Thought and Reality in Hegel's System
Thought and Reality in Hegel's System
Thought and Reality in Hegel's System
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<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong>In Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamA Former Fellow <strong>and</strong> Scholar <strong>in</strong> the Sage School of PhilosophyA ThesisPresented to the University Faculty of Cornell University<strong>in</strong> Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for theDegree of Doctor of Philosophy
Cornell Studies <strong>in</strong> Philosophy No. 8Longmans, Green, <strong>and</strong> CompanyNew York, London, Bombay, Calcutta1910This edition published 2001.Batoche Books Limited52 Eby Street SouthKitchener, OntarioN2G 3L1Canadaemail: batoche@gto.netISBN: 1-55273-063-8
ContentsPreface. .............................................................................................. 5Part I .................................................................................................. 7Chapter I: <strong>Thought</strong> as Objective <strong>and</strong> Universal. ................................ 7Chapter II: The Process of <strong>Thought</strong>: Mediation <strong>and</strong> Negation. ....... 26Chapter III: Ontology <strong>and</strong> Epistemology.......................................... 43Part II. .............................................................................................. 69Chapter IV: <strong>Reality</strong> as Individual..................................................... 69Chapter V: The of the Absolute. ...................................................... 97Notes .............................................................................................. 127
Preface.Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that there is no system ofthought more <strong>in</strong>timately bound up with one fundamental pr<strong>in</strong>ciple thanis the system of Hegel. Even a cursory read<strong>in</strong>g of his works is sufficientto conv<strong>in</strong>ce one that the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the Notion, whatever it may be, isbasic to the system; <strong>and</strong> a more detailed study only forces the convictionhome. In the Phenomenology, <strong>in</strong> the Encyclopaedia, <strong>in</strong> the History ofPhilosophy, <strong>in</strong> the Philosophy of Religion, everywhere it is this doctr<strong>in</strong>eof the Notion upon which emphasis is laid. Indeed, if one were to saythat the entire system is just the explication of this doctr<strong>in</strong>e, its elaborationby def<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>and</strong> application, one would be well with<strong>in</strong> the boundsof justification. A correct <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the system, consequently,depends upon a thorough comprehension of the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the Notion;if this doctr<strong>in</strong>e is neglected, the system must rema<strong>in</strong> a sealed book. Theaim of the present monograph is to set forth this doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the Notion,to emphasize its importance for a theory of knowledge, <strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> the lightof it, to give some <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to Hegel’s conception of ultimate reality.The first chapter of this study was read <strong>in</strong> part before the meet<strong>in</strong>g ofthe American Philosophical Association at Cornell University <strong>in</strong> December,1907. Subsequently it was published <strong>in</strong> an exp<strong>and</strong>ed form <strong>in</strong>The Philosophical Review (Vol. XVII, pp. 619–642), under the title“The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge.”My thanks are due to the editor of the Review for his permission torepr<strong>in</strong>t it here substantially as it appeared there.My very great <strong>in</strong>debtedness to various books <strong>and</strong> authors is sufficientlytestified to by the footnotes. The references to the larger Logicare to the edition of 1841, published by Duncker <strong>and</strong> Humblot. Thetranslations of Hegel’s works, to which I have referred for assistance
6/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>gham<strong>and</strong> from which I have freely quoted, are: W. Wallace, The Logic ofHegel (second edition, 1892); W. Wallace, Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d (1894);S. W. Dyde, Philosophy of Right (1896); E. B. Speirs <strong>and</strong> J. B.S<strong>and</strong>erson, Philosophy of Religion (three volumes, 1895); E. S. Haldane<strong>and</strong> F. H. Simson, History of Philosophy (three volumes, 1894); J. Sibree,Philosophy of History (repr<strong>in</strong>t of 1902). I have not followed the translationsverbatim <strong>in</strong> every case; but what few changes have been madeare, I trust, not less faithful to the orig<strong>in</strong>al.To the members of the Sage School of Philosophy I am deeply <strong>in</strong>debtedfor many suggestions both consciously <strong>and</strong> unconsciously given.Professor G. H. Sab<strong>in</strong>e, of Lel<strong>and</strong> Stanford Jr. University, has read aportion of the study <strong>in</strong> manuscript <strong>and</strong> has aided me <strong>in</strong> the not verypleasant task of proof-read<strong>in</strong>g. My heaviest debt of gratitude is to ProfessorJ. E. Creighton, of Cornell University, at whose suggestion thestudy was first undertaken <strong>and</strong> under whose guidance <strong>and</strong> encouragementit has been brought to completion. The study would be much moreimperfect than it now appears, were there not <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> it ProfessorCreighton’s many valuable suggestions <strong>and</strong> criticisms. For the contentof the monograph, however, I myself must alone be held responsible.G. W. C.Middlebury College,September, 1910.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong><strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>Part IChapter I.<strong>Thought</strong> as Objective <strong>and</strong> Universal.Perhaps no part of Hegel’s system has been more persistently overlookedor misunderstood than has his doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the nature of thought.Certa<strong>in</strong>ly no part of his system deserves to be more carefully studied.For this is the doctr<strong>in</strong>e that is absolutely fundamental to his system; <strong>and</strong>it must be understood before any fair appreciation of his system can bearrived at or any just criticism of his contentions be advanced. To givean exposition of the Hegelian doctr<strong>in</strong>e of thought, <strong>and</strong> to do this asmuch as is practicable <strong>in</strong> the author’s own words, is the aim of thischapter.Almost universally it is taken for granted that the Logic conta<strong>in</strong>s allthat Hegel thought it worth while to say about the nature of thought. Hisepistemology is criticized <strong>and</strong> defended aga<strong>in</strong>st criticism exclusively onthe basis of the dialectical development of the categories, the assumptionof both critic <strong>and</strong> champion be<strong>in</strong>g that here we f<strong>in</strong>d Hegel’s lastword concern<strong>in</strong>g the nature of knowledge. That such an assumption iserroneous <strong>and</strong> leads to positive error <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpret<strong>in</strong>g the Hegelian epistemologywill, I trust, appear <strong>in</strong> what is to follow. The Logic does, <strong>in</strong>deed,purport to give an account of the essentially organic nature of thought,by show<strong>in</strong>g how one category necessarily loses itself <strong>in</strong> its negative,which proves to be, not an abstract negative, but a negative that dialecticallyleads on to a more concrete synthesis of the two opposed categories.The Logic leads progressively from the abstract categories of Be<strong>in</strong>g,through the more concrete categories of Essence, to the still moreconcrete categories of the Notion; <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally to the most concrete cat-
8/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamegory of all, that category <strong>in</strong> which all the lower categories f<strong>in</strong>d their‘truth,’ namely, the Absolute Idea. This the Logic does; but this is allthat it does. It tells us noth<strong>in</strong>g direct about the empirical significance ofthe categories themselves. Except by frequent h<strong>in</strong>ts — which <strong>in</strong>deed arequite emphatic <strong>and</strong> significant — the Logic gives us no <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to thatfundamental problem of epistemology, namely, the significance of thesubject-object relation. On the contrary, as Hegel himself declares, thevery purpose of the Logic is to deal with the categories <strong>in</strong> the pure etherof thought <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> abstraction from their empirical sett<strong>in</strong>g. 1 So <strong>in</strong> theLogic we search <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong> for an exposition of this most important aspectof our know<strong>in</strong>g experience; the implications of the objective referenceof thought are not explicitly touched upon there. For such an expositionwe must look elsewhere.The exposition for which we seek is to be found <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenologyof Spirit. Perhaps this will appear beyond dispute from a considerationof some of Hegel’s own statements on the po<strong>in</strong>t. In the preface tothe Phenomenology he says: “The task which I have set myself is toelaborate the fact that philosophy approaches the form of science —approaches the po<strong>in</strong>t where it lays aside the name of love for knowledge,<strong>and</strong> becomes real knowledge.” 2 Aga<strong>in</strong>, later <strong>in</strong> the same prefacewe read: “The process of science <strong>in</strong> general, or of knowledge, is setforth <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenology of Spirit. Knowledge as it is at first, or theimmediate spirit, is spiritless or sensuous consciousness. In order tobecome real knowledge, to reach the element of science which is its purenotion itself, this sensuous consciousness has to work itself through along way.” 3 This way is, of course, that traced by the Phenomenology.A little later <strong>in</strong> the same work we are told that the problem of the Phenomenologyis simply “an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>and</strong> proof of the reality of knowledge.”4 This same po<strong>in</strong>t Hegel is emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g when he urges that thePhenomenology is the science of experience; for experience, he tells us,is only the “dialectical process (Bewegung) which perfects consciousness<strong>in</strong> itself, both <strong>in</strong> its knowledge <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> its object.” 5 In other words,s<strong>in</strong>ce experience is essentially a subject-object relation, its truth is to befound <strong>in</strong> the determ<strong>in</strong>ation of the real import <strong>and</strong> significance of thatrelation. Thus it seems that the problem of Phenomenology is prettyclearly def<strong>in</strong>ed: it is simply the progressive def<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>and</strong> exposition ofthe significance of this duality with<strong>in</strong> experience. It is not merely totrace an organic development from one to another stage of consciousness,as Professor Baillie would seem to suggest. 6 Rather is it to dis-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/9close the important change that takes place between subject <strong>and</strong> objectas the know<strong>in</strong>g experience is traced through the various attitudes ofconsciousness. As Lasson aptly remarks <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>troduction to his recentedition of the Phenomenology, the po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the work isthe transition “from one relation of consciousness to the entire world ofbe<strong>in</strong>g, to another such relation.” 7 Hegel’s purpose <strong>in</strong> this novel Introductionto Philosophy is not like Kant’s <strong>in</strong> the first of the Critiques,namely, to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the possibility <strong>and</strong> limitations of knowledge. Heaccepts knowledge <strong>and</strong> the know<strong>in</strong>g experience very much as it is acceptedby common-sense, <strong>and</strong> then proceeds to develop its implications.Pass<strong>in</strong>g dialectically from sensuous consciousness through self-consciousness,reason, spirit, <strong>and</strong> religion, he f<strong>in</strong>ally arrives at what seemsto him to be the true attitude of consciousness, the truth of the know<strong>in</strong>gexperience. This f<strong>in</strong>al result of the Phenomenology, which Hegel callsAbsolute Knowledge (das absolute Wissen), is thus his def<strong>in</strong>ition of thereal nature of knowledge; it is his f<strong>in</strong>al statement of the significance ofthe subject-object relation with<strong>in</strong> concrete experience.It is very important to notice at the outset, <strong>and</strong> to keep constantly <strong>in</strong>m<strong>in</strong>d, the fact that Hegel bases this conception of absolute knowledgedirectly <strong>and</strong> unequivocally upon our common know<strong>in</strong>g experience. Thispo<strong>in</strong>t is so fundamental, <strong>and</strong> is so generally neglected by the critics, thatit needs emphasis even at the risk of digression. If there is wanted moreevidence than has already been adduced, it is not far to seek. In thePreface to the Phenomenology itself, we f<strong>in</strong>d an explicit statement tothe effect that there is no break between consciousness as it appears <strong>in</strong>sensuous perception <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> absolute know<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>and</strong> this very fact, Hegelargues, makes possible the transition from the lower to the higher stage.“The beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of philosophy,” he says, “makes the presupposition ordem<strong>and</strong> that consciousness be <strong>in</strong> this element” (i.e., as the context <strong>in</strong>dicates,<strong>in</strong> the ‘element’ of ‘absolute science,’ which is simply the po<strong>in</strong>t ofview of absolute knowledge). “But this element receives its completion<strong>and</strong> clearness only through the process of its development.... On its side,science dem<strong>and</strong>s of self-consciousness that it raise itself <strong>in</strong>to this ether....On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the <strong>in</strong>dividual has a right to ask that science at leastlet down to him the ladder to this st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t, that is, show him the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>twith<strong>in</strong> himself.” 8 Furthermore, <strong>in</strong> the Introduction to the largerLogic we read: “Absolute knowledge is the truth of all modes or attitudesof consciousness.” 9 F<strong>in</strong>ally, there is a passage <strong>in</strong> the smaller Logicwhich runs thus: “In my Phenomenology of Spirit... the method adopted
10/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamwas to beg<strong>in</strong> with the first <strong>and</strong> simplest phase of m<strong>in</strong>d, immediate consciousness,<strong>and</strong> to show how that stage gradually of necessity workedonward to the philosophical po<strong>in</strong>t of view, the necessity of that viewbe<strong>in</strong>g proved by the process.” 10 Now it would seem that the import ofsuch passages as these is unmistakable. The Phenomenology beg<strong>in</strong>swith the most naive attitude of consciousness, where the matter of <strong>in</strong>tuitionis looked upon as a mere datum; its progress, as ProfessorMcGilvary suggests, 11 consists just <strong>in</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g that this sensuous consciousnessis an essential element <strong>in</strong> absolute know<strong>in</strong>g. In other words,the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of absolute know<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> every, even the simplest,phase of consciousness; it is implied <strong>in</strong> every act of knowledge, <strong>in</strong>every subject-object relation, — which is tantamount to say<strong>in</strong>g that it isconterm<strong>in</strong>ous with experience itself.Near the end of his discussion of the Phenomenology, Haym, look<strong>in</strong>gback over the course of its development, remarks: “This whole phenomenologicalgenesis of absolute knowledge was noth<strong>in</strong>g other thanthe presence of the Absolute, which unfolded itself before our very eyes<strong>in</strong> the methodical manner peculiar to its spiritual nature. It was the selfdevelopmentof the Absolute as it has mirrored itself <strong>in</strong> consciousness<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> history.” 12 One is led to believe that the critic means by this, as hesays later, that the ego “is at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the Phenomenology exactlywhere it ought to be at the end, — not <strong>in</strong> itself, but <strong>in</strong> the Absolute.”13 The suggestion of such a po<strong>in</strong>t of view as this, however, seemsto me to be at best mislead<strong>in</strong>g. Whatever may be said concern<strong>in</strong>g therelation of the result of the Phenomenology to the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of an AbsoluteIntelligence, 14 there is certa<strong>in</strong>ly no reason for ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g thatHegel would ask us to assume such a st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of thePhenomenology. He asks us merely to place ourselves at the po<strong>in</strong>t ofview of sensuous consciousness, <strong>and</strong> to try to discover its logical implications.It is, <strong>in</strong>deed, true that <strong>in</strong> the attitude of sensuous consciousnessHegel sees the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of absolute know<strong>in</strong>g, which thus f<strong>in</strong>ds its basis<strong>in</strong> the actual know<strong>in</strong>g experiences of f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>in</strong>dividuals; <strong>and</strong> it is alsotrue that these experiences are never left out of consideration by him.But this means noth<strong>in</strong>g more than that absolute knowledge is logically<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> every know<strong>in</strong>g experience, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>in</strong>vestigation can provethat it is so <strong>in</strong>volved. Hegel himself has very clearly put the matter <strong>in</strong>another context: “It may be said that the Absolute is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> everybeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, just as every advance is simply an exposition of it.... Butbecause it is at first only implicit, it is really not the Absolute.... The
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/11advance, therefore, is not a sort of overflow, as it would be were thebeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g truly the Absolute; rather the development consists <strong>in</strong> the factthat the universal determ<strong>in</strong>es itself.... Only <strong>in</strong> its completion is it theAbsolute.” 15 Even grant<strong>in</strong>g, then, for the sake of the argument, thatHegel f<strong>in</strong>ally identifies absolute knowledge with the po<strong>in</strong>t of view of anomniscient Intelligence (which assumption is by no means self-evident,— <strong>in</strong>deed, it is difficult to prove that Hegel’s Absolute is such an Intelligence),we are certa<strong>in</strong>ly not justified <strong>in</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g that he emerges fromthe Phenomenology with noth<strong>in</strong>g more than the assumption with whichhe began his <strong>in</strong>vestigation. The st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of absolute knowledge is notassumed at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g; it is arrived at only at the end. And to accuseHegel of hav<strong>in</strong>g begun with the po<strong>in</strong>t of view of the Absolute is an<strong>in</strong>dication that his actual procedure has been misconstrued. Absoluteknowledge does not, as Haym asserts, f<strong>in</strong>d its justification <strong>in</strong> the factthat “the Weltgeist has completed itself <strong>in</strong> history,” but, as we shall seelater, <strong>in</strong> the fact that it is the necessary presupposition of all concrete<strong>in</strong>dividual experience.Lotze, too, has brought practically the same accusation aga<strong>in</strong>st Hegel.“It was not after Hegel’s m<strong>in</strong>d,” he tells us, “to beg<strong>in</strong> by determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g thesubjective forms of thought, under which alone we can apprehend theconcrete nature of this ground of the Universe, — a nature perhaps to us<strong>in</strong>accessible. From the outset he looked on the motion of our thought <strong>in</strong>its effort to ga<strong>in</strong> a clear idea of this still obscure goal of our aspirationas the proper <strong>in</strong>ward development of the Absolute itself, which onlyneeded to be pursued consistently <strong>in</strong> order gradually to br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to consciousnessall that the universe conta<strong>in</strong>s.” 16 Now I submit that such anaccusation entirely overlooks the procedure of the Phenomenology <strong>in</strong>establish<strong>in</strong>g the category of absolute knowledge. The very purpose ofthis effort was ‘to determ<strong>in</strong>e the subjective forms of thought’ as theyappear <strong>in</strong> the know<strong>in</strong>g experience of the <strong>in</strong>dividual. It is true that Hegeldid not enter <strong>in</strong>to psychological discussion of <strong>in</strong>dividual m<strong>in</strong>ds; his aimwas epistemological <strong>and</strong> not psychological. 17 It is also true that he endedhis <strong>in</strong>vestigation by exhibit<strong>in</strong>g the essential objectivity of these so-called‘subjective forms’ of thought. But the fact still rema<strong>in</strong>s that he took hisst<strong>and</strong> on actual human experience <strong>and</strong> began his <strong>in</strong>quiry with commoneveryday consciousness. In the case of the Logic (provided one forgetsthe fact that the result of the Phenomenology is its presupposition) itmay be argued with some show of plausibility that from the outset theauthor regards thought as the “proper <strong>in</strong>ward development of the Abso-
12/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamlute itself.” But there can be no doubt whatever concern<strong>in</strong>g thebaselessness of the charge when made with reference to the Phenomenologyof Spirit. The category of absolute knowledge is not a firstpr<strong>in</strong>ciple shot out of a pistol at us, as it were, but a conclusion laboriouslyreached; <strong>and</strong> it is atta<strong>in</strong>ed only by a careful <strong>and</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>stak<strong>in</strong>g exam<strong>in</strong>ationof all stages of consciousness from the sensuous to the scientific<strong>and</strong> religious. Wherever there is a subject-object relation, there thecharacteristics of absolute knowledge are disclosed.Absolute knowledge be<strong>in</strong>g, then, Hegel’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the essentialcharacteristics of thought as it appears <strong>in</strong> every actual know<strong>in</strong>gexperience, the question arises concern<strong>in</strong>g the details of the conception.What are the fundamental characteristics of thought as def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> thisHegelian category? It is to an attempt to answer this question, partiallyat least, that we now address ourselves.In the first place, Hegel claims that his conception of absolute knowledgegives thought release from the subjectivity <strong>in</strong> which it was boundby both the Kantian <strong>and</strong> Fichtean systems. Kant, he admits, does <strong>in</strong>deedgive to thought a quasi-objectivity, namely, universal validity. “Kantgave the title objective to the <strong>in</strong>tellectual factor, to the universal <strong>and</strong>necessary; <strong>and</strong> he was quite justified <strong>in</strong> so do<strong>in</strong>g.” 18 That is to say, forKant objectivity means the universally valid <strong>in</strong> contradist<strong>in</strong>ction to theparticularity <strong>and</strong> relativity of sense-perception; <strong>and</strong> this is a step <strong>in</strong> theright direction towards true objectivity. “But after all,” Hegel cont<strong>in</strong>ues,“objectivity of thought, <strong>in</strong> Kant’s sense, is aga<strong>in</strong> to a certa<strong>in</strong> extent subjective.<strong>Thought</strong>s, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Kant, although universal <strong>and</strong> necessarycategories, are only our thoughts — separated by an impassable gulffrom the th<strong>in</strong>g, as it exists apart from our knowledge.” 19 In other words,Kant’s categories cannot, by their very nature, express the real: they aremere ideas, which can <strong>in</strong>deed tell us about the temporal <strong>and</strong> spatialrelations of objects, but which just for this reason can give us no <strong>in</strong>sight<strong>in</strong>to the nature of ultimate reality. Hegel elsewhere speaks of them asprisms through which the light of truth is so refracted <strong>and</strong> broken that itcan never be had <strong>in</strong> its purity. Such idealism, Hegel justly concludes, ispurely subjective. 20 Heroic as were Fichte’s efforts to break through toreality, they were, Hegel asserts, unavail<strong>in</strong>g. “Fichte,” he says, “neveradvanced beyond Kant’s conclusion, that the f<strong>in</strong>ite only is knowable,while the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite transcends the range of thought. What Kant calls theth<strong>in</strong>g-by-itself, Fichte calls the impulse from without, — that abstractionof someth<strong>in</strong>g else than ‘I,’ not otherwise describable or def<strong>in</strong>able
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/13than as the negative or non-Ego <strong>in</strong> general.” 21 To express it otherwise,Fichte, <strong>in</strong> his search for objectivity, f<strong>in</strong>ds noth<strong>in</strong>g more satisfactory thanan unatta<strong>in</strong>able ideal, an eternal Sollen. But this vanish<strong>in</strong>g ideal doesnot meet the difficulty; thought, which merely ought to be objective, isstill subjective, even though an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite time be allowed for transition toobjectivity. Consequently, Fichte’s position, like Kant’s, is <strong>in</strong> the lastanalysis noth<strong>in</strong>g more than subjective idealism. Now the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t ofabsolute knowledge, Hegel ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s, transcends the dualism <strong>in</strong> whichthe systems of Kant <strong>and</strong> Fichte seem hopelessly <strong>in</strong>volved. It gives tothought, not a quasi-objectivity or an objectivity that ought to be, but anobjectivity that is at once genu<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> actual.Hegel has left us <strong>in</strong> no doubt as to what he th<strong>in</strong>ks such an objectivityimplies. In the context of the above criticism of Kant, he says: “Thetrue objectivity of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g means that the thoughts, far from be<strong>in</strong>g merelyours, must at the same time be the real essence of the th<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>and</strong> ofwhatever is an object to us.” Later <strong>in</strong> the same context he tells us thatobjectivity means “the thought-apprehended essence of the exist<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g,<strong>in</strong> contradist<strong>in</strong>ction from what is merely our thought, <strong>and</strong> what consequentlyis still separated from the th<strong>in</strong>g itself, as it exists <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependentessence.” From these very explicit statements it is evident that objectivityof thought means for Hegel at least two th<strong>in</strong>gs: (a) that thought whichis truly objective is not particular <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual, but <strong>in</strong> a sense transcendsthe <strong>in</strong>dividual; <strong>and</strong> (b) that truly objective thought does actuallyexpress the essence of th<strong>in</strong>gs. A consideration of these two po<strong>in</strong>ts willnow occupy our attention for a time.The first of these po<strong>in</strong>ts, that thought is really more than an <strong>in</strong>dividualaffair, Hegel states very explicitly <strong>in</strong> the smaller Logic. In thetwenty-third section he asserts that thought is “no private or particularstate or act of the subject, but rather that attitude of consciousness wherethe abstract self, freed from all the special limitations to which its ord<strong>in</strong>arystates or qualities are liable, restricts itself to that universal action<strong>in</strong> which it is identical with all <strong>in</strong>dividuals.” Furthermore, he constantly<strong>in</strong>sists that the dialectic of thought is really der Gang der Sache selbst.“It is not the outward action of subjective thought, but the personal soulof the content, which unfolds its branches <strong>and</strong> fruit organically.” 22 Thequestion, however, at once arises, Are not such statements mean<strong>in</strong>gless?Is the “abstract self, freed from all the special limitations to whichits ord<strong>in</strong>ary states or qualities are liable,” anyth<strong>in</strong>g more than an hypostatizedentity? Do we know anyth<strong>in</strong>g about the ‘universal action’ of
14/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamthought apart from an <strong>in</strong>dividual experience? Is the f<strong>in</strong>ite knower merelya passive observer of the ‘march of the object,’ or of the organicallyunfold<strong>in</strong>g ‘soul of the content’? To meet the objection implied <strong>in</strong> thesequestions, a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary consideration is necessary.Every act of thought may be looked at from two po<strong>in</strong>ts of view. Itmay be regarded as a process <strong>in</strong> time, that is, as a mere psychologicalevent, or as a mean<strong>in</strong>g. As a process <strong>in</strong> time, it is a state of consciousnessamong other such states to which it is related <strong>and</strong> by reference towhich it may be expla<strong>in</strong>ed. As a mean<strong>in</strong>g, it is the expression of therelation of subject to object, the expression of which relation gives it itssignificance as an act of knowledge. Neither of these aspects of thoughtcan, of course, be neglected; a timeless act of thought is as much a nonentityas a mean<strong>in</strong>gless act of thought. But, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the twoaspects must not be confused; thought as a process <strong>in</strong> time is someth<strong>in</strong>gquite different from thought as a mean<strong>in</strong>g. Both po<strong>in</strong>ts of view are legitimate<strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong>deed, necessary <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with concrete mental experience.If, now, these ways of view<strong>in</strong>g thought be the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ts of psychology<strong>and</strong> epistemology, respectively, we are perfectly right <strong>in</strong> say<strong>in</strong>gthat, from the psychological po<strong>in</strong>t of view, thought is subjective <strong>and</strong>particular, while from the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of epistemology it is transsubjective.As a psychological process, thought is subjective <strong>and</strong> particular for thesimple reason that, when so viewed, it is noth<strong>in</strong>g more than an element<strong>in</strong> a complex presentation which at a particular moment makes up themental life of the <strong>in</strong>dividual subject. Even belief <strong>in</strong> a trans-subjectiveworld, the psychologist treats, as Professor Seth Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison says,“simply as a subjective fact; he analyzes its constituents <strong>and</strong> tells us thecomplex elements of which it is built up; he tells us with great precisionwhat we do believe, but so far as he is a pure psychologist he does notattempt to tell us whether our belief is true, whether we have real warrantfor it.” 23 Epistemology, on the contrary, necessarily transcends thissubjective st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of psychology. It deals, not with the know<strong>in</strong>g experienceof any particular m<strong>in</strong>d, not with knowledge as it is possessedby any particular subject, but with knowledge as it is <strong>in</strong> itself. Epistemologyf<strong>in</strong>ds its special field just <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the validity or falsity ofthe claims of our trans-subjective belief. Its bus<strong>in</strong>ess is to give us acriterion of truth, to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the subject-object relation with<strong>in</strong> experience<strong>and</strong> to develop its implications. In do<strong>in</strong>g this it must neglect theparticular experiences, or, to use Professor Bosanquet’s phrase, it mustabstract from the abstractions of psychology, <strong>and</strong> fix its attention upon
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/15the essential nature of knowledge qua knowledge. It does not, of course,deny the significance of the psychological aspect of thought, nor does ittry to escape from the implications of experience when read from thatangle of vision. It simply deals with thought from its own specific st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t,its aim be<strong>in</strong>g to h<strong>and</strong>le its data unencumbered as much as possibleby psychological considerations. 24Now, as I underst<strong>and</strong> Hegel, we can accuse him neither of confus<strong>in</strong>gthese two po<strong>in</strong>ts of view, nor of overlook<strong>in</strong>g one <strong>in</strong> his zeal for theother. As has been po<strong>in</strong>ted out, his <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the discussion of knowledgeis primarily epistemological <strong>in</strong> the sense above def<strong>in</strong>ed; <strong>and</strong> hekeeps consistently to this po<strong>in</strong>t of departure. He sees clearly that, fromthis po<strong>in</strong>t of view, knowledge must be <strong>in</strong>vestigated as it is <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> foritself <strong>and</strong> freed from the prejudices <strong>and</strong> preconceptions which attach toit <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual m<strong>in</strong>ds; if an adequate st<strong>and</strong>ard of truth is to be atta<strong>in</strong>ed,relativity <strong>in</strong> knowledge must be overcome. But it should be very carefullynoted that Hegel does not, at any rate need not, forget that thoughtis always a process <strong>in</strong> a know<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>d. The objectivity which he claimsfor thought <strong>in</strong> the category of absolute knowledge is claimed for thethought of every <strong>in</strong>dividual who knows; the truth of absolute experience,truth as it is <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> for itself, is simply the truth of the experiencesthat are here <strong>and</strong> now. This po<strong>in</strong>t I tried to emphasize at thebeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the discussion. Thus the ‘abstract self,’ freed from thelimitations of its ord<strong>in</strong>ary states <strong>and</strong> busy <strong>in</strong> its universal mode of action,turns out to be the f<strong>in</strong>ite self mak<strong>in</strong>g an unusually strenuous effortto be consistent. Genu<strong>in</strong>ely objective thought is not the private possessionof A or B; it is rather the thought activity <strong>in</strong> which, so far as theyare rational creatures, A <strong>and</strong> B participate. Even if we are fully conv<strong>in</strong>cedthat Hegel has gone too far <strong>in</strong> the identification of the f<strong>in</strong>ite knowerwith the Absolute, still we must admit the legitimacy <strong>and</strong> necessity ofthis dem<strong>and</strong> of the category of absolute knowledge. For if the subjectivity<strong>in</strong> which experience is <strong>in</strong>volved by the Kantian <strong>and</strong> Fichtean philosophiesis really to be transcended, experience must be given some form ofgenu<strong>in</strong>e objectivity; <strong>and</strong> if that form of objectivity is to be found <strong>in</strong>thought, then thought must be looked upon as it is <strong>in</strong> its essential nature<strong>and</strong> not as it appears <strong>in</strong> this or that <strong>in</strong>dividual m<strong>in</strong>d. And this, it wouldseem, is all that Hegel means when he says that truly objective thoughttranscends the <strong>in</strong>dividual experience.The second factor <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the conception of true objectivity,namely, the capacity of thought to express the essential nature of its
