FM 100-5 Operations - Survival Ebooks Military Manuals Survival ...

WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMFM 100-5combined force together. Teamwork and trust are essential.Shared hardships; missions that are reasonablyachievable in accordance with capabilities; accessto reserves and reinforcements, to include CASand air interdiction; and frequent face-to-face commandand soldier exchanges build trust and a sharedsense of mission.Common purpose not only requires well-articulatedgoals shared by all members of the coalition oralliance, it demands the efforts of leaders capable ofinspiring, motivating, and directing multicultural forcesin execution. The force of personality in combinedoperations is often key to multinational cooperationdirectly influencing the strength of the coalition or alliance.If all participating nations understand clearlystated objectives and have trust and confidence in theirleaders, the combined forces should succeed. Buildinga team and establishing trust before, during, andafter the battle and campaign are vital to success.PLANNING AND CONDUCTThe US Army has extensive experience in planningand conducting combined operations. Its participationin peace, conflict, and war over the past 200years has provided insights into how to synchronizecombat power and achieve unity of effort in cooperationwith allies. These insights are summarized belowand discussed in greater detail in FM 100-8.COMMANDSuccessful combined operations center on achievingunity of effort. Each participating nation must agreeto provide the commander of the alliance or coalitionsufficient authority to achieve this. In turn, the commanderand his staff use this authority to unify theefforts of the combined force toward common objectives.This authority, however, is seldom absolute.Consensus will be important to the overall commander.National contingents normally retain command oftheir own forces, relinquishing only operational commandor OPCON to the alliance or coalition militaryleadership, even though staffs might be combined. The1st (UK) Armored Division under TACON of the VII(US) Corps in Operation Desert Storm is an examplewherein British staff members were totally integratedinto the VII Corps staff. The combined force commandermay not be a US Army officer. He could be asenior US officer from another service or a commanderfrom another nation. Army commanders fight at thedirection of the allied or coalition commander, retainingall of the command authority and responsibilityinherent in the command relationships (OPCON,TACON, attached, direct support) of the forces theyhave been provided. Missions should be perceived asappropriate and achievable for the forces to which theyare given and equitable in terms of burden and risksharing.The factors mentioned earlier in this chapter influencethe C2 structure of the combined force. If thenations are very similar in culture, doctrine, training,and equipment, or if extensive cooperative experienceexists, a combined headquarters may be effective. Thisdirect approach requires each armed force to receive,understand, plan, and implement missions at the samelevel as the other nations. However, in planning combinedoperations, commanders have to accommodatedifferences in planning capabilities. Some armies havelarge staffs and the technical means to support planning.Others have austere staff structures and do notpossess the means to process, reproduce, or rapidlydisseminate many contingency plans. Moreover, decisionauthority of staffs and subordinate commandersvaries between armies. The sophistication andnature of missions assigned to each nation may varyto accommodate differences between nations, but thecombined staff should provide guidance directly toeach nation’s forces.A coalition of dissimilar nations may require anindirect approach to achieving unity of effort. Thetheater commander may use a primary staff for planningand an auxiliary staff to absorb, translate, andrelay straightforward, executable instructions to membersof the coalition. USCENTCOM used such an approachin the 1991 Persian Gulf War as the coalitioncoordination, communications, and integration center(C3IC) was formed to coordinate the efforts betweenIslamic and non-Islamic command structures.MANEUVERTo best achieve strategic and operational aims,plans should reflect the special capabilities of each nationalcontingent in the assignment of missions. Mobility,intelligence collection assets, size andsustainability of formations, air defenses, capabilitiesfor long-range fires, SOF, training for operations inspecial environments, and preparation for operationsinvolving nuclear and chemical weapons are amongthe significant factors at this level.5-3