FM 100-5 Operations - Survival Ebooks Military Manuals Survival ...

WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMFM 100-5Years of undertraining and neglected weapon development placed Army units in battle against a betterequippedenemy that was superior in numbers. The time needed to fill out and train the half-strengthGuard division delayed deployment of the first two Guard divisions to March 1951. One year after theoutbreak of hostilities, the Eight Army reached the level of eight divisions, which maintained for theduration of the conflict.MacArthur’s brilliant amphibious flanking stroke at Inchon in September 1950 broke the initial NorthKorean thrust. But almost three years of arduous combat up and down the Korean peninsula - ending ina stalemate in July 1953 - was the price paid for American unreadiness to meet the force-projectionchallenges of American’s global leadership responsiblities.PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITYSuccessful force-projection capabilities rely on afoundation of fully trained, well-led, properly equippedand sustained units and soldiers. All units in the Army,whether active or reserve components, within CONUSor OCONUS, are an integral part of the force-projectionstrategy. Thus, unit METLs must reflect appropriatemobilization and deployment tasks. Also, unittraining must emphasize and integrate critical aspectsof force projection.When required to deploy forces in response to acrisis, the Army tailors them based upon the missionassigned by the combatant commander and availableresources. The theater campaign plan will specify thecommand, intelligence, and logistics relationshipsamong the services. It should also specify any combinedoperations relationships, if known. Intelligencepreparation must begin as early as possible to allowcommanders to develop adequate plans. The deployingforce achieves this through split-based operations,which integrate CONUS-based national systems withforward-deploying tactical systems. Anticipatory logisticsplanning during this stage is key to successfulexecution of later stages. While always important,OPSEC is critical during this stage to deny the enemyintelligence that he may use against friendly forcesduring deployment and entry operations.Army commanders must prioritize lift requirementsconsistent with METT-T. The combatant commanderor JFC can then establish the sequence in whichArmy units should deploy relative to the movement offorces of the other services. Early decisions on sequencingwill solidify the time-phased force and deploymentdata (TPFDD), determine the time requiredto deploy the force, and initialize the theater distributionplan.DEPLOYMENTThe Joint Operation Planning and Execution System(JOPES) provides the umbrella structure for thedeployment of Army units. Deployment planning toolsmust allow commanders to adapt to rapidly changingcircumstances. Sealift and airlift assets are limited yetcritical to the successful projection of the force. TheArmy therefore makes every effort to integrate thecapabilities of the deploying force with host nationsupport and forward-presence capabilities to maximizethe available airlift and sealift. US Army forces aretrained, structured, and postured for rapid deployment.Light forces are based close to major airports. Armoredforces are located near major rail nets, assistingrapid displacement to seaports.Army forces, capable of striking worldwide regardlessof weather, terrain, location, or threat, providethe predominant ground element to joint forces.Commanders must balance the factors of METT-Tagainst available airlift and sealift assets to determinethe composition of the initial response force. Whentime is critical, light and SOF Army units may be thebest for initial deployment.Light-armored, cavalry, and selected aviation unitscan deploy more quickly than heavier armored unitsand enhance the firepower and flexibility of earlydeploying forces. Armored forces, if required, will3-9