16/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamobject, Hegel shows to be the necessary presupposition of all know<strong>in</strong>gexperience. <strong>Thought</strong> must disclose the constitution of reality, he ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s,otherwise experience is doomed to a hopeless dualism. “The truthas such,” he tells us, “is essentially <strong>in</strong> knowledge.” 25 “Only <strong>in</strong> so far asreflection has relation to the Absolute is it reason <strong>and</strong> its activity that oftrue knowledge (Wissen).” 26 Every <strong>in</strong>dividual who knows does, by virtueof that very fact, transcend the dualism which seems to exist betweensubject <strong>and</strong> object; on any other assumption it is not easy to seehow experience can be brought <strong>in</strong>to actual contact with ultimate reality.To elaborate this argument is exactly what Hegel undertakes <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenology.He shows there by dialectical procedure how the lowest<strong>and</strong> most naive attitude of consciousness to its object subsumes the oppositionwhich prima facie seems such a barrier to the comprehensionof reality; such subsumption must be assumed, or we shall never be ableto say that experience <strong>and</strong> reality are one. One might summarily say,without do<strong>in</strong>g violence to Hegel’s own words, that the purpose of thePhenomenology is to show, <strong>in</strong> opposition to the Kantian philosophy,why the D<strong>in</strong>g-an-sich must be known <strong>and</strong> how it can be known. It mustbe known, because this is the presupposition of experience from its earliest<strong>and</strong> simplest stages; it can be known, because thought is no merelysubjective <strong>and</strong> private process go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> our heads, but <strong>in</strong> its veryessence is a significant relation to objects. Thus Hegel solves the problemof the opposition between subject <strong>and</strong> object by po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out thatthe problem is really made by our own abstract procedure <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>gwith experience. In po<strong>in</strong>t of fact, he tells us, there is no such opposition;on the contrary, the very fact that we can have significant knowledgeforces us to the conclusion that thought is truly objective, <strong>and</strong> that theobject is <strong>in</strong> reality as it is <strong>in</strong> knowledge.Hegel’s position on this po<strong>in</strong>t can, perhaps, be more clearly understoodwhen contrasted with Lotze’s view. In his Logic Lotze summarizeshis position thus: “We have conv<strong>in</strong>ced ourselves that this chang<strong>in</strong>gworld of our ideas is the sole material given us to work upon; that truth<strong>and</strong> the knowledge of truth consist only <strong>in</strong> the laws of <strong>in</strong>terconnectionwhich are found to obta<strong>in</strong> universally with<strong>in</strong> a given set of ideas.” 27Now when we recall that these ideas are for Lotze more or less subjective,mere ‘tools’ by means of which we somehow come <strong>in</strong> contact withreality, but through which the essence of objects can never be known,the contrast between his position <strong>and</strong> Hegel’s is pla<strong>in</strong>. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to theone, we are shut off from reality by means of the very tools we va<strong>in</strong>ly
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/17endeavor to work with; reality is a realm ‘whose marg<strong>in</strong> fades forever<strong>and</strong> forever’ as we move. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the other, we are never out oftouch with reality, s<strong>in</strong>ce to know is ipso facto to know the essentialnature of the objects of knowledge. To the former, truth is noth<strong>in</strong>g morethan consistency with<strong>in</strong> a given set of ideas; to the latter, truth is noth<strong>in</strong>gless than reality itself. In a word, on the theory of Lotze thought is afterall still subjective, still conf<strong>in</strong>ed to the abstract realm of bare universals,impotent to overtake the phantom reality it pursues: Hegel teaches, onthe contrary, that thought is essentially objective, that form <strong>and</strong> content<strong>in</strong>terpenetrate, that the process of knowledge is the process of th<strong>in</strong>gs.And this conception of the objectivity of thought, Hegel would urge, is anecessary presupposition of experience, unless <strong>in</strong>deed we are will<strong>in</strong>g toabide by the consequences of an epistemological dualism.But if thought expresses the essence of its object, then thought ipsofacto comprehends its object <strong>and</strong> so exhausts reality. This implicationof his doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the objectivity of thought Hegel not only recognizesbut <strong>in</strong>sists upon. “Conception is the penetration of the object, which isthen no longer opposed to me. From it I have taken its own peculiarnature, which it had as an <strong>in</strong>dependent object <strong>in</strong> opposition to me. AsAdam said to Eve, ‘Thou art flesh of my flesh <strong>and</strong> bone of my bone,’ sosays the Spirit, ‘This object is spirit of my spirit, <strong>and</strong> all alienation hasdisappeared.”’ 28 This same idea Hegel has <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d when he speaks ofthought as begreifendes Denken. “Begreifendes Denken,” says ProfessorMcGilvary, “is grasp<strong>in</strong>g, clutch<strong>in</strong>g thought, thought that grips itsobject as its own <strong>in</strong>alienable possession. Perhaps we might translate dasbegreifende Denken by the phrase ‘object-appropriat<strong>in</strong>g thought’; forthe logical relation of such thought to its object is analogous to the legalrelation of the master to the slave; the slave had no <strong>in</strong>dependent status;he stood only <strong>in</strong> his master, who engulfed him.” 29 Aga<strong>in</strong>, the one dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>gfeature between what Hegel terms ‘f<strong>in</strong>ite’ <strong>and</strong> ‘<strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite’ thoughtis that the latter destroys the opposition between form <strong>and</strong> content, whichopposition the former never transcends; as Hegel puts it, ‘f<strong>in</strong>ite’ thoughtis “subjective, arbitrary, <strong>and</strong> accidental,” while ‘<strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite’ thought is whatalone “can get really <strong>in</strong> touch with the supreme <strong>and</strong> true.” 30 And, ofcourse, it is ‘<strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite’ thought with which Hegel has to do <strong>in</strong> his categoryof absolute knowledge. Furthermore, <strong>in</strong> the Introduction to the largerLogic Hegel argues that to separate the form <strong>and</strong> content of knowledgeis to presuppose an external objective world which is <strong>in</strong>dependent ofthought; <strong>and</strong> this, he objects, is unjustifiable. 31 And later <strong>in</strong> the same
18/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamIntroduction, we read: “In logic we have noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with thoughtabout someth<strong>in</strong>g which lies <strong>in</strong>dependently outside of thought as the basisof it.” 32 F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> the smaller Logic, he asserts: “In the negativeunity of the Idea, the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite overlaps <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cludes the f<strong>in</strong>ite, thoughtoverlaps be<strong>in</strong>g, subjectivity overlaps objectivity.” 33 Other passages bear<strong>in</strong>gon this po<strong>in</strong>t might be quoted, did it seem necessary; but the abovepassages state very clearly Hegel’s position. In fact, the position is <strong>in</strong>evitably<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> his whole conception of the objectivity of knowledge.Truly objective knowledge cannot have opposed to it an unaccountableresiduum of fact, which it is unable to comprehend or <strong>in</strong>terpret;on the contrary, it must be conterm<strong>in</strong>ous with reality.The follow<strong>in</strong>g quotation from Mr. McTaggart presents an admirableantithesis to Hegel’s position here. “<strong>Thought</strong> is a process of mediation<strong>and</strong> relation, <strong>and</strong> implies someth<strong>in</strong>g immediate to be related,which cannot be found <strong>in</strong> thought. Even if a stage of thought could beconceived as exist<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> which it was self-subsistent, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> which ithad no reference to any data... at any rate this is not the ord<strong>in</strong>ary thoughtof common life. And as the dialectic process professes to start from abasis common to every one,... it is certa<strong>in</strong> that it will be necessary forthought, <strong>in</strong> the dialectic process, to have some relation to data givenimmediately, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent of that thought itself.” 34 It makes no differencethat this statement is given by the critic as an <strong>in</strong>terpretation ofHegel; it is <strong>in</strong> truth exactly contrary to Hegel’s view of the matter.<strong>Thought</strong>, as Hegel conceives of it, certa<strong>in</strong>ly has no data opposed to, <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>dependent of it; nor is it merely a process of mediation <strong>and</strong> relationamong phenomena external to it. It bears no relation whatever to immediatelygiven data, ‘nuclei’ of be<strong>in</strong>g, which lie outside of <strong>and</strong> beyond it,for there are no such. On the contrary, it transcends this dualism, <strong>and</strong>always f<strong>in</strong>ds itself ‘at home’ <strong>in</strong> its object from which every trace ofalienation has disappeared. 35 Perhaps I can best br<strong>in</strong>g out the contrastbetween Hegel’s real position <strong>and</strong> that attributed to him by his critic bylett<strong>in</strong>g him once more speak for himself: “If under the process of knowledgewe figure to ourselves an external operation <strong>in</strong> which it is brought<strong>in</strong>to a merely mechanical relation to an object, that is to say, rema<strong>in</strong>soutside it, <strong>and</strong> is only externally applied to it, knowledge is presented <strong>in</strong>such a relation as a particular th<strong>in</strong>g for itself, so that it may well be thatits forms have noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> common with the qualities of the object; <strong>and</strong>thus, when it concerns itself with an object, it rema<strong>in</strong>s only <strong>in</strong> its ownforms, <strong>and</strong> does not reach the essential qualities of the object, that is to
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/19say, does not become real knowledge of it. In such a relation knowledgeis determ<strong>in</strong>ed as f<strong>in</strong>ite, <strong>and</strong> as of the f<strong>in</strong>ite; <strong>in</strong> its object there rema<strong>in</strong>ssometh<strong>in</strong>g essentially <strong>in</strong>ner, whose notion is thus unatta<strong>in</strong>able by <strong>and</strong>foreign to knowledge, which f<strong>in</strong>ds here its limit <strong>and</strong> its end, <strong>and</strong> is onthat account limited <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ite.” So far we have a statement of the critic’sview with its attendant difficulties. By way of criticism <strong>and</strong> expositionof his own position, Hegel cont<strong>in</strong>ues: “But to take such a relation as theonly one, or as f<strong>in</strong>al or absolute, is a purely made-up <strong>and</strong> unjustifiableassumption of the Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Real knowledge, <strong>in</strong>asmuch as it doesnot rema<strong>in</strong> outside the object, but <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of fact occupies itself with it,must be immanent <strong>in</strong> the object, the proper movement of its nature, onlyexpressed <strong>in</strong> the form of thought <strong>and</strong> taken up <strong>in</strong>to consciousness.” 36This passage is self-explanatory, <strong>and</strong> comment on it seems superfluous.In it Hegel has simply po<strong>in</strong>ted out the <strong>in</strong>evitable dualism <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> theposition which Mr. McTaggart has attributed to him; <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> oppositionto such a position he has stated his own more objective st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>tAn objection which arises just here seems prima facie unanswerable.If it be true that thought actually does exhaust reality, then it mustbe that thought, or know<strong>in</strong>g experience, <strong>and</strong> reality co<strong>in</strong>cide. But cansuch a view possibly be seriously enterta<strong>in</strong>ed? Is it not nonsense to saythat thought is co-extensive with the real, when so much of our everydayexperience, our hopes, our fears, our loves, our hates, fall outsidethe th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g process? Can one be so mad as to attempt to reduce existentialreality to terms of ideas? Lotze has put the objection very forciblythus: “Noth<strong>in</strong>g is simpler than to conv<strong>in</strong>ce ourselves that every apprehend<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>telligence can only see th<strong>in</strong>gs as they look to it when it perceivesthem, not as they look when no one perceives them; he who dem<strong>and</strong>sa knowledge which should be more than a perfectly connected<strong>and</strong> consistent system of ideas about the th<strong>in</strong>g, a knowledge which shouldactually exhaust the th<strong>in</strong>g itself, is no longer ask<strong>in</strong>g for knowledge atall, but for someth<strong>in</strong>g entirely un<strong>in</strong>telligible.” 37 Mr. Bradley, <strong>in</strong> a classicpassage, has voiced the same feel<strong>in</strong>g: “Unless thought st<strong>and</strong>s for someth<strong>in</strong>gthat falls beyond mere <strong>in</strong>telligence, if ‘th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g’ is not used withsome strange implication that never was part of the mean<strong>in</strong>g of the word,a l<strong>in</strong>ger<strong>in</strong>g scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever bepurely rational.... The notion that existence could be the same as underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gstrikes as cold <strong>and</strong> ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. Thatthe glory of this world <strong>in</strong> the end is appearance leaves the world moreglorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensu-
20/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamous curta<strong>in</strong> is a deception <strong>and</strong> a cheat, if it hides some colourless movementof atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthlyballet of bloodless categories.” 38 Now Hegel’s answer to thisobjection is, I th<strong>in</strong>k, found <strong>in</strong> the second characteristic of thought as hehas def<strong>in</strong>ed it for us <strong>in</strong> absolute knowledge; <strong>and</strong> this we shall proceed atonce to exam<strong>in</strong>e.<strong>Thought</strong>, Hegel argues, is not mere abstract cognition, but, on thecontrary, is truly universal. In answer to Mr. Bradley he would say thatthought does st<strong>and</strong> for someth<strong>in</strong>g which falls beyond mere <strong>in</strong>telligence.That is to say, actual concrete thought, <strong>in</strong> Professor Bosanquet’s phraseology,is a process, not of selective omission, but of constructive analysis;its universals are syntheses of differences. 39 In Hegel’s own words:“The Notion is generally associated <strong>in</strong> our m<strong>in</strong>ds with abstract generality,<strong>and</strong> on that account it is often described as a general conception. Wespeak, accord<strong>in</strong>gly, of the notions of color, plant, animal, etc. They aresupposed to be arrived at by neglect<strong>in</strong>g the particular features whichdist<strong>in</strong>guish the different colors, plants, <strong>and</strong> animals from each other,<strong>and</strong> by reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g those common to them all. This is the aspect of theNotion which is familiar to the underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g; <strong>and</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong> the rightwhen it stigmatizes such hollow <strong>and</strong> empty notions as mere phantoms<strong>and</strong> shadows. But the universal of the Notion is not a mere sum offeatures common to several th<strong>in</strong>gs, confronted by a particular whichenjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the contrary, self-particulariz<strong>in</strong>gor self-specify<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> with undimmed clearness f<strong>in</strong>ds itself at home <strong>in</strong>its antithesis. For the sake both of cognition <strong>and</strong> of our practical conduct,it is of the utmost importance that the real universal should not beconfused with what is merely held <strong>in</strong> common. All those charges whichthe devotees of feel<strong>in</strong>g make aga<strong>in</strong>st thought, <strong>and</strong> especially aga<strong>in</strong>stphilosophic thought, <strong>and</strong> the reiterated statement that it is dangerous tocarry thought to what they call too great lengths, orig<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong> the confusionof these two th<strong>in</strong>gs.” 40 In other words, universality may mean twovery different th<strong>in</strong>gs. On the one h<strong>and</strong>, it may <strong>in</strong>dicate noth<strong>in</strong>g but abstractgenerality which is arrived at by neglect<strong>in</strong>g the marks peculiar toparticular objects. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, it may mean the synthetic analysisof the particulars, <strong>and</strong> so <strong>in</strong>clude with<strong>in</strong> itself the essential characteristicsof them. If one only remembers this dist<strong>in</strong>ction, <strong>and</strong> remembers thatthe true universal of thought is the subsumption, not the annihilation, ofthe particular, then, Hegel would say, there should be no objection raisedaga<strong>in</strong>st the assertion that ultimately the real is comprehended by thought.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/21For, <strong>in</strong> this mean<strong>in</strong>g of thought, experience <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g experience aresynonymous terms.There are various passages <strong>in</strong> which Hegel emphasizes this aspectof thought by <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that thought is not one mental faculty amongothers coord<strong>in</strong>ate with it, but that it is the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of universality <strong>in</strong>m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong> itself the other so-called mental faculties asessential elements. In his lectures on the History of Philosophy occurs acriticism of Kant which is very suggestive <strong>in</strong> this connection: “WithKant the th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> sensuousness are both someth<strong>in</strong>gparticular, <strong>and</strong> they are merely united <strong>in</strong> an external, superficial way,just as a piece of wood <strong>and</strong> a leg might be bound together with a cord.” 41Aga<strong>in</strong>st any such atomistic conception of the m<strong>in</strong>d Hegel would <strong>in</strong>sist:“Even our sense of the m<strong>in</strong>d’s liv<strong>in</strong>g unity naturally protests aga<strong>in</strong>st anyattempt to break it up <strong>in</strong>to different faculties, forces, or, what comes tothe same th<strong>in</strong>g, activities, conceived as <strong>in</strong>dependent of each other.” 42But he would go further than this. Not only does he ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that thoughtis not one element <strong>in</strong> an aggregate of disparate parts; he also urges thatthought is rather the very life of the one organic whole which we callm<strong>in</strong>d, “its very unadulterated self.” 43 For example, <strong>in</strong> the smaller Logiche asserts that thought is present <strong>in</strong> every perception <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> every mentalactivity. 44 “We simply cannot escape from thought,” he elsewheresays, “it is present <strong>in</strong> sensation, <strong>in</strong> cognition, <strong>and</strong> knowledge, <strong>in</strong> the<strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> volition, <strong>in</strong> so far as these are attributes of a humanm<strong>in</strong>d.” 45 In the Philosophy of Right we read: “Spirit <strong>in</strong> general is thought,<strong>and</strong> by thought man is dist<strong>in</strong>guished from the animal. But we must notimag<strong>in</strong>e that man is on one side th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> on another side will<strong>in</strong>g, asthough he had will <strong>in</strong> one pocket <strong>and</strong> thought <strong>in</strong> another. Such an idea isva<strong>in</strong>. The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between thought <strong>and</strong> will is only that between atheoretical <strong>and</strong> a practical relation. They are not two separate faculties.The will is a special way of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g; it is thought translat<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>in</strong>toreality; it is the impulse of thought to give itself reality.” 46 The conclusionof the whole matter is, that “<strong>in</strong> the human be<strong>in</strong>g there <strong>in</strong> only onereason, <strong>in</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g, volition, <strong>and</strong> thought.” 47Overlook<strong>in</strong>g this conception of universality <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e ofthought, Mr. McTaggart criticizes him for hold<strong>in</strong>g “that the highest activityof Spirit, <strong>in</strong> which all others are transcended <strong>and</strong> swallowed up, isthat of pure thought.” 48 Such a contention, we are <strong>in</strong>formed, ignores afact which Lotze has emphasized <strong>in</strong> many parts of his system. And thatfact is “that Spirit has two other aspects besides thought — namely,
22/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamvolition <strong>and</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g — which are as important as thought, <strong>and</strong> whichcannot be deduced from it, nor expla<strong>in</strong>ed by it.” 49 Now this criticismassumes that Hegel actually tried to reduce the contents of m<strong>in</strong>d to termsof abstract cognition. But, as we have just seen, such an assumption isentirely groundless. Hegel never thought of reduc<strong>in</strong>g will <strong>and</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g toknowledge, mean<strong>in</strong>g by knowledge what his critic means by it, namely,one of several coord<strong>in</strong>ate elements with<strong>in</strong> the life of m<strong>in</strong>d. What Hegelmeans by thought, when he asserts that it is conterm<strong>in</strong>ous with experience,is simply that pr<strong>in</strong>ciple by virtue of which experience is an organic<strong>and</strong> unitary whole. It is that life of m<strong>in</strong>d itself, which <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong>itself feel<strong>in</strong>g, will, <strong>and</strong> cognition, <strong>and</strong> which f<strong>in</strong>ds its very be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theexpression of this liv<strong>in</strong>g unity of the m<strong>in</strong>d’s activity. 50 For Hegel, thereis “only one reason, <strong>in</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g, volition, <strong>and</strong> thought.”After all, the difference between Hegel <strong>and</strong> his critics on this po<strong>in</strong>tis not so great as might at first appear. Mr. McTaggart is perfectlywill<strong>in</strong>g to admit that it is not impossible that these elements of m<strong>in</strong>d“might be found to be aspects of a unity which embraces <strong>and</strong> transcendsthem all”; but he is unwill<strong>in</strong>g to call this unity thought. 51 Mr. Bradley,likewise, dem<strong>and</strong>s an ultimate synthesis; but it must fall beyond thecategory of rationality. 52 Though Lotze states it as his conviction “thatthe nature of th<strong>in</strong>gs does not consist <strong>in</strong> thoughts, <strong>and</strong> that th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is notable to grasp it,” yet he goes so far as to say that “perhaps the wholem<strong>in</strong>d experiences <strong>in</strong> other forms of its action <strong>and</strong> passion the essentialmean<strong>in</strong>g of all be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> action.” 53 Thus it would seem that the realquarrel between Hegel <strong>and</strong> the critics is concern<strong>in</strong>g the real nature of thesynthesis. What the critics vaguely term an ultimate unity, Hegel prefersto call thought, reason, or Spirit. The former try to f<strong>in</strong>d a synthesis ofelements which they have def<strong>in</strong>ed as practically exclusive <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent,though, of course, not ontologically separable from each other;<strong>and</strong> they seek this synthetic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>in</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g or <strong>in</strong>tuition, — someth<strong>in</strong>gultra-rational. Hegel, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong>sists that m<strong>in</strong>d is anorganic unity, <strong>and</strong> that it is such only by virtue of its own most characteristicactivity; it is a one reason. Every concrete act of knowledge, heargues, is an activity of the whole m<strong>in</strong>d; <strong>and</strong> this unitary, synthetic activitycan be made <strong>in</strong>telligible <strong>and</strong> given true objectivity, not, as thecritics seem to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> terms of <strong>in</strong>tuition or feel<strong>in</strong>g, but only <strong>in</strong>terms of rationality. And reflection on the po<strong>in</strong>t will, I th<strong>in</strong>k, conv<strong>in</strong>ceus that Hegel is <strong>in</strong> the right. 54We are now <strong>in</strong> a position to expose another aspect of the current
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/23misconception of Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of universality. The misconceptionconcerns Hegel’s supposed identification of thought <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> is,perhaps, one of the most prolific sources of adverse criticism of theHegelian philosophy. I refer to the prevalent view, implied <strong>in</strong> the abovequotations from Mr. Bradley <strong>and</strong> Lotze, which Professor Seth Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison expresses thus: “The result of Hegel’s procedure would reallybe to sweep ‘existential reality’ off the board altogether, under the persuasion,apparently, that a full statement of all the thought-relationsthat constitute our knowledge of the th<strong>in</strong>g is equivalent to the existentth<strong>in</strong>g itself. On the contrary, it may be confidently asserted that there isno more identity of Know<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g with an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ity of such relationsthan there was with one.” 55Now this idea that Hegel tried to reduce th<strong>in</strong>gs to pure thought aboutth<strong>in</strong>gs, or that he for a moment ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that thought could possiblybe the existent th<strong>in</strong>g, seems to me a monstrous mis<strong>in</strong>terpretation of hisreal mean<strong>in</strong>g. It is <strong>in</strong>consistent with the presupposition of his wholephilosophy, namely, that reality is essentially a subject-object relation.It is also <strong>in</strong>consistent with the explicit statements quoted above concern<strong>in</strong>gthe universality of the Notion, which always <strong>in</strong>volves particularity.And, as we shall see <strong>in</strong> the next chapter, he emphatically repudiatessuch a view <strong>in</strong> his account of mediation <strong>and</strong> the function of the negative<strong>in</strong> thought. But, apart from these facts, it seems that we might creditHegel with sufficient acumen to see the <strong>in</strong>herent absurdity of such aposition. Surely he saw the contradiction <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> an attempt to atta<strong>in</strong>by thought an ideal which would result <strong>in</strong> the annihilation of thoughtitself. Indeed, was it not Hegel who first impressed upon us the fact thatknowledge always requires an object, <strong>and</strong> that, if that object be takenaway, knowledge itself ceases to be? As Professor Jones has said: “It is<strong>in</strong>consistent with the possibility of knowledge that it should be the realityit represents: knowledge is <strong>in</strong>compatible alike with s<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g the real <strong>in</strong>the ideal, <strong>and</strong> the ideal <strong>in</strong> the real.” 56 And I th<strong>in</strong>k we are safe <strong>in</strong> say<strong>in</strong>gthat Hegel was well aware of this truth; his essential disagreement withSp<strong>in</strong>oza is that <strong>in</strong> the Sp<strong>in</strong>ozistic philosophy object is reduced to <strong>and</strong>identified with subject.Hegel seems to have taken special pa<strong>in</strong>s that he should not be misunderstoodon this po<strong>in</strong>t. The passages already quoted might be paralleledwith others just as positive. I shall content myself, however, withadd<strong>in</strong>g only two which show, as pla<strong>in</strong>ly as words can show, that theauthor was not an advocate of the theory of abstract identity. The first
24/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamof these is to be found <strong>in</strong> the eighty-second section of the smaller Logic:“If we say that the absolute is the unity of subjective <strong>and</strong> objective, weare undoubtedly <strong>in</strong> the right, but so far one-sided, as we enunciate theunity only <strong>and</strong> lay the accent upon it, forgett<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong> reality the subjective<strong>and</strong> objective are not merely identical but also dist<strong>in</strong>ct.” In thePhilosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d is found the other passage, which so well forestallsthe above criticism <strong>and</strong> so forcefully emphasizes the necessity of dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>gbetween merely formal identity <strong>and</strong> concrete unity that I maybe pardoned for quot<strong>in</strong>g it at length: “The close of philosophy is not theplace, even <strong>in</strong> a general exoteric discussion, to waste a word on what a‘Notion’ means. But as the view taken of this relation is closely connectedwith the view taken of philosophy generally <strong>and</strong> with all imputationsaga<strong>in</strong>st it, we may still add the remark that though philosophycerta<strong>in</strong>ly has to do with unity <strong>in</strong> general, it is not however with abstractunity, mere identity, <strong>and</strong> the empty absolute, but with concrete unity (theNotion), <strong>and</strong> that <strong>in</strong> its whole course it has to do with noth<strong>in</strong>g else; thateach step <strong>in</strong> its advance is a peculiar term or phase of this concreteunity, <strong>and</strong> that the deepest <strong>and</strong> last expression of unity is the unity ofabsolute m<strong>in</strong>d itself. Would-be judges <strong>and</strong> critics of philosophy mightbe recommended to familiarize themselves with these phases of unity<strong>and</strong> to take the trouble to get acqua<strong>in</strong>ted with them.... But they show solittle acqua<strong>in</strong>tance with them... that, when they of unity — <strong>and</strong> relationipso facto implies unity — they rather stick fast at quite abstract <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ateunity, <strong>and</strong> lose sight of the chief po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>in</strong>terest — the specialmode <strong>in</strong> which the unity is qualified. Hence all they can say aboutphilosophy is that dry identity is its pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>and</strong> result, <strong>and</strong> that it is thesystem of Identity. Stick<strong>in</strong>g fast to the undigested thought of identity,they have laid h<strong>and</strong>s on, not the concrete unity, the notion <strong>and</strong> content ofphilosophy, but rather its reverse.” 57 If <strong>in</strong> these passages Hegel does notdeny any attempt to arrive at the blank identification of thought <strong>and</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g, of subject <strong>and</strong> object, <strong>and</strong> if <strong>in</strong> them he does not criticize such agoal as an essentially mistaken ideal of philosophical <strong>in</strong>quiry, then sofar as I am concerned the import of the passages is lost. Surely by concreteunity he means someth<strong>in</strong>g quite different from abstract identity, —<strong>and</strong> concrete unity is that with which philosophy, as he conceives it, hasto do.It seems only fair to <strong>in</strong>sist that such considerations as the preced<strong>in</strong>gbe taken <strong>in</strong>to account before Hegel is accused of attempt<strong>in</strong>g that whichis at once impossible <strong>and</strong> absurd. He never had any idea of reduc<strong>in</strong>g the
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/25‘choir of heaven’ <strong>and</strong> the multifarious passions of the human soul to a‘ballet of bloodless categories.’ Such an attempt would have seemed toHegel as nonsensical as it seems to his critics. When he speaks of theunity of thought <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, he always means identity <strong>in</strong> difference, <strong>and</strong>never the undifferentiated identity of Schell<strong>in</strong>g’s system. And when heasserts that subject comprehends object, he does not mean to reduceexperience to abstract subject, as did Sp<strong>in</strong>oza. He does <strong>in</strong>deed <strong>in</strong>sistupon unity, but it is always upon concrete unity, the unity of the ‘Notion’;<strong>and</strong> this unity does not annihilate or even harm its differences. Ina word, Hegel transcends dualism, <strong>and</strong> yet, at the same time, does justiceto the duality with<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> essential to experience. He neither deniesnor attempts to expla<strong>in</strong> away the factual side of experience; he simplydenies that an <strong>in</strong>explicable datum has any part or lot with<strong>in</strong> experience.Not immediacy, but abstract immediacy, immediacy apart from <strong>in</strong>terpretation,is unreal.This chapter may be brought to an end by an attempt to state <strong>in</strong> oneparagraph its essential po<strong>in</strong>ts. Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of thought, philosophicthought, is given <strong>in</strong> the category of absolute knowledge, which is arrivedat through the procedure of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Theconception is thus based directly upon our actual know<strong>in</strong>g experience,<strong>and</strong> claims to give us an account of thought as it essentially is. <strong>Thought</strong>,as here def<strong>in</strong>ed, is genu<strong>in</strong>ely objective, transcend<strong>in</strong>g the relativity of<strong>in</strong>dividual experiences <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g the determ<strong>in</strong>ation of th<strong>in</strong>gs as they are<strong>in</strong> themselves. But this is not to say that reality is identical with abstractcognition. For thought f<strong>in</strong>ds its capacity to express the real <strong>in</strong> the factthat its universals are always the syntheses of differences, <strong>and</strong> not theblank universals of purely formal logic. Actual liv<strong>in</strong>g thought <strong>in</strong>cludeswith<strong>in</strong> itself the data of so-called <strong>in</strong>tuitive perception, of feel<strong>in</strong>g, of volition,of cognition, <strong>and</strong> it is adequately conceived of only as this unify<strong>in</strong>gpr<strong>in</strong>ciple of experience; it is the liv<strong>in</strong>g unity of m<strong>in</strong>d, the one reasonwhich appears <strong>in</strong> every mental activity. Therefore, when Hegel teachesthat thought is conterm<strong>in</strong>ous with the real, he is simply stat<strong>in</strong>g the doctr<strong>in</strong>ethat experience <strong>and</strong> reality are one.
