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On the real effects of private equity investment: evidence from new ...

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Table 9Endogeneity and selection issuesIndustry shareEntry US * Private <strong>equity</strong>High legal efficiency *(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)All firms Small firms onlyPE lawsand fundsizeSmallindustriesonlyHigh-lowlegalefficiencyHigh-lowshadoweconomy PE lawsPE lawsand fundsizeSmallindustriesonlyHigh-lowlegalefficiencyHigh-lowshadoweconomyPE laws0.001 -0.019 0.328 -0.095 -0.017 -0.016 0.019 0.082 -0.031 -0.034(0.091) (0.097) (0.239) (0.092) (0.091) (0.053) (0.059) (0.157) (0.059) (0.065)0.253 0.242 0.276 0.234 0.293 0.264(0.144)* (0.121)** (0.120)** (0.143)* (0.135)** (0.126)**0.268 0.275Entry US * Private <strong>equity</strong> (0.121)** (0.122)**Low legal efficiency *-0.435 0.179Entry US * Private <strong>equity</strong> (0.472) (0.302)Low share shadow econ *0.278 0.262Entry US * Private <strong>equity</strong> (0.122)** (0.122)***High share shadow econ *0.283 0.174Entry US * Private <strong>equity</strong> (0.176) (0.127)Observations 571 571 515 438 443 571 571 515 438 443R 2 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.66 0.67 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.63 0.68The reported estimates are <strong>from</strong> an IV regression (columns (i)-(ii) and (vi)-(vii)) and <strong>from</strong> OLS regressions (columns (iii)-(v) and (viii)-(x)). The dependentvariable is <strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> <strong>new</strong> firms to total firms (columns (i)-(v)) and <strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> <strong>new</strong> firms with less than 10 employees to total firms (columns (vi)-(x)), by 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1 and averaged for 1998-1999. Private <strong>equity</strong> measures actual <strong>private</strong> <strong>equity</strong> <strong>investment</strong> at <strong>the</strong> country level, normalized by GDP. Private<strong>equity</strong> laws is a dummy equal to 1 if by 1998 pension funds were allower to invest in risk capital markets in <strong>the</strong> respective country. In columns (ii) and (vi), <strong>the</strong>dummy is interacted with <strong>the</strong> actual size <strong>of</strong> pension funds assets as share <strong>of</strong> GDP. Columns (iii) and (viii) perform <strong>the</strong> analysis on <strong>the</strong> sample <strong>of</strong> all industriesexcluding <strong>the</strong> top 10% in terms <strong>of</strong> share <strong>of</strong> sales. Industry share is <strong>the</strong> ratio <strong>of</strong> industry sales to total sales by all industries in each country. Entry US is <strong>the</strong> ratio<strong>of</strong> <strong>new</strong> firms to total firms in <strong>the</strong> US, by 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1. High(low) legal efficiencies are dummies equal to 1 if <strong>the</strong> country is in <strong>the</strong> top(bottom) 33% interms <strong>of</strong> legal efficiency, and to 0 o<strong>the</strong>rwise. High(low) share shadow economy are dummies equal to 1 if <strong>the</strong> country is in <strong>the</strong> top(bottom) 33% in terms <strong>of</strong>implied size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> un<strong>of</strong>ficial economy, and to 0 o<strong>the</strong>rwise. All regressions include a constant, 2-digit industry dummies and country dummies, not reported.White’s heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors standard errors are reported in paren<strong>the</strong>ses. ***, **, and * report significance at <strong>the</strong> 1%, 5% and 10%level, respectively. See Appendix 1 for detailed variable definitions and sources.ECBWorking Paper Series No 1078August 200945

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