page 52wander until it is time to return.” Thus, it appears thateven in <strong>the</strong> hostile Middle East, non-contiguous states,such as Israel for <strong>the</strong> first two decades of its existence,can be viable.Some states remain discontiguous to <strong>the</strong>present. Examples of current non-contiguousstates that are none<strong>the</strong>less viable include:• Angola is separated from its oil-rich, 158 mile-longCabinda Province by <strong>the</strong> Democratic Republic of <strong>the</strong>Congo. 293• Russia maintains <strong>the</strong> Oblast of Kaliningrad, which isa non-contiguous enclave surrounded by Lithuania,Poland, and <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea. 294• Azerbaijan includes <strong>the</strong> exclave of <strong>the</strong> NaxcivanAutonomous Republic, which is separated fromAzerbaijan-proper by Armenia (an unresolved disputeexists between Azerbaijan and Armenia over <strong>the</strong>Nagorno-Karabakh region). 295• Brunei consists of two territories, physically separatedby Malesia. 296• East Timor is separated from its Oecussi (Ambeno)region on <strong>the</strong> northwest portion of <strong>the</strong> island of Timorby Indonesia. 297• Oman controls <strong>the</strong> strategic port of MusandamPeninsula, although it is separated by territorybelonging to <strong>the</strong> United Arab Emirates. 298• Argentina is separated from its sou<strong>the</strong>rn region ofUshuaia by Chilean territory. 299• The United States is separated from its state of Alaskaby approximately 500 miles of Canadian territory. 300• The sou<strong>the</strong>rn region of Croatia is separated from <strong>the</strong>rest of Croatia by a 16-mile stretch of Bosnian coast.The fact that <strong>the</strong>re were and are non-contiguous states,which are viable, appears to militate against <strong>the</strong> callfor a territorially contiguous Palestinian State as aprerequisite for its viability. The state, it appears, couldfunction and maintain a separate existence <strong>with</strong>out suchcontiguity.ConclusionConventional wisdom insists that a territorial link between<strong>Gaza</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> -- whe<strong>the</strong>r sovereign or not -- isessential for <strong>the</strong> existence of a viable Palestinian State.Thus, safe passage is called for to link <strong>Gaza</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong><strong>Bank</strong>. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> need for a territorial link of some sortis often imbedded in <strong>the</strong> call for a viable PalestinianState, <strong>the</strong> premise being that a non-contiguous statecannot be viable. This monograph’s analysis revealsthat <strong>the</strong> lack of a link between separated territories doesnot affect whe<strong>the</strong>r a new political community should berecognized as a state under international law. In addition,based on past and present international practice, a statedoes not possess an inherent right to a link between itsgeographically distinct areas. In particular this may beapplied to <strong>the</strong> sovereign link called for by <strong>the</strong> Palestiniansbetween <strong>Gaza</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>.Not<strong>with</strong>standing conventional wisdom, <strong>the</strong> need for sucha link is questionable. One generally thinks that at <strong>the</strong>very least <strong>the</strong> Palestinians need to be able to transportgoods between <strong>the</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>Strip</strong> and <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> for <strong>the</strong>irstate to be viable. However, this is not <strong>the</strong> case. First,<strong>the</strong>re were convoys, discussed above, which affect <strong>the</strong>movement of goods from <strong>Gaza</strong> to <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>, andfrom <strong>the</strong>re to Jordan. Interestingly, this was in usefor ten years, despite <strong>the</strong> absence of any safe passageregime. Second, being a member of <strong>the</strong> Arab League ofStates and a signatory to <strong>the</strong> Arab Transit Agreement of1977, ‘Palestine’ has <strong>the</strong> right of free transit across <strong>the</strong>territories of all Arab countries that are parties to <strong>the</strong>Agreement. Both Egypt and Jordan are signatories to<strong>the</strong> Agreement. They are <strong>the</strong>refore under an obligation toexempt Palestinian goods in transit from customs duties,taxes and o<strong>the</strong>r such charges. 301 This would surelybe preferable to a safe passage <strong>with</strong> its many securitychecks, customs and duties. This has not been fullycapitalized upon, and while “<strong>the</strong> right of <strong>the</strong> Palestinians<strong>with</strong> regard to transit transport is practiced” it is done ona “very exceptional basis.” 302 There is no reason for thisnot to be capitalized upon in as much as <strong>the</strong> Arab statesprofess <strong>the</strong>ir commitment to an economically successfulPalestinian State. Thus, <strong>the</strong> need for safe passage isquestionable.
