III. Israel’s Security ConsiderationsA. Israel’s Right to Self-DefenseB. Israel’s Need for Defensible BordersC. Have Technological and Political Developments Made Defensible Borders Obsolete?D. Does Progress in <strong>the</strong> Peace Process Diminish <strong>the</strong> Threat of Terrorism?3636373940page 4IV. Viability of a Palestinian StateA. “Viable Statehood” in ContextB. Terms Defined: “Viability” and “Viable”C. Legal Criteria for Statehood1. A Defined Territory2. O<strong>the</strong>r Criteriaa. A Permanent Populationb. Governmentc. A Capacity to Enter into Relations <strong>with</strong> O<strong>the</strong>r Statesd. Independencee. Modern Developments in International LawD. Examples of Viable Non-Contiguous States444444464647474747484848Conclusion52Notes56JCPA Publications64
Executive SummaryOn March 27, 2007, U.S. Secretary of State CondoleezzaRice reiterated her call for a “viable” Palestinianstate. Before a viable Palestinian state can come intoexistence, <strong>the</strong> Palestinian Authority and Israel mustcome to certain agreements. It is understood that issuessuch as <strong>the</strong> political status of <strong>Jerusalem</strong>, <strong>the</strong> questionof refugees, Jewish settlements, borders, and securityarrangements locally and against long-range missiles(and weapons of mass destruction) are fundamentalelements in any political agreement between Israel and<strong>the</strong> Palestinians. The idea of a territorial link between<strong>the</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>Strip</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>, commonly called<strong>the</strong> issue of “safe passage,” is often overlooked. In <strong>the</strong>opinion of <strong>the</strong> authors this additional disagreementmust be addressed if <strong>the</strong> peace process is ever to reacha successful conclusion. Safe passage, in turn, raiseslegal, economic, and security concerns for Israel as wellas for <strong>the</strong> Palestinians.International law, traditional and modern, positsthat to be recognized as a state an entity must meetcertain requirements. One is <strong>the</strong> need for a definedterritory, although <strong>the</strong>re is no prescribed minimumsize of <strong>the</strong> territory. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, it is not a requirementthat <strong>the</strong> boundaries of <strong>the</strong> territory be fixed or certain.Accordingly, alterations to a state’s territory, whe<strong>the</strong>rby increase or decrease, do not affect <strong>the</strong> identity of <strong>the</strong>state or compromise its existence. 1What is vital to note is that <strong>the</strong> criterion of a definedterritory does not require that <strong>the</strong> state possessgeographical unity. Stated in <strong>the</strong> positive, a state mayconsist of disconnected territorial areas. Thus scoresof states are comprised of a mainland and islands, suchas Australia. In addition, and of particular relevance tothis monograph, a state may be comprised of separatedterritories between which lies territory of a foreignsovereign entity. <strong>For</strong> example, <strong>the</strong> United States andits state of Alaska are separated by approximately 500miles of Canadian territory. 2 In fact for <strong>the</strong> sake of thismonograph we have identified nine such examples ofnon-contiguous states, which will be discussed below.The lack of a link between separated territories doesnot affect whe<strong>the</strong>r a new political community should berecognized as a state under international law. In addition,based on past and present international practice, a statedoes not possess an inherent right to a link between itsgeographically distinct areas. In particular, this may beapplied to <strong>the</strong> sovereign link called for by <strong>the</strong> Palestiniansbetween <strong>Gaza</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>.From 1948 to 1967 <strong>the</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>Strip</strong> was controlled byEgyptian military rule. During that period <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>was occupied by Jordan. Thus for almost twenty years,<strong>the</strong>re was no connection between <strong>the</strong>se two territories.After Israel captured <strong>the</strong>se areas in <strong>the</strong> 1967 Six-DayWar, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which wasadopted in November 1967 to recommend a resolutionof <strong>the</strong> final status of <strong>the</strong> territories, made no mention ofa territorial link between <strong>Gaza</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>. Whatis essential is <strong>the</strong> control of territory — that <strong>the</strong> stateconstitutes a certain coherent territory that is effectivelygoverned. 3The Oslo Accords of <strong>the</strong> 1990s and specifically <strong>the</strong>Declaration of Principles outlined <strong>the</strong> interim selfgovernmentalarrangements agreed to by Israel and <strong>the</strong>PLO (which would become <strong>the</strong> Palestinian Authority).These included immediate Palestinian self-rule in <strong>Gaza</strong>and Jericho, early empowerment for <strong>the</strong> Palestinians in<strong>the</strong> <strong>West</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>, and an agreement on self-governmentand <strong>the</strong> election of a Palestinian legislative council. 4Shortly after <strong>the</strong> DOP was signed, negotiations beganbetween <strong>the</strong> parties concerning <strong>the</strong> implementation of<strong>the</strong> first stage of <strong>the</strong> DOP, which was Palestinian selfrulein <strong>Gaza</strong>-Jericho. These negotiations resulted in <strong>the</strong><strong>Gaza</strong>-Jericho Agreement (Cairo Agreement) that wassigned on May 4, 1994. 5 The notion of safe passage isfirst mentioned in <strong>the</strong> Oslo-era <strong>Gaza</strong>-Jericho Agreementarticle on security arrangements, one of four main issuesthat <strong>the</strong> agreement addresses. 6Today, <strong>the</strong>re is very widespread international support for<strong>the</strong> creation of a Palestinian state. It is <strong>the</strong>refore likely thatless will likely be demanded of <strong>the</strong> nascent Palestinianentity in terms of adherence to <strong>the</strong> criteria for statehood.page 5