it to influence physical players in air and space. Becauseof the nonphysical nature of information, placing it in cyberspacegives it instant, global availability to all users ofthat cyberspace. We often cannot determine whether informationwe obtain from a source in cyberspace is originalor has been copied from somewhere else withincyberspace.Cyberspace—particularly the Internet—is a global phenomenon.Information that the United States does notwish to reveal may be available through sources locatedin countries outside its purview. We cannot necessarilycontrol all information, nor can we necessarily remove apiece of information. We can only regulate informationwithin our own span of control.Cyberspace Brings the Front Line to the Front DoorCensus and survey data indicate that 54 million householdsin the United States have at least one personal computerand that roughly two-thirds of Americans activelyuse the Internet in some fashion. 12 Fifty-seven millionemployed Americans—62 percent of the workforce— reportusing a computer at work, 98 percent of whom haveaccess to electronic mail. 13 Of those, the majority reportstrusting the content of electronic mail when it contains atleast one item of personal information other than firstname. We can reasonably assume that these statistics generallyrepresent the <strong>Air</strong> Force workforce, given the 15 millionpersonal computers in the Department of Defense’sinventory, combined with the leadership’s vision of a netcentricforce. 14We can access public cyberspace literally from within ourown homes or places of employment. For the first time inhistory, we have a vast amount of information at our fingertips.Also for the first time, we have the front line of abattle at our front door. Prior to cyberspace’s rise in popularity,the main participants in military operations weresoldiers physically engaged in conflict. News reports thatportrayed the results of military action to civilians athome dealt with events happening outside the country’sborders. With cyberspace within easy reach of ordinarycitizens, those who wish to use it for ill gain have directentrée into the home. This situation is particularlypoignant since empirical studies have shown that computers,at home or otherwise, are probed for security vulnerabilitiesduring the first 20 minutes of theirconnection to a public network. 15Contrary to the prevailing picture painted by the media,“war” in cyberspace will not likely manifest itself as anelectronic Pearl Harbor, causing massive destruction.More probably, cyberwar will take the form of influencerather than lethality. Cyber warriors will not destroy infrastructurebecause that would be self-defeating, particularlywithin the United States. Instead, they will morelikely obtain information they can use to manipulate happeningsin the physical world to their advantage.Those who choose to operate in cyberspace have a numberof asymmetrical advantages. First, the “battlefield” islarge and easy to hide in. Second, the effects of attacks aredisproportionate to their costs. Using cyberspace is neithermaterial- or capital-intensive. Individuals can accessit with inexpensive computers, free software, and consumer-readycommunication equipment. They canlaunch attacks from across the globe almost with impunitybecause of the difficulty of determining the exactorigin of the attack or the identity of the attacker. Third,the one-sided nature of cyber attacks forces potential victimsinto assuming a defensive posture. The victim curtailshis computer and communication services to withinwhat his governance structure deems “acceptable,” basedon its perceptions of the prevailing dangers—real or not.In case of an attack, the victim probably will not launchan in-kind offensive action since, even if he can identifythe attacker, he probably lacks the computer infrastructureto make a counterattack worthwhile.CONCLUSIONPerhaps the greatest lesson we can derive from the <strong>Air</strong>Force’s revised mission statement is that it warns all <strong>Air</strong>menof the reality of cyberspace. The statement requiresus to understand the implications of an information-reliantmilitary. It also challenges us to look for ways to bestuse cyberspace and to understand that we can attain“throw weight” by finding new ways to make the best useof cyberspace technology.B. H. Liddell Hart’s admonition that a “strategist shouldthink in terms of paralyzing, not killing” remains as relevanttoday as it ever was. 16 Although Liddell Hart spoke ofparalyzing armies of people and the economies of states,his words nevertheless apply to the individual <strong>Air</strong>man.Never in history have so many people found themselvesintimately tied to a weapon system—cyberspace—that islimited only by the human imagination.NOTES1. William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York: Ace Books, 1984).2. Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium Is the Message(New York: Random House, 1967).3. Ibid.; John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions TransformingOur Lives (New York: Warner Books, 1982); Alvin Toffler, TheThird Wave (New York: Morrow, 1980); and Don Tapscott, The DigitalEconomy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 6.4. Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 18.96
5. John G. Grimes, “From the DoD CIO: The Net-Centric InformationEnterprise,” CrossTalk: The Journal of Defense Software Engineering19, no. 7 (July 2006): 4; Managing Knowledge @ Work: AnOverview of Knowledge Management (Washington, DC: Chief InformationOfficers Council, 2001), 7; Dr. David S. Alberts, DefensiveInformation Warfare (Washington, DC: National DefenseUniversity Press, August 1996),http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201996/Defense%20Information%20Warfare%20-%20Aug%2096/index.html; and Michael Vlahos, “Entering the Infosphere,”Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1998): 497–525.6. Tim Jordan, “Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace,”Internet Society, http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/3i/3i_1.htm.7. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Power and Interdependencein the Information Age,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October1998): 89–92.8. “Web Worldwide,” ClickZ Stats, http://www.clickz.com/show-Page.html?page=stats/web_worldwide.9. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “List of Social NetworkingWebsites,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_social_networking_websites.10. “Israeli Aggression on Lebanon,” Moqawama.org,http://www.moqawama.org/aggression/eindex.php.11. Maura Conway, “Cybercortical Warfare: The Case ofHizbollah.org” (paper prepared for presentation at the EuropeanConsortium for Political Research [ECPR] Joint Sessions of Workshops,Edinburgh, United Kingdom, 23 March–2 April 2003),http://www2.scedu.unibo.it/roversi/SocioNet/Conway.pdf.12. Home Computers and Internet Use in the United States: August2002 (Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, US CensusBureau, September 2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p23-207.pdf; and “U.S. Internet Adoption to Slow,”ClickZ Stats, http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3587496#table1.13. “Email at Work,” Pew Internet and American Life Project, 8 December2002, http://www.pewinternet.org/ reports/toc.asp?Report=79.14. Army Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, 27 August1996, 14.15. Lorraine Weaver, “They’re Out to Get Us! The Cyber Threat tothe Telecommuter, Small Office / Home Office (SOHO), and HomeUser” (presentation to the 14th Annual Systems and SoftwareTechnology Conference, Salt Lake City, UT, 1 May 2002),http://www.sstc-online .org/Proceedings/2002/SpkrPDFS/Wed-Tracs/p1371.pdf.16. B. H. Liddell Hart, Paris: Or the Future of War (New York: GarlandPublishing, 1975), 40–41.ABOUT THE AUTHORLieutenant Colonel Umphress is an individual mobilizationaugmentee at the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Researchand Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and an associateprofessor in the Department of Computer Science and SoftwareEngineering at Auburn University.From: Lt Col David A. Umphress, “Cyberspace: The New <strong>Air</strong> andSpace?,” <strong>Air</strong> & Space Power Journal (Spring 2007): 50-55. Used withpermission.97
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THE CADET OATHI pledge that I will