FM 100-5 Operations - Survival Ebooks Military Manuals Survival ...

WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMOPERATIONSHistorical PerspectiveDuring the weekend of 18-19 August 1990, the vice chief of staff of the Army and senior Department of theArmy staff officers met with the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps on the green ramp at Pope AirForce Base. The 82d Airborne Division had already prepared soldiers and equipment for immediatedeployment to secure an air base in Saudi Arabia. Having considered the factors of operational METT-T, the immediate concern of the senior officers present was the threat of an Iraqi armor attack on theinitial deploying force of infantrymen.As the soldiers waited on the ramp for whatever aircraft would arrive, C-141, C5A, or Civilian ReserveAir Fleet (CRAF), the officers decided that sufficient protection was needed to deploy with the lightforces. This was task-organization on the move. Sections or platoons—not company- or battalion-sizeunits—were already on the ramp, waiting to be woven into the hastily improvised time-phased forcedeployment list (TPFDL). These were sections or platoons of Sheridans with antitank capability, longrangemultiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), some deep intelligence satellite downlink equipment, andother BOSs. This additional equipment was critical to the operation in order to protect the force and holdthe airhead that would be vital for the rest of the Army’s deploying forces.maps, studying available infrastructures, familiarizingsoldiers with the language, training soldiers for deployment,and sensitizing soldiers to a particular culture.Key to successful anticipation is continuous forcetracking, total asset visibility during deployment, andcontinuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB) of the contingency area.In addition to direct broadcast from collection platforms,analyzed, predictive, and all-source intelligence(ASI) reports and assessments must be transmitted tothe tactical commander. These activities help unitsmaintain a high state of combat readiness. If possible,officers and noncommissioned officers should conductan early leaders’ reconnaissance of the AO.Generally, decisions made after the alert as to size,composition, and deployment sequences of Armyforces will begin to set the conditions for later success.Senior commanders and staffs must provide immediateand intense problem solving and forecasting,based on known METT-T. Commanders must ensurethat they do not foreclose options the deployed forcemay need later. Proper planning should give the operationalcommander the resources and dispositionsto deal with any eventuality that might jeopardize eithermission accomplishment or protection of the force.Uncertainty and chance combine to confound the bestplans. Even with extensive planning, the nature of theoperation will often change significantly before satisfactoryexecution. Plans must be simple, deploymentoptions redundant, and deployment flow sufficientlyversatile to generate alternative options. Simplicity inplanning and the ability to adapt will help ensure success.Early deploying forces must have the combat capabilityto establish and protect lodgments from themoment of arrival. The ability to fight at the outset iscrucial to the successful execution of the theater campaignplan since hostilities can begin at any time.FORCE TAILORING AND TEAMWORKForce tailoring is the process of determining theright mix and sequence of units. Forces on quick alertmay have little opportunity to tailor forces.Predesignated load plans might not precisely matchthe contingency for which they deploy. Their forcepackages, however, should include sufficient combatpower to sustain and protect them for the short term,wherever they might go. Follow-on forces can thenbe tailored to meet the specific concerns of the longtermmission.3-4