Thought and Reality in Hegel's System

Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System/27which we have already reached, by showing how philosophical knowledge,in the Hegelian system, is more than a mere mediating activityamong phenomena external to it.It may be helpful at the beginning to state in a general way the orderof the discussion before us. No detailed account of the dialectical process,nor any defense of the dialectical method with reference to thedevelopment of the categories in the Logic will be attempted here. Ourpresent purpose is a less ambitious one. We shall simply state, as bestwe may, what Hegel means by thought as a process of mediation, andwhat is his real contention when he says that negation is the vital andpotent element in this process. In accordance with this purpose, therefore,we shall begin our study with a consideration of immediacy andmediation; and this will lead us on to a discussion of negation, which weshall be forced to defend against certain misconceptions that have givenrise to some unjustifiable criticisms of Hegel. Our general conclusionwill be that thought, as the Hegelian system defines it from this point ofview, is a process of mediation which, because of the negative elementinvolved in it, makes it possible for us to say that reality is comprehendedin thought; for its universals assume the form, not of abstractindeterminate immediacy, but of concrete determinate immediacy, thatis, individuality.Before passing directly to a consideration of Hegel’s conception ofmediation and immediacy, steps should be taken to avoid a possibleerror of interpretation. And this precaution will also serve us as a pointof departure in our discussion. Absolutely pure immediacy, immediacyexclusive of mediation, is meaningless for Hegel. This, of course, followsat once from what was said in the preceding chapter concerningthe objectivity of thought: these is no indeterminate given. A few quotations,however’ will settle the matter. “We must reject the oppositionbetween an independent immediacy in the contents or facts of consciousnessand an equally independent mediation, supposed incompatible withthe former. The incompatibility is a mere assumption, an arbitrary assertion.”60 Again, we read: “There is nothing, nothing in heaven, innature, in spirit, or anywhere else which does not contain both immediacyand mediation.” 61 The whole of the second part of the Logic, weare told, is “a discussion of the intrinsic and self-affirming unity ofimmediacy and mediation.” 62 Only the abstract understanding separatesthe two, and then it finds itself utterly helpless to reconcile them. 63 It isthe business of philosophy, however, to disclose the fallacy involved in