schools in Bangladesh, for example. Several authors
note the existence of a significant number of unregistered and unrecognised private
schools which are not covered by government regulations or closed down. For example,
Härmä and Adefisayo (2013) note that only 26 percent of private schools in Lagos, Nigeria
are government approved. This lack of enforcement is in some cases attributable to a lack
of sector knowledge and capacity in governments and agencies but there is also evidence
that regulations may be being set in an unrealistically stringent manner to provide
either a deterrent effect or to allow for rent-seeking.
In much of the literature the effects of state regulations are characterised as being fairly
minimal with private schools adopting informal mechanisms for achieving recognition and
avoiding regulation rather than complying with them. Srivastava (2008b) notes that in
India the regulations for private unaided schools require a much higher standard in terms
of infrastructure and teacher qualifications than is found in state schools and Härmä and
Adefisayo (2013) similarly note that some 40 percent of surveyed heads of private schools
in Lagos do not consider applying for government approved status due to the stringency of
requirements. Ohara (2012) notes examples of strategies used by school managers to avoid
regulations on teacher pay, while Srivastava (2008b) finds that all six of the government
recognised private schools surveyed did not meet the criteria for state recognition in
terms of infrastructure, teacher qualifications and fee levels. There also seems to be a
widespread acceptance of the fact that recognition can be, and is, acquired by bribery
and through political connections (Ohara 2012, 2013; Srivastava, 2008b). Similar issues are
also noted in the context of Lagos by Härmä and Adefisayo (2013) where approved schools
frequently do not meet the criteria for this status and government officials extort bribes
from the owners of unapproved schools in return for not closing them down. Some of the
literature suggests that officials may take a pragmatic approach to regulation in some
cases recognising that private schools are an important element in achieving education
strategies and understanding that an overly strict or unreasonable enforcement of
regulations may do more harm than good.
Supporting evidence
The available evidence indicates a history of limited and dysfunctional regulatory
engagement by government with the private sector. However, some studies (e.g. Rose
2010; Srivastava 2010) recognise that in principle a positive policy stance and effective
regulation are necessary to private school expansion. Another study has detected a move
in this direction in practice. Verger and VanderKaaij (2012) argue that in India the
existence of a more supportive government policy has facilitated the expansion of private
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