26/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamChapter IIThe Process of <strong>Thought</strong>: Mediation <strong>and</strong>Negation.In criticism of Hegel’s position that the science of Philosophy can adequatelyexpress the nature of the ultimately real, Mr. McTaggart says:“Philosophy itself is knowledge, it is neither action nor feel<strong>in</strong>g. Andthere seems noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s account of it to <strong>in</strong>duce us to change themean<strong>in</strong>g of the word <strong>in</strong> this respect.” 58 I quote this criticism because itconta<strong>in</strong>s an assumption which I wish to challenge, <strong>and</strong> thus sets theproblem for the present chapter. The assumption is that philosophicalthought, as Hegel def<strong>in</strong>es it, is bare cognition to which the other aspectsof the mental life bear only an external relation, that it is simply oneamong other elements coord<strong>in</strong>ate with it, <strong>and</strong> that, consequently, it canat most be only a mediat<strong>in</strong>g activity among these other elements of experiencewhich forever lie beyond <strong>and</strong> external to it. It is the justice ofthis assumption which the follow<strong>in</strong>g pages will call <strong>in</strong> question. Wehave already seen, <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g chapter, that such a position is foreignto Hegel’s system, <strong>and</strong> that philosophy for him is action <strong>and</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>gas well as cognition. But it may be well to emphasize the fact fromanother po<strong>in</strong>t of view. So we now address ourselves to the task of establish<strong>in</strong>gthe thesis that Hegel’s account of philosophy does force us togive to the word a mean<strong>in</strong>g essentially different from that which theabove criticism attaches to it. We shall support this thesis with an expositionof the process of philosophical knowledge as it is presented <strong>in</strong>Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of mediation <strong>and</strong> negation.In the preface to the Phenomenology of Sprit, 59 Hegel has been atpa<strong>in</strong>s to po<strong>in</strong>t out that, if we are to appreciate what he means by philosophy<strong>and</strong> the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t which it assumes, we must make an effort tounderst<strong>and</strong> what he means by absolute knowledge <strong>and</strong> by mediation. Inthe preced<strong>in</strong>g chapter we <strong>in</strong>vestigated the nature <strong>and</strong> significance ofabsolute knowledge. And that <strong>in</strong>vestigation showed us that absoluteknowledge is simply Hegel’s def<strong>in</strong>ition of the essential nature of thoughtas he uses the term, <strong>and</strong> that thought as thus def<strong>in</strong>ed is more than abstractcognition s<strong>in</strong>ce it is both genu<strong>in</strong>ely objective <strong>and</strong> truly universal.In the present chapter it is our aim to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the nature of mediation,to learn if we can what Hegel has to say about the activity ofthought <strong>and</strong> about its function as a mediat<strong>in</strong>g process. The discussionhere will, presumably, elaborate further <strong>and</strong> strengthen the conclusions
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/27which we have already reached, by show<strong>in</strong>g how philosophical knowledge,<strong>in</strong> the Hegelian system, is more than a mere mediat<strong>in</strong>g activityamong phenomena external to it.It may be helpful at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to state <strong>in</strong> a general way the orderof the discussion before us. No detailed account of the dialectical process,nor any defense of the dialectical method with reference to thedevelopment of the categories <strong>in</strong> the Logic will be attempted here. Ourpresent purpose is a less ambitious one. We shall simply state, as bestwe may, what Hegel means by thought as a process of mediation, <strong>and</strong>what is his real contention when he says that negation is the vital <strong>and</strong>potent element <strong>in</strong> this process. In accordance with this purpose, therefore,we shall beg<strong>in</strong> our study with a consideration of immediacy <strong>and</strong>mediation; <strong>and</strong> this will lead us on to a discussion of negation, which weshall be forced to defend aga<strong>in</strong>st certa<strong>in</strong> misconceptions that have givenrise to some unjustifiable criticisms of Hegel. Our general conclusionwill be that thought, as the Hegelian system def<strong>in</strong>es it from this po<strong>in</strong>t ofview, is a process of mediation which, because of the negative element<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> it, makes it possible for us to say that reality is comprehended<strong>in</strong> thought; for its universals assume the form, not of abstract<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate immediacy, but of concrete determ<strong>in</strong>ate immediacy, thatis, <strong>in</strong>dividuality.Before pass<strong>in</strong>g directly to a consideration of Hegel’s conception ofmediation <strong>and</strong> immediacy, steps should be taken to avoid a possibleerror of <strong>in</strong>terpretation. And this precaution will also serve us as a po<strong>in</strong>tof departure <strong>in</strong> our discussion. Absolutely pure immediacy, immediacyexclusive of mediation, is mean<strong>in</strong>gless for Hegel. This, of course, followsat once from what was said <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g chapter concern<strong>in</strong>gthe objectivity of thought: these is no <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate given. A few quotations,however’ will settle the matter. “We must reject the oppositionbetween an <strong>in</strong>dependent immediacy <strong>in</strong> the contents or facts of consciousness<strong>and</strong> an equally <strong>in</strong>dependent mediation, supposed <strong>in</strong>compatible withthe former. The <strong>in</strong>compatibility is a mere assumption, an arbitrary assertion.”60 Aga<strong>in</strong>, we read: “There is noth<strong>in</strong>g, noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> heaven, <strong>in</strong>nature, <strong>in</strong> spirit, or anywhere else which does not conta<strong>in</strong> both immediacy<strong>and</strong> mediation.” 61 The whole of the second part of the Logic, weare told, is “a discussion of the <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sic <strong>and</strong> self-affirm<strong>in</strong>g unity ofimmediacy <strong>and</strong> mediation.” 62 Only the abstract underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g separatesthe two, <strong>and</strong> then it f<strong>in</strong>ds itself utterly helpless to reconcile them. 63 It isthe bus<strong>in</strong>ess of philosophy, however, to disclose the fallacy <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>
28/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamsuch arbitrary procedure, <strong>and</strong> to br<strong>in</strong>g to consciousness the fact of theessential <strong>in</strong>separability of that which is immediate <strong>and</strong> that which ismediated. 64 “Even if we take up an empirical, an external attitude, itwill be found that there is noth<strong>in</strong>g at all that is immediate, that there isnoth<strong>in</strong>g to which only the quality of immediacy belongs to the exclusionof that of mediation, but that what is immediate is likewise mediated,<strong>and</strong> that immediacy itself is essentially mediated.” 65 From these explicitstatements it is unmistakably clear that, whatever Hegel may mean byimmediacy <strong>and</strong> mediation, they are <strong>in</strong>dissolubly associated with eachother.The conclusion to which we are thus led is that immediacy is theresult of at least partial mediation, or, as Hegel prefers to say, that “immediacyitself is essentially mediated.” The degree of truth to which thevarious stages of immediacy can lay claim depends upon the amount, orrather the exhaustiveness, of the mediation <strong>in</strong>volved. That is to say,imperfect mediation results <strong>in</strong> an immediacy which is only partially true;immediacy becomes entirely true only when it is exhaustively mediated.This fact might be illustrated by any category of the Logic. Be<strong>in</strong>g, forexample, is really viewed <strong>in</strong> its truth only when it is seen <strong>in</strong> the light ofthe Absolute Idea; <strong>and</strong> the same is true of all other lower forms of immediacy.The Absolute Idea itself is the ultimately true immediate solelybecause it is the perfectly mediated. The nature of true immediacy willthus appear as we determ<strong>in</strong>e the essential nature of the process of mediationof which it is the result.A po<strong>in</strong>t which will be of great importance to us when we come to<strong>in</strong>quire concern<strong>in</strong>g Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the ultimately real emerges here.We have just said that the completely mediated is for Hegel the ultimatelytrue. Now when we remember that he identifies the ultimatelytrue <strong>and</strong> the ultimately real, we are led at once to the important conclusionthat the real is the result of this process of mediation. As Hegelviews the matter, the various stages of immediacy are more or less concreteaccord<strong>in</strong>g as the mediation <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> each is more nor less exhaustive;the completely mediated immediacy is noth<strong>in</strong>g more nor lessthan the concreteness of reality itself. The Absolute Idea is an immediacywhich is completely mediated; it is therefore the ultimately realcategory, the very expression of reality itself. <strong>Reality</strong> thus is a matter ofmediation. This po<strong>in</strong>t will serve as the basis of our discussion of Hegel’sdoctr<strong>in</strong>e of the nature of reality. But for the present we are <strong>in</strong>terested towork out the nature of this process of mediation itself.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/29If we turn to the preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit, we f<strong>in</strong>dthere Hegel’s formal def<strong>in</strong>ition of the process of mediation. Mediation,he there tells us, is “noth<strong>in</strong>g other than self-uniformity(Sichselbstgleichheit) develop<strong>in</strong>g itself; or it is reflection <strong>in</strong>to itself, themoment of the Ego which exists for itself (des fürsichseienden Ich),pure negativity, or, degraded from its pure abstraction, simple becom<strong>in</strong>g.”66 A page or two preced<strong>in</strong>g this passage he asserts that, accord<strong>in</strong>gto his view, the whole matter reduces to this: “Truth is to be conceivedof <strong>and</strong> expressed, not as Substance, but as Subject. At the same time itis to be noted that substantiality <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>in</strong> itself both that which is theimmediacy of knowledge itself, namely, the universal, <strong>and</strong> that which isthe immediacy for knowledge, namely, Be<strong>in</strong>g....” 67The first of these passages gives us Hegel’s conception of the nature<strong>and</strong> characteristics of the process of mediation; the second emphasizesthe nature of the result of the process. Taken together, the mean<strong>in</strong>g ofthe two seems to be this. If we def<strong>in</strong>e truth as substance, our def<strong>in</strong>itionis so far right; both thought <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, both the particular <strong>and</strong> the universal,are <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the def<strong>in</strong>ition. But the <strong>in</strong>adequacy of this def<strong>in</strong>itionlies <strong>in</strong> the fact that It fails to expla<strong>in</strong> satisfactorily the relation ofthese two aspects of experiences. <strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g are left exist<strong>in</strong>gside by side, as it were, <strong>in</strong> a blank identity devoid of differences, whichidentity, like Schell<strong>in</strong>g’s, “is absolutely presupposed without any attemptbe<strong>in</strong>g made to show that this is the truth.” 68 The attempt to showthat this is the truth <strong>in</strong>evitably leads us, Hegel th<strong>in</strong>ks, to the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>tof subject, to the conception of identity <strong>in</strong> difference which is the centralfact of consciousness. Now the process of exhibit<strong>in</strong>g this necessity isthe process of mediation, which, when the goal is once reached, appears<strong>in</strong> its true light as the expression of the <strong>in</strong>terrelation of the parts of anorganic whole which itself exists for itself. When viewed from the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>tof the lower stages of immediacy, mediation seems merely theexpression of an external relation among phenomena more or less <strong>in</strong>dependentof each other; but when it is looked at <strong>in</strong> its real nature, when itis viewed sub specie aeternitatis, it is seen to be the expression of thenecessary <strong>and</strong> vital <strong>in</strong>terconnection of phenomena which themselves havesignificance only as parts of a comprehensive unity. Summariz<strong>in</strong>g, then,we may say that the process of mediation is a development towardsgreater determ<strong>in</strong>ateness <strong>and</strong> the progressive substitution of necessary<strong>and</strong> vital, for seem<strong>in</strong>gly accidental <strong>and</strong> arbitrary, connections amongphenomena; <strong>and</strong> such a development is from the abstract to the con-
30/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamcrete, its f<strong>in</strong>al goal be<strong>in</strong>g the concreteness of reality itself. As Hegelhimself elsewhere expresses it: “The progress of development is equivalentto further determ<strong>in</strong>ation, <strong>and</strong> this means further immersion <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> afuller grasp of the Idea itself.” 69A glance at Hegel’s criticisms of Jacobi’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of immediacywill give us an <strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to his own doctr<strong>in</strong>e of mediation It will accord<strong>in</strong>glybe well for us to notice this criticism before pass<strong>in</strong>g on. But firstlet us rem<strong>in</strong>d ourselves of what <strong>in</strong> general are the nature <strong>and</strong> significanceof Jacobi’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e.The chief significance of Jacobi’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e, for our purposes at anyrate, is its <strong>in</strong>sistence that after all there is an ultimate reality with whichwe must somehow come <strong>in</strong> contact. “Reason,” he. tells us, “pla<strong>in</strong>ly presupposesthe true, as the outer sense space <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner sense time, <strong>and</strong>exists only as the faculty of this presupposition. So that where this presuppositionis want<strong>in</strong>g there is no reason The true must therefore bepossessed by man just as certa<strong>in</strong>ly as he possesses reason.” 70 Reason“affords us a knowledge of supersensible objects, that is, affords usassurance of their reality <strong>and</strong> truth.” 71 This <strong>in</strong>sistence upon the ultimate<strong>in</strong>telligibility of reality is an important po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> Jacobi’s philosophy, <strong>and</strong>Hegel does not fail to call attention to it. But, notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g Hegel’srecognition of this po<strong>in</strong>t, he yet criticizes Jacobi, as he does Kant, fordeny<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> fact that reality can be known. 72 And we are compelled toadmit the justice of the criticism. For Jacobi’s only medium throughwhich reality can be known, though at times he calls it reason as above,is <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of fact different from reason; it is someth<strong>in</strong>g which lies beyondreason, a k<strong>in</strong>d of <strong>in</strong>tuition, a form of immediate knowledge fromwhich all mediation is excluded. From this form of know<strong>in</strong>g the categoriesof thought are, to some extent at least, banished as useless. Ofcourse, this is no place to enter <strong>in</strong>to the disputed question whether, <strong>in</strong> hisconception of immediacy, Jacobi attempted to get rid entirely of thecategories of thought; to solve this problem is not necessary for ourpresent purpose. However the problem may be solved, there can be nodoubt that Jacobi contemned mediation <strong>in</strong> his grasp of that immediacywhich is the ultimately real, <strong>and</strong> that he arrived at his goal only bymeans of a salto mortale, baldly assert<strong>in</strong>g that “sometime or other everyphilosophy must have recourse to a miracle.” 73Now, from Hegel’s po<strong>in</strong>t of view, this Jacobian position, if true,would be the death-knell of all philosophy <strong>and</strong> would reduce us to absoluterelativity. It corroborates the ‘comfortable view’ that study, pa<strong>in</strong>s-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/31tak<strong>in</strong>g effort <strong>and</strong> diligent application are not <strong>in</strong> the least essential to thesearch after truth: truth is given, is thrust upon us <strong>in</strong> immediate, <strong>in</strong>tuitiveperception. But this is a dangerous attitude, Hegel urges. It may bethat God gives to His beloved <strong>in</strong> sleep; but, so far as we can see, thatwhich is given <strong>in</strong> sleep is usually discovered to be simply the wares ofsleep. In less figurative language, if truth is a matter of feel<strong>in</strong>g, howeverhigh above reason the feel<strong>in</strong>g may be supposed to st<strong>and</strong>, then it is relative<strong>and</strong> the search for it is useless: <strong>in</strong>dividual perception, immediate<strong>in</strong>tuition, or what not, is too prone to cater to <strong>in</strong>dividual prejudices <strong>and</strong>prepossessions. “What has its root only <strong>in</strong> my feel<strong>in</strong>gs, is only for me; itis m<strong>in</strong>e, but not its own; it has no <strong>in</strong>dependent existence <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> foritself.” 74 Hence, if ultimate reality is <strong>and</strong> can be only an object of feel<strong>in</strong>g,whether that feel<strong>in</strong>g be called <strong>in</strong>tuition, faith, immediate certa<strong>in</strong>ty,or ultra-rational perception, then there is absolutely no reason why thereal should not be denied objectivity; on the contrary, there seems to beevery reason to urge that it is reduced to purely subjective terms. Hegelmakes merry over this predicament of the Jacobian philosophy, <strong>and</strong> sarcasticallyexclaims: “Truth is <strong>in</strong> a bad way, when all metaphysics isdone away with, <strong>and</strong> the only philosophy acknowledged is not a philosophyat all!” 75But fortunately for truth it is not <strong>in</strong> this sad predicament. In support<strong>in</strong>gthis position Jacobi overlooks the fact that short-cuts <strong>in</strong> philosophyare as useless <strong>and</strong> hurtful as they are <strong>in</strong> any other field where assiduous<strong>and</strong> patient toil is an absolute requisite. Philosophy, the discoveryof truth, does not depend upon a miracle, as Jacobi asserts, but uponhard work. Jacobi was led to his false position by his misconception ofthe nature of thought as a mediat<strong>in</strong>g activity. This Hegel sees clearly<strong>and</strong> criticizes sharply <strong>and</strong> decisively. As Jacobi conceives the matter,the mediation of thought is merely a progression from f<strong>in</strong>ite to f<strong>in</strong>ite,from conditioned to condition<strong>in</strong>g which is <strong>in</strong> turn conditioned. 76 It is aprocess of mediation among phenomena quasi-mechanically related toeach other; thus it can be noth<strong>in</strong>g but a regresses ad <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itum. The endof this <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite regress cannot be anyth<strong>in</strong>g more than a blank abstraction,the empty absolute, a barren identity of thought <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g. 77 Theultimately real must lie beyond such knowledge, s<strong>in</strong>ce to know it wouldbe to limit it <strong>and</strong> a limited absolute is a contradiction <strong>in</strong> terms. 78 Thusthere is an impassable gulf set between the f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>and</strong> conditioned <strong>and</strong>the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>and</strong> unconditioned, between the realm of that which seems<strong>and</strong> that which really is. And the process of mediation is arbitrarily
32/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamconf<strong>in</strong>ed to the former sphere. True immediacy, therefore, that immediacywhich can be predicated of reality, must exclude all mediation. 79So the real task of philosophy is to leap the gulf which cannot be bridged;<strong>and</strong> it accomplishes this miracle <strong>in</strong> order to f<strong>in</strong>d outside of the ken ofhuman knowledge that which makes human knowledge possible, namely,the ultimately true. But, Hegel argues, this ridiculous contention is basedupon a false view of the mediat<strong>in</strong>g activity of thought. True mediation isnot external mediation. Instead of lead<strong>in</strong>g only from the conditioned tothe condition<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite regress, it transforms the conditioned <strong>in</strong>tothe self-condition<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> so discloses the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>and</strong> unconditioned justwith<strong>in</strong> the realm of the f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>and</strong> conditioned. Likewise, true immediacydoes not consist <strong>in</strong> transcend<strong>in</strong>g mediation; on the contrary, it is thesubsumption of mediation, the unity <strong>in</strong> a higher synthesis of mediatedfactors. 80 We may put the whole matter <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s own words: “Immediateknowledge, like mediated knowledge, is entirely one-sided. Whatis true is their unity, an immediate knowledge which is likewise mediated,someth<strong>in</strong>g mediated which is likewise simple <strong>in</strong> itself, which isimmediate reference to itself... Here is union, <strong>in</strong> which the difference ofthose characteristics is done away with, while at the same time, be<strong>in</strong>gpreserved ideally, they have the higher dest<strong>in</strong>y of serv<strong>in</strong>g as the pulse ofvitality, the impulse, movement, unrest of the spiritual as of the naturallife.” 81A brief statement of the contrast between Jacobi <strong>and</strong> Hegel on thispo<strong>in</strong>t will serve to put <strong>in</strong> relief Hegel’s view of the matter. Jacobi wouldfully agree with Hegel that “the only content which can be held to be thetruth is one not mediated with someth<strong>in</strong>g else, not limited by otherth<strong>in</strong>gs.” 82 And from this both would agree <strong>in</strong> draw<strong>in</strong>g the conclusionthat the ultimately true must be immediate But here they would partcompany; of the nature of this immediate they would have exactly antitheticalconceptions. By immediate Jacobi would mean that which isgiven <strong>in</strong>dependently of all mediation whatsoever; while Hegel wouldmean by it a completely mediated content, a content “mediated by itself,where mediation <strong>and</strong> immediate reference-to-self co<strong>in</strong>cide.” 83 WhereasJacobi conceives of ultimate reality as the postulate of immediate <strong>in</strong>tuition,Hegel def<strong>in</strong>es it as the result of mediat<strong>in</strong>g thought: to the one, trueimmediacy is void of any trace of mediation; while to the other, it isnoth<strong>in</strong>g but perfect mediation. This difference between the two th<strong>in</strong>kersconcern<strong>in</strong>g immediacy, is, of course, due to the fact that their views ofthe mediat<strong>in</strong>g activity of thought are different. Jacobi conceives of the
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/33process as one of simple negation, which passes from content to contentwithout be<strong>in</strong>g any the richer for its w<strong>and</strong>er<strong>in</strong>gs; it forever pursues a goalwhich eternally lies beyond its grasp. Hegel, on the contrary, views theprocess, not as one of mere negation, but as one of determ<strong>in</strong>ate negation;one which “holds fast the positive <strong>in</strong> the negative,” <strong>in</strong>cludes itscontent with<strong>in</strong> itself, <strong>and</strong> passes by means of the negative <strong>in</strong>to a highersynthesis <strong>in</strong> which is preserved the truth of the mediated factors. 84And this br<strong>in</strong>gs us to a consideration of negation, that aspect ofthought which gives it its possibility as a mediat<strong>in</strong>g activity. I th<strong>in</strong>k itmay be justly said that an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of this Hegelian conception isabsolutely essential to a correct appreciation of the system. As the authorhimself says more than once, it is the very soul <strong>and</strong> vitality of thedialectic; it is that by virtue of which the dialectic leads us to the concretefullness of the Absolute Idea itself. Let us first try to grasp itssignificance, <strong>and</strong> we shall then be <strong>in</strong> a position to see how it has beenmisunderstood. It has been said that <strong>in</strong> order to underst<strong>and</strong> Hegel properlyone must read him backwards. This is nowhere more imperativethan <strong>in</strong> an attempt to see what he means by the negative <strong>in</strong> thought. Hetells us <strong>in</strong> the Logic, “To mediate is to take someth<strong>in</strong>g as a beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> to go onward to a second th<strong>in</strong>g: so that the existence of this secondth<strong>in</strong>g depends on our hav<strong>in</strong>g reached it from someth<strong>in</strong>g elsecontradist<strong>in</strong>guished from it.” 85 But this is by no means all there is to theprocess as Hegel def<strong>in</strong>es it. He ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s further that this “developmentof one th<strong>in</strong>g out of another means that what appears as sequel <strong>and</strong> derivativeis rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediatedby.” 86 In this statement we f<strong>in</strong>d set forth, it would seem, the fundamentalaspect of the dialectical method: at any rate, here we f<strong>in</strong>d given usthe right po<strong>in</strong>t of view for regard<strong>in</strong>g the process. That which comes firstf<strong>in</strong>ds its explanation <strong>in</strong> what follows; what seems to be product is reallyground; truth is a last result <strong>and</strong> not a first pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. Mediation is thusa passage from one object to another which takes place by simply mak<strong>in</strong>gexplicit the <strong>in</strong>ner connection <strong>and</strong> the essential oneness of the objects.This po<strong>in</strong>t we have already dwelt upon above.Assum<strong>in</strong>g now this po<strong>in</strong>t of view, we are <strong>in</strong> a position to see whatHegel means by the significance <strong>and</strong> power of the negative <strong>in</strong> thought.Simple relation to another is, for Hegel, negation: <strong>in</strong> so far as an objectrefers beyond itself it <strong>in</strong>volves negation. From this it follows that everyth<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>volves negation, that is, every f<strong>in</strong>ite object; for by its very natureevery f<strong>in</strong>ite object refers beyond itself. Hence the potency of negation <strong>in</strong>
34/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamthe dialectic. The particular po<strong>in</strong>ts beyond itself for its explanation <strong>and</strong>completion, it f<strong>in</strong>ds its ‘truth’ <strong>in</strong> the other. Taken as it is given, it isisolated, <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate, abstract; but by the power of the negative <strong>in</strong>herent<strong>in</strong> it, that is, because of its abstract <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ateness, it leads on to<strong>and</strong> passes <strong>in</strong>to its context, <strong>and</strong> so becomes less <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate. Its other,however, <strong>in</strong> terms of which the object f<strong>in</strong>ds its explanation, is <strong>in</strong> its turnabstract <strong>and</strong> leads on to its other for its determ<strong>in</strong>ation; <strong>and</strong> so the processgoes on. Reference beyond self, negation, is thus the power thatkeeps <strong>in</strong> motion the mach<strong>in</strong>ery of the dialectic. This reference beyonditself, however, is not externally imposed upon the object; it is not theexpression of a relation between itself <strong>and</strong> another essentially differentfrom it. Rather is this reference beyond self the very expression of thedeepest nature of the object; the other is not an <strong>in</strong>different other, but theother <strong>in</strong> which the object f<strong>in</strong>ds its true self. The reference beyond self,the negation <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> the object, is just the <strong>in</strong>dication of the fact thatthe true self of the object lies elsewhere than <strong>in</strong> its own factual existence.Thus the negative leads us ever to concrete universality; for theform proves to be the “<strong>in</strong>digenous becom<strong>in</strong>g of the concrete content,”<strong>and</strong> so the process is one of self-determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> which the particularf<strong>in</strong>ds its universal <strong>and</strong> the universal its particular. 87But, <strong>in</strong> order to see that negation does actually lead us to such aresult, it is essential that the exact function of the negative <strong>in</strong> thought bekept clearly <strong>in</strong> view. Hegel criticizes Jacobi very severely for neglect<strong>in</strong>gthe negative <strong>in</strong> his doctr<strong>in</strong>e of immediate knowledge; <strong>and</strong> the chief faulthe has to f<strong>in</strong>d with Condillac’s development of the categories is that <strong>in</strong>the development the negative aspect of thought is entirely overlooked.So it will be well for us to state explicitly <strong>and</strong> discuss the two po<strong>in</strong>tsupon which Hegel lays stress <strong>in</strong> his doctr<strong>in</strong>e of negation. The first ofthese po<strong>in</strong>ts is that negation is negative. The second is that negation ispositive. We beg<strong>in</strong> with the first of these two po<strong>in</strong>ts.It is necessary for us to remember, says Hegel, that thought really isa process of negation. This is just the po<strong>in</strong>t which he has <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> theabove mentioned criticism of Condillac. He grants that Condillac positsthe right po<strong>in</strong>t of departure, namely, immediate experience: the card<strong>in</strong>alerror of Condillac’s procedure, he urges, is that the negative <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>the development of the categories is completely forgotten. Perhaps itwill be well to quote the passage here: “In Condillac’s method there isan unmistakable <strong>in</strong>tention to show how the several modes of mentalactivity could be made <strong>in</strong>telligible without los<strong>in</strong>g sight of mental unity,
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/35<strong>and</strong> to exhibit their necessary <strong>in</strong>terconnection. But the categories employed<strong>in</strong> do<strong>in</strong>g so are of a wretched sort. Their rul<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple is thatthe sensible is taken (<strong>and</strong> with justice) as the prius or the <strong>in</strong>itial basis,but that the later phases that follow this start<strong>in</strong>g-po<strong>in</strong>t present themselvesas emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a solely affirmative manner, <strong>and</strong> the negative aspectof mental activity, by which this material is transmuted <strong>in</strong>to m<strong>in</strong>d<strong>and</strong> destroyed as a sensible, is misconceived <strong>and</strong> overlooked. As thetheory of Condillac states it, the sensible is not merely the empiricalfirst, but is left as if it were the true <strong>and</strong> essential foundation.” 88Now what does this criticism mean? Of course we are not concernedto <strong>in</strong>quire here whether it is a just criticism of Condillac’s theory.Apart from this theory, <strong>and</strong> expressed <strong>in</strong> general terms, the criticismmeans, it would seem, simply that, <strong>in</strong> the nature of the case, to th<strong>in</strong>k theworld is virtually to deny that its first immediate aspect is the ultimatelytrue. <strong>Thought</strong> is not exclusively affirmative; it is negative as well, <strong>and</strong>its negative function is to transform the immediately given. Expressed<strong>in</strong> Hegel’s own words: “To th<strong>in</strong>k the phenomenal world rather means torecast its form <strong>and</strong> transmute it <strong>in</strong>to a universal. And thus the action ofthought has also a negative effect upon its basis: <strong>and</strong> the matter of sensation,when it receives the stamp of universality, at once loses its first<strong>and</strong> phenomenal shape.” 89 That is, all th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g experience is a processof <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> which there is <strong>and</strong> can be no bare immediacy; forth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g ipso facto <strong>in</strong>volves the transcend<strong>in</strong>g of the particular <strong>and</strong> thetransformation of it <strong>in</strong>to the form of the universal. Such, then, is thenegative function of thought: <strong>and</strong> all thought is negative. To th<strong>in</strong>k theworld is to deny its reality <strong>in</strong> the form of abstract particularity; its purelyimmediate aspect is by thought negated.But, be it noted, the particular is not merely denied; <strong>in</strong> a very importantsense it is also affirmed. And this br<strong>in</strong>gs us to the second po<strong>in</strong>t, thatthought is positive as well as negative. As an abstract particular, quaabstract to th<strong>in</strong>k it is to negate it; as a universalized particular, quauniversalized, to th<strong>in</strong>k it is to affirm it. Reason, <strong>in</strong> short, is positive aswell as negative; <strong>and</strong>, what is more important still, is positive by virtueof the very fact of its negativity. “To hold fast the positive <strong>in</strong> the negativeis the most important aspect of rational knowledge.” 90 Hegel cannotbe accused of hav<strong>in</strong>g neglected to state very def<strong>in</strong>itely what he meansby this positive significance of negation. In the <strong>in</strong>troduction to the largerLogic he tells us that what is needed to secure the dialectical movementof thought “is to realize that the negative is just as much positive, or that
36/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamcontradiction does not dissolve <strong>in</strong>to zero, <strong>in</strong>to blank noth<strong>in</strong>gness, butonly <strong>in</strong>to the negation of its particular content.” And he goes on to say:“We must realize that such negation is not total negation, but only negationof a determ<strong>in</strong>ate content; consequently it is determ<strong>in</strong>ate negation. Inother words, the result conta<strong>in</strong>s essentially that from which it results....So the result, that is, the negation, be<strong>in</strong>g a def<strong>in</strong>ite negation has a content:it is a new concept or notion, but a higher, richer notion than thepreced<strong>in</strong>g one which has been enriched by its own negation or opposite.The new notion conta<strong>in</strong>s both the old one <strong>and</strong> its negation, <strong>and</strong> is thus atthe same time the unity of the older with its opposite.” 91 This we f<strong>in</strong>d atthe beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the Logic; at the very end we f<strong>in</strong>d the author emphasiz<strong>in</strong>gexactly the same po<strong>in</strong>t. The negative, he there tells us, is <strong>in</strong>deed “thenegative, but of a positive which it <strong>in</strong>cludes. It is the other, not of someth<strong>in</strong>gto which it is <strong>in</strong>different, else it would be no other.... It is the other<strong>in</strong> itself, the other of another, <strong>and</strong> therefore it <strong>in</strong>cludes its other with<strong>in</strong>itself.” 92 These passages are so very explicit little need be added by wayof <strong>in</strong>terpretation. Their unquestionable mean<strong>in</strong>g is that negation is notto be thought of as abstract contradiction, but as affirmative negation— concrete synthesis. Negation is not merely the tendency of the f<strong>in</strong>itecategory to negate itself, to pass <strong>in</strong>to its abstract opposite or other; it isnot a bare denial of thesis by its antithesis. Rather is it the tendency ofthe f<strong>in</strong>ite category to complete itself, to pass <strong>in</strong>to its other where lies itsown true nature; it is a denial of the thesis, which is at the same time asynthesis of the thesis <strong>and</strong> its formal opposite. Thus it is that the negativehas a very positive import.This is a very vital po<strong>in</strong>t upon which Hegel is here <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g. Realnegation must be significant negation: the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite judgment, we mustagree with Hegel, is a ‘nonsensical curiosity’ of formal logic. 93 As Mr.Bradley has well put it: “A someth<strong>in</strong>g that is only not someth<strong>in</strong>g else, isa relation that term<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> an impalpable void, a reflection thrownupon empty space. It is a mere non-entity which can not be real.” 94 Allsignificant negation ipso facto has a positive import; it presupposes asystem with<strong>in</strong> which the negative is to fall, a unity of differences, <strong>and</strong>with<strong>in</strong> the system negation affirms, more or less explicitly, some reallysignificant conclusion about the unity. Bare negation simply denies identityof contents that have noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> common, <strong>and</strong> is consequently amere tautology; significant negation, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, denies identityof contents which are <strong>in</strong> some respects one, <strong>and</strong> so asserts real difference.Of course, if disjunction with<strong>in</strong> the unity is exhaustive, negation