Not only is <strong>the</strong> need for Palestinian safe passagequestionable, but also <strong>the</strong> legal basis of <strong>the</strong> demand isdubious.International law does notrequire territorial contiguity.Likewise contiguity is not arequirement for statehood;not under <strong>the</strong> traditionalcriteria for statehood, nor interms of modern criteria thathave arisen as a result ofdevelopments in <strong>the</strong> field ofinternational law.Not only is such a link -- be it sovereign or not -- notrequired of a state by international law, but it is alsonot granted to states as a right under international law.Both past and present international practice confirm thatstates made up of geographically distinct areas have noinherent right to a special link connecting those areas, andin particular, a sovereign link. This applies to <strong>the</strong> Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well. While <strong>the</strong> largely defunctinterim Oslo Agreements mentioned <strong>the</strong> creation of safepassage, none of <strong>the</strong>se eight agreements conferred aright to safe passage. Perhaps more importantly, U.N.Security Council Resolution 242, <strong>the</strong> foundation of anysolution to <strong>the</strong> conflict, does not call for safe passage orconfer a right to safe passage.Thus, under international law, territorial contiguity isnot a prerequisite for statehood. Therefore, should <strong>the</strong>Palestinians have non-contiguous territory, this wouldbe no bar to statehood. In fact, a bar to statehood for‘Palestine’ might arise, but not because its territorywould be non-contiguous. Despite <strong>the</strong>ir numerous alliesand admirers, ‘Palestine’ may not satisfy <strong>the</strong> criteriafor statehood because its elected leaders utterly fail toexercise effective government, or exercise even nominalcontrol over <strong>the</strong> Palestinian Territories.Should <strong>the</strong>Palestinians restore and sustain law and order in <strong>Gaza</strong>and <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>, <strong>the</strong> authors see no reason why <strong>the</strong>ycould not create a viable, non-contiguous state.Therefore, those who assert that Israel is obliged byinternational law to create such a passage are whollymistaken or misled.There is no such obligation onIsrael. Out of humanitarian concern Israel could chooseto create such passage, but it is in no way obliged to do so.Undeniably Israel’s security concerns militate against herdoing so. As demonstrated above, Israel is situated in anacutely threatening region <strong>with</strong> both states and terroristorganizations calling for and planning conventional andeven genocidal attacks aimed at obliterating or drivingout its Jewish population.Should Israel choose to create a safe passage, sheneed not transfer sovereignty over such passage to<strong>the</strong> Palestinians. Indeed, <strong>the</strong> concept of internationalservitudes urges her to retain sovereignty over <strong>the</strong>passage itself.The legal concept of internationalservitudes also entitles her to terminate <strong>the</strong> use of suchpassage should <strong>the</strong>re be a violation of <strong>the</strong> treaty thatcreates such an arrangement, or should <strong>the</strong> Palestinianstacitly or expressly renounce such a treaty.This isimportant: were <strong>the</strong> Palestinians to comply <strong>with</strong> <strong>the</strong>terms of <strong>the</strong> treaty until <strong>the</strong> first day of its implementationand <strong>the</strong>n breach <strong>the</strong> treaty by, for example, smugglingIranian missiles or Hezbollah terrorists <strong>the</strong> length of <strong>the</strong>safe passage, <strong>the</strong>n Israel would no longer remain boundby any such commitments.Moreover, and asimportantly, internationallaw justifies Israel’s retainingcontrol over <strong>the</strong> crossingpoints, in light of its right toself-defense and its duty toprotect its citizens.page 53