FM 100-5 Operations - Survival Ebooks Military Manuals Survival ...

WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMOPERATIONSsupport large, protracted conflicts such as World WarII. The mobilization system includes five levels:• Selective mobilization.• Presidential selected reserve call-up (PSRC).• Partial mobilization.• Full mobilization.• Total mobilization.These levels might not be implemented sequentially.Rather, a flexible decision-making process referredto as graduated mobilization response (GMR)controls the pace and extent of mobilization. GMRtriggers readiness and response actions incrementallyto provide timely yet reversible steps to increase theUS national security emergency preparedness posture.The actual mobilization flow for a unit includes fivephases: planning, alert, home station, mobilizationstation, and port of embarkation. Details of the mobilizationprocess are in FM 100-17.Historical PerspectiveThe projection of American military power to the Republic of Korea in July 1950 provided a costly lessonin strategic and military unreadiness. Ambiguous national policy had clouded the issue of South Korea’sinclusion under the US defense umbrella when North Korean armies crossed the 38th Parallel on 25June. Lack of planning for conventional war in the new nuclear age, together with postwar occupationconcerns and weak defense budgets, had left the US Army understrength and undertrained to projectforces quickly.In June 1950, active Army strength stood at 593,000, with 10 active divisions: 5 in the CONUS generalreserve (140,000 soldiers), 4 in Japan (111,000), and 1 in Germany. All units were far understrength.Infantry regiments had only 2 of their 3 battalions, most artillery battalions had only 2 of their 3 firingbatteries, and organic armor was generally lacking.Planners had to fill out the Far East divisions by stripping the CONUS general reserve of infantry battalions,other untis, and individual replacements. In two months, the strength of the general reserve hadfallen to 90,000, losing most of its capacity to react to a major contingency. Since the active Army, withglobal defense responsibilities, could not focus on Korea alone, reserve component troops and units werecalled to duty. They were used both to reconstitute the depleted general reserve and to provide a reserviorof units and individuals to reinforce Far East Command and strengthen European defenses. Eight ArmyNational Guard divisions were federalized during the course of the conflict.Fortunately, the United States could project forces initially from Japan. But the four divisions underGeneral Douglas MacArthur’s Far East Command were severely undermanned, and the early US responsewas perilously weak. Task Force Smith, the initial, lightly equipped contingent of the 24th Division,suffered heavy casualties against enemy armor in a costly delaying action. Three of the Japanbaseddivisions deployed in July 1950, the fourth being stripped for fillers and replacements before eventuallyfollowing. Only one additional division could be spared from unready and depleted CONUSgeneral reserve deploying in September 1950. But the buildup was painful.3-8