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/37may to all <strong>in</strong>tents <strong>and</strong> purposes be affirmation, if only two alternativesare possible, for example, the denial of the one is the affirmation of theother. 95 It is <strong>in</strong>deed true that negation may carry with it very little positivesignificance: the judgment, ‘This is not black,’ tells us practicallynoth<strong>in</strong>g so far as the actual color of the object under consideration isconcerned. But if the judgment is really a significant one, if it has anymean<strong>in</strong>g at all, it partially at least <strong>in</strong>troduces a determ<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong>to theuniverse of discourse by tell<strong>in</strong>g us, for example, that the subject of thejudgment is a colored object, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> so far it gives us positive knowledgeof the object of <strong>in</strong>terest. 96 And this negation approximates to direct affirmationas the differences with<strong>in</strong> the system <strong>in</strong> which it falls are moresharply def<strong>in</strong>ed — it is to be noted that this very def<strong>in</strong>ition may be theresult of negation; negative <strong>in</strong>stances are always more than negative.Ultimately, from the denial of blackness there might arise positive knowledgeconcern<strong>in</strong>g the actual color of the object of judgment.Now <strong>in</strong> view of the above considerations we can more clearly seewhat Hegel means by the constant assertion that the negative is the verysoul <strong>and</strong> vitality of thought. <strong>Thought</strong> is at once analytic <strong>and</strong> synthetic; itdoes not first negate <strong>and</strong> then synthesize, but it synthesizes <strong>in</strong> its negation.It denies abstract unrelatedness, <strong>and</strong> affirms <strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>es complex<strong>in</strong>terrelatedness among phenomena. It rejects the unrelated particular<strong>and</strong> the blank universal as alike <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>able <strong>and</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gless; it assertsthe necessity of identity <strong>in</strong> difference, of unity with<strong>in</strong> multiplicity. <strong>Thought</strong>as a process of mediation is thus of a two-fold nature: it is the denial ofa world of unrelated elements, <strong>and</strong> the affirmation of the world as concretetotality. Such is the double function of negation: it denies the abstract<strong>and</strong> affirms the concrete. Because thought is negative, it drives usfrom the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of immediate sense experience <strong>and</strong> forces us to seekthe eternal <strong>and</strong> true elsewhere; because thought is positive <strong>in</strong> its negation,it perforce “produces the universal <strong>and</strong> seizes the particular <strong>in</strong>it.” 97 Thus, by its very nature, thought is a process of mediation whichgives as a result, not mere abstract generalization, but real determ<strong>in</strong>ation— the concrete <strong>in</strong>dividual.I know of no better summary of Hegel’s view concern<strong>in</strong>g the negative<strong>in</strong> thought than the one which he himself has given <strong>in</strong> the preface tothe first edition of the larger Logic: “Reason is negative <strong>and</strong> dialectical,<strong>in</strong> that it dissolves the determ<strong>in</strong>ations of the underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to noth<strong>in</strong>g;it is positive <strong>in</strong> that it produces the universal <strong>and</strong> preserves (begreift) theparticular <strong>in</strong> it. As the underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g used to be taken as someth<strong>in</strong>g
38/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamseparated from reason <strong>in</strong> general, so dialectical reason used to be takenas someth<strong>in</strong>g separated from positive reason. But <strong>in</strong> its true nature reasonis m<strong>in</strong>d (Geist), which is higher than both cognitive (verständige)reason <strong>and</strong> rational underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. M<strong>in</strong>d is the negative, that which constitutesthe quality of dialectical reason as well as of the underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g.It negates simplicity <strong>and</strong> so, like the underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, posits determ<strong>in</strong>atedifference; but it also destroys this difference <strong>and</strong> so is dialectical. Itsresult, however, is not mere empt<strong>in</strong>ess, but is just as much positive; thusit returns to <strong>and</strong> establishes the first simplicity, which now is a universalconcrete <strong>in</strong> itself.” 98Our conclusion, then, concern<strong>in</strong>g Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the process ofthought as dialectical is that thought is a process of negative mediation.As a mediat<strong>in</strong>g activity, thought is not limited to the f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>and</strong> conditionedas those who appeal to the necessity of immediate knowledgewould have us believe. On the contrary, its very mediation is the def<strong>in</strong>itionof reality; by relat<strong>in</strong>g it def<strong>in</strong>es, <strong>and</strong> by negat<strong>in</strong>g it affirms. In otherwords, the process of thought is the progressive explication of the implicit,the disclosure of the essential nature of the objects of knowledgeNegation is not construed <strong>in</strong> terms of formal contradiction; it is thatfunction of the dialectic by virtue of which it leads ultimately to theessence of reality. However faultily Hegel may be thought to have workedout this conception <strong>in</strong> the Logic, its illum<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g suggestiveness for anytheory of knowledge cannot be denied <strong>and</strong> should not be overlooked. 99Perhaps enough has been said about this Hegelian doctr<strong>in</strong>e of negation.But, like most of Hegel’s teach<strong>in</strong>gs, it has not escaped misconstructionat the h<strong>and</strong>s of the critics. So it may not be amiss, at the conclusionof our exposition, to add a few words <strong>in</strong> reply to some of themost characteristic criticisms; not, <strong>in</strong>deed, for controversial purposes,but <strong>in</strong> the hope that the attempt to set Hegel right <strong>in</strong> the eyes of hiscritics will at least serve to call attention to the fact that another <strong>in</strong>terpretationof him is possible.The criticisms of Haym <strong>and</strong> James seem unquestionably to rest uponan entirely false notion of what Hegel means by negation. Haym seemsto th<strong>in</strong>k that Hegel absurdly contended that the essence of th<strong>in</strong>gs consists<strong>in</strong> their be<strong>in</strong>g contradictory; <strong>and</strong> he contrasts this supposed positionof Hegel’s with the Herbartian pr<strong>in</strong>ciple that the way to truth liesthrough the elim<strong>in</strong>ation of contradiction. 100 Such an <strong>in</strong>terpretation evidentlytakes it for granted that Hegel can mean by contradiction, negation,noth<strong>in</strong>g more than what formal logic means by it, namely, sheer
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/39<strong>in</strong>compatibility <strong>and</strong> absolute opposition; to all appearances, the critic is<strong>in</strong>nocent of the fact that negation or contradiction, as Hegel is at greatpa<strong>in</strong>s to def<strong>in</strong>e it, is just the do<strong>in</strong>g away with bare negation, abstractopposition, <strong>and</strong> that the term embodies Hegel’s unwearied <strong>in</strong>sistencethat formal contradiction has no significance when applied to reality.Naturally the criticism is no more significant than the assumption uponwhich it leans for support. The same oversight is at the basis of ProfessorJames’s criticism of this Hegelian conception, <strong>in</strong> a characteristicdiscussion “On Some Hegelisms,” <strong>in</strong> his volume of popular lectures onphilosophy entitled The Will to Believe. At a very dramatic po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> thisessay Hegel is presented to us, st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g amidst a jarr<strong>in</strong>g, jolt<strong>in</strong>g worldof <strong>in</strong>coherent facts, frantically lift<strong>in</strong>g ‘va<strong>in</strong> h<strong>and</strong>s of imprecation’ at thewild <strong>and</strong> tumultuous scene before him. “But hark! What wondrous stra<strong>in</strong>is this that steals upon his ear? Muddle! is it anyth<strong>in</strong>g but a peculiar sortof transparency? Is not jolt passage? Is friction other than a k<strong>in</strong>d oflubrication? Is not a chasm a fill<strong>in</strong>g? — a queer k<strong>in</strong>d of fill<strong>in</strong>g, but afill<strong>in</strong>g still. Why seek for a glue to hold th<strong>in</strong>gs together when their veryfall<strong>in</strong>g apart is the only glue you need? Let all that negation which seemedto dis<strong>in</strong>tegrate the universe be the mortar that comb<strong>in</strong>es it, <strong>and</strong> the problemst<strong>and</strong>s solved.” 101 These strictures are apparently supposed to be areal criticism of Hegel, but the absurdity aga<strong>in</strong>st which they are directedfirst saw the light when they themselves were penned. It is certa<strong>in</strong> thatsuch an absurd position as the one here criticized cannot justly be attributedto Hegel; it is a caricature of Hegel’s real position. The ‘glue’ thatb<strong>in</strong>ds the world together is, <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s view of the matter, not the eternalfall<strong>in</strong>g apart of objects, but simply their necessary <strong>in</strong>terconnectedness;if you attempt to separate them, they will not stay put. Nor is it thatnegation which dis<strong>in</strong>tegrates the universe that Hegel uses as the ‘mortar’to comb<strong>in</strong>e it; it is that negation which, because it is as much positiveas negative, does actually comb<strong>in</strong>e it. After all, it would appear thatone is forced to admit that Hegel is more than a superficial th<strong>in</strong>ker try<strong>in</strong>gto palm off on a long-suffer<strong>in</strong>g public palpable absurdities.Trendelenburg’s criticism of Hegel on this po<strong>in</strong>t is more serious<strong>and</strong>, one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to say, more significant than the preced<strong>in</strong>g criticisms,but it seems no less fallacious. This critic triumphantly forcesHegel <strong>in</strong>to the follow<strong>in</strong>g dilemma: “Either the negation, through whichthe dialectic development to the second <strong>and</strong> third moments is mediated,is logical negation (A, not-A) — <strong>in</strong> which case noth<strong>in</strong>g determ<strong>in</strong>ate isproduced <strong>in</strong> the second moment <strong>and</strong> no synthesis is given <strong>in</strong> the third; or
40/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamelse the opposition is a real one — <strong>in</strong> which case it cannot be atta<strong>in</strong>ed bylogical means, <strong>and</strong> consequently the dialectic is not the dialectic of purethought.” 102 Here it is evident that the critic is at least aware that twok<strong>in</strong>ds of opposition or negation are possible, namely, logical <strong>and</strong> real;<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> this respect his criticism differs from the preced<strong>in</strong>g ones But, likethese others, Trendelenburg’s criticism rests upon an assumption thevalidity of which he does not attempt to establish. The assumption <strong>in</strong>this case is that Hegel has no right to claim that the dialectic of purethought can <strong>in</strong>volve material opposition. This assumption is based upona further assumption that pure thought <strong>and</strong> formal thought (abstractcognition) are one. If we are will<strong>in</strong>g to grant this second assumption,then the above dilemma exhausts the possibilities <strong>and</strong> so accomplishesits purpose; <strong>in</strong> the nature of the case formal opposition or negation is notmaterial opposition. But if we ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> with Hegel that form <strong>and</strong> matterare one <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>separable, <strong>and</strong> that real thought, so far from be<strong>in</strong>g merelyformal thought conf<strong>in</strong>ed to the magic circle of the impotent universal,actually does express the nature of its object, then the critic’s dilemma isnot exhaustive <strong>and</strong> so loses its significance; <strong>in</strong> this event, formal oppositionbecomes a mere abstraction, <strong>and</strong> dialectical negation, the negationof what Hegel calls pure thought, becomes ipso facto real opposition.So it would seem that before the critic undertook to annihilate thedialectic with an ‘either-or’ proposition, he should have come to anunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g with the author concern<strong>in</strong>g the nature of that thought ofwhich the dialectic is the expression. The whole problem is whetherpure thought, as Hegel uses the term, does <strong>in</strong>volve real opposition; <strong>and</strong>this must be argued, not assumed at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.Mr. McTaggart’s contention that negation loses import as the dialecticadvances from the more abstract to the more concrete categoriesimplies the same general misconception of the nature of negation. In hisop<strong>in</strong>ion negation is very prom<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong> the earlier categories, while <strong>in</strong> thelater categories it has almost entirely disappeared. And he seeks to establishthis <strong>in</strong>terpretation by <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g the movement of the dialectic<strong>in</strong> the categories of Be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> by contrast<strong>in</strong>g the movement there withthe movement <strong>in</strong> the categories of the Notion. 103 It is not our presentpurpose to <strong>in</strong>quire whether this is or is not a correct account of thedialectic as it is actually worked out <strong>in</strong> the Logic. The po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>in</strong>terestnow is the fact that negation, as Mr. McTaggart implicitly conceives it,is not negation as we have seen Hegel def<strong>in</strong>e it above. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to thecritic thesis <strong>and</strong> antithesis, <strong>in</strong> the earlier categories of the Logic, are
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/41opposed to each other <strong>in</strong> a more or less mechanical fashion <strong>and</strong> are moreor less externally jo<strong>in</strong>ed together by means of the synthesis; but, <strong>in</strong> thelater categories, this abstract opposition is want<strong>in</strong>g. Now to go fromthis fact (grant<strong>in</strong>g for the sake of the argument that it is a fact) to theconclusion that negation becomes less significant as the dialectic advancesis clearly to identify negation with abstract opposition The argumentis this: <strong>in</strong> the categories of Be<strong>in</strong>g, antithesis is the logical oppositeof thesis, <strong>and</strong> so here we f<strong>in</strong>d negation; <strong>in</strong> the categories of the Notion,antithesis <strong>and</strong> thesis are no longer sheer <strong>in</strong>compatibles, antithesis def<strong>in</strong>esthesis, <strong>and</strong> therefore the negation formerly exist<strong>in</strong>g between themhas disappeared. In this argument sheer <strong>in</strong>compatibility <strong>and</strong> negationare obviously used synonymously. But, as we have already seen, thissheer <strong>in</strong>compatibility is not Hegel’s conception of negation. From hispo<strong>in</strong>t of view negation does not simply negate; its nature is not exhausted<strong>in</strong> bare opposition. On the contrary, it always presupposes a positiveground <strong>and</strong> so is <strong>in</strong> a very important sense positive. All genu<strong>in</strong>ely significantnegation carries with it a positive import; bare negation is amean<strong>in</strong>gless tautology. Hence it follows that, if the antithesis is to be atrue negative, a dialectical negative, as Hegel says it is, then it must to adegree at least def<strong>in</strong>e the thesis; <strong>and</strong> the more perfectly it does this, themore significant a negative does it become. Thus, even accept<strong>in</strong>g Mr.McTaggart’s account of the general nature <strong>and</strong> procedure of the dialecticas true, still we are forced to reject his conclusion. As Hegel conceivesthe negative, it progressively becomes, not a less <strong>and</strong> less, but amore <strong>and</strong> more important factor <strong>in</strong> the dialectical process; so far fromf<strong>in</strong>ally disappear<strong>in</strong>g entirely, it ever grows more explicit <strong>and</strong> more emphatic.And this, one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to th<strong>in</strong>k, is the true description of thematter: negation ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> positive import as the universe of discoursebecomes more determ<strong>in</strong>ate.F<strong>in</strong>ally, Mr. Bradley’s implied criticism of Hegel on this po<strong>in</strong>t seemsopen to the same general criticism as the above. “The law of Contradiction,”he says, “has had the misfortune to be flatly denied from a certa<strong>in</strong>theory of the nature of th<strong>in</strong>gs. So far is that law (it has been contended)from be<strong>in</strong>g the truth, that <strong>in</strong> the nature of th<strong>in</strong>gs contradiction exists.” 104Now I submit that this statement, as a criticism of the Hegelian theory,is beside the mark. Hegel does not deny the validity of the law of contradictiontaken <strong>in</strong> its abstract <strong>and</strong> formal sense, that is, as the statement ofthe relation which exists between logical contradictories. A unitary wholewhose elements are sheer logical disparates is, I th<strong>in</strong>k we may safely
42/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamsay, as genu<strong>in</strong>e a non-entity for Hegel as it is for anyone else. WhatHegel does deny, however, is that such abstract contradiction f<strong>in</strong>ds aplace <strong>in</strong> reality; <strong>and</strong> he is prepared to argue that when we attribute it toreality we are guilty of attempt<strong>in</strong>g the impossible task of mak<strong>in</strong>g realitysquare with the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of our abstract <strong>and</strong> formal logic. What he<strong>in</strong>sists upon is that we must def<strong>in</strong>e contradiction more concretely, if wewould apply the category to the real; <strong>and</strong> this more concrete def<strong>in</strong>itionhe gives us <strong>in</strong> his doctr<strong>in</strong>e of negation. But this position does not necessarilytouch the validity (formal validity) of the law of contradiction atall as Mr. Bradley himself is will<strong>in</strong>g to admit. “In the object <strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong>the whole,” he tells us, “the truth may be that we never really do havethese disparates. We only have moments which would be <strong>in</strong>compatibleif they really were separate, but, conjo<strong>in</strong>ed together, have been subdued<strong>in</strong>to someth<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the character of the whole If we so can underst<strong>and</strong>the identity of opposites — <strong>and</strong> I am not sure that we may not doso — then the law of Contradiction flourishes untouched. If, <strong>in</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to one, the contraries as such no longer exist, then where is the contradiction?”105 Although it is questionable whether Mr. Bradley st<strong>and</strong>sconsistently by this position <strong>in</strong> his theory of knowledge, we certa<strong>in</strong>ly arejustified <strong>in</strong> attribut<strong>in</strong>g it to Hegel. So, grant<strong>in</strong>g this, it would seem that,on the critic’s own show<strong>in</strong>g, Hegel is free from the charge of hav<strong>in</strong>g‘flatly denied’ the significance of the law of contradiction. He had noquarrel with this pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, as a pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of formal logic; I am persuadedthat he, as well as his critic, was fully conscious of the fact that“it has not a tooth with which to bite any one.” He respected its toothlessestate <strong>and</strong> had no reason, <strong>and</strong>, so far as I have been able to see, no<strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ation, to rob it of its legitimate claims, ‘absurdly feeble’ thoughthey surely are. What he was anxious to do was to make the formalpr<strong>in</strong>ciple conscious of its absurdly feeble condition, <strong>and</strong> to rejuvenate itby br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>to vital touch with concrete reality. As the statement ofthe blank opposition of disparates the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple is <strong>in</strong>deed abstract <strong>and</strong>impotent; as the negative of the Notion it is the very pulse of the life ofreality itself. This, as I comprehend it, is the position of Hegel withreference to the law of contradiction; <strong>and</strong>, if I read Mr. Bradley aright,it differs only <strong>in</strong> term<strong>in</strong>ology from his own view of the matter.The ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts which this chapter has attempted to establish arethe follow<strong>in</strong>g. Hegel <strong>in</strong>sists that immediacy <strong>and</strong> mediation are <strong>in</strong>separable,that all immediacy implies mediation, <strong>and</strong> that the immediacy ofreality <strong>in</strong>volves complete mediation. But this is not to identify the imme-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/43diacy of reality with the abstractions of science. For the process of mediation,as Hegel def<strong>in</strong>es it, is a process of determ<strong>in</strong>ate negation whichreduces experience to an ordered <strong>and</strong> systematic whole; it affirms aswell as denies, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>deed affirms by deny<strong>in</strong>g. In short, it is the pr<strong>in</strong>ciplewith<strong>in</strong> experience which makes of experience a cosmos <strong>and</strong> not a chaos.A completely mediated immediacy, that is, reality, is, therefore, justcompletely organized experience. This negative with<strong>in</strong> thought is notmerely negative; it is a negative which annuls the false immediacy onlybecause it is ever lead<strong>in</strong>g us onwards to the true immediacy. The manycriticisms which are directed aga<strong>in</strong>st Hegel on this po<strong>in</strong>t overlook thisfact, <strong>and</strong> unwarrantedly assume that he means by negation abstract contradiction.Chapter III.Ontology <strong>and</strong> Epistemology.The conclusions of the two preced<strong>in</strong>g chapters have led us to a furtherproblem which we shall here be forced to face. If it be true that thoughtdoes <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of fact express the nature of th<strong>in</strong>gs, then it would seem tofollow that the science of thought is the science of th<strong>in</strong>gs, that ontology<strong>and</strong> epistemology co<strong>in</strong>cide. In this connection two questions arise: DoesHegel identify the two? And if so, what does he mean by the identification<strong>and</strong> what justification is there for it? It is to the task of answer<strong>in</strong>gthese questions that we now address ourselves.To the first of the above questions there can, I th<strong>in</strong>k, be only oneanswer. Hegel does identify logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysics. In the first place, wehave his own explicit statement on the po<strong>in</strong>t. S<strong>in</strong>ce thoughts are “Objective<strong>Thought</strong>s,” he says, “Logic therefore co<strong>in</strong>cides with metaphysics,the science of th<strong>in</strong>gs set <strong>and</strong> held <strong>in</strong> thoughts — thoughts accreditedable to express the essential reality of th<strong>in</strong>gs.” 106 Besides such an explicitstatement, one might offer as evidence the whole logical bias ofthe Hegelian philosophy which is unquestionably towards this identification.S<strong>in</strong>ce the categories “really are, as forms of the Notion, the vitalspirit of the actual world,” 107 <strong>and</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce th<strong>in</strong>gs or objects which do notagree with them are accidental, arbitrary, <strong>and</strong> untrue phenomena; 108s<strong>in</strong>ce the universal aspect of the object is not someth<strong>in</strong>g subjective attributedto it only when it is an object of thought, but rather belongs to<strong>and</strong> expresses its essential nature, it follows that the science which hasto do with these universals is ipso facto the science of reality. This sci-
44/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamence, of course, is logic. Logic, therefore, is metaphysics. 109For this identification of logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysics Hegel has been veryseverely criticized. And this br<strong>in</strong>gs us to our second question: Whatdoes Hegel mean by the identification, <strong>and</strong> can it <strong>in</strong> any way be defended?Perhaps we can best answer this question by attempt<strong>in</strong>g to answerthe objections to which the identification <strong>in</strong> question has givenrise. One of the most recent <strong>and</strong> perhaps the clearest <strong>and</strong> most conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>gof Hegel’s critics on this po<strong>in</strong>t is Professor Seth Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison;consequently we shall devote ourselves to a consideration of his objections.If we succeed <strong>in</strong> answer<strong>in</strong>g satisfactorily his criticism, we shallhave succeeded <strong>in</strong> answer<strong>in</strong>g all.But before pass<strong>in</strong>g to this criticism some prelim<strong>in</strong>ary work is necessary.We must first attempt to def<strong>in</strong>e the exact position of the Logic withreference to the other parts of Hegel’s system. This will clear the wayfor the follow<strong>in</strong>g discussion But <strong>in</strong> order not to anticipate that discussionour attention will here be conf<strong>in</strong>ed exclusively to the problem of theposition of the Logic <strong>in</strong> the system; the problem of the ontological significanceof the Logic will occupy us when we come to take up ProfessorPr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s criticism. What then, we first ask, is the positionof the Logic <strong>in</strong> the system, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> what relation does it st<strong>and</strong> to the otherparts of the Encyclopedia?The best po<strong>in</strong>t of departure <strong>in</strong> attempt<strong>in</strong>g to answer this question isacqua<strong>in</strong>tance with the specific problem that Hegel has before him <strong>in</strong> theLogic. In order to determ<strong>in</strong>e the nature of this problem, however, a considerationof the question concern<strong>in</strong>g the presupposition of the Logic isnecessary. For it would seem that one could hardly appreciate the significanceof the dialectical development of the categories by plung<strong>in</strong>g atonce <strong>in</strong>to the ‘bacchic whirl.’ A prelim<strong>in</strong>ary discussion of what the Logicpresupposes, if, <strong>in</strong>deed, it is not absolutely necessary to an adequateappreciation of its real problem <strong>and</strong> aim, is at least desirable.But this problem of the presupposition of the Logic need not deta<strong>in</strong>us long. There can be no doubt, it would seem that <strong>in</strong> the author’s m<strong>in</strong>dthe Logic presupposes the result of the Phenomenology. To justify thiscontention it is necessary simply to let the author speak for himself. “Inthe Phenomenology of Spirit,” he says <strong>in</strong> the larger Logic, “I have exhibitedconsciousness <strong>in</strong> its progress from its first immediate oppositionof itself <strong>and</strong> its object, on to absolute knowledge. This course traversesall the forms of the relation of consciousness to its object, <strong>and</strong> has as itsresult the conception of our science. This conception needs no justifica-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/45tion here — apart from the fact that it comes out as the f<strong>in</strong>al result <strong>in</strong> theLogic itself — it needs no justification here, because it got its justificationthere. And it is capable of no other justification than just this productionof it by consciousness, all whose own peculiar forms are resolved<strong>in</strong>to this conception as their truth. . .This conception of the purescience <strong>and</strong> the deduction of it are presupposed <strong>in</strong> the present treatise, <strong>in</strong>so far as the Phenomenology of Spirit is noth<strong>in</strong>g else but such a deductionof it “ 110 Aga<strong>in</strong>, later <strong>in</strong> the same work, we read: “It has been remarked<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>troduction that the Phenomenology of Spirit is the scienceof consciousness, the exhibition of the fact that consciousness hasthe conception of our science, that is, of pure knowledge as its result. Tothis extent, then, the Logic has the science of the phenomenal Spirit asits presupposition; for that science conta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>and</strong> displays the necessity,<strong>and</strong> hence the proof of the truth of the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of pure knowledge, aswell as the way <strong>in</strong> which that st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t is reached.” 111 In addition tothese explicit statements of the Logic, I may be permitted to quote oneother passage from the preface to the Phenomenology itself. Hav<strong>in</strong>gtraced <strong>in</strong> a sentence or two the development of the Phenomenology fromthe st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of sensuous consciousness to that of absolute knowledge,where we have completely mediated be<strong>in</strong>g, Hegel cont<strong>in</strong>ues: “Just herethe Phenomenology comes to an end. In it the way has been preparedfor the element of knowledge where<strong>in</strong> the moments of Spirit have unfoldedthemselves <strong>in</strong> the form of simplicity which knows its object asitself. These moments no longer st<strong>and</strong> opposed to each other as be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>and</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g, but rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the simplicity of knowledge; they are thetrue <strong>in</strong> the form of the true, <strong>and</strong> their difference is only difference ofcontent. Their development, which <strong>in</strong> this element is organized <strong>in</strong>to awhole, is Logic or Speculative Philosophy.” 112 Comment on such pla<strong>in</strong>passages as these seems superfluous: Hegel’s mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> them is unmistakable.The science of Logic assumes the conclusion of the Phenomenologyas its start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>and</strong> its procedure <strong>and</strong> result are to be judgedonly <strong>in</strong> the light of this assumption.Without further discussion of this po<strong>in</strong>t, then, we pass to the ma<strong>in</strong>problem before us. What is the aim of the Logic <strong>in</strong> the light of its presupposition?The passage quoted last <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g paragraph givesus a basis for an answer to this question. In this passage Hegel tells uswhat the purpose of the Logic is, viewed from the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of absoluteknowledge. The passage, translated <strong>in</strong>to simpler language, amounts tothis. At the conclusion of the Phenomenology we reached the true defi-
46/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamnition of knowledge; the categories no longer appear as merely subjectiveideas, or concepts, opposed to objects to which they are quasi-mechanicallyrelated, but they show themselves to be capable of express<strong>in</strong>gthe essential nature of objects, <strong>and</strong> so are genu<strong>in</strong>ely universal <strong>and</strong>objective. To organize these categories <strong>in</strong>to a systematic whole <strong>and</strong> toset forth <strong>in</strong> a scientific manner their <strong>in</strong>terconnection is the bus<strong>in</strong>ess ofthe Logic. In other words, the Phenomenology exhibits the essentiallyobjective <strong>and</strong> universal nature of that thought which is the subject-matterof the Logic; the problem of the Logic be<strong>in</strong>g to work out the connectionamong the categories <strong>in</strong> abstraction from their essential relation tosensuous experience. In the Phenomenology thought has been observed<strong>and</strong> its nature determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> its relation to the objects of time <strong>and</strong> place,but <strong>in</strong> the Logic temporal <strong>and</strong> spatial relations are entirely ignored <strong>and</strong>we move <strong>in</strong> the ether of pure thought: the concrete categories of thePhenomenology are, <strong>in</strong> the Logic, to be considered for their own sake<strong>and</strong> their <strong>in</strong>ter-relations determ<strong>in</strong>ed apart from their experientibasis. Ina sense it may be said that the Phenomenology assumes that thought isalways concrete, its procedure consist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an exhibition of the necessityof this assumption: the Logic, likewise, takes this for granted but asa fact established by the Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> then proceeds to <strong>in</strong>vestigatespecifically thought as it is <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> for itself. “To raise to knowledge....those forms of thought which act <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ctively <strong>in</strong> common consciousness<strong>and</strong> obta<strong>in</strong> there only an obscure <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>complete reality, toseize them by thought, <strong>and</strong> thought alone, <strong>in</strong> their most simple, abstract,<strong>and</strong> universal existence, to trace <strong>and</strong> comprehend them <strong>in</strong> their relations<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> their unity — such is the task of the Hegelian Logic.” 113We must guard the statement above that the purpose of the Logic isto deal with thought <strong>in</strong> abstraction from its empirical nature. Such astatement might be misconstrued to mean that the Logic deals only withabstract thought. And such an op<strong>in</strong>ion would certa<strong>in</strong>ly not be withoutjustification, even on the basis of Hegel’s own assertions. When weconsider his statements concern<strong>in</strong>g the science of logic, all that we havehitherto said about the concreteness of logical thought seems to havebeen said falsely. For example, Hegel tells us <strong>in</strong> one place that the realmof logic is “a k<strong>in</strong>gdom of shadows, the world of simple essences, freedfrom all sensuous concretion.” 114 Elsewhere he says that the content oflogic is “the presentation of God as He is <strong>in</strong> His eternal essence beforethe creation of Nature or of a f<strong>in</strong>ite m<strong>in</strong>d.” 115 In yet another passage weare <strong>in</strong>formed that logic “has to do not with perceptions, nor, like geom-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/47etry, with abstract representations of the senses, but with pure abstractions.”116 But such deliverances as these are balanced by numerouscounter-assertions concern<strong>in</strong>g the concreteness of the science of logic.For example, we meet such a passage as this: “Bare abstractions orformal thoughts are no bus<strong>in</strong>ess of philosophy, which has to deal onlywith concrete thoughts.” 117 Or this: “Logic has noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with anact of thought about someth<strong>in</strong>g that lies outside of the thought as theground or basis of it, or with forms that furnish mere signs or marks ofthe truth. On the contrary, the necessary forms <strong>and</strong> peculiar determ<strong>in</strong>ationsof thought are the content <strong>and</strong> the highest truth itself.” 118 Furthermore,we are explicitly <strong>in</strong>formed 119 that das begreifende Denken ratherthan simply das Denken is the subject matter of logic; <strong>and</strong>, as I havetried to show <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g chapters, this is to say that the thought ofthe science of logic is concrete.The question naturally arises, Do not these two sets of passagescontradict each other? Is not a ‘pure’ abstraction equivalent to a ‘bare’abstraction, <strong>and</strong> when Hegel asserts that the science of logic has to dowith pure abstractions does he not virtually deny the validity of hisclaims for its concreteness? A consideration of this essential po<strong>in</strong>t willgive us a clearer idea of the Logic, both as to its aim <strong>and</strong> problem <strong>and</strong> asto its relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit.The answer to the puzzle before us will be found <strong>in</strong> an appreciationof the ambiguity which attaches to the terms ‘abstract’ <strong>and</strong> ‘concrete.’Abstract may mean not concrete <strong>in</strong> the sense of not sensuous. For example,it is sometimes said that the phenomena of the m<strong>in</strong>d are abstract,because they cannot be touched seen, heard, etc., but are objects ofthought only; objects of the world of sense-perception would, <strong>in</strong> thismean<strong>in</strong>g of the terms, be concrete. This is the signification of the termsas common sense uses them. In this sense, Hegel’s logic is unquestionablyabstract, as he himself explicitly states; <strong>and</strong> when he speaks of theabstractness of the logic he is th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of this mean<strong>in</strong>g of the terms. Thecontent of the Logic may be called abstract, he says, “if the name concreteis restricted to the concrete facts of sense or of immediate perception.”120 “If content means no more than what is palpable <strong>and</strong> obviousto the senses, all philosophy <strong>and</strong> logic <strong>in</strong> particular must be at onceacknowledged to be void of content, that is to say, of content perceptibleto the senses.” 121 Of course, all sciences which have to do with objectsnot perceptible to the senses are, from this po<strong>in</strong>t of view, abstract Butthere is another mean<strong>in</strong>g of the terms abstract <strong>and</strong> concrete. An object
