and our strategy, not sector earmarks; and ensuring thatour policy instruments are aligned in support of developmentobjectives.• Homeland Security: Homeland security traces itsroots to traditional and historic functions of governmentand society, such as civil defense, emergency response,law enforcement, customs, border patrol, and immigration.In the aftermath of 9/11 and the foundation of theDepartment of Homeland Security, these functions havetaken on new organization and urgency. Homeland security,therefore, strives to adapt these traditional functionsto confront new threats and evolving hazards. It is notsimply about government action alone, but rather aboutthe collective strength of the entire country. Our approachrelies on our shared efforts to identify and interdictthreats; deny hostile actors the ability to operate withinour borders; maintain effective control of our physicalborders; safeguard lawful trade and travel into and out ofthe United States; disrupt and dismantle transnationalterrorist, and criminal organiza¬tions; and ensure ournational resilience in the face of the threat and hazards.Taken together, these efforts must support a homelandthat is safe and secure from terrorism and other hazardsand in which American interests, aspirations, and way oflife can thrive.• Intelligence: Our country’s safety and prosperity dependon the quality of the intelligence we collect and theanalysis we produce, our ability to evaluate and share thisinformation in a timely manner, and our ability to counterintelligence threats. This is as true for the strategic intelligencethat informs executive decisions as it is for intelligencesupport to homeland security, state, local, andtribal govern¬ments, our troops, and critical national missions.We are working to better integrate the IntelligenceCommunity, while also enhancing the capabilities of ourIntelligence Community members. We are strengtheningour partnerships with foreign intelligence services andsustaining strong ties with our close allies. And we continueto invest in the men and women of the IntelligenceCommunity.• Strategic Communications: Across all of our efforts,effective strategic communications are essential to sustainingglobal legitimacy and supporting our policy aims.Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibilitythat must be fostered by a culture of communicationthroughout government. We must also be more effectivein our deliberate communication and engagement and doa better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances,and concerns of peoples—not just elites—aroundthe world. Doing so allows us to convey credible, consistentmessages and to develop effective plans, while betterunderstanding how our actions will be perceived. Wemust also use a broad range of meth¬ods for communicatingwith foreign publics, including new media.• The American People and the Private Sector: Theideas, values, energy, creativity, and resilience of our citizensare America’s greatest resource. We will support thedevelopment of prepared, vigilant, and engaged communitiesand underscore that our citizens are the heart of aresilient country. And we must tap the ingenuity outsidegovernment through strategic partnerships with the privatesector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations,and community-based organizations. Such partnershipsare critical to U.S. success at home and abroad, and wewill support them through enhanced opportunities forengagement, coordination, transparency, and informationsharing.22
12.3 Leadership and Systems ThinkingBy COL George E. Reed, USAOBJECTIVES:9. List three steps in the systems thinking approach.10. Identify barriers to our ability to use systems thinking.“‘For every problem there is a solution that issimple, neat – and wrong.’ This maxim hasbeen attributed at various times to MarkTwain, H.L. Mencken, and Peter Drucker as awake-up call to managers who mistakenlythink that making a change in just one part of acomplex problem will cure the ails of an entiresystem. Everyday management thinking toooften looks for straightforward cause andeffect relationships in problem solving thatignores the effect on, and feedback from, theentire system.”-Ron Zemke,writing in the February 2011 issue of TrainingLeaders operate in the realm of bewildering uncertaintyand staggering complexity. Today’s problems are rarelysimple and clear-cut. If they were, they would likelyalready have been solved by someone else. If not wellconsidered—and sometimes even when they are—today’ssolutions become tomorrow’s problems. Success in thecontemporary operating environment requires differentways of thinking about problems and organizations. Thisarticle introduces some concepts of systems thinking andsuggests that it is a framework that should be understoodand applied by leaders at all levels, but especially thosewithin the acquisition community. It is insufficient andoften counterproductive for leaders merely to act as goodcogs in the machine. Leaders perform a valuable servicewhen they discern that a venerated system or process hasoutlived its usefulness, or that it is operating as originallydesigned but against the organization’s overall purpose.Sometimes we forget that systems are created by people,based on an idea about what should happen at a givenpoint in time. A wise senior warrant officer referred tothis phenomenon as a BOGSAT—a bunch of guys sittingaround talking.SYSTEMS ENDUREAlthough times and circumstances may change, systemstend to endure. We seem to be better at creating new systemsthan changing or eliminating existing ones. SociologistRobert K. Merton coined the term “goal displacement”to describe what happens when complying with bureaucraticprocesses becomes the objective rather than focusingon organizational goals and values. When that happens,systems take on a life of their own and seem immune tocommon sense. Thoughtless application of rules and procedurescan stifle innovation, hamper adaptivity, anddash creativity. Wholesale disregard of rules and procedures,however, can be equally disastrous.When members of an organization feel as though theymust constantly fight the system by circumventing establishedrules and procedures, the result can be cynicism ora poor ethical climate. Because of their experience andposition, leaders are invested with the authority to interveneand correct or abandon malfunctioning systems. Atthe very least, they can advocate for change in a way thatthose with less positional authority cannot. Leaders at alllevels should, therefore, be alert to systems that drivehuman behavior inimical to organizational effectiveness.It is arguable that military organizations placing a premiumon tradition and standardization are predisposed togoal displacement. We need leaders, therefore, who cansee both the parts and the big picture; to this end some ofthe concepts of systems thinking are useful.The Department of Defense is a large and complex socialsystem with many interrelated parts. As with any systemof this type, when changes are made to one part, manyothers are affected in a cascading and often unpredictablemanner. Thus, organizational decisions are fraught withsecond- and third-order effects that result in unintendedconsequences. “Fire and forget” approaches are rarelysufficient and are sometimes downright harmful. Extensiveplanning—combined with even the best of intentions—does not guarantee success. Better prediction is not theanswer, nor is it possible. There are so many interactionsin complex systems that no individual can be expected toforecast the impact of even small changes that are amplifiedover time.GETTING BEYOND THE MACHINEMETAPHORIn her book Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, andPostmodern Perspectives, Mary Jo Hatch provides anintroduction to general systems theory that is useful in23
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TABLE 1:FUNCTIONS OF GENERAL MANAGE
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3. Career System. The model corpora
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islative charter - the Clean Air Ac
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In controlling performance, Chapin
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14.4 Basic Air Force DoctrineAF Doc
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earthquake-stricken Haiti. The worl
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Command and ControlCommand and cont
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14.5 Should the US Maintain the Nuc
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15CHAPTER 15ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
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Review. This action strives to unco
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gram will serve and then having the
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Many years of working with change p
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At the least, the areas of concern
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15.4 Developing an Innovative Cultu
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTSIn an ever-chang
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global issues. Businesses that poss
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— Sees the big picture—the shif
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16CHAPTER 16STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
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16.1 Principles of Strategic Commun
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16.3 Negotiating Effectively Across
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hidden areas can act as cultural ho
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Public diplomacy is surely about mu
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Photo courtesy of the familyThe LEA
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THE CADET OATHI pledge that I will