WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMOPERATIONSBy the evening of 26 February, the VII Corps had turned 90 degrees to the east, fixed the RepublicanGuard, and opened a corridor for the XVIII Airborne corps to continue their attack to the east afterhaving secured the coalition’s west flank. The 24th Infantry Division had reach the Euphrates River,blocking Iraqi western routes of withdrawal, and had turned east with the 3d ACR to engage the RepublicanGuard. Throughout the theater of operations, coalition forces held the initiative.Coalition forces attacked on the night of 26 February, with VII Corps making the main attack againstthree Republican Guard Armored Divisions (Figure 6-3) and parts of other Iraqi formations, to includethe Jihad Corps. In the south of the corps sector, the 1st Infantry Division conducted a night passage oflines through the engaged 2d ACR and immediately made contact. To their north, the 1st and 3d ArmoredDivisions pressed the attack east while the 1st Cavalry Division, released for USCENTCOM reserve,moved almost 200 kilometers in 24 hours to an attack position. XVIII Airborne corps pressed the attackeast to the north of VII Corps, with attack aviation of the 101st Airborne Division and ground and airattacks of the 3d ACR and 24th Infantry Division. The allies pressed the attack relentlessly through thenight and during the day of 27 February toward the Iraqi city of Basrah and the coast of Kuwait.Figure 6-3. Operation Desert Storm 24 February 1991By the morning of 28 February, the Republican Guard divisions were effectively routed and incapable offurther coordinated resistance. At 0800 hours on the 28th, after the coalition achieved the militaryobjectives of the operation, President Bush called for coalition forces to cease offensive operations.6-18
WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COM<strong>FM</strong> <strong>100</strong>-5The ideal attack might resemble a torrent of waterrushing forward and expanding its channels aroundmajor resistance. It should move fast, follow reconnaissanceunits or successful probes through gaps inenemy defenses, and shift its strength quickly to widenpenetrations and reinforce its successes, thereby carryingthe battle deep into the enemy’s rear.JFCs orient offensive campaigns and major operationson decisive objectives. Their plans identifythe center of gravity and decisive points and establishobjectives that lead to the enemy’s defeat. Although acampaign should attempt to defeat the enemy in asingle major operation, an elusive enemy may causecommanders to structure the campaign to defeat theenemy in a series of major operations.Within a given theater, a number of ground, air,and naval operations occur simultaneously in supportof the campaign plan. Even during a major operation,one large joint force might be attacking, another defending,and still another protecting LOCs, while othersarrive in theater.Additionally, commanders may find themselvesfighting offensive campaigns against either concentratedor dispersed enemy forces. Facing a concentratedenemy, operational commanders maneuver toforce the enemy to abandon his position or fight at adisadvantage. In practice, this means directing operationsagainst an enemy’s flanks or rear or penetratinghis defenses through weak areas. Facing a dispersedenemy, attacking commanders can isolate and defeatseparated enemy forces in turn before they can join toorganize a stronger defense.However, in any offensive operation, ground commanderstry to collapse enemy defenses as rapidly aspossible with the smallest expenditure of resources.They do this by massing fires, concentrating units onlywhen necessary. They also do this by retaining theinitiative, striking enemy weaknesses, attacking theenemy in depth, and creating conditions that preventthe enemy from organizing a coherent defense. Occasionally,attacking commanders maneuver to avoidbattles that would slow or weaken the offensive.The initiative is critical to successful offensive operations.Whatever its purpose, campaign plans mustbe flexible enough to accommodate change so commanderscan shift their main effort in response to eithersetback or opportunity without losing the initiative.Accordingly, commanders anticipate likely enemyactions and prepare contingencies for them andtrain their units to do likewise. Successful commandersdo not run out of options and are always lookingfor ways to hurt the enemy. Anticipation and continuousformulation of attack options are key.Security of the force is crucial. Successful reconnaissanceis vital to success. The high-speed mobilityof modern forces can create exposed LOCs and gapsbetween large, friendly formations. Commandersshould anticipate this and take precautions to keep itfrom happening. Moreover, covering forces operatewell forward, providing early warning.In each phase of a campaign, operational commandersdeploy their units using whatever form of maneuverbest fits the conditions of METT-T. They movethe force as a whole, orienting on enemy forces ormajor geographical terrain features, keeping someforces in depth as reserves.The employment of the reserve may be the mostcrucial decision commanders make. As the battle isjoined, operational-level commanders adjust the finalmaneuver of their forces and look for opportunities todefeat the enemy’s defense in depth. In particular,they seek ways to employ their operational reservesdecisively. In any battle, commanders position operationalreserves where they can best exploit tacticalsuccess. As tactical success is achieved, the choicesfor employing reserves become more certain, whetherto destroy the enemy in the battle area, to secure deepobjectives, or whatever else commanders desire. So itis important that commanders plan for the commitmentof the reserve and, once committed, anticipateits reconstitution.Finally, in an offensive campaign, commanders tryto preserve the fighting integrity of the force. However,if their force becomes dispersed or overextended,they may have to resort to the defense, planning forsuch a contingency as either a branch or sequel to theiroffensive operations.DEFENSIVE OPERATIONSThe defense is the less decisive form of war. Thedefense may nonetheless be stronger than the offense,thus METT-T may necessitate defense in a campaignfor a force-projection army prior to conducting offensiveoperations. The advantages of cover and concealment,advance siting of weapons, shorter LOCs,and operations over familiar terrain among a friendlypopulation generally favor the defender. The6-19