48/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghammay be abstract <strong>in</strong> the sense of be<strong>in</strong>g unreal, or taken apart from itsrelations; while the concrete object is the object seen <strong>in</strong> its deepest <strong>and</strong>truest significance. The categories of mathematics, for example, may besaid to be more abstract than the categories of ethical science; <strong>and</strong> theideals that seriously <strong>in</strong>fluence our lives for weal or woe are more concretethan the air-castles which we build <strong>in</strong> our day-dreams. The abstract<strong>in</strong> this signification, Hegel strongly <strong>in</strong>sists, is not the realm ofphilosophy: it is just the aim of philosophy to get rid of all abstraction<strong>and</strong> to see the world as concrete. 122From these considerations Hegel’s answer to the charge of <strong>in</strong>consistency<strong>in</strong> his statements concern<strong>in</strong>g the science of logic is pla<strong>in</strong>. ‘Pure’abstraction is not equivalent to ‘bare’ abstraction; the former is characteristicof all thought, the latter only of formal thought. In that its subjectmatter is thought <strong>and</strong> not the immediately given of sense-perception,logic may be said to busy itself with abstractions, to move <strong>in</strong> arealm of shades; but <strong>in</strong> this way every mental science is abstract, <strong>and</strong>might be metaphorically described as a ‘k<strong>in</strong>gdom of shadows.’ In thatits subject matter is the Notion, however, that is to say, concrete thought,the Logic is not only not abstract, but is the most concrete of the sciences.123 “The Notion is not palpable to the touch, <strong>and</strong> when we areengaged with it, we must be dead to hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> see<strong>in</strong>g. And yet . . theNotion is the only true concrete; for no other reason than because it<strong>in</strong>volves Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Essence, <strong>and</strong> the total wealth of these two sphereswith them, merged <strong>in</strong> the unity of thought.” 124 We shall have to return tothis po<strong>in</strong>t later.And all this shows us aga<strong>in</strong> the essential difference, as well as thefundamental similarity, between the Logic <strong>and</strong> the Phenomenology. Theyboth deal with consciousness; they are both expositions of the essentialnature of thought. But whereas the Phenomenology is <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> consciousnessprimarily as a subject-object relation <strong>and</strong> endeavors to workout the significance of this relation, the Logic is <strong>in</strong>terested primarily <strong>in</strong>disclos<strong>in</strong>g the organic nature of thought <strong>and</strong> so conf<strong>in</strong>es its attention tothe thought activity <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> for itself. The one is an <strong>in</strong>terpretation ofthought <strong>in</strong> its relation to its object: the other is an <strong>in</strong>terpretation of thecategories as they are <strong>in</strong> themselves, temporarily held <strong>in</strong> isolation fromtheir empirical sett<strong>in</strong>g. Hegel has stated this dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>in</strong> the preface tothe first edition of the larger Logic: “In this manner” — dialectically —”I have tried to present consciousness <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenology of Spirit.Consciousness is Spirit <strong>in</strong> the form of concrete knowledge, knowledge
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/49shut <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the form of externality; but the motion of the form of thisobject, as the development of all natural <strong>and</strong> spiritual life, rests onlyupon the nature of the pure essences that constitute the content of theLogic. As phenomenal Spirit, which <strong>in</strong> its own manner frees itself fromits immediacy <strong>and</strong> external concretion, consciousness develops <strong>in</strong>to pureknowledge which appropriates as its subject matter those pure essencesas they are <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> for themselves . . . Thus is given the relation of thescience that I have called the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Logic.” 125To sum up briefly, our conclusion so far is this. The Logic has as itspresupposition the whole development of the Phenomenology of Spirit.The Phenomenology, as we have already seen, asserts the <strong>in</strong>separabilityof thought <strong>and</strong> reality <strong>and</strong> attempts to def<strong>in</strong>e for us the true nature ofthought. The Logic presupposes this conclusion, tak<strong>in</strong>g for granted thatthought is really as it is here def<strong>in</strong>ed; <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the light of this presuppositionits aim is to give a more detailed account of the nature of thought, towork out the organic unity which exists among the several categories ofthought. 126Such, then, be<strong>in</strong>g the relation between the Logic <strong>and</strong> the Phenomenology,we pass on to ask concern<strong>in</strong>g the relation between the Logic<strong>and</strong> the other parts of the Encyclopaedia. This is a much debated problem<strong>in</strong> connection with Hegel’s philosophy, <strong>and</strong> upon its solution dependsthe <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the system as a system. In accordance with ourdeterm<strong>in</strong>ation not to anticipate the follow<strong>in</strong>g discussion, we shall hereconf<strong>in</strong>e ourselves to the formal aspect of the problem: as little as possiblewill be said concern<strong>in</strong>g the real ontological significance of theLogic. The question now before us is: As regards the systematic arrangementof the Encyclopaedia, what is the relation of the Logic to thePhilosophy of Nature <strong>and</strong> the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d?If at this juncture we turn to Hegel for light on the problem, we aresadly disappo<strong>in</strong>ted; very little light is vouchsafed us. His statements onthe po<strong>in</strong>t are few, <strong>and</strong> those few are couched <strong>in</strong> such metaphorical termsit is almost impossible to attach a def<strong>in</strong>ite mean<strong>in</strong>g to them. But one factseems <strong>in</strong>disputable, the fact, namely, that Hegel believed necessary <strong>and</strong>actually tried to make some k<strong>in</strong>d of transition from one part of theEncyclopaedia to another. Let us see what he has to say about thistransition.In the second edition of his Hegelianism <strong>and</strong> Personality 127 ProfessorPr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison has summarized Hegel’s account of the transitionas follows: “The Absolute Idea, Hegel says <strong>in</strong> the larger ‘Logic,’ 128 is
50/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>gham‘still logical, still conf<strong>in</strong>ed to the element of pure thoughts.... But <strong>in</strong>asmuchas the pure idea of knowledge is thus, so far, shut up <strong>in</strong> a speciesof subjectivity, it is impelled to remove this limitation; <strong>and</strong> thus the puretruth, the last result of the Logic, becomes also the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of anothersphere <strong>and</strong> science.’ The Idea, he recalls to us, has been def<strong>in</strong>ed as ‘theabsolute unity of the pure notion <strong>and</strong> its reality’ — ’the pure notionwhich is related only to itself’; but if this is so, the two sides of thisrelation are one, <strong>and</strong> they collapse, as it were, ‘<strong>in</strong>to the immediacy ofBe<strong>in</strong>g.’ ‘The Idea as the totality <strong>in</strong> this form is Nature. This determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gof itself, however, is not a process of becom<strong>in</strong>g or a transition’ such aswe have from stage to stage <strong>in</strong> the Logic. ‘The pass<strong>in</strong>g over is rather tobe understood thus — that the Idea freely lets itself go, be<strong>in</strong>g absolutelysure of itself <strong>and</strong> at rest <strong>in</strong> itself. On account of this freedom, the form ofits determ<strong>in</strong>ation is likewise absolutely free — namely, the externalityof space <strong>and</strong> time exist<strong>in</strong>g absolutely for itself without subjectivity. Afew l<strong>in</strong>es lower he speaks of the ‘resolve (Entschluss) of the pure Idea todeterm<strong>in</strong>e itself as external Idea.’ Turn<strong>in</strong>g to the Encyclopaedia we f<strong>in</strong>dat the end of the smaller Logic, a more concise but substantially similarstatement. ‘The Idea which exists for itself, looked at from the po<strong>in</strong>t ofview of this unity with itself, is Perception; <strong>and</strong> the Idea as it exists forperception is nature . . . The absolute freedom of the Idea consists <strong>in</strong>this, that <strong>in</strong> the absolute truth of itself (i.e., accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hegel’s usage,when it has atta<strong>in</strong>ed the full perfection of the form which belongs to it),it resolves to let the element of its particularity — the immediate idea, asits own reflection — go forth freely from itself as Nature.’ 129 And <strong>in</strong> thelecture-note which follows we read, as <strong>in</strong> the larger Logic — ’We havenow returned to the notion of the Idea with which we began. This returnto the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g is also an advance. That with which we began wasBe<strong>in</strong>g, abstract Be<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> now we have the Idea as Be<strong>in</strong>g; but thisexistent Idea is Nature.’”Such is Hegel’s account of the transition from the Logic to the Philosophyof Nature. Conf<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g our attention for the present to the aspectof the problem before us, let us ask concern<strong>in</strong>g the significance <strong>and</strong>justification of this attempted transition. There seems to be no doubtthat Hegel believed the transition necessary <strong>and</strong> that he did attempt tomake it. The question is, Why, <strong>and</strong> with what success? One or twoprelim<strong>in</strong>ary considerations will lead us to an answer.In the first place, I th<strong>in</strong>k we must agree with Haldane that the transition<strong>in</strong> question is logical only, not temporal. 130 If what we have been
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/51argu<strong>in</strong>g is true, namely, that the Notion is genu<strong>in</strong>ely objective <strong>and</strong> universal,this conclusion is forced upon us: the Absolute Idea would then<strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong> itself the fullness of Nature. And Hegel teaches us that thetransition is only logical. For he <strong>in</strong>sists that the Idea cannot be thoughtof as exist<strong>in</strong>g anterior to or <strong>in</strong>dependent of Nature; <strong>and</strong> that, when itpasses <strong>in</strong>to Nature, it does not come <strong>in</strong>to possession of a content whichbefore was alien to it. 131 On the contrary, we are <strong>in</strong>formed that the Ideais noth<strong>in</strong>g but completed Be<strong>in</strong>g, the abstract immediacy of Be<strong>in</strong>g madeconcrete. 132 And so such an account of the relation between the Idea <strong>and</strong>its manifestations as the follow<strong>in</strong>g from Falckenberg may be dismissedat once as at best mislead<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>in</strong>deed, if it means what it says, it isridiculously false: “The absolute or the logical Idea exists first as asystem of antemundane concepts, then it descends <strong>in</strong>to the unconscioussphere of nature, awakens to self-consciousness <strong>in</strong> man, realizes its content<strong>in</strong> social <strong>in</strong>stitutions, <strong>in</strong> order, f<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> art, religion, <strong>and</strong> science toreturn to itself enriched <strong>and</strong> completed, i.e., to atta<strong>in</strong> a higher absolutenessthan that of the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g.” 133 As Hegel conceives the matter, theIdea does <strong>in</strong>deed enrich itself by pass<strong>in</strong>g through these various stages ofits existence, or, rather, by exhibit<strong>in</strong>g these differentiations of itself, butit does so only by show<strong>in</strong>g that these differentiations are essential aspectsof itself <strong>and</strong> by disclos<strong>in</strong>g itself as <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> them from the first.The Idea is prior, not <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of time, but solely <strong>in</strong> the logical sense.In the second place, as Vera suggests, 134 the true significance of theproblem <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> this transition, as well as the correct solution of theproblem, can be had only <strong>in</strong> the light of Hegel’s philosophy as a whole.In a very important sense the Phenomenology of Spirit is the presuppositionof the entire Encyclopedia. As has already been po<strong>in</strong>ted out, theaim of the Phenomenology is simply to show what are the implicationsof knowledge, <strong>and</strong> to prove, aga<strong>in</strong>st Kant, that <strong>in</strong> knowledge as thusdeveloped we have the expression of ultimate reality. Now, as I th<strong>in</strong>k wemust conceive the matter, the Encyclopedia simply attempts a moredetailed <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>and</strong> a more elaborate exposition of this position.We might put it thus. In the Phenomenology we beg<strong>in</strong> with all the realitywe know anyth<strong>in</strong>g about, namely, experience, <strong>and</strong> we proceed todevelop its implications as regards its nature as a subject-object relation.The Logic abstracts from this concrete whole <strong>and</strong> exam<strong>in</strong>es oneaspect of it, which here we might call the subject-aspect; while the Philosophyof Nature <strong>and</strong> the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d deal with other aspectsof the same whole, that is, they might be said to def<strong>in</strong>e reality <strong>in</strong> its
52/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamobject-significance. For it must not be forgotten that, when we arrive atthe category of absolute knowledge <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenology, we havereached, not a new k<strong>in</strong>d of experience, but only a more concrete po<strong>in</strong>t ofview <strong>in</strong> our common everyday experience; <strong>and</strong> this po<strong>in</strong>t of view istaken by the other parts of the Encyclopaedia as well as by the Logic.Though Haym unfortunately failed to appreciate the full significance ofhis words, still he is essentially right whehe says that the Phenomenology“is really the whole system.... The later expression of the system <strong>in</strong>its articulated totality is only a more detailed exposition <strong>and</strong> completionthat which is conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenology.” 135 And it seems to methat this fact about the Encyclopaedia is not to be forgotten or overlooked,if we are truly to appreciate the relation of its several parts toeach other.If the preced<strong>in</strong>g considerations are substantially true, then we areforced to conclude (a) that the Logic, Philosophy of Nature <strong>and</strong> Philosophyof M<strong>in</strong>d are only three po<strong>in</strong>ts of view from which one organicwhole is observed <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpreted. The first <strong>in</strong>vestigates the more strictlycognitive side of experience; the second has to do with its crass objective,its sensuous aspect; while the third undertakes to <strong>in</strong>terpret its spiritualvalues. As Kuno Fischer po<strong>in</strong>ts out, each <strong>in</strong> a sense has the samecontent: the difference among them lies rather <strong>in</strong> the form which thatcontent assumes. 136 Each has a unique sphere <strong>and</strong> claim of its own, butneither is the whole of reality nor can it be ontologically separated fromthe others. <strong>Thought</strong> does <strong>in</strong>deed, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hegel, <strong>in</strong>clude its object,whether that object be crass matter or the other so-called functions ofthe m<strong>in</strong>d; but it <strong>in</strong>cludes by subsum<strong>in</strong>g, by tak<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>and</strong> preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>itself. So other sciences besides that of pure thought have their raisond’etre. 137 But because thought does thus <strong>in</strong>clude its object, we must say(b) that <strong>in</strong> a sense the Logic comprehends the other two parts of theEncyclopaedia. 138 And so Haym’s criticism loses its force <strong>and</strong> becomesa simple statement of fact: “So muss die Logik die ganze Philosophiese<strong>in</strong>, so muss mit ihr das <strong>System</strong> schliessen.” 139 This last po<strong>in</strong>t willcome up for direct discussion later <strong>in</strong> the present chapter.But it will be objected that on this score we are forced to deny thenecessity of the transition from the Logic as Hegel has attempted it. AndI have purposely courted the objection <strong>in</strong> order to emphasize my agreementwith it. If what has been said above is true — <strong>and</strong> its validity isattested to by our entire discussion of Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the nature ofthought — then we must give up the idea of a dialectical transition from
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/53one to another part of the Encyclopaedia. Such a transition is impossiblewere it necessary, but it is not necessary. Its necessity has beenobviated by the result of the Phenomenology; for this work has shownthat <strong>in</strong> the dialectic of the categories the object cannot be entirely absent,even though, for methodological purposes its presence be as far aspossible neglected. A dialectical transition here would <strong>in</strong> fact be <strong>in</strong>consistentwith the spirit of Hegel’s philosophy; it would seem to <strong>in</strong>dicatethat the Idea is a mere abstraction which dem<strong>and</strong>s a content to make itreal, an abstract universal to be particularized. Hegel himself at timesseems to feel this difficulty, although, so far as I am aware, he neverexplicitly expresses himself on the po<strong>in</strong>t. For example, his very frankrecognition that the transition which he attempts from the Logic to thePhilosophy of Nature is different from the transition of the subjectivenotion <strong>in</strong>to objectivity, or of subjective purpose <strong>in</strong>to life, one wouldth<strong>in</strong>k is not entirely without significance. 140 Aga<strong>in</strong> elsewhere he seemsto show that he fears the transition because he takes pa<strong>in</strong>s to warn usaga<strong>in</strong>st misconceiv<strong>in</strong>g its real import. 141 And <strong>in</strong> the larger Logic, at thebeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the discussion of the Absolute Idea, there occurs a passagewhich is suggestive <strong>in</strong> this connection: “S<strong>in</strong>ce it [i.e., the Idea] conta<strong>in</strong>sall determ<strong>in</strong>ation with<strong>in</strong> itself, <strong>and</strong> its essence is to return to itself throughits self-determ<strong>in</strong>ation or particularity, it possesses different forms; <strong>and</strong>it is the bus<strong>in</strong>ess of philosophy to trace it <strong>in</strong> these forms” — such asnature, art, <strong>and</strong> religion. 142But whether Hegel had any such feel<strong>in</strong>g as I have attributed to himor whether he did not, the fact rema<strong>in</strong>s that he felt called upon to makethe leap from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature. He explicitly assertsthat “the last result of the Logic becomes also the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g ofanother sphere <strong>and</strong> science,” which science is, of course, the Philosophyof Nature. If now, as we have argued, this transition is not only notnecessary, but, what is more important, is really <strong>in</strong>consistent with thelogical bias of the system, then the question why the author deemed itnecessary becomes a very press<strong>in</strong>g one. As a matter of fact he doesattempt the transition: what is to be said about the fact?The answer to this question is, <strong>in</strong> my op<strong>in</strong>ion, not far to seek. Hegelwas very much <strong>in</strong> earnest about this transition, <strong>and</strong> he was <strong>in</strong> earnestabout it for the reason that with it st<strong>and</strong>s or falls his system as a system.This, it seems to me, is the secret of his anxiety concern<strong>in</strong>g the matter.Like Kant, he was bound down to his system; he could not get beyondthe mach<strong>in</strong>ery of his dialectic. The Logic, Philosophy of Nature, <strong>and</strong>
54/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamPhilosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d had to form a triad of thesis, antithesis, <strong>and</strong> synthesis,else the formal coherence <strong>and</strong> symmetry of the system would havebeen lost. The scheme of the system dem<strong>and</strong>s a cont<strong>in</strong>uous l<strong>in</strong>ear developmentfrom one phase of it to another — an absolutely necessary development.If the dialectic is the absolute <strong>and</strong> universal method, why isthere not a dialectical passage from the Logic to nature? There simplymust be — <strong>and</strong> there was. Such procedure is due to the fact that Hegeldid not always raise the spirit of his system above the letter. The Method,the unerr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> absolute method of the dialectic, had to be looked outfor <strong>and</strong> its claims catered to regardless of consequences; <strong>and</strong> only toofrequently was the method seen <strong>in</strong> a false light <strong>and</strong> its claims mis<strong>in</strong>terpreted.If at all times Hegel could have identified his method with hisdoctr<strong>in</strong>e of begreifendes Denken, the relation of the various parts of theEncyclopaedia to each other would have been differently conceived <strong>and</strong>the position of the Logic <strong>in</strong> the system would have been more clearly<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligibly set forth.Some commentators seem disposed to justify this leap from the Logic.Noel, for example, goes so far as to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that there is a connectionbetween the Logic <strong>and</strong> what follows <strong>in</strong> the system analogous to theconnection among the several sections of the Logic. 143 “There must be,”he says, “a dialectical passage from the Logic to Nature. The logicalIdea must negate itself <strong>and</strong> pass <strong>in</strong>to its contrary.” But there seems to beno very good reason why the logical Idea should, just at this po<strong>in</strong>t,negate itself <strong>and</strong> pass <strong>in</strong>to Nature. Indeed, Noel’s position seems to overlookHegel’s own explicit statement, quoted above, to the effect that thetransition here <strong>in</strong> question is different from that which obta<strong>in</strong>s amongthe categories of the Logic. In this respect Mr. McTaggart is, perhaps,truer to Hegel. It is true that he asserts, “Granted pure thought, we arecompelled by the necessity of the dialectic to grant the existence of somesensuous <strong>in</strong>tuition also.” But he recognizes Hegel’s statement that thetransition to the Philosophy of Nature has its own peculiar characteristics.144 The fundamentals of Mr. McTaggart’s position seem to be: thatthe transition is both analytic <strong>and</strong> synthetic; that it really represents thephases of thesis, antithesis, <strong>and</strong> synthesis; <strong>and</strong> that Spirit, as the truth<strong>and</strong> goal of the movement, is present even from the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. In so faras this position <strong>in</strong>sists that <strong>in</strong> the Idea both Nature <strong>and</strong> Spirit are <strong>in</strong>volved,one is not <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to call it <strong>in</strong> question. But does this <strong>in</strong>sistencemake the transition from the Absolute Idea to Nature dialectically necessary?Merely by observ<strong>in</strong>g the Idea as the highest of the logical cat-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/55egories, are we forced to posit nature as its counterpart? If so, are wethereby made aware of the implicit appearance of Spirit, even before itlooms on the horizon? Even if we grant, with Noel, that logic conta<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong>germ philosophy <strong>in</strong> its entirety, <strong>and</strong> with Mr. McTaggart that, if therewere a transition at the end of the Logic, it would necessarily be bothanalytic <strong>and</strong> synthetic, still the essential po<strong>in</strong>t here has not been touched.Is the transition a dialectical necessity? If so, why is it so? I confessmyself unable to see any dialectical advance from the end of the Logicto the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the Philosophy of Nature, or even from the Idea to amatter of sensuous <strong>in</strong>tuition. Is it any less reasonable to say that the firstcategory of the Logic should alienate itself <strong>in</strong> its other than that the lastcategory should do so? Is not the category of Be<strong>in</strong>g as likely to go forth<strong>in</strong>to its opposite as is the Absolute Idea? Certa<strong>in</strong>ly so, if as Mr. McTaggartseems to suggest, the fact that the Absolute Idea is ‘pure thought’ is theimpetus of the movement; for Be<strong>in</strong>g is just as much ‘pure thought’ as isthe Absolute Idea. In fact, it would seem to be more reasonable to returnto the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the Logic <strong>and</strong> take the sensuous ‘alienation’ of Be<strong>in</strong>gas the po<strong>in</strong>t of departure for the Naturphilosophie: at any rate, <strong>in</strong> thisevent we should have the privilege of proceed<strong>in</strong>g on l<strong>in</strong>es analogous tothose followed <strong>in</strong> the development of the Logic, namely, from the less tothe more determ<strong>in</strong>ate. But whether we put ourselves at the first categoryor at the ‘last result’ of the Logic, hop<strong>in</strong>g thereby to discover a beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gfor our new ‘sphere <strong>and</strong> science,’ we f<strong>in</strong>d ourselves baffled. In noevent do we f<strong>in</strong>d that mysterious secret power that would drive us on toNature. And we fail for the somewhat obvious reason that we are alreadyat Nature <strong>and</strong> do not need to be driven to it. This so-called transitioncan be defended only on the basis of the Phenomenology: there ithas received the only justification which it needs <strong>and</strong> of which it is capable.But — <strong>and</strong> this is the important po<strong>in</strong>t — the conclusion of thePhenomenology destroys at once the necessity <strong>and</strong> the possibility ofsuch a transition; <strong>and</strong> from this po<strong>in</strong>t of view the dialectical passagebecomes noth<strong>in</strong>g more than a misguided zeal for schematization. Onemust feel that neither Noel nor Mr. McTaggart has succeeded <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>gthe leap plausible: if they had succeeded, one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to say that thereal significance of the Hegelian Logic would have been greatly dim<strong>in</strong>ished,if not completely destroyed.It might be argued <strong>in</strong> support of this transition from the Logic thatHegel is simply recogniz<strong>in</strong>g here, explicitly, the presupposition that hasbeen implicit <strong>in</strong> the entire development of the categories. For what is a
56/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamdialectical transition? Does it not consist simply <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g explicit apresupposition? And do we not at the end of the Logic recognize whathas been a presupposition all through, namely, the spiritual union ofthought <strong>and</strong> its object? Thus the circle is completed, the end is one withthe beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g. And with this the necessity of a more concrete treatmentis apparent — a treatment that shall take <strong>in</strong>to full account the presuppositionthus disclosed. And so we are brought at once <strong>in</strong>to the realm ofNature <strong>and</strong> of Spirit.This, it must be confessed, is all that Hegel could consistently havemeant by the transition <strong>in</strong> question. It could signify noth<strong>in</strong>g more than achange <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of view, if the lesson of the Phenomenology is to holdhere. One is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to th<strong>in</strong>k that this is really the essence of the transition.But the question <strong>in</strong>evitably arises why the presupposition is peculiarlyforced upon us <strong>in</strong> the Absolute Idea. Is not the recognition of thepresupposition as explicit <strong>in</strong> the first categories of the Logic as it is <strong>in</strong>the last? Does not Hegel make constant appeal to it throughout the wholedialectical advance? Why, then, should the presupposition be forced tothe fore <strong>in</strong> the Absolute Idea as it is not <strong>in</strong> any of the other categories? Itmight be answered, Because at the Absolute Idea we have a def<strong>in</strong>itionof reality itself. Even so, how was this def<strong>in</strong>ition arrived at apart fromthe phenomena of Nature <strong>and</strong> Spirit? The fact is that it was not; for theresult of the Phenomenology is recognized at every stage of the dialecticaldevelopment of the categories, <strong>and</strong> this necessitates the <strong>in</strong>clusion bythe Idea of these phenomena of Nature <strong>and</strong> Spirit. So far as I can see,the objective aspect of existence is no more clearly <strong>and</strong> necessarily evident<strong>in</strong> any one of the categories than it is <strong>in</strong> all; we are not forced totake account of it <strong>in</strong> the Idea <strong>in</strong> a manner different from that <strong>in</strong> which itforces itself upon us <strong>in</strong> the categories of Be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Essence. If, whenHegel reached the end of the Logic, he had contented himself with assert<strong>in</strong>gwhat the above argument would have him assert, namely, thatthe time had come for us to turn to a detailed consideration of thosephenomena that had not been explicitly taken <strong>in</strong>to account by the Logic,if he had simply told us that at the Idea the Logic reached its conclusion<strong>and</strong> that he here proposed to change his po<strong>in</strong>t of view, we could haveunderstood him: the necessity of the change <strong>and</strong> the partially abstractnature of the Logic, had already been sufficiently expla<strong>in</strong>ed to us <strong>in</strong> thePhenomenology. But when he goes on to urge that the Absolute Ideamust, by a dialectical necessity, alienate itself <strong>in</strong> its Other, we beg<strong>in</strong> towonder where the categories of Be<strong>in</strong>g came from <strong>and</strong> how we ever suc-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/57ceeded <strong>in</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g from this abstract view of the world to the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>tof the Idea. We had thought all along that <strong>in</strong> the Idea we were at last <strong>in</strong>touch with reality; but when this mysterious alienation beg<strong>in</strong>s to takeplace, the earth trembles under us <strong>and</strong> we wonder if we have been deceived.At this juncture the Phenomenology comes to our relief, whenwe remember that its conclusion has made the transition both unnecessary<strong>and</strong> impossible. The argument before us does <strong>in</strong>deed state whatHegel must have meant, if he rema<strong>in</strong>ed true to the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of his doctr<strong>in</strong>e;but it hardly expla<strong>in</strong>s what he seems actually to have attempted.It would seem, then, that this would-be transition from the Logicmust be given up. And, furthermore, we must agree with ProfessorPr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison that to admit so much <strong>in</strong>volves a surrender of Hegel’ssystem as he left it. He is systematic to a fault. With<strong>in</strong> the Logic itselfthe author’s mania for system often clouds, if it does not completelyhide, the issue; the omnipotent Dialectic Method, rather than the organicdevelopment of thought, is only too frequently the object of <strong>in</strong>terest.And, unfortunately, even the data of nature <strong>and</strong> history are sometimesforced <strong>in</strong>to this formal scheme whether they will or no. Whatunder other circumstances might have been a very simple change <strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of view is, as we have just seen, made <strong>in</strong>comprehensible <strong>and</strong> mislead<strong>in</strong>gby the same absurd reverence for the triadic movement of the‘absolute method.’ No doubt one may easily be too severely critical ofthis aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, both because it is so exasperat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>because it is calculated to conceal the real import of the system. Ourzeal to remove these barriers to a true appreciation of the system, <strong>and</strong> toga<strong>in</strong> an unprejudiced hear<strong>in</strong>g for the author, might bl<strong>in</strong>d us to the factthat these impedimenta f<strong>in</strong>d their partial explanation at least <strong>in</strong> the circumstancesunder which Hegel wrote. Historically speak<strong>in</strong>g this transitionfrom the Logic may claim for itself some sort of justification. Perhapsit was important for Hegel’s <strong>in</strong>fluence that he set forth his system<strong>in</strong>tact; <strong>and</strong> to do this seemed to necessitate this transition. For if thedialectic had with unerr<strong>in</strong>g precision led from the poor <strong>and</strong> abstractcategory of Be<strong>in</strong>g up to the fullness of the Absolute Idea, <strong>and</strong> that, too,apart from a direct consideration of Nature <strong>and</strong> of Spirit, then it was<strong>in</strong>cumbent upon the dialectic to lead <strong>in</strong> some way to a consideration ofthese important aspects of experience; <strong>and</strong> how could this be more happilyaccomplished than by the assertion of at least a quasi-dialecticalconnection between the Idea <strong>and</strong> these its manifestations? This groundof justification for Hegel’s procedure here should not be overlooked,
