Linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank: - Jerusalem Center For ...

There were three phases to the Roadmap. In each phasethe parties were expected to perform their obligationsin parallel, unless otherwise stated. Progress under theRoadmap required and depended upon the good faithefforts of the parties and their compliance with each oftheir obligations. Phase I of the Roadmap was directedat ending terror and violence, normalizing Palestinianlife, and building Palestinian institutions. Phase II wasa transition phase, wherein efforts were to be focusedon creating an independent Palestinian State withprovisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, basedon a new constitution, as a step towards a permanentstatus settlement. As part of this process, there wasto be implementation of prior agreements to enhancemaximum territorial contiguity. This suggests thatprovisions of safe passage in prior agreements were tobe implemented in Phase II of the Roadmap. Finally,Phase III dealt with a Permanent Status Agreement andthe End of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict.obligations. 132 Similar sentiments were expressedby Ariel Sharon in September 2005, when he said that“[t]he State of Israel is committed to the Roadmap.” 133Further, none of the parties involved have renounced,either expressly or tacitly, the provisions of the Roadmapor the Roadmap in its entirety.The General Outline of Sharon’s Disengagement Planwas made public in April 2004. The main aspects of thisplan were the evacuation of the Gaza Strip, including allexisting Israeli towns and villages, and the evacuation ofcertain areas in the West Bank, including four villagesand all military installations. 134 Post-disengagement,Israel entered into an agreement with the Palestiniansconcerning the Rafah crossing on the Gaza-Egypt border.In this agreement, Israel not only committed herselfto an international crossing point on the Gaza-Egyptborder, but to facilitating the movement of goods andpeople between the Palestinian Territories.page 24Subsequent to theRoadmap’s proposal, thenIsraeli Prime MinisterAriel Sharon formulatedthe Disengagement Plan,which he believed createdan opportunity for advancingtowards peace in accordancewith the Roadmap.The Agreement Document on Movement and Access fromand to Gaza, dated November 15, 2005, speaks not ofsafe passage, but of convoys. The parties agreed to theestablishment of bus convoys for transit of people andtruck convoys for transit of goods. There is an importantreservation in the Agreement Document on Movementand Access from and to Gaza: it is to be “understood thatsecurity is a prime and continuing concern for Israel andthat appropriate arrangements to ensure security will beadopted.” 135 This provision is widely phrased, such that itis difficult to determine how the link between Gaza andthe West Bank will be implemented, and whether in fact itis still the same as the safe passage agreed to previously.Ariel Sharon attached fourteen reservations to hisacceptance of the Roadmap. Despite such reservations,both sides accepted the content of the Roadmap inprinciple and committed themselves to its realization.Although the timetable set by the Roadmap has not beencomplied with, the document is relevant in light of thefact that both parties and international bodies still referto it. For example, in December 2005 then Secretary-General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, called for the redoublingof efforts by the respective parties to meet their RoadmapDespite Israel’s commitment to bus convoys operatingbetween Gaza and the West Bank by December 15, 2005,this promise has not been actualized. This is due to afailure on the part of the PA to fulfill their commitmentsunder the Rafah Agreement. The agreement requiredthat the PA prevent the movement of weapons andexplosives from Egypt into Gaza. Yet, large amountsof weapons and explosives have in fact flowed in fromSinai. 136 Moreover, terrorists have been allowed toenter Gaza through the Rafah border with Egypt, as