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FM 100-5 Operations - Survival Ebooks Military Manuals Survival ...

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WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMOPERATIONSsimultaneously upload for deployment by sea. Eachcrisis will have unique demands, causing commandersto balance the speed with which light and SOFunits can deploy against the greater lethality and protectionprovided by heavier forces. In deployment,commanders must maintain versatility and agility inforce mix, combat capability, sustainment, and lift,along with the need to forecast future events that callfor decisions early in the deployment stage.ENTRY OPERATIONSThe requirements of entry operations followingdeployment will vary. Entry may be in direct supportof host nation or forward-presence forces. In some instancesconditions may dictate that operations be conductedin the absence of either. Entry may be eitheropposed or unopposed. Commanders sequence combatunits and supporting structures into the contingencyarea in a manner that enables them to gain and sustainthe initiative and protect the force.Unopposed EntryWhenever possible, US forces seek unopposedentry, entering the theater peacefully with the assistanceof the host nation. Early deploying units mayflow through airports or seaports into a lodgment area.From this area, they will prepare to assist forwardpresenceor host nation forces, protect the force,reconfigure, build combat capability, train, and acclimateto the environment. Entry during operations otherthan war will normally be unopposed. However, evenin an apparently benign entry operation, protection ofthe force remains a critical command consideration.Opposed EntryAn opposed entry requires combat operations toland deploying forces in the theater. If the circumstancesare right, the entry and combat operationsstages could combine in a coup de main, achievingthe strategic objectives in a single major operation.Operation Just Cause, conducted in Panama in 1989,is such an example. When this type of operation isnot possible, Army forces will typically gain, secure,and expand a lodgment as part of the joint team beforeconducting combat operations. The operation is atgreatest risk during opposed entry operations in whichunits move directly to combat operations. Often thiswill be the first contact between US forces and theenemy.Commanders make maximum use of joint capabilitiesto ensure early lethality and security of the forceby engaging the enemy in depth. Early entry forcesmay have to move immediately to combat operationsto take advantage of an opportunity, protect the force,or even conduct retrograde operations to gain time foradditional force buildup. Situations are likely to arisewith little or no advance warning. Opposed entry operationswill require the full synchronization of jointcapabilities in order to place large ground forces inthe theater.Early Entry DecisionsThe initial decisions in force-projection operationswill often be the most critical. These decisions normallyfall into an early deployment time window. Oncedecisions are made and the operation begins, adjustments,while necessary, become more difficult. Thus,it is vital that commanders and staffs focus immediatelyon deployment, early entry, and force placementin the theater decisions. The essential trade-off is betweenprojecting force rapidly and projecting the rightmix of combat power and resources to accomplish themission. The selection of the earliest arriving unitswill have far-reaching implications.If the right units deploy early, they may help theforce maintain a balanced posture, ready to respond tounforeseen events. In areas with substantial infrastructure,the commander may more heavily weight hisforce with combat units. When entry is made into anarea requiring infrastructure enhancement, CS and CSSunits will be needed early in the flow and will reducethe number of combat units arriving early in theater.These decisions are most difficult when combathas not begun, yet the enemy is capable of sudden,effective opposition. In such cases, the commandermust seek a balance that provides protection of hisforce, efficient deployment, ad a range of feasible responseoptions—should the enemy attack. Joint forcecooperation is particularly critical in this phase. Airand naval forces may have to compensate for an initiallack of ground combat power that can reach deep.Forces are most vulnerable and the success of thecontingency operation at greatest risk during initialentry. This vulnerability is acute when the enemypossesses weapons of mass destruction. Defensive andoffensive operations to counter these weapons willaffect both Army and joint planning. Protecting theforce3-10

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