58/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>gham<strong>and</strong>, of course, should be given the weight that is due it. But, after all,though we may be <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to excuse Hegel for his formality, we have nospecial reason for be<strong>in</strong>g grateful to hi him for it; his system will beappreciated fully only when we throw aside this formality <strong>and</strong> penetrateto the fundamentals of the system. And the fundamentals of the systemcan best be disclosed when the fruitlessness <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>consistency of thisattempted transition from the Logic are revealed.So with no great degree of reluctance we surrender the formal arrangementof Hegel’s system. But we can ill afford to miss its spirit <strong>and</strong>the results that follow from it. One of the most marked of these results isthe position that epistemology is <strong>in</strong> a sense ontology, that logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysicscannot be separated from each other. This br<strong>in</strong>gs us back to ourorig<strong>in</strong>al question, the <strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g discussion hav<strong>in</strong>g been necessary toclear the way for an answer. So we ask once aga<strong>in</strong> concern<strong>in</strong>g the realmean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> justification of this Hegelian position, that a theory of knowledgecannot be separated from a theory of reality. In accordance withour plan of discussion, we shall attempt to answer this question by exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>ga criticism to which the contention has been subjected.The criticism which we shall here exam<strong>in</strong>e is to be found <strong>in</strong> thefourth lecture of Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s Hegelianism <strong>and</strong> Personality.The criticism, we seem compelled to say, is based upon a misapprehensionof Hegel’s real mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> actual procedure. 145 The rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gpart of this chapter will first attempt to justify this assertion,<strong>and</strong> then conclude with a statement of what Hegel, <strong>in</strong> consistency withhis own pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, must have meant by the identification <strong>in</strong> question.The criticism is based upon the attempted transition from the Logicto the Philosophy of Nature, one phase of which we have already considered.Put <strong>in</strong> a few words, the criticism seems to be that <strong>in</strong> this transitionHegel deliberately attempted to deduce nature from the logical Idea,<strong>and</strong> that, by a copious use of metaphors, he deluded himself <strong>in</strong>to th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gthat he had successfully bridged the gulf which separates formalthought from actual existence. To quote: “The concrete existence of thecategories (<strong>in</strong> Nature <strong>and</strong> Spirit) is to be deduced from their essence orthought-nature; it is to be shown that they cannot not be. When we havemounted to the Absolute Idea, it is contended, we cannot help go<strong>in</strong>gfurther. The nisus of thought itself projects thought out of the sphere ofthought altogether <strong>in</strong>to that of actual existence. In fact, strive aga<strong>in</strong>stthe idea as we may, it seems <strong>in</strong>dubitable that there is here once morerepeated <strong>in</strong> Hegel the extraord<strong>in</strong>ary but apparently fasc<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g attempt
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/59to construct the world out of abstract thought or mere universals. Thewhole form <strong>and</strong> structure of the system, <strong>and</strong> the express declarations ofits author at po<strong>in</strong>ts of critical importance, comb<strong>in</strong>e to force this convictionupon us. The language used can only be <strong>in</strong>terpreted to mean thatthought out of its own abstract nature gives birth to the reality ofth<strong>in</strong>gs.” 146 All of which amounts to say<strong>in</strong>g that Hegel has taken abstractthought, ontologized it, <strong>and</strong> then has turned about <strong>and</strong> attempted to deduceconcrete reality from this hypostatized abstractionIt must be admitted at once that such an accusation is not primafacie without some justification. If we turn once more to the passagesabove quoted bear<strong>in</strong>g on the transition from the Logic, our first <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ationis to accept Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of them. Otherpassages, especially those referr<strong>in</strong>g to the absoluteness <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ality ofthe system, seem to bear out the same contention. And when <strong>in</strong> theEncyclopaedia we run across passages which baldly assert that everyth<strong>in</strong>gis a judgment or a syllogism, we wonder whether Plato’s conceptionof archetypal Ideas is more removed from concrete experience. Andyet such an attempt to deduce nature from abstract thought would be arather remarkable undertak<strong>in</strong>g on Hegel’s part: it would be <strong>in</strong>consistentwith the entire spirit of his philosophy, the fundamental assumption ofwhich is, as Haldane suggests, 147 that you cannot deduce the ‘that.’ Is itpossible to <strong>in</strong>terpret these passages so as to make Hegel consistent withthe fundaments of his system? If so, it would seem that such an <strong>in</strong>terpretationshould certa<strong>in</strong>ly be adopted.I th<strong>in</strong>k it is possible to make Hegel consistent <strong>in</strong> this regard, <strong>and</strong> thisI have tried to do <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g pages of this chapter. I fully agreewith Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison that the attempted transition from oneto another part of Encyclopedia must be given up; <strong>and</strong> I also agree thatwith this transition we surrender the system as a system. But I cannotagree with the reasons which the critic advances <strong>in</strong> support of his conclusions.It was just because his system depended upon it that Hegelmade the resolute leap, <strong>and</strong> not for the purpose of gett<strong>in</strong>g from abstractthought to concrete existence. The ‘ugly broad ditch’ between thought<strong>and</strong> reality seems to me only a shadow; <strong>and</strong>, unless <strong>in</strong>deed we are tocredit Hegel with momentary forgetfulness of the foundation of his system,I cannot th<strong>in</strong>k that it was more to him. Now it would seem that this<strong>in</strong>terpretation, namely, that the transition from the Logic was attemptedfor purely schematic purposes, has the advantage over such an <strong>in</strong>terpretationas Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s, which makes of the transition an
60/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamattempt to deduce existential reality from abstract universals; <strong>and</strong> theadvantage of the former <strong>in</strong>terpretation lies <strong>in</strong> the fact that it does makeHegel consistent with the basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of his theory. We may ventureto put the matter <strong>in</strong> the form of a disjunction. Either Hegel tried todeduce nature from the logical categories or he did not. If he did attemptit, then he contradicts himself; for such an attempt would presupposethat the logical categories are merely abstract thoughts exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theheads of <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>and</strong> possess<strong>in</strong>g no vital significance <strong>in</strong> relation tothe essence of concrete objects. But this is the very conception of thoughtwhich we have seen Hegel object to <strong>in</strong> the systems of his predecessors<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> contradist<strong>in</strong>ction to which he emphasizes his own doctr<strong>in</strong>e. Andthat doctr<strong>in</strong>e is that thought has transcended the opposition betweenitself <strong>and</strong> its <strong>and</strong> is really the expression of the essence of the object.“Pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness.It conta<strong>in</strong>s thought <strong>in</strong> so far as it is just as much the object <strong>in</strong> itself,or the object <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>in</strong> so far as it is just as much pure thought.” 148But, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, if Hegel did not attempt to deduce naturefrom thought, it would seem that his statements about a transition fromthe Logic must be expla<strong>in</strong>ed away. Now the latter horn of this dilemmais comparatively easily disposed of, as has already been po<strong>in</strong>ted out <strong>in</strong>the preced<strong>in</strong>g part of the present chapter; the so-called transition is onlya change <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of view, the author’s <strong>in</strong>sistence upon the necessity ofthe transition be<strong>in</strong>g made for the sake of his system. But if we followProfessor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison <strong>in</strong> accept<strong>in</strong>g the former, the most significantaspect of Hegel’s philosophy will, to say the least, become questionable<strong>and</strong> he himself will st<strong>and</strong> accused of the most glar<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>consistencies.There seems to be no doubt, then, of the conclusion to be reached here.But leav<strong>in</strong>g aside speculation as to what may or may not have beenthe immediate purpose of Hegel <strong>in</strong> this transition, let us try to see whatis logically <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> it. Whether or not Hegel has here made a deliberateattempt to deduce nature from thought, such an attempt is certa<strong>in</strong>lynot logically imposed upon him.This contention is based upon what has already been said about thepresupposition of the Encyclopedia. In the Encyclopedia we are deal<strong>in</strong>gwith one whole, namely, reality: the three parts of the Encyclopediarepresent different po<strong>in</strong>ts of view from which this totality is observed.This conclusion follows necessarily, if our view concern<strong>in</strong>g the significanceof the Phenomenology <strong>in</strong> the system be correct. For the veryoutcome of the Phenomenology, we remember, has been the disclosure
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/61of the impossibility of divid<strong>in</strong>g reality <strong>in</strong>to water-tight compartmentswhich are so separated from each other that each may be dealt withentirely <strong>in</strong>dependently of the others. <strong>Reality</strong>, this discussion has taughtus, is rather one <strong>in</strong>dissoluble whole whose parts can be separated fromeach other only by abstraction. The Encyclopedia, therefore, presuppos<strong>in</strong>gas it unquestionably does the result of the Phenomenology, musthave for its object the one reality, <strong>and</strong> its several parts must be simplydifferent po<strong>in</strong>ts of view from which this unitary reality is observed <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>vestigated. Now as a corollary of this, it follows that the transitionfrom the Logic is as Kuno Fischer suggests, 149 logically noth<strong>in</strong>g morethan a change <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of view. If the Encyclopedia presents reality to usfrom three different st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ts each of which <strong>in</strong>volves the others, —<strong>and</strong> let us not forget that this is the lesson of the Phenomenology — thena transition with<strong>in</strong> the Encyclopedia cannot be anyth<strong>in</strong>g but a change <strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of view. So all that Hegel really was called upon to do <strong>in</strong> order toget from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature was simply to announcethat he <strong>in</strong>tended to <strong>in</strong>vestigate his problems from a new viewpo<strong>in</strong>t: thetransition, if one will call it so, had already been made <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenologyof Spirit as we have abundantly seen.Now it would seem that the accusation that Hegel seriously tried todeduce existence from thought when he made the transition from theLogic to the Philosophy of Nature fails to give the above considerationsthe weight that is due them. Unless one drops them out of m<strong>in</strong>d entirely,it is difficult, not to say impossible, to catch the significance of thefollow<strong>in</strong>g as a criticism of Hegel: “Most assuredly the Notion conta<strong>in</strong>sthe category of Be<strong>in</strong>g; so does the Ego, that is to say, the idea of the ego,<strong>and</strong> the Idea of God, both of which are simply the Notion under anothername....But when we ask for real bread, why put us off with a logical stonelike this? It is not the category ‘Be<strong>in</strong>g,’ of which we are <strong>in</strong> quest, butthat reality of which all categories are only descriptions, <strong>and</strong> whichitself can only be experienced, immediately known or lived. To suchreality or factual existence there is no logical bridge; <strong>and</strong> thoughts orcategories have mean<strong>in</strong>g only if we assume, as somehow given, a realworld to which they refer.” 150 Surely such a criticism could have beenwritten only <strong>in</strong> forgetfulness of what Hegel has said about the presuppositionof the Logic <strong>and</strong> the mediated aspect of the category of Be<strong>in</strong>g.Be<strong>in</strong>g is, <strong>in</strong>deed, a logical category; but it is more than a mere abstractcategory, a blank universal, that has only a psychological existence <strong>in</strong>
62/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamthe consciousness of the th<strong>in</strong>ker who happens to possess it. It is a concretethought that expresses one very general, but withal very essential,characteristic of that which really is. In Hegel’s usage, Be<strong>in</strong>g, or anyother category of thought, is not a mere idea or concept; on the contrary,it is a universal which ipso facto <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong> its very nature theparticularity of existence. 151And this br<strong>in</strong>gs us face to face with what seems to be the fundamentalerror <strong>in</strong> Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s charge. I refer to his neglect ofthe mean<strong>in</strong>g which Hegel attaches to the Notion. This is the bed-rockupon which Hegel bases his contention that logic <strong>and</strong> ontology are essentiallyone. It is only the Notion that “s<strong>in</strong>ks itself <strong>in</strong> the facts”; it isonly the Notion that is “accredited able to express the essential reality ofth<strong>in</strong>gs”; <strong>and</strong> only the Notion is the subject-matter of the science of logic.The Notion, thus, is the tie that b<strong>in</strong>ds epistemology <strong>and</strong> metaphysicstogether. For if thought comprehends reality <strong>and</strong> is capable of express<strong>in</strong>git, if there is no ‘residuum’ which lies outside of thought <strong>and</strong> which<strong>in</strong> its nature is <strong>in</strong>expressible <strong>in</strong> terms of thought, then the science ofthought is <strong>in</strong> a very important sense the science of th<strong>in</strong>gs. Now just thisconclusion the critic objects to; <strong>and</strong> his objection seems to rest upon amis<strong>in</strong>terpretation of the premise.Let us notice some of Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s statements. Afterquot<strong>in</strong>g several passages from Hegel to the effect that Nature is thelogical Idea <strong>in</strong> its otherness, is the Spirit <strong>in</strong> alienation from itself, <strong>and</strong> soforth, he cont<strong>in</strong>ues: “Now I ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that the whole problem of realityas such is wrapped up <strong>in</strong> these metaphorical phrases — otherness, petrifaction,materiature, concretion — <strong>and</strong> that by evad<strong>in</strong>g the question,Hegel virtually decl<strong>in</strong>es to take account of anyth<strong>in</strong>g but logical abstractions.He offers us, <strong>in</strong> a word, a logic <strong>in</strong> place of a metaphysic; <strong>and</strong> itmay be unhesitat<strong>in</strong>gly asserted that such a proposal, if taken literally, isnot only untenable, it is absurd.” Noth<strong>in</strong>g, we are further <strong>in</strong>formed, is <strong>in</strong>very truth a logical category. “A liv<strong>in</strong>g dog is better than a dead lion,<strong>and</strong> even an atom is more than a category. It at least exists as a reality,whereas a category is an abstract ghost, which may have a mean<strong>in</strong>g for<strong>in</strong>telligent be<strong>in</strong>gs, but which, divorced from such real be<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> theirexperience, is the very type of a non-ens.” A little later he says: “Existenceis one th<strong>in</strong>g, knowledge is another. But the logical bias of theHegelian philosophy tends to make this essential di t<strong>in</strong>ction disappear,<strong>and</strong> to reduce th<strong>in</strong>gs to mere types or ‘concretions’ of abstract formulae.”“The result of Hegel’s procedure would really be to sweep ‘exis-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/63tential reality’ off the board altogether, under the persuasion, apparently,that a full statement of all the thought-relations that constitute ourknowledge of the th<strong>in</strong>g is equivalent to the existent th<strong>in</strong>g itself. On thecontrary, it may be confidently asserted that there is no more identity ofKnow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> Be<strong>in</strong>g with an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ity of such relations than there waswith one.” 152If I underst<strong>and</strong> the import of these passages — <strong>and</strong> their mean<strong>in</strong>gseems unmistakable — there is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> them an assumption which Idare th<strong>in</strong>k is unwarranted. The assumption is that Hegel has actuallyattempted to reduce sensuous experience to the universals of formalthought, <strong>and</strong> has tried to make such universals really be the existentth<strong>in</strong>gs. If it be true that Hegel has attempted this, then it should beadmitted without argument that he has attempted that which is bothimpossible <strong>and</strong> absurd. It may, perhaps, be rather difficult to say just <strong>in</strong>what respect an atom is more than a category, just what other reality itpossesses besides its mean<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>in</strong>telligent be<strong>in</strong>gs; but there can not beany question that a liv<strong>in</strong>g dog is better than a dead lion — an object is<strong>in</strong>disputably more than a mere meet<strong>in</strong>g-po<strong>in</strong>t of abstract relations. Butdoes Hegel deny this? Is it quite fair to him to assert that the logical biasof his philosophy is “to reduce th<strong>in</strong>gs to mere types or ‘concretions’ ofabstract formulae”? Does he really try to force the particularity of existence<strong>in</strong>to the abstract universality of bare cognition? I have alreadyma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that such an assumption is groundless <strong>and</strong> even contrary tothe real spirit of Hegel’s system; <strong>and</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g chapters attempt toset forth the reasons upon which such a contention rests. If I have therefailed to accomplish this, it would hardly be worth while for me to undertakeit here. Suffice it to reiterate that, when Hegel <strong>in</strong>sists that knowledgeor thought <strong>and</strong> reality are conterm<strong>in</strong>ous, he is simply uphold<strong>in</strong>g thetheory that experience <strong>and</strong> reality are one: he means by thought, theNotion, not abstract <strong>and</strong> formal cognition, but organized experience. Ifsuch a criticism as the one with which we are here deal<strong>in</strong>g is to beestablished, it must first be shown that Hegel does not hold such a doctr<strong>in</strong>eof the nature of thought as has here been attributed to him; <strong>and</strong> thismust be shown regardless of <strong>in</strong>numerable utterances to the contrary,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> spite of the pages of the Phenomenology of Spirit.In the last analysis, one seems safe <strong>in</strong> say<strong>in</strong>g, the real differencebetween Hegel <strong>and</strong> his critic turns upon the question whether thought isan adequate expression of the real. Both have the same conception ofreality, namely, that it consists <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dividual; <strong>and</strong> both agree as to the
64/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamtrue def<strong>in</strong>ition of the <strong>in</strong>dividual, namely, that it is identity <strong>in</strong> difference. 153But <strong>in</strong> answer to the question whether thought is capable of express<strong>in</strong>gthe <strong>in</strong>dividual, author <strong>and</strong> critic part company. The former, as we haveseen, answers <strong>in</strong> the affirmative; while the latter, though he shows apuzzl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>consistency, f<strong>in</strong>ally gives a negative answer. 154 So we facethe question, Is thought adequate to express the real as thus def<strong>in</strong>ed? Oris it the very nature of the <strong>in</strong>dividual to transcend thought?In order to answer this question we must first come to some underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gconcern<strong>in</strong>g the real nature of thought. And two conceptions ofits essential nature are possible. One doctr<strong>in</strong>e of thought is that whichMr. McTaggart attributes to Hegel <strong>and</strong> which has been def<strong>in</strong>ed by Lotzethus: “<strong>Thought</strong> is everywhere but a mediat<strong>in</strong>g activity mov<strong>in</strong>g hither<strong>and</strong> thither, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to connection the orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>tuitions of external<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal perception, which are predeterm<strong>in</strong>ed by fundamental ideas<strong>and</strong> laws the orig<strong>in</strong> of which cannot be shown; it develops special <strong>and</strong>properly logical forms, peculiar to itself, only <strong>in</strong> the effort to apply theidea of truth (which it f<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>in</strong> us) to the scattered multiplicity of perceptions,<strong>and</strong> of the consequences developed from them.” 155 Accord<strong>in</strong>g tothis conception of thought, thought is a mediat<strong>in</strong>g activity among othermental processes which bear to it an external relation. The other possibleconception of thought is that which has been attributed to Hegel <strong>in</strong>the present study, the nature of which Hegel expresses thus: “If we identifythe Idea with thought, thought must not be taken <strong>in</strong> the sense of amethod or form, but <strong>in</strong> the sense of the self-develop<strong>in</strong>g totality of itslaws <strong>and</strong> peculiar terms. These laws are the work of thought itself, <strong>and</strong>not a fact which it f<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>and</strong> must submit to.” 156 Or thus: “In all humanperception thought is present; so too thought is the universal <strong>in</strong> all theacts of conception <strong>and</strong> recollection; <strong>in</strong> short, <strong>in</strong> every mental activity, <strong>in</strong>will<strong>in</strong>g, wish<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> the like. All these faculties are only further specializationsof thought. When it is presented <strong>in</strong> this light, thought has adifferent part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty of thought,one among a crowd of other faculties, such as perception, conception,<strong>and</strong> will, with which it st<strong>and</strong>s on the same level.” 157Now whichever of these doctr<strong>in</strong>es of thought we accept as true tothe facts of experience, our answer to the above question is fixed. If, onthe one h<strong>and</strong>, Lotze’s account be the true description of actual concretethought, then it is certa<strong>in</strong> beyond any dispute that Be<strong>in</strong>g can not be“resolved <strong>in</strong>to it without leav<strong>in</strong>g any residuum.” <strong>Thought</strong> which is merelya process of mediation among brute facts of experience cannot possibly
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/65be more than a formal method of deal<strong>in</strong>g with data given <strong>in</strong>dependentlyof it; <strong>and</strong> these data would certa<strong>in</strong>ly have to be accounted a part ofBe<strong>in</strong>g. Such thought might prove a valuable <strong>in</strong>strument for deal<strong>in</strong>g withreality — though I am not sure that I can see why it should, or, <strong>in</strong>deed,how it could, do so — but it could at most only compare <strong>and</strong> relatephenomena: reality would be, <strong>and</strong> would forever rema<strong>in</strong>, beyond it. But,if, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, Hegel’s account of thought is the true one, then itwould seem that we might as dogmatically assert that thought does comprehend<strong>and</strong> exhaust the real. Either this, or we commit ourselves to thedoctr<strong>in</strong>e of the th<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-itself which Kant has taught us, by his failure tomake it comprehensible, to fear. For if thought is conterm<strong>in</strong>ous onlywith experience, then it is also conterm<strong>in</strong>ous with the real; otherwise, ofcourse, reality would be trans-experiential. Just how, <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s op<strong>in</strong>ion,such thought is capable of express<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>dividuality of reality, Ihave tried to <strong>in</strong>dicate <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g chapter on the process of thought:his doctr<strong>in</strong>e is that thought is adequate to express the <strong>in</strong>dividual, becauseits categories are just such self-particulariz<strong>in</strong>g universals — universalsobta<strong>in</strong>ed, not by abstraction from the particulars, but by the<strong>in</strong>terpretation of them.It seems to me that, <strong>in</strong> the above criticism of Hegel, Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison confuses these two doctr<strong>in</strong>es of thought, or rather, that he overlooksHegel’s own doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> tacitly attributes to him that of Lotze,<strong>and</strong> so criticizes him for that of which he is not guilty. For if we takeHegel’s more concrete doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the nature of thought <strong>in</strong>to account,the criticism misses the mark. Perhaps I have dwelt long enough on thispo<strong>in</strong>t; but it is a very vital one <strong>in</strong> connection with Hegel’s system. Isubmit that it is only this confusion which gives Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s criticism significance, <strong>and</strong> that the criticism falls of its ownaccord when the confusion is cleared away.Just here emerges a consideration which we may pause to emphasizebefore we pass on to the conclud<strong>in</strong>g remarks of this chapter. Andthat consideration is that the po<strong>in</strong>t at which to attack Hegel’s identificationof logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysicsis his doctr<strong>in</strong>e concern<strong>in</strong>g the nature ofthat thought which is the subject-matter of the science of logic. With thevalidity of this doctr<strong>in</strong>e st<strong>and</strong>s or falls his contention that epistemology<strong>and</strong> ontology are essentially one. For if the categories express the natureof ultimate reality, then the science of the categories, namely, logic, isthe science of the real. And <strong>in</strong> order to prove that Hegel has no right toclaim that thought expresses fully the real, one must show that his doc-
66/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamtr<strong>in</strong>e of thought is false. And this, it would seem, would <strong>in</strong>volve a careful<strong>in</strong>vestigation of experience, s<strong>in</strong>ce Hegel claims to have rooted hisdoctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> experience through the procedure of the Phenomenology. Sofar as I am aware, such an enterprise has been undertaken by none ofHegel’s critics. 158The answer to the question as to what Hegel really did mean by hisassertion that logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysics are fundamentally one is <strong>in</strong>volved<strong>in</strong> what has already been said. It rema<strong>in</strong>s only to set it forth <strong>and</strong> toemphasize it. In the first place, it seems that we are forced to say thatHegel does not mean to reduce thought <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g to an abstract identity.We have already <strong>in</strong>sisted upon this po<strong>in</strong>t, but it will be well to emphasizeit aga<strong>in</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce it is so generally taken for granted that the contrary istrue. Critics generally seem to th<strong>in</strong>k that, when Hegel asserts that thoughtexhausts reality, he is assert<strong>in</strong>g that thought about an object actually isthe object itself <strong>and</strong> that experience is no richer than the poverty ofabstract cognition. Identity of thought <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g means for them undifferentiatedidentity; upon their <strong>in</strong>terpretation the particular loses itself<strong>in</strong> the universal, becomes vaporized, as it were, <strong>in</strong>to a mere meet<strong>in</strong>gpo<strong>in</strong>tof abstract relations. But such abstract identity between thought<strong>and</strong> its object Hegel simply could not teach <strong>and</strong> at the same time rema<strong>in</strong>true to his system: it is <strong>in</strong> direct contradiction of his fundamental presuppositions,<strong>in</strong>deed it contradicts the very thesis he was try<strong>in</strong>g to establish.159 He began by assum<strong>in</strong>g a duality with<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> basic to experience,namely, the subject-object relation; <strong>and</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>ly he did not wish to destroythe very foundation on which he was build<strong>in</strong>g. He never denied theexistence of the concrete object, nor did he make any attempt to reducethe object to blank universality. He did <strong>in</strong>deed reduce the object to termsof the subject; he urged that ultimate reality must be construed as Subject<strong>and</strong> not as Substance. But he did not destroy the duality with<strong>in</strong>experience. The object was never annihilated as an object, only expla<strong>in</strong>ed;its alienation disappeared, but its self-identity was never lost. This ideathat Hegel tried to reduce factual existence to abstract relations shouldbe dismissed from our m<strong>in</strong>ds once for all, unless we prefer to believethat he forgot or set about to contradict the very doctr<strong>in</strong>e which he wasendeavor<strong>in</strong>g to establish. Whatever one may see <strong>in</strong> the leap from theLogic to the Philosophy of Nature, one must grant that Hegel could nothave seriously enterta<strong>in</strong>ed the idea that abstract cognition <strong>and</strong> existentialreality are identical; the <strong>in</strong>consistency <strong>in</strong>volved is too patent. 160In the second place, what Hegel really does mean by his position
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/67that logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysic co<strong>in</strong>cide seems to be this, namely, the assertionof the complete <strong>in</strong>telligibility or mediated character of reality. Insteadof be<strong>in</strong>g merely subjective ideas, the categories of the Logic arepr<strong>in</strong>ciples of ultimate reality; <strong>and</strong> ultimate reality is simply what thesepr<strong>in</strong>ciples show it to be. It is only by these <strong>in</strong>struments that experiencegets its organization; <strong>and</strong> organized experience <strong>and</strong> reality co<strong>in</strong>cide. Thescience of the categories is, thus, the science of the real; but be<strong>in</strong>g is notdeduced, it is only thoroughly rationalized <strong>and</strong> expla<strong>in</strong>ed. Of course, wemust remember that these categories are not merely conceptions of theUnderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, as Hegel calls it, or of what we call cognition: the categoriesof feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> will are just as important as the categories ofcognition. And we must also remember that the categories of the Reasonare not merely universals bear<strong>in</strong>g an external <strong>and</strong> mechanical relationto the particulars; they are universals which exist only <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> throughthe particulars subsumed under them, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> which the particulars f<strong>in</strong>dtheir only reality. 161 Such an identification of logic <strong>and</strong> ontology, Hegelma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s, is logically <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the system of Kant: the reason whyKant failed to realize the fact was that he gave his categories an ‘essentiallysubjective significance.’ 162 That is to say, had Kant only realizedthat the realm of possible experience is the real <strong>and</strong> only real, then thecategories, which he recognized as pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of the deepest import <strong>in</strong>experience, would have been regarded as pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of reality, wouldhave atta<strong>in</strong>ed to truly objective significance; <strong>and</strong> so the science of thesepr<strong>in</strong>ciples would have become the science of the real, the Critique ofPure Reason would have been a metaphysic as well as a treatise onepistemology. Now Hegel argues that thought must be genu<strong>in</strong>ely objective,else we have on our h<strong>and</strong>s a dualism which cannot be transcended.And thought be<strong>in</strong>g really objective, logic is <strong>in</strong>evitably metaphysic.This leads us <strong>in</strong> conclusion to remark, <strong>in</strong> anticipation of a discussionthat will follow <strong>in</strong> the next chapter, that doubtless Hegel wouldhardly f<strong>in</strong>d free from difficulties the epistemology of those who are <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>edto criticize him for mak<strong>in</strong>g logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysics co<strong>in</strong>cident. Hemight ask concern<strong>in</strong>g the logical consequences of their position; <strong>and</strong>more than likely he would <strong>in</strong>timate that the <strong>in</strong>evitable answer is theD<strong>in</strong>g-an-sich of the Kantian philosophy. For what reality is it that liesbeyond thought, but a reality that is unknowable <strong>in</strong> terms of thought?And how can that reality which is unknowable <strong>in</strong> terms of thought beknown at all? And what significance can be attached to an unknowablereality? Is it logically possible to separate knowledge <strong>and</strong> reality? Hegel
68/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamwould urge that knowledge, which is <strong>in</strong>capable of express<strong>in</strong>g the natureof the ultimately real, is impotent. “Only <strong>in</strong> so far as reflection hasreference to the Absolute is it Reason, <strong>and</strong> its activity that of real knowledge.”163 He would furthermore <strong>in</strong>sist that what exists apart from knowledgeis an abstraction. “The object as it is without thought <strong>and</strong> the Notionis a mere idea, a name: the forms of thought <strong>and</strong> the Notion make ofit what it is.” 164 To such strictures it would seem that the critics couldreply only by admitt<strong>in</strong>g that the real does somehow fall with<strong>in</strong> the systemof knowledge; for, ultimately, there can be no bits or nuclei of realitythat rema<strong>in</strong> opaque to thought. As Professor Bosanquet has remarked:“If the object-matter of reality lay genu<strong>in</strong>ely outside the system of thought,not only our analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold ofreality.” 165 And such an empty conception of thought <strong>and</strong> such a hopelessconception of reality would comb<strong>in</strong>e to l<strong>and</strong> us <strong>in</strong> a rather barren<strong>and</strong> forlorn subjectivism.The conclusions of our discussion are as follows. Hegel does arguethat logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysic co<strong>in</strong>cide. But the co<strong>in</strong>cidence is not an abstractidentity. Aga<strong>in</strong>st such a conclusion the lesson of the Phenomenologywarns us. The co<strong>in</strong>cidence between the two consists <strong>in</strong> the fact thatthe thought, which is the subject matter of logic, is the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of organizationof reality itself; logic, thus, is necessarily a science of reality.The attempted transition from the Logic to the other parts of theEncyclopaedia must be expla<strong>in</strong>ed as the result of Hegel’s anxiety tokeep his system <strong>in</strong>tact. It cannot be construed as an attempt on Hegel’spart to deduce factual existence from one aspect of conscious experience;for such an attempt would have contradicted the doctr<strong>in</strong>e whichHegel most persistently presupposes, the doctr<strong>in</strong>e, namely, that thoughtis concrete, not abstract.
