WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMOPERATIONScommander as fighting continues and friendly forcesseek to gain and maintain the initiative.Use of reserves and realignment of forces is continuous.The commander may have to realign forcesin response to the operational situation or otherwiseattempt to adjust the terms of the battle itself to meethis objectives or facilitate future operations. A significantconcern of the large-unit commander duringbattle is to defeat the enemy’s operational reserves andcommit his own reserves, if necessary, at the decisivetime and place. Friendly operational reserves oftenexploit the results of battle by penetrating deep beyondenemy defenses. In the defense, such reservescounterattack to defeat the enemy attack or start thefriendly counteroffensive. The operational reserve canlimit the enemy’s success or cover the force’s withdrawal.The theater commander attacks the enemy’sstrategic reserves. One-time commitment of reservesto achieve decisive results is desirable, but often notattainable. Thus commanders and staffs continuallyreconstitute a reserve in order to have decisive optionsavailable.During the current battle, commanders comparethe progress of ongoing operations against the anticipatedrequirements of future operations. They continuallyassess the potential culmination of their force andseek to achieve decisive results before reaching culmination.OFFENSIVE OPERATIONSThe offensive is the decisive form of war-¡the commanders’ultimate means of imposing their will uponthe enemy. While strategic, operational, or tacticalconsiderations may require defending, the defeat ofan enemy force at any level may require shifting tothe offensive. Even in the defense itself, seizure andretention of the initiative requires offensive activities.The more fluid the battle, the truer this will be.Offensive campaigns and major operations are designedto achieve operational and strategic objectivesquickly and decisively at least cost. <strong>Operations</strong> JustCause and Desert Storm are good examples. Armyforces must also be adept and have the will to fight inmore protracted conflicts if necessary. Several dynamiccharacteristics apply to offensive operations:initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, rapidshifts in the main effort to take advantage of opportunities,momentum and tempo, and the deepest, mostrapid and simultaneous destruction of enemy defensespossible.Historical PerspectiveThe Desert Storm phase of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War reflects the dynamic joint andcombined nature of the operational offensive and simultaneous operations in depth.Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991, when allied air and naval forces began the destruction of keyIraqi strategic, operational, and tactical targets. By the end of the second day, the coalition air componenthad achieved air superiority; by 21 January the Iraqi air force was incapable of operations. Airoperations continued to strike at key systems in the heart of Iraq, as well as at the Republican Guard andfrontline Iraqi forces. USMC forces afloat tied down Iraqi ground forces along the coast with a threatenedamphibious landing. SOF operated throughout the theater.The coalition set the final conditions for the ground attack. It moved the VII Corps by ground tacticalmovement and the XVIII Airborne Corps by road convoy from defensive positions in the east to attackpositions up to 500 miles away, west of Kuwait. As air interdiction and operational deception operationscontinued, allied ground forces were set to execute the decisive action against the enemy.The major ground operation began in the early morning hours of 24 February. The objective was to driveIraqi forces from Kuwait, requiring defeat of the Republican Guard divisions in southern Iraq. The planfor achieving this envisioned a deliberate attack along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia border by the 1st MarineExpeditionary Force and Arab coalition forces. Included in the plan were deception operations to fixIraqi forces while the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps swept around to the west of the Iraqi defensesto envelop them, to strike deep into Iraq to sever Iraqi LOCs, and to isolate and defeat the RepublicanGuard.6-16
WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COM<strong>FM</strong> <strong>100</strong>-5The coalition attack began with supporting attacks on both flanks and a feint in the center of sector(Figure 6-2). The XVIII Airborne corps attacked in the west with two divisions. The French DaguetDivision (6th French Light Armored Division), with OPCON of a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division,attacked to secure as-Salman Airfield and protect the coalition’s west flank. The 82d Airborne Division (-) followed and supported the 6th French Light Armored Division. The 101st Airborne Division (AirAssault) conducted the largest air assault operation in history to secure a forward operating base deep inIraq.Figure 6-2. Operation Desert Storm, 24 February 1991On the coalition’s eastern flank, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, with an attached armor brigade of the2d Armored Division and forces of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, attacked north into Kuwait. In thecenter, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted a feint as part of the plan to deceive the Iraqis as to thelocation of the coalition’s main effort.Based on the initial success, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) began the coalition’s maineffort 14 hours early. The XVIII Airborne Corps continued to attack west of the Iraqi obstacle belt withthe 24th Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to seize objectives inside Iraq.VII Corps, conducting the main effort for USCENTCOM, attacked in the center with the 1st InfantryDivision penetrating the main Iraqi defensive belt. The 1st (UK) Armored Division attacked through thebreach to defeat Iraqi tactical reserves and secure the corps eastern flank. Simultaneously, to the west ofthis, the 2d ACR led the attack of the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions around the flank of the obstacle beltand into Iraq. In the east, Arab coalition forces began their attack into Kuwait.6-17