Apache Campaigns - Fort Huachuca - U.S. Army

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rear probably all in.
From the side of attack by Cav. their position could not have been carried by assault by
any force without probably greater loss than I had men and Indians in my command. Rafferty’s
troop was in the lead, ...and moved for nearly a mile at a charge, with men deploying, up to,
through their herd and over ground which we soon learned was swept by fire of enemy from
opposite directions. A volley was delivered into his troop at Point blank range—so near that I
plainly saw the hostile countenance as they recovered arms and dropped out of sight behind
the rocks. I had turned at the moment to ride across to the left where Toney had deployed my
troop to see what he was firing at, I soon found out that he had all he could attend to. The
volley fired at Rafferty’s Troop, instead of emptying half his saddles, as I expected to see, was
aimed too high and did little or no execution. I found that Toney had displayed excellent
judgement, but had met with a similar experience with Rafferty. Both troops were quickly but
steadily withdrawn and held on open ground, dismounted at ranges varying from four to eight
hundred yards for the next six hours which was spent in holding hostiles where they were, and
vain efforts to dislodge them.
Their fire was habitually over our heads. They fired for hours, at intervals, from points
which I supposed occupied by our Scouts, who were virtually among the same rocks with
them, while a detached spur with mostly open ground for with four or five hundred yards
about it which had been burned off some weeks before and from which I saw fully 125 Indians
move out, as we drew off about noon. Effectually held my little force of about 50 Cavalrymen
at bay. As we rode in upon the hostile camp I supposed that we had the whole concern, and
for a few minutes paid little attention to their herd, which was mostly grazing within easy rifle
range, but when a few men were detached by my order from Rafferty’s Troop (and Toney did
the same) to round up their stock, we soon found that the trouble had just begun. Toney sent
a courier from the left back to pack train for ammunition and it arrived—mules and packers on
the jump—just in the nick of time.
After receiving a note from —, and having an interview with Mills learned how much
ammunition was left and definitely the position of hostiles, there seemed nothing more to be
done but to let go, if we could. Sent Sieber to see what Scouts could do, if anything. Mills
expressed confidence in ability of Scouts to get out, and I decided to withdraw and go home,
about which I think there was perfect unanimity among officers, soldiers and Scouts.
While Scouts were getting out, the Cav. was watered, Troop at a time—one replacing
the other on skirmish line—at holes to the south, direction that hostiles wanted to go. Pack
train and captured stock moved around slowly, to the North and West. The Scouts, by a
detour, moved to the packs in our rear. After moving off, probably half a mile, the hostiles
swarmed out of the rocks, some of them catching up what stock was left, others moving up
gulches into Hatchet Mts. When it was discovered that two boxes of ammunition had been left
on our previous skirmish line, by one of the packers who preferred target practice to packing.
Toney immediately deployed my Troop, returned as prettily as on drill to less than six hundred
yards of Indian stronghold, some of hostiles in mean time running back to it—had the ammunition
picked up, packed on a mule and brought off without a shot being fired. I was then
satisfied that the hostiles had no further immediate use for us and were glad enough to cry
quit.
I knew nothing of any help within a hundred miles—knew I was some distance in
Mexico—had reported fact of courier being sent to stop pursuit across line last fall, staring us
HUACHUCA ILLUSTRATED