Part II.Chapter IV.<strong>Reality</strong> as Individual.In the preced<strong>in</strong>g chapters of this study we have been concerned exclusivelywith Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the nature of thought. We have learnedthat, accord<strong>in</strong>g to his doctr<strong>in</strong>e, thought is co-extensive with experience<strong>and</strong> consequently with reality itself: it has no datum opposed to <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>dependent of it. 166 Thus an <strong>in</strong>vestigation of the nature of thought wasnecessary before we could arrive at a just appreciation of Hegel’s teach<strong>in</strong>gconcern<strong>in</strong>g the nature of the ultimately real. Hav<strong>in</strong>g now completedthis <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>and</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g learned what Hegel has to say concern<strong>in</strong>gthe thought-process, we turn to the other aspect of our general problem<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>quire about the details of Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of reality.As we have already seen, Hegel <strong>in</strong>sists that reality is the result of aprocess of mediation; it is not a first pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, but a last result. This isa contention upon which Hegel is constantly <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g. “If knowledge isto grasp the truth,” he tells us, “it must not rema<strong>in</strong> at the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t ofthe immediately given <strong>and</strong> its determ<strong>in</strong>ations. On the contrary, it mustpenetrate this immediate be<strong>in</strong>g, assum<strong>in</strong>g that beh<strong>in</strong>d it there is someth<strong>in</strong>gother than itself, which hidden somewhat constitutes its truth.” 167“Every immediate unity is only abstract potential truth, not real truth.” 168“Concern<strong>in</strong>g the Absolute, it is to be said that it is first as a result whatit is <strong>in</strong> truth.” 169 The real is not to be found <strong>in</strong> sense-perception: it isonly the result of the process of thought. 170 This emphasis of the mediatedaspect of reality is one of the fundamental doctr<strong>in</strong>es of the Hegelianphilosophy, <strong>and</strong> the author never tires of rem<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g us of it. 171 The ultimatelyreal is not shot out of a pistol at us; truth is not given, as it were,
70/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghama co<strong>in</strong> from the m<strong>in</strong>t. On the contrary, the real must be def<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>and</strong> itsdef<strong>in</strong>ition comes only with develop<strong>in</strong>g experience <strong>and</strong> the growth ofknowledge. It is only the labors of thought that can lead us to the l<strong>and</strong> ofreality.This be<strong>in</strong>g true, it follows at once that the form of universality is, asHegel views the matter, an essential aspect of the real. For, on this hypothesis,reality lies exclusively with<strong>in</strong> the doma<strong>in</strong> of thought; <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gipso facto necessitates the form of universality. 172 This implicationof his system Hegel does not overlook. In the Naturphilosophie, forexample, he urges that the universal aspect of objects is not to be consideredas someth<strong>in</strong>g foreign to them, a form which belongs to themonly when they happen to be thought about; rather, the universal is absolutelyessential to their reality, it is the noumenon, as it were, beh<strong>in</strong>dthe transitory <strong>and</strong> fleet<strong>in</strong>g phenomenon. 173Reason, he tells us elsewhere, “is the certitude that its determ<strong>in</strong>ationsare just as much objective, e.g., determ<strong>in</strong>ations of the essence ofth<strong>in</strong>gs, as they are subjective thoughts.” 174 Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> opposition to theatomistic view of Locke <strong>and</strong> the empiricists to the effect that the universaldoes not <strong>in</strong> reality belong to objects, Hegel asserts: “To say . . . thatthe universal is not the essential reality of nature . . . is tantamount tosay<strong>in</strong>g that we do not know real existence.” 175 And an unknowable realityis, for Hegel, a contradiction <strong>in</strong> terms. <strong>Reality</strong>, then, does assume theform of universality; this is essential to its very be<strong>in</strong>g.From this we may pass at once to the conclusion that the real, asHegel conceives of it, cannot be the abstract particular. After what hasjust been said it is hardly necessary to argue this po<strong>in</strong>t further. Hegelwould unhesitat<strong>in</strong>gly assert that the particular, qua particular, is neverfound <strong>in</strong> experience at all. This is exactly what his doctr<strong>in</strong>es of the<strong>in</strong>separability of immediacy <strong>and</strong> mediation amounts to. The immediacyof reality is a mediated immediacy; <strong>and</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce the mediat<strong>in</strong>g process isthat of thought which can advance only by means of universals, theimmediacy of the real must transcend bare particularity. In a word, wemay put the matter so: if knowledge is coextensive with experience, thenthe possibility that a mere particular may appear with<strong>in</strong> experience iselim<strong>in</strong>ated; whatever appears <strong>in</strong> knowledge must be more than a mereparticular, for the universals of thought can lay hold only of that whichsomehow itself is universal. The abstract particular plays no part <strong>in</strong>reality. Aga<strong>in</strong>st the idea that particularity is a form adequate to the realHegel has some cogent objections to urge. And perhaps it would not be
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/71too much to say that those objections are rather obvious. In the firstplace, the particular seems to be absolutely noth<strong>in</strong>g so far as experienceis concerned. In order that it may be a part of experience it must, asKant has shown us <strong>in</strong> his famous Transcendental Deduction of the categories,become universalized, must lose its abstract particularity. Forthe particular which is to be experienced must rema<strong>in</strong> identical withitself through a period of time; <strong>and</strong> self-identity is universality. So theabstract particular has no part to play <strong>in</strong> experience, is impossible, <strong>in</strong>deed,with<strong>in</strong> experience. But, <strong>in</strong> the second place, if we should grant thepossibility of the abstract particular with<strong>in</strong> experience, we should f<strong>in</strong>dourselves <strong>in</strong> the midst of some puzzl<strong>in</strong>g problems. And not the leastconfus<strong>in</strong>g is the question, What is an unrelated particular? Absolutelynoth<strong>in</strong>g can be said about it, because anyth<strong>in</strong>g can be def<strong>in</strong>ed only <strong>in</strong>terms of its relations <strong>and</strong> a particular has no relations. Indeed, an abstractparticular is simply an <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>able absolute. Hegel puts the difficultythus: “The form of immediacy <strong>in</strong>vests the particular with the characterof <strong>in</strong>dependent or self-centered be<strong>in</strong>g. But such predicates contradictthe very essence of the particular, — which is to be referred tosometh<strong>in</strong>g else outside. They thus <strong>in</strong>vest the f<strong>in</strong>ite with the character ofan absolute.” 176 And of course it is not easy to see how experience couldpossibly be composed of a number of unrelated absolutes. But it seemsuseless to stress this po<strong>in</strong>t further. It is pla<strong>in</strong>, as Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattisonhas urged, that the mere particular f<strong>in</strong>ds a place to exist nowhere outsidea logic which is not wholly clear about its own procedure. 177But, grant<strong>in</strong>g that Hegel is not guilty of hypostatiz<strong>in</strong>g the abstractparticular, what are we to say about his assertions concern<strong>in</strong>g the universal?Are we so sure that he does not go to the other extreme <strong>and</strong> urgethat experience consists <strong>in</strong> blank universality? Have we not seen that hema<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that to th<strong>in</strong>k the world is to cast it <strong>in</strong> the form of the universal,<strong>and</strong> is it not true that he reduces experience to terms of thought? Is henot always <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that the universal, the Notion, is the very qu<strong>in</strong>tessenceof the object?It is true, as we have all along seen, that Hegel has been generallyaccused of reduc<strong>in</strong>g the real to the form of abstract universality. This isthe view of Haym, of Trendelenburg, of Lotze, <strong>in</strong>deed of all the criticsof the Hegelian philosophy <strong>in</strong> general Even the sympathetic critics ofthe system are all practically agreed <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g the same assumption. Itis the very nerve of Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s criticism, which wereviewed <strong>in</strong> some detail <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g chapter; <strong>and</strong> it is the nerve also
72/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamof the criticisms of Professor Baillie <strong>and</strong> Mr. McTaggart, which weshall presently consider. Is Hegel really guilty of this accusation thathas been brought aga<strong>in</strong>st him by so many students of his philosophy, oris he not? If he is, then there can be no question that his system is as farfrom concrete experience as any system well can be. If he is not, thenwith the assumption fall the criticisms based upon it.Our answer to the question is already determ<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>and</strong> our reasonsfor it already set forth. The answer must be an unequivocal <strong>and</strong> emphaticnegative, its justification be<strong>in</strong>g found <strong>in</strong> the entire first part ofthis study. There it was the aim to let Hegel speak for himself; <strong>and</strong> if weare to believe what he has said, then we are forced to admit at least thatit was not his <strong>in</strong>tention to champion the position that reality is simply anaggregate of blank universals, a ‘ballet of bloodless categories.’ He doesgrant that thought is conterm<strong>in</strong>ous with experience, <strong>and</strong>, consequently,with reality itself; the real for him exists only <strong>in</strong> the form of the Notion.About this there need be no dispute. Aga<strong>in</strong>, he as frankly admits thatthis position forces him to assume the further position that reality can befound only <strong>in</strong> universality; for “th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g means the br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g of someth<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to the form of universality.” 178 Upon this all may agree. But theall-important po<strong>in</strong>t here, the po<strong>in</strong>t upon which there is difference ofop<strong>in</strong>ion, is the determ<strong>in</strong>ation of Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of universality. This isreally the bone of contention. What does Hegel mean by the form ofuniversality which reality assumes? Does he mean by the universal ofthe Notion merely formal universality? If we dare ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> our positionaga<strong>in</strong>st the cloud of witnesses on the other side, we must hold that by hisdoctr<strong>in</strong>e of the universality of the Notion Hegel means, not abstractgenerality, but concrete universality. This was the central thesis of ourdiscussion of Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the nature of thought, which we sawHegel def<strong>in</strong>e, not as mere cognition, but as the very life of m<strong>in</strong>d itself. Inthis Hegelian thought are <strong>in</strong>cluded all the categories of the m<strong>in</strong>d, fromthe barest, most empty sensation which only po<strong>in</strong>ts dimly to the factualexistence of an objective world, to the fullest, most concrete expressionof the essential constitution of the world. As Hegel conceives the matter,experience is not reduced to the bare universals of cognition: cognitionis only one aspect of the mental life, which <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong> itself thecategories of feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> volition as well. To accuse him of reduc<strong>in</strong>greality to blank universality, therefore, is to misapprehend what he meansby the form of the Notion. 179Both Professor Baillie <strong>and</strong> Mr. McTaggart give their op<strong>in</strong>ion aga<strong>in</strong>st
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/73the conclusion here advanced. These two professedly close <strong>and</strong> sympatheticstudents of Hegel ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that he conceives reality to be noth<strong>in</strong>gmore than a process of discursive knowledge, that he reduces experienceto blank universality. An exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> some detail of the groundsupon which these critics base their op<strong>in</strong>ions will perhaps serve to clearup the problem before us.The Phenomenology of Spirit forms the po<strong>in</strong>t of departure for ProfessorBaillie’s criticism. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the critic, Hegel arrives at hisfundamental position <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g manner: “All experience <strong>in</strong>volvesthe relation of subject to object, <strong>and</strong> all Experience is fundamentally thelife of m<strong>in</strong>d; it f<strong>in</strong>ds its mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> explanation <strong>in</strong> self-consciousness.Now <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenology it was further shown that self-consciousnessf<strong>in</strong>ds its most perfect expression <strong>in</strong> Absolute Science. In other words,that while all Experience is the realization of self-consciousness, Scienceis its truest form: it is ‘the crown of the life of m<strong>in</strong>d.’ Therefore . .. the immediacy of Experience is the immediacy of Science; the mediationconstitut<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> construct<strong>in</strong>g Experience is the mediation of Science.What is immediate to life <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dissoluble union with environment(<strong>in</strong> the widest sense of the term) is the same as what is ‘given’ or ‘immediate’<strong>in</strong> Knowledge. In other words, <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> its essence is a processof Knowledge.” In the paragraph immediately follow<strong>in</strong>g this statementof Hegel’s supposed procedure, the critic cont<strong>in</strong>ues: “Now it is safe tosay that such an identification is absolutely groundless. To assert thatthe whole teem<strong>in</strong>g life of the world, with its boundless activity, its <strong>in</strong>exhaustiblewealth of content, is for knowledge literally ‘giver’ <strong>in</strong> its entirety,<strong>and</strong> only exists as so ‘given’ — this is surely the mere perversionof Experience <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terests of a speculative preconception.” 180 Laterhe gives the follow<strong>in</strong>g as the gist of his objection: “The process of sciencemust not for a moment be taken to be equivalent to the fullness ofthe life of Experience itself.” 181The central part of this accusation, we notice, is that Hegel identifiesthe immediacy of experience, that immediacy which is the real, withthe immediacy of science. He is made to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that the richness ofreality, “the whole teem<strong>in</strong>g life of the world, with its boundless activityits <strong>in</strong>exhaustible wealth of content,” may legitimately be forced <strong>in</strong>to theabstract framework of scientific formulae. The wealth of the factualworld <strong>and</strong> the glory of it, he is supposed to have transformed <strong>in</strong>to thepoverty of general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>and</strong> universal laws. Under his h<strong>and</strong>s, it issaid, the flesh <strong>and</strong> blood of liv<strong>in</strong>g reality become so attenuated that only
74/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamthe skeleton is left us; <strong>and</strong> such a skeleton, we are asked to believe Hegelwould have us accept for the puls<strong>in</strong>g life of concrete experience.Now I venture to th<strong>in</strong>k that Hegel cannot fairly be accused of anysuch absurd contention. He must have known, as well as everybody elseknows, that there is more to reality than mere thoughts about it. And hedid. This is quite evident from the emphasis that he places from time totime upon the factual aspect of experience. Over <strong>and</strong> over aga<strong>in</strong> he urgesthat thought is true only <strong>in</strong> so far as it s<strong>in</strong>ks itself <strong>in</strong> the facts, whichcerta<strong>in</strong>ly are more than the thoughts about them. With the reader’s permissionI shall quote some other passages bear<strong>in</strong>g on this po<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>in</strong> orderto show that Hegel not only is not afraid of, but <strong>in</strong>sists upon, the ‘logicof the fact.’ 182 In the sixth section of the Introduction to the smallerLogic we read: “The actuality of the rational st<strong>and</strong>s opposed by thepopular fancy that Ideas <strong>and</strong> ideals are noth<strong>in</strong>g but chimeras, <strong>and</strong> philosophya mere system of such phantasms. It is also opposed by the verydifferent fancy that Ideas <strong>and</strong> ideals are someth<strong>in</strong>g far too excellent tohave actuality, or someth<strong>in</strong>g too impotent to procure it for themselves.This divorce between idea <strong>and</strong> reality is especially dear to the analyticunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g which looks upon its own abstractions, dreams thoughthey are, as someth<strong>in</strong>g true <strong>and</strong> real, <strong>and</strong> prides itself on the imperative‘ought,’ which it takes especial pleasure <strong>in</strong> prescrib<strong>in</strong>g even on the fieldof politics.... The object of philosophy is the Idea: <strong>and</strong> the Idea is not soimpotent as merely to have a right or obligation to exist without actuallyexist<strong>in</strong>g.” In the twenty-fourth section we read: “If thought tries to forma notion of th<strong>in</strong>gs, this notion (as well as its proximate phases the judgment<strong>and</strong> syllogism) cannot be composed of articles <strong>and</strong> relations whichare alien <strong>and</strong> irrelevant to the th<strong>in</strong>gs.” And <strong>in</strong> the second lecture note:“When we th<strong>in</strong>k, we renounce our selfish <strong>and</strong> particular be<strong>in</strong>g, s<strong>in</strong>kourselves <strong>in</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>g, allow thought to follow its own course, <strong>and</strong>, if weadd anyth<strong>in</strong>g of our own, we th<strong>in</strong>k ill.” If these passages (<strong>and</strong> others ofsimilar import) do not mean that thought <strong>and</strong> the science of thoughthave to do with factual existence, then I fail to see what they do mean.<strong>Thought</strong> always has an objective reference, they tell us, apart from whichthought is noth<strong>in</strong>g more than an abstraction; if the object is neglected, ifthe th<strong>in</strong>g is left out of account. thought is useless. Indeed, if the object isneglected, thought is noth<strong>in</strong>g; for it is just the expression of the essenceof the object. This would seem to be Hegel’s mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> these passages,<strong>and</strong> it certa<strong>in</strong>ly is <strong>in</strong> harmony with the spirit of his system.The above accusation of Professor Baillie, one seems forced to say,
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/75is based upon a complete mis<strong>in</strong>terpretation of Hegel’s actual procedure.In the preface to the Phenomenology Hegel does, <strong>in</strong>deed, identify the‘element of science’ with the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of absolute knowledge; <strong>and</strong> thiscategory, as we saw <strong>in</strong> the first chapter of this study, is the truth ofexperience. Thus it is true, <strong>in</strong> a sense, that the ‘element of science’ is thetruth of experience. But — this is the vital po<strong>in</strong>t — Hegel does not meanby science here what Professor Baillie seems to th<strong>in</strong>k he means by it,namely, a system of abstract <strong>and</strong> general laws. On the contrary, he meansby it just that concrete po<strong>in</strong>t of view of the category of absolute knowledge,whose nature <strong>and</strong> whose necessity as a presupposition of all experienceit was the prov<strong>in</strong>ce of the Phenomenology to work out <strong>and</strong> elaborate.Therefore, when Hegel ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that we arrive at the truth ofexperience only when we enter the realm of science <strong>and</strong> that <strong>in</strong> thisrealm we seize reality <strong>in</strong> its essence, he certa<strong>in</strong>ly does not argue thatreality is noth<strong>in</strong>g more than scientific laws <strong>and</strong> universal pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, nordoes he assume that the content of abstract science is ‘equivalent to thefullness of life itself.’ Such abstract pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, he would say, have theirpart to play<strong>in</strong> experience; but their part, though unquestionably important<strong>and</strong> extremely significant for any theory of ultimate reality, is not toassume the role of absolute <strong>and</strong> exhaustive formulae or pr<strong>in</strong>ciples. Thatscience which is exhaustive of reality is only ‘absolute science’; it is onthe plane not of the Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, but of Reason, where all ‘f<strong>in</strong>ite’categories are viewed <strong>in</strong> their true light <strong>and</strong> where mere generality isseen to be what it really is — a blank abstraction.Hegel’s real position or. this po<strong>in</strong>t may perhaps be set forth by thefollow<strong>in</strong>g considerations. The only immediacy which he would th<strong>in</strong>k ofequat<strong>in</strong>g with reality is the immediacy of what he calls ‘absolute science.’Now what is this immediacy? The immediacy of ‘absolute science’is completely mediated immediacy, or thoroughly rationalized experience.There are various forms of immediacy, such as that of commonsense, of science, of religion, of philosophy, each of which, accord<strong>in</strong>gto Hegel, has a degree of reality attach<strong>in</strong>g to it proportional to theexhaustiveness of the mediation which it <strong>in</strong>volves; the immediacy of‘absolute science’ is the highest of these forms of immediacy, <strong>and</strong> isabsolutely concrete because it <strong>in</strong>volves absolutely exhaustive mediation.Furthermore, each more exhaustively mediated form of immediacydoes not simply negate the lower; it negates <strong>and</strong> affirms it, <strong>and</strong> affirmsby negat<strong>in</strong>g. This, as we have seen, is the unique aspect of Hegel’sdoctr<strong>in</strong>e of the negative function of thought. The various stages of im-
76/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghammediacy, therefore, are not opposed to, <strong>and</strong> more or less <strong>in</strong>dependent ofeach other; on the contrary, each is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> all <strong>and</strong> all <strong>in</strong> each. Andfrom this it follows that the immediacy of ‘absolute science,’ which isthe only completely mediated immediacy, ipso facto <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong> itselfall the other forms of immediacy; the truth of all f<strong>in</strong>ds its expression<strong>in</strong> this form of immediacy. Thus that immediacy with which Hegel identifiesreality is an immediacy which <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong> itself the entire realmof experience, <strong>in</strong> its most trivial as well as <strong>in</strong> its most momentous <strong>and</strong>sublime reaches. For such is the immediacy of ‘absolute science.’ 183So much for Professor Baillie’s mis<strong>in</strong>terpretation of Hegel. I th<strong>in</strong>kwe have shown that his criticism is beside the mark, <strong>and</strong> that is all weare concerned to do at present. The criticism itself implies a position thetenability of which we shall have to call <strong>in</strong> question later on <strong>in</strong> thischapter. We turn now to a consideration of Mr. McTaggart’s objection.Mr. McTaggart’s criticism, though essentially the same as that ofProfessor Baillie, is presented from a different po<strong>in</strong>t of view <strong>and</strong> sodem<strong>and</strong>s separate notice. The conclusion of the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d ismade the basis for this attack. There, it is asserted, Hegel explicitlyma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that philosophy is the highest expression of Spirit, <strong>and</strong> thus isguilty of equat<strong>in</strong>g reality with philosophical knowledge. But, the criticobjects, the position that <strong>in</strong> philosophy one f<strong>in</strong>ds the complete expositionof ultimate reality is untenable. “Philosophy itself is knowledge, itis neither action nor feel<strong>in</strong>g. And there seems noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s accountof it to <strong>in</strong>duce us to change the mean<strong>in</strong>g of the word <strong>in</strong> this respect.... Weare thus, it would seem, bound down to the view that Hegel consideredthe supreme nature of Spirit to be expressed as knowledge, <strong>and</strong> as knowledgeonly.” 184 “But knowledge,” we are further <strong>in</strong>formed, “does notexhaust the nature of Spirit. The simplest <strong>in</strong>trospection will show usthat, besides knowledge, we have also volition, <strong>and</strong> the feel<strong>in</strong>g of pleasure<strong>and</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>. These are prima facie different from knowledge, <strong>and</strong> itdoes not seem possible that they should ever be reduced to it.” 185 Therefore,the critic concludes, <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>al st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of the EncyclopaediaHegel tried “to ignore volition, <strong>and</strong> to ignore pleasure <strong>and</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>.” And,of course, “a view of Spirit which does this is fatally one-sided.” 186The assumption <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> this criticism is quite evident. It is thatPhilosophy, as Hegel def<strong>in</strong>es it, has to do with purely discursive knowledge,that is, with cognition as opposed to feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> volition, <strong>and</strong> withthis alone. As the critic himself puts it:‘Philosophy itself is knowledge, it is neither action nor feel<strong>in</strong>g. And
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/77there seems noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s account of it to <strong>in</strong>duce us to change themean<strong>in</strong>g of the word <strong>in</strong> this respect.” Now it is just this assertion that Ichallenge. In the first place, as I have already argued <strong>in</strong> the somewhatdetailed discussion of Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of immediacy <strong>and</strong> mediation, theaccount which Hegel gives us of philosophical knowledge not only ‘<strong>in</strong>duces’us, but forces us, to def<strong>in</strong>e philosophy as a science of more thanmere cognition. In po<strong>in</strong>t of fact, philosophy, as Hegel uses the term, isthe science of experience, s<strong>in</strong>ce it has to do with that life of m<strong>in</strong>d, reason,which is noth<strong>in</strong>g more nor less than experience itself. In the secondplace, the assumption here is the same as the assumption above, <strong>and</strong> allwe have said <strong>in</strong> answer to the latter applies equally well to the former.The realm of philosophy Hegel identifies with the realm of ‘absolutescience’; <strong>and</strong> it must never be forgotten that the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of ‘absolutescience’ is to be found <strong>in</strong> the category of absolute knowledge. Philosophicalknowledge, therefore, always means more than mere abstractcognition: it is an immediacy which <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong> itself the whole lifeof Spirit.Mr. McTaggart is will<strong>in</strong>g to admit that the conclusion which he sees<strong>in</strong> the last division of the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d is palpably <strong>in</strong>consistentwith the outcome of the Logic. In the Absolute Idea, he grants, volitionas well as cognition is present. Hence the Absolute Idea “must be anidea richer <strong>and</strong> fuller than that of Cognition — richer <strong>and</strong> fuller by thecontent of the idea of volition.... The Absolute Idea then conta<strong>in</strong>s with<strong>in</strong>itself the idea of knowledge as a transcended moment.” Thus “<strong>in</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>gthe abstract framework of absolute reality <strong>in</strong> the Logic,” Hegel has atthe same time given “a framework for someth<strong>in</strong>g which, whatever it is,is more than any form of mere cognition.” 187 Now I submit that theactual result of the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d is not <strong>in</strong> the least <strong>in</strong>consistentwith this result of the Logic. Hegel always <strong>and</strong> everywhere ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>sthat philosophical knowledge <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong> itself feel<strong>in</strong>g, volition, cognition,<strong>in</strong> short all the action <strong>and</strong> passion of the human m<strong>in</strong>d; <strong>and</strong> that,therefore, philosophy is the science of the real, if the realm of experiencebe the real. This position is the presupposition of the entireEncyclopaedia, <strong>and</strong> it is just as much <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the last part as it is <strong>in</strong>the first. The proof of this contention has already been given <strong>in</strong> ourattempt to state Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of thought <strong>and</strong> to determ<strong>in</strong>e the positionof the Logic <strong>in</strong> the system.It is suggestive <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>structive to notice that, <strong>in</strong> criticis<strong>in</strong>g Hegel’scontention that philosophical knowledge is conterm<strong>in</strong>ous with the real,
78/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamMr. McTaggart attacks the very contention which he himself immediatelyafterwards champions. To see that this is true, one need only comparewith Hegel’s thought the critic’s ultimate synthesis of the real. Instat<strong>in</strong>g the characteristics of the form of unity which he th<strong>in</strong>ks would bean adequate expression of reality, Mr. McTaggart says: “It must besome state of conscious spirit <strong>in</strong> which the opposition of cognition <strong>and</strong>volition is overcome — <strong>in</strong> which we neither judge our ideas by the world,nor the world by our ideas, but are aware that <strong>in</strong>ner <strong>and</strong> outer are <strong>in</strong>such close <strong>and</strong> necessary harmony that even the thought of possiblediscord has become impossible. In its unity not only cognition <strong>and</strong> volition,but feel<strong>in</strong>g also, must be blended <strong>and</strong> united. In some way or otherit must have overcome the rift <strong>in</strong> discursive knowledge, <strong>and</strong> the immediatemust for it be no longer the alien. It must be as direct as art, ascerta<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> universal as philosophy.” 188 It matters not that these l<strong>in</strong>esare supposed by their author to express an idea essentially differentfrom what Hegel means by thought; one could not want a better summaryof Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e. Must feel<strong>in</strong>g, volition, <strong>and</strong> cognition all beblended <strong>in</strong> the expression of ultimate reality? This, Hegel says, is accomplished<strong>in</strong> that state of conscious spirit which he calls thought: “It ispresent <strong>in</strong> every sensation, <strong>in</strong> cognition <strong>and</strong> knowledge, <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>cts,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> volition <strong>in</strong> so far as these are attributes of the human m<strong>in</strong>d.” 189For “<strong>in</strong> the human be<strong>in</strong>g there is only one reason <strong>in</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g, volition, <strong>and</strong>thought or cognition. 190 Must the rift <strong>in</strong> discursive knowledge have beenremoved <strong>in</strong> this unity? This, Hegel tells us, is the characteristic peculiarto philosophical knowledge: the sciences “are f<strong>in</strong>ite because their modeof thought, as a merely formal act, derives its content from without.Their content therefore is not known as moulded from with<strong>in</strong> throughthe thoughts which lie at the ground of it, <strong>and</strong> form <strong>and</strong> content do notthoroughly <strong>in</strong>terpenetrate each other. This partition disappears <strong>in</strong> philosophy,<strong>and</strong> thus justifies its title of <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite knowledge.” 191 Must theimmediate be no longer alien for the expression of the ultimately real?Our dem<strong>and</strong>, Hegel assures us, is satisfied <strong>in</strong> Spirit: “As Adam said toEve, ‘Thou art flesh of my flesh <strong>and</strong> bone of my bone,’so says the Spirit,‘This object is spirit of my spirit, <strong>and</strong> all alienation has disappeared.’” 192Should that form of expression which exhausts the real be as direct asart <strong>and</strong> as universal as philosophy? Such a comb<strong>in</strong>ation Hegel th<strong>in</strong>ks hehas found <strong>in</strong> philosophy itself: “The multifarious whole is reflected <strong>in</strong> itas <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle focus, <strong>in</strong> the Notion which knows itself.” 193 In short, philosophicalknowledge, as Hegel has def<strong>in</strong>ed it for us, meets all the require-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/79ments which Mr. McTaggart sees fit to make of the medium throughwhich reality may receive adequate expression. And it does seem ratherhard that an author should be criticized for uphold<strong>in</strong>g exactly the sameposition (barr<strong>in</strong>g term<strong>in</strong>ology) as his critic champions.Further detailed discussion of this po<strong>in</strong>t seems superfluous. Enoughhas already been said to show us not only that we are justified <strong>in</strong> conclud<strong>in</strong>g,but that we are forced to conclude, that Hegel does not equatereality with any process of formal knowledge. Such a position would becontrary to his own frequent explicit assertions, as well as to the presuppositions<strong>and</strong> actual procedure of his system. For his fundamentalcontention, both by word <strong>and</strong> deed, is that thought is the unify<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>cipleof experience which <strong>in</strong>cludes with<strong>in</strong> its diamond net the entire sphereof the activities <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests of the human soul. It subsumes with<strong>in</strong>itself sensuous experience, moral <strong>and</strong> religious experience, scientificexperience, all experience of which man is capable; it is the all-pervad<strong>in</strong>gharmonizer that illum<strong>in</strong>es every phase of experience <strong>and</strong> makes itwhat it is. Only such thought as this, that is to say, experience, is whatHegel claims to be an adequate expression of the ultimately real. Andwith this we leave these misunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> pass on to ask whatform reality does actually assume <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s system.There occurs a passage <strong>in</strong> Professor Bosanquet’s Logic which runsas follows: “It is important that we should dismiss the notion that thehigher degrees of knowledge are necessarily <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the nature of <strong>in</strong>telligenceframed out of abstractions that omit whatever has <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>and</strong>peculiarity <strong>in</strong> the real world. Noth<strong>in</strong>g has been more fatal to the truth<strong>and</strong> vitality of ideas than this prejudice.” 194 It is certa<strong>in</strong> that no prejudicehas been more fatal to an appreciation of Hegel’s philosophy, <strong>and</strong>that, too, notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the fact that the author has constantly warnedaga<strong>in</strong>st the danger. And it would seem that the time has come when sucha prejudice should be laid aside <strong>and</strong> an unbiased effort made to seeexactly what Hegel has taught concern<strong>in</strong>g the universal aspect which heth<strong>in</strong>ks every unitary experience must have. Is there any other conceptionof universality possible than that which sets it down to mere abstraction?If there is, may it not be such a universality as will offer us aconsistent explanation of experience <strong>and</strong> a satisfactory account of theultimately real? May it not also be just the conception of universalitythat Hegel has <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d when he speaks of the ‘Notion,’ with which heequates reality <strong>and</strong> which he ever <strong>and</strong> anon assures us “is not a meresum of features common to several th<strong>in</strong>gs”? 195
