LEARN TO LEAD - Civil Air Patrol

The late W. T. Grant Company is a recent, vivid exampleof the bottom right quadrant of the chart. It was aloser because it did not have a clear idea of what it shouldbe in the future and had inadequate operations plans. Thefollowing commentaries from Business Week attest toGrant’s lack of direction:Worse yet, early on Grant seemingly could not makeup its mind what kind of store it was. “There was a lotof dissension within the company whether we shouldgo the K Mart route or go after the Ward and Penneyposition,” says a former executive. “Ed Staly and LouLustenberger were at loggerheads over the issue, withthe upshot being we took a position between the twoand that consequently stood for nothing.”In addition to its lack of direction, Grant’s day-to-dayresults suffered from ineffective operations:From 1963 to 1973 Grant opened 612 stores and expanded91 others, with the bulk of the increase startingin 1968 under the guidance of president RichardW. Mayer and chairman Edward Staley. “The expansionprogram placed a great strain on the physical andhuman capability of the company to cope with theprogram,” says Chairman James G. Kendrick. “Thesewere all large stores – 6 million to 7 million squarefeet per year – and the expansion of our managementorganization just did not match the expansion of ourstores.” Adds a former operations executive: “Ourtraining program couldn’t keep up with the explosionof stores, and it didn’t take long for the mediocrity tobegin to show.”In the upper left quadrant, Sears, Roebuck & Companyis typical of a “winner.” With a clear image of what itshould be in the future, it has also been eminently successfulin its operations. While Sears has had its share of troublerecently, over the years it has consistently demonstratedthe ability to anticipate needed changes in direction andto organize quickly and efficiently in order to make thosechanges.The majority of organizations probably fit in the othertwo quadrants of the chart. For example, many conglomeratescould be placed in the lower left quadrant becausethey are characterized by well defined growth and financialobjectives and ineffective operations. Such organizationstend to see themselves as diverse giants that providea wide range of products and services. However, the carefullythought-out grand scheme has often been marred bypoor operational planning, with resultant over-expansionand inability to manage.The Swiss watch industry is typical of the upper rightquadrant of companies. Superbly efficient at producingand marketing, the industry was overtaken by changes intechnology. The Swiss watchmakers’ strategy was inadequateto help them anticipate external threats to theirsurvival.In the United States, strong operations historicallyhave been more important than clear strategic thinking.In the past, many U.S. organizations survived even whenthey lacked a clear sense of strategic direction. After all,with unlimited resources, skilled labor, and a large, homogeneousmarket, who needed to think much aboutwhat kind of a business they wanted to be in the future?Now, however, with diminishing resources, worldcompetition, and rising costs, even the most efficient operationsmay no longer survive the handicap of operatingwithout a clear, strategic direction. Today’s companymust formulate a clear strategy from which effectiveoperations flow.LONG-RANGE PLANNING: ROADBLOCK TOSTRATEGIC THINKINGSince strategy provides the framework or picture ofwhat the organization wants to be at some future point intime, it must precede and provide the basis for operationalplanning. Most long-range planning and all shortrangeplanning are operational – they define the “how.”Paradoxically, the real danger to an organization’sstrategic thinking often comes from its own long-rangeplanning. From our research on strategy, conducted inover 200 major American , Canadian, and Europeanfirms, and our strategic-planning consulting with thechief executives of some 75 of these firms, we have seenthat primary emphasis on long-range planning impedesstrategic thinking. It is ironic that the process on whichexecutives rely most heavily to prepare for the future isdoing the most damage, but here is how it happens:1. Long-range planning invariably predicts the organization’sfuture by extrapolation from the present. Projectingfrom current activities straitjackets the future. Startingwith a base of current products and markets makes it difficultto incorporate the new and to eliminate the old inthe light of a changing external environment.2. Theoreticians who urge the establishment of long-rangeobjectives as a starting point for long-range planning fail torecognize this fact: Most managers do not set objectivesthat define their future because they lack a process to assistthem. Without practical tools, managers are forced tobuild their futures on the shaky foundations of the projectionsinstead of on a clear definition of what they wanttheir organizations to be. Where long-range objectives doexist, they are usually set in financial terms. Plans arethen developed down the line and are force-fit into thefinancial constraints imposed by top management. Topexecutives review these plans and then congratulate28