Linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank: - Jerusalem Center For ...
Linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank: - Jerusalem Center For ...
Linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank: - Jerusalem Center For ...
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page 42and <strong>the</strong> oil pipeline running to <strong>the</strong> Red Sea port of Eilat. 235On February 14, 2006, eight Qassam rockets were firedat <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong>ern Negev, <strong>with</strong> one exploding close to astrategic installation in <strong>the</strong> Ashkelon industrial zone. Thethreat this capability poses could wreak havoc: NationalInfrastructure Ministry officials told <strong>the</strong> <strong>Jerusalem</strong> Postthat if fired accurately, Qassam rockets had <strong>the</strong> abilityto shut down <strong>the</strong> Ashkelon power plant, which provideselectricity to half <strong>the</strong> country, causing “severe damageto infrastructure and human lives.” 236 Moreover, beingcloser to <strong>the</strong> Israeli border has enabled terrorists from<strong>Gaza</strong> to reach, as mentioned above, <strong>the</strong> major coastal cityof Ashkelon. This is especially so <strong>with</strong> reports by ShinBet Director Diskin that Fatah smuggled seven to tenmissiles <strong>with</strong> a range of nine to eighteen miles into <strong>the</strong><strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>Strip</strong> prior to disengagement. These missiles canreach approximately three times far<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> Qassamrockets that terrorists are currently using, and could put<strong>the</strong> major Israeli port city of Ashdod <strong>with</strong>in firing range. 237Additionally, Brigadier General Yossi Kooperwasser, Headof IDF Military Intelligence Research, warned that, “It isvery possible that in <strong>the</strong> coming months <strong>the</strong> Palestinianorganizations will succeed in extending <strong>the</strong> Qassamrange.” 238 However, <strong>the</strong>se facts pale in significance whencompared <strong>with</strong> <strong>the</strong> imminent possibility of safe passageand <strong>the</strong> smuggling of rockets and such weapons into <strong>the</strong><strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> via <strong>the</strong> safe passage.Some might argue that<strong>the</strong> possibility of peaceeliminates threats ofterrorism to <strong>the</strong> Israelipopulation centers andstrategic Israeli interests.However, this does notappear to be <strong>the</strong> case basedon <strong>the</strong> historic responsesof <strong>the</strong> Palestinian people topeace initiatives.Indeed, on December 26, 2005, three Palestinian groups,one of which belongs to <strong>the</strong> mainstream Fatah factionof PA President Abu Mazen, 239 threatened to continue<strong>the</strong>ir attacks on Israel. They claimed to have longrangemissiles, capable of reaching more Israeli townsand cities than in <strong>the</strong> past, and one of <strong>the</strong> groups saidthat it has developed a rocket <strong>with</strong> a range of 9.3 miles.Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> groups claim that <strong>the</strong>y possess RussianmanufacturedGrad missiles smuggled into <strong>the</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>Strip</strong>from Egypt. These missiles have a range of approximately15 miles. The missiles, also known as BM-21, are 4.80in (122-mm caliber) in diameter. 240 These missiles wereclearly intended for military use, and not for attacks onvulnerable civilian population centers.When asked whe<strong>the</strong>r Grad missiles had indeed beensmuggled into <strong>the</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>Strip</strong> from Egypt, an unnamedPalestinian official said he did not rule out <strong>the</strong>possibility that such weapons had been smuggled fromEgypt. 241 This failure on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> PA to meet <strong>the</strong>commitments <strong>the</strong>y made in <strong>the</strong> negotiations on <strong>the</strong> Rafahcrossing bodes poorly for <strong>the</strong> future Palestinian State’scommitments to peace. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> importation of suchweapons into <strong>Gaza</strong> from Egypt increases <strong>the</strong> probabilitythat <strong>the</strong>y will be smuggled via <strong>the</strong> proposed safe passagefrom <strong>the</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>Strip</strong> to <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>. The improvedweaponry would enable Palestinians in <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> toreach additional Israeli population centers.Thus, not only will <strong>the</strong> threat of smuggling be increased by<strong>the</strong> creation of safe passage, but <strong>the</strong> threat posed by <strong>the</strong>firing of rockets from <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> will be augmented.It does not appear that <strong>the</strong>se threats will subside in <strong>the</strong>near future. In fact, <strong>the</strong> threats posed are enhanced byimproved technology and increased rocket range. Thisconfirms <strong>the</strong> need for defensible borders, and raisesserious security concerns over any future safe passagethat is agreed to by <strong>the</strong> parties.To appreciate <strong>the</strong> threat that will be posed, it is importantto have a basic knowledge of <strong>the</strong> kind of weaponry that<strong>the</strong> Palestinians currently possess as well as thoseweapons that Palestinians could possess in <strong>the</strong> future.