80/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamAn honest look at experience forces us, it would seem, to assert thatthe real universal of actual thought is not that of formal logic. It is anotorious fact that we contradict the rules of the time-honored syllogism<strong>in</strong> our every-day th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Every develop<strong>in</strong>g science is an enigma to theformal pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of distributed middle <strong>and</strong> negative premises; <strong>and</strong> manyof the simplest arguments of common sense cannot be forced <strong>in</strong>to thesyllogistic form. We are not surprised, therefore, that man, qua man,exists nowhere outside the texts on formal logic: not man has be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>the real world, but only men. Professors Bradley <strong>and</strong> Bosanquet, follow<strong>in</strong>gthe lead of Hegel, have so clearly <strong>and</strong> exhaustively exposed thesediscrepancies <strong>in</strong> the procedure <strong>and</strong> presupposition of formal logic that itwould be superfluous, if not presumptuous, for me to attempt to enlargeon them here.It is sufficient for our present purpose simply to po<strong>in</strong>t out that thefundamental difficulty with the traditional logic is that it deals with anabstraction. It separates from each other two essentially <strong>in</strong>separableaspects of experience, namely, form <strong>and</strong> content, <strong>and</strong> then concerns itselfwith one, namely, form, <strong>in</strong> isolation. There should be no wonderthat its results are not applicable to concrete experience; the wonderperhaps is that, when so applied, they do not l<strong>and</strong> us <strong>in</strong> more numerousant<strong>in</strong>omies. Of course, there is no such th<strong>in</strong>g as th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the abstract,as if thought were <strong>in</strong>different to its object; <strong>and</strong> the universals that resultfrom such an imag<strong>in</strong>ary process can be noth<strong>in</strong>g more than mere makebelieves.These universals of formal logic, as such, can have no part <strong>in</strong>reality. 196What, then, we ask, is the nature of the universal of concrete thought?I know of no better or clearer def<strong>in</strong>ition than that given by ProfessorBosanquet <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>troductory chapter to his Logic. 197 He there warnsus to beware of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of the universals as the result of the process ofselective omission of differences among phenomena; this is the errorwhich proves so fatal to the significance of formal logic. The true universal,the universal that actually has a place <strong>in</strong> concrete experience, israther the result of a synthesis of differences, the constructive analysisof phenomena. That is to say, progression towards true universality issimply the cont<strong>in</strong>uous organization <strong>and</strong> systematization of the data ofexperience. So far from it be<strong>in</strong>g true that thought takes place <strong>in</strong> vacuityapart from any content, th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is noth<strong>in</strong>g but the progressive organizationof its content; apart from its content thought is absolutely noth<strong>in</strong>g.S<strong>in</strong>ce form <strong>and</strong> content are thus <strong>in</strong>separable, the true form can be
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/81realized only when it is viewed <strong>in</strong> its essential relation to its correlative;<strong>and</strong> when it is so viewed it is seen to <strong>in</strong>clude the content with<strong>in</strong> itself.The true universal, therefore, is thought-content. It does not have towait for its fill<strong>in</strong>g from without, for it has with<strong>in</strong> it its own fill<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong>lives only by virtue of the vital significance that it possesses <strong>in</strong> referenceto its content. In a word, the universal of thought is concrete, a synthesisof particulars. It has no mean<strong>in</strong>g whatever, not even the semblance ofone, <strong>in</strong> isolation from the material aspect of experience of which it is theform. 198This change of attitude towards the syllogistic logic of the Scholastics<strong>and</strong> this doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the concrete universal are really the fundamentsof Hegel’s system. After the first Part of the present study this statementhardly needs further proof. It is true that the change <strong>in</strong> view-po<strong>in</strong>t wasmore or less unconsciously present <strong>in</strong> the epistemology of Kant <strong>and</strong>Jacobi, as Hegel himself po<strong>in</strong>ts out. 199 But the change comes to fullconsciousness of itself only <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s own work. He openly revoltsaga<strong>in</strong>st the traditional tendency to regard the concept, judgment, <strong>and</strong>syllogism, as if they were sharply differentiated forms of abstract thought<strong>and</strong> not liv<strong>in</strong>g manifestations of truth. 200 Naturally this change of viewconcern<strong>in</strong>g the nature of thought brought with it a change of view concern<strong>in</strong>gthe result of thought. S<strong>in</strong>ce thought is no longer regarded as aprocess <strong>in</strong> abstraction, the universal of thought can no longer be thoughtof as the result of abstraction. If thought is the vital unity of the m<strong>in</strong>d,the true universal of thought is simply the content of m<strong>in</strong>d thoroughlyrationalized <strong>and</strong> exhaustively expla<strong>in</strong>ed. If thought is the Notion, theuniversal of thought is the universal of the Notion. And “the universalof the Notion is not a mere sum of features common to several th<strong>in</strong>gs,confronted by a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, onthe contrary, self-particulariz<strong>in</strong>g or self-specify<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> with undimmedclearness f<strong>in</strong>ds itself at home <strong>in</strong> its antithesis.” 201 That this doctr<strong>in</strong>e ofthought <strong>and</strong> universality is peculiarly Hegel’s own, there seems to be nodoubt: the doctr<strong>in</strong>e is the burden of his philosophy.From these considerations we may pass at once to the conclusionthat for Hegel the ultimately real must assume the form of concrete<strong>in</strong>dividuality. Neither the mere particular nor the blank universal willsuffice; the real must be the particularized universal, the universalizedparticular. “Actuality is always the unity of universality <strong>and</strong> particularity,”as Hegel himself puts it. 202 “Everyth<strong>in</strong>g is a Notion, the existenceof which is the differentiation of its members or functions, so that the
82/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamuniversal nature of the Notion gives itself external reality by means ofparticularity, <strong>and</strong> thereby, <strong>and</strong> as a negative reflection-<strong>in</strong>to-self, makesitself an <strong>in</strong>dividual.” 203 The follow<strong>in</strong>g hypothetical argument seems tosum up the matter: If it be true that thought is conterm<strong>in</strong>ous with experience,then certa<strong>in</strong>ly experience must somehow assume the form ofuniversality; discrete particulars are excluded from it. If, <strong>in</strong> the secondplace, it be true that thought is simply the “<strong>in</strong>digenous becom<strong>in</strong>g(e<strong>in</strong>heimische Werden) of the concrete content,” 204 then its universalitymust be concrete, that is to say, the particulars must f<strong>in</strong>d their placewith<strong>in</strong> the sphere of the universal, which, itself, gets its mean<strong>in</strong>g only byvirtue of this relation to the particulars. Therefore the form of universalitywhich experience takes (<strong>and</strong> it must take some form of universality)can be only that of the particularized universal, or, <strong>in</strong> a word, that of the<strong>in</strong>dividual. Now the chief purpose of this study has been to show thatHegel asserts the premises of this argument. It must be shown that thisis erroneous before one may legitimately claim that Hegel equates realityeither with the bare particular or with the abstract universal, or denythat he gives to the real the form of <strong>in</strong>dividuality.That this is the correct account of Hegel’s view of reality may beshown <strong>in</strong> another way. The argument that is to be found <strong>in</strong> the Logic,under the head of the Notion, is <strong>in</strong> direct confirmation of the conclusionwe have just reached. So we turn to this argument for further evidenceon the po<strong>in</strong>t. 205For our present purpose it will be sufficient to state the argumentmerely <strong>in</strong> its general outl<strong>in</strong>e. The triadic movement Hegel expressesunder the follow<strong>in</strong>g heads: (a) The Subjective Notion; (b) The Object;<strong>and</strong> (c) The Idea. The development here <strong>in</strong>volved may be put <strong>in</strong> thefollow<strong>in</strong>g general manner. At the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of the Subjective Notionwe have presented to us the Notion as <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> formal, thetruth is given only implicitly. 206 In a sense, this may be said to be thepo<strong>in</strong>t of view of formal logic, from which thought is looked upon as asort of subjective process whose end is the formation of concepts <strong>and</strong>the manipulation of those concepts <strong>in</strong> the higher mental processes of thejudgment <strong>and</strong> the syllogism. But, as Hegel goes on to show, it is impossibleto rest at this po<strong>in</strong>t of view. It has <strong>in</strong>herent <strong>in</strong> it its own deficiency,<strong>in</strong> that it is an <strong>in</strong>adequate expression of the real nature of the Notion.<strong>Thought</strong> cannot be conf<strong>in</strong>ed to subjectivity; it is objective as well. Thuswe are led on to the consideration of the Object — the second stage ofthe dialectical development. The Object is the ‘realization’ of the No-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/83tion, <strong>and</strong> the transition is accomplished through the syllogism of necessity,that is, the disjunctive syllogism. 207 But objectivity, like subjectivity,is not an adequate expression of the Notion; the Notion is neithermerely subjective nor merely objective. The content, apart from the form,just as the form apart from the content, is an abstraction; the true viewof the matter is reached only when we see that the two are one <strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>separable. This unity of the two is the Idea, which is truth complete —the ultimately real.It should be observed that this whole development is noth<strong>in</strong>g morethan the progressive def<strong>in</strong>ition of the nature of the Notion itself. As weshall see more fully below, the thesis is simply the expression of theform that the Notion, because of its very nature as form, assumes. Theantithesis is the ‘realization’ of the Notion; that is to say, when the Notionhas exhaustively differentiated itself <strong>in</strong> the judgment of necessity,the disjunctive judgment, it is seen to <strong>in</strong>volve the object. The synthesis,f<strong>in</strong>ally, as Hegel himself observes, is noth<strong>in</strong>g but the Notion taken <strong>in</strong> itsparticularity <strong>and</strong> universality. “Its ‘ideal’ content is noth<strong>in</strong>g but the Notion<strong>in</strong> its detailed terms: its ‘real’ content is only the exhibition which thereal gives itself <strong>in</strong> the form of external existence.” 208 In a word, the Ideafor Hegel is simply the Notion taken <strong>in</strong> its complete nature, as, on theone h<strong>and</strong>, a substantial somewhat, <strong>and</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, a mean<strong>in</strong>g.S<strong>in</strong>ce, now, the Idea is the form which ultimate reality assumes <strong>in</strong>Hegel’s system, it follows that the real is <strong>in</strong> the form of the Notion. Thisconclusion is <strong>in</strong> exact agreement with what we have been <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g on allalong <strong>in</strong> this study, <strong>and</strong> it might be supported by numerous passagesfrom various contexts. But this hardly seems necessary: presumably itwill not be disputed that the Hegelian philosophy has to do with theunity of the Notion. If, then, we can here establish the claim that theunity of the Notion is that of the <strong>in</strong>dividual, our contention above willhave been corroborated from another po<strong>in</strong>t of departure.And it would seem that Hegel has left us <strong>in</strong> no doubt concern<strong>in</strong>g hisposition on this po<strong>in</strong>t. In the first division of his discussion of the Notion,referred to above, he tells us quite pla<strong>in</strong>ly that the ultimate form ofthe Subjective Notion is <strong>in</strong>dividuality. The three members of the triad <strong>in</strong>this division are Universality, Particularity, <strong>and</strong> Individuality. Individualityis thus made the synthesis of the other two, <strong>and</strong> consequently mustbe considered the highest expression of the Subjective Notion. And thereseems to be no particular difficulty <strong>in</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g what Hegel meansby the <strong>in</strong>dividual. He means by it “the refiection-<strong>in</strong>to-self of the specific
84/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamcharacters of universality <strong>and</strong> particularity,” 209 or determ<strong>in</strong>ate universality(bestimmte Allgeme<strong>in</strong>heit). 210 In contradist<strong>in</strong>ction to <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>itemultiplicity, it is “the particular <strong>and</strong> the universal <strong>in</strong> an identity.” 211 In aword, <strong>in</strong>dividuality means for Hegel what it means for others, namely,unity with<strong>in</strong> difference, harmony with<strong>in</strong> diversity, a systematic whole.The Subjective Notion, therefore, is a whole with<strong>in</strong> which differencesare found <strong>and</strong> through which those differences get their significance <strong>and</strong>reality. This seems to be a legitimate conclusion from the dialecticalmovement that takes place with<strong>in</strong> the Notion as Notion.But just here an objection awaits us. This may all be true of theSubjective Notion, but is it true of the Idea? Can we legitimately arguethat, because the ultimate expression of the Subjective Notion is <strong>in</strong>dividuality,the ultimate expression of the real must be <strong>in</strong>dividuality? Havewe not already seen that the Subjective Notion is the thesis of a triad ofwhich the Idea is the synthesis, <strong>and</strong> is it not therefore false reason<strong>in</strong>g tosay that the form of the Subjective Notion is adequate to the Idea? In aword, does the fact that Hegel ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that <strong>in</strong>dividuality is the consummationof the process of thought justify us <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ference that forhim the real is <strong>in</strong>dividual?We have already answered this objection <strong>in</strong> what we said aboveconcern<strong>in</strong>g the fact that the Idea is simply the Notion exhaustively analyzed.It is true that the Idea is the Notion completely differentiated; butit is the Notion nevertheless. The dialectical development by means ofwhich we are led to the Absolute Idea <strong>in</strong>dicates this; for the AbsoluteIdea is the synthesis of the triadic development of the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of theNotion. Indeed, the whole dialectical development of the third part ofthe Logic goes to prove that the Idea is the most perfect expression ofthe Notion. The Idea <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuality thus co<strong>in</strong>cide. It is true, of course,that by pass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Idea the Notion is enriched <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tensified by allthe <strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g categories; this enrichment is really the significance ofthe advance. But this does not at all affect the fact that the form of theNotion does not change <strong>in</strong> the process, <strong>and</strong> that the Idea is simply theNotion seen <strong>in</strong> its truest light.This is perhaps sufficient answer to the objection. But there is <strong>in</strong>volved<strong>in</strong> it an assumption the error of which it will be worth while toexpose. The assumption is that <strong>in</strong> the treatment of the Subjective NotionHegel is deal<strong>in</strong>g with the formal concept of the logic of the schools. Oneor two passages from the smaller Logic bear<strong>in</strong>g on this po<strong>in</strong>t will sufficeto show the falsity of the assumption. “It is a mistake to imag<strong>in</strong>e
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/85that the objects which form the content of our mental ideas come first<strong>and</strong> that our subjective agency then supervenes, <strong>and</strong> by the aforesaidoperation of abstraction, <strong>and</strong> by colligat<strong>in</strong>g the po<strong>in</strong>ts possessed <strong>in</strong> commonby the objects, frames notions of them. Rather the Notion is thegenu<strong>in</strong>e first; <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs are what they are through the action of theNotion, immanent <strong>in</strong> them, <strong>and</strong> reveal<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>in</strong> them.” 212 “No compla<strong>in</strong>tis oftener made aga<strong>in</strong>st the Notion than that it is abstract. Ofcourse it is abstract, if abstract means that the medium <strong>in</strong> which theNotion exists is thought <strong>in</strong> general <strong>and</strong> not the sensible th<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its empiricalconcreteness. It is abstract also, because the Notion falls short ofthe Idea. To this extent the Subjective Notion is still formal. This howeverdoes not mean that it ought to have or receive another content thanits own. It is itself the absolute form, <strong>and</strong> so is all specific character, butas that character is <strong>in</strong> its truth. Although it be abstract therefore, it is theconcrete, concrete altogether, the subject as such.... What are callednotions, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> fact specific notions, such as man, house, animal, etc.,are simply denotations <strong>and</strong> abstract representations. These abstractionsreta<strong>in</strong> out of all the functions of the Notion only that of universality;they leave particularity <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuality out of account <strong>and</strong> have nodevelopment <strong>in</strong> these directions. By so do<strong>in</strong>g they just miss the Notion.”213 These passages are found at the very beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the discussionof the Subjective Notion. At the end of this discussion we read: “Tosay that the Notion is subjective <strong>and</strong> subjective only, is so far quitecorrect: for the Notion certa<strong>in</strong>ly is subjectivity itself.... But we may go astep further. This subjectivity, with its functions of notion, judgment,<strong>and</strong> syllogism, is not like a set of empty compartments which has to getfilled from without by separately exist<strong>in</strong>g objects. It would be truer tosay that it is subjectivity itself which, as dialectical, breaks through itsown barriers <strong>and</strong> opens out <strong>in</strong>to objectivity by means of the syllogism.” 214The Subjective Notion, therefore, is not merely subjective; it is not abare concept of formal logic that has only a psychological existence <strong>in</strong>some know<strong>in</strong>g consciousness. On the contrary, it is the life of the objectsthemselves, <strong>and</strong> is implicitly that which, when made explicit, becomesthe Idea. 215If, then, we are right <strong>in</strong> argu<strong>in</strong>g that the real must conform itself tothe Notion, <strong>and</strong> if the Notion is, when fully expressed, the <strong>in</strong>dividual, itseems to follow that the real must assume the form of the <strong>in</strong>dividual.And this appears to be Hegel’s position as we f<strong>in</strong>d it expressed <strong>in</strong> thethird part of the Logic. So our conclusion, which we before reached
86/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghammore or less <strong>in</strong>directly, is based directly upon the dialectical developmentof the Logic.Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison has criticised Hegel for disparag<strong>in</strong>g the<strong>in</strong>dividual, <strong>and</strong> that criticism must be exam<strong>in</strong>ed here. It is based uponthe follow<strong>in</strong>g passage from the smaller Logic: “Sensible existence hasbeen characterized by the attributes of <strong>in</strong>dividuality <strong>and</strong> mutual exclusionof the members. It is well to remember that these very attributes ofsense are thoughts <strong>and</strong> general terms. . . . Language is the work ofthought: <strong>and</strong> hence all that is expressed <strong>in</strong> language must be universal....And what cannot be uttered, feel<strong>in</strong>g or sensation, far from be<strong>in</strong>gthe highest truth, is the most unimportant or untrue. If I say ‘the unit,’‘this unit,’ ‘here,’ ‘now,’ all these are universal terms. Everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>anyth<strong>in</strong>g is an <strong>in</strong>dividual, a ‘this,’ or if it be sensible, is here <strong>and</strong> now.Similarly, when I say ‘I,’ I mean my s<strong>in</strong>gle self, to the exclusion of allothers; but what I say, viz., ‘I,’ is just every other ‘I,’ which <strong>in</strong> likemanner excludes all others from itself. .. . All other men have it <strong>in</strong> commonwith me to be ‘I’” 216 Comment<strong>in</strong>g on this passage, the critic says:“This demonstration of the universal, or, to put it perhaps more pla<strong>in</strong>ly,the abstract nature of thought, even <strong>in</strong> the case of those terms whichseem to lay most immediate hold upon reality, is both true <strong>and</strong> useful <strong>in</strong>its own place. But the legitimate conclusion from it <strong>in</strong> the present connectionis not Hegel’s <strong>in</strong>s<strong>in</strong>uated disparagement of the <strong>in</strong>dividual, butrather that which Tredelenburg draws from the very same considerations,that the <strong>in</strong>dividual, as such, is <strong>in</strong>commensurable or unapproachable bythought. 217 Or, as Mr. Bradley puts it still more roundly <strong>and</strong> trenchantly 218‘The real is <strong>in</strong>accessible by way of ideas.... We escape from ideas, <strong>and</strong>from mere universals, by a reference to the real which appears <strong>in</strong> perception.’”Now it seems to me unfair to charge Hegel here with disparagementof the <strong>in</strong>dividual. In the passage <strong>in</strong> question he has <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d discrete partsof experience, unorganized elements of sensuous perception; <strong>and</strong> it isthese abstract sensations <strong>and</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>gs that he calls ‘unimportant <strong>and</strong>untrue.’ He does, <strong>in</strong>deed, <strong>in</strong> the same section speak of <strong>in</strong>dividuality asthe essential feature of sense-experience; but that he means by this noth<strong>in</strong>gmore than that “sensible existence presents a number of mutuallyexclusive units,” he himself is at pa<strong>in</strong>s to tell us. So it would appear thatthe disparagement is of the isolated particular <strong>and</strong> not of the <strong>in</strong>dividual.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hegel, it is not the <strong>in</strong>dividual which is the ‘unutterable’;for the very form of the judgment is the <strong>in</strong>dividual, it is essentially ‘a
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/87universal which is <strong>in</strong>dividualized.’ 219 The isolated, unrelated elementsof abstract sense-perception <strong>and</strong> conception, these it is to which Hegelrefuses to give any ultimate significance; for such discrete particularsare essentially unreal. And <strong>in</strong> this position Hegel differs little from hiscritic. 220The real import of the section from which the above quotation istaken seems to be implied at least <strong>in</strong> a sentence of the passage whichProfessor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison fails to quote. The sentence runs thus: “Itwill be shown <strong>in</strong> the Logic that thought (<strong>and</strong> the universal) is not a mereopposite of sense: it lets noth<strong>in</strong>g escape it, but, outflank<strong>in</strong>g its other, isat once that other <strong>and</strong> itself.” By this I underst<strong>and</strong> Hegel to mean that heis to show <strong>in</strong> the Logic that thought is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> sense-perception, thatthought is a pr<strong>in</strong>ciple which, as he tells us <strong>in</strong> the very last sentence of theparagraph from which we have quoted, runs through all “sensations,conceptions, <strong>and</strong> states of consciousness.” And from this it would followthat even sense-experience is universalized, <strong>and</strong> to regard this experienceas composed of discreet units is really to regard it abstractly.That, it would seem, is what Hegel po<strong>in</strong>ts out <strong>in</strong> the section under discussion.It is the unrelated which is unutterable, because the universalsof thought cannot get hold of it to express it. But the unrelated is not the<strong>in</strong>dividual, <strong>and</strong> one does not see how it could be the real. At all events,Hegel seems free from the charge of disparag<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>dividual here,mean<strong>in</strong>g by the <strong>in</strong>dividual the universalized particular. It is just uponthe <strong>in</strong>dividual that he is lay<strong>in</strong>g the emphasis, as aga<strong>in</strong>st the doctr<strong>in</strong>e ofdiscrete particularity.The doctr<strong>in</strong>e of Hegel’s critics that the <strong>in</strong>dividual is unapproachableby way of ideas is a position which itself dem<strong>and</strong>s exam<strong>in</strong>ation. Inthe first place, it seems to rest upon the doctr<strong>in</strong>e that ideas, or categories,can be noth<strong>in</strong>g but pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of cognition, that the assertion of the<strong>in</strong>telligibility of reality <strong>in</strong> terms of thought limits us to the mechanicalcategories (the categories of the sciences which have to do with factualexistence) <strong>in</strong> our efforts to <strong>in</strong>terpret reality. Now this doctr<strong>in</strong>e is notselfevidently true, <strong>and</strong> should be tested as to its validity. Of course if itbe true, we must admit at once that thought is not an adequate expressionof reality; for we must all agree with Professor Royce that “<strong>in</strong>dividuality. . . is a category <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>able <strong>in</strong> purely theoretical terms.” 221But is it true? Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of thought it is not true;Hegel’s thought <strong>in</strong>cludes categories of value as well as those of factualexistence, <strong>and</strong> so he <strong>in</strong>sists that the <strong>in</strong>dividual is expressible <strong>in</strong> terms of
88/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamcategories, though not necessarily the categories of pure cognition.Whether or not Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of thought is true to the facts of experiencewe have tried to determ<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the first Part of our study.In the second place, this position <strong>in</strong>volves a mistaken epistemologicalpr<strong>in</strong>ciple. Baldly stated, it is that the uniqueness of reality consists <strong>in</strong>its transcend<strong>in</strong>g knowledge. Mr. Bradley puts the position thus: “It isnot by its quality, as a temporal event or phenomenon of space, that thegiven is unique. It is unique, not because it has a certa<strong>in</strong> character, butbecause it is given.” 222 The question naturally arises whether this statementactually agrees with the facts. One is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to dispute that itdoes. At any rate, the unique <strong>in</strong> this sense is certa<strong>in</strong>ly not synonymouswith the term as it is commonly used. Let us take one or two examples.What is a unique <strong>in</strong>vention? Popularly, it is an <strong>in</strong>vention that has properties<strong>and</strong> characteristics different from others of its class. But certa<strong>in</strong>lyits uniqueness is not thought of as consist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the fact that the <strong>in</strong>ventionis <strong>in</strong>explicable; if it were <strong>in</strong>explicable, it would be simply a mystery<strong>and</strong> not anyth<strong>in</strong>g unique at all. Suppose it were an <strong>in</strong>tricate mach<strong>in</strong>e,which none but the man tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> mechanics could underst<strong>and</strong>. Wouldit then be truly unique for anyone save the mechanician? It would seemthat an <strong>in</strong>vention is unique <strong>in</strong> terms of its peculiar properties <strong>and</strong> attributes,which must be known <strong>and</strong> appreciated as such; it is of such aknown nature that it differs from all other creations of mechanical genius.And the more <strong>in</strong>telligibly one succeeds <strong>in</strong> differentiat<strong>in</strong>g it fromother such creations, the more clearly def<strong>in</strong>ed does its uniqueness become.This same fact may be illustrated by the example of a uniquepersonality. A person is unique only <strong>in</strong> so far as he differs from others,<strong>and</strong> he differs from others only because of certa<strong>in</strong> positive characteristicsthat make him different. The assertion, “Ben is a unique character,”is, I dare say, a rather mean<strong>in</strong>gless jumble of words; naturally, we mustknow more about Ben before we can appreciate his uniqueness. But “Orare Ben Jonson!” is an exclamation of genu<strong>in</strong>e significance. What isthe difference <strong>in</strong> the two cases? Is it not simply that <strong>in</strong> the latter ourknowledge has someth<strong>in</strong>g to attach to itself to, while <strong>in</strong> the former knowledgecan get no foothold? And is it not permissible to argue that themore one knows of the characteristics of Ben Jonson, the more determ<strong>in</strong>ate<strong>and</strong> impressive grows the uniqueness of his <strong>in</strong>dividuality? Doubtless,<strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>ds of his associates <strong>and</strong> companions <strong>in</strong> the Mermaid theeccentricities of his genius were much more marked than they can be tous, assum<strong>in</strong>g, of course, that the man was more fully known by personal
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/89contact with him. So it seems that the person, like the <strong>in</strong>vention, is uniqueonly because he possesses positive characteristics that make him unique;<strong>and</strong> apart from such positive characteristics uniqueness is lack<strong>in</strong>g.Now from the epistemological po<strong>in</strong>t of view, what does this amountto? Simply, I th<strong>in</strong>k, to the conclusion that uniqueness, <strong>in</strong>dividuality, is tobe measured <strong>in</strong> terms of knowledge, not of ignorance. Before an objectcan be unique, it certa<strong>in</strong>ly must be self-identical; <strong>and</strong> the more completelyself-identical it becomes, the more emphasized does its <strong>in</strong>dividualityappear. Now the vaguest self-identity implies reference beyondself; <strong>and</strong> apart from this reference to others self-identity is impossible.But reference beyond self is relation, <strong>and</strong> relations are categories. Thusit would seem that the unique not only does not exclude categories, but,on the contrary, depends upon them for its very existence. It is onlywhen an object is fully known to be itself, that is, when it is seen todiffer determ<strong>in</strong>ately from others of its class, that it may legitimately betermed unique. Apart from universality <strong>in</strong>dividuality is a fiction. Thusthe <strong>in</strong>dividual gets its uniqueness by be<strong>in</strong>g def<strong>in</strong>ed. That is unique whichis seen to be itself, <strong>and</strong> only that which possesses attributes <strong>and</strong> qualitiespeculiar to itself can be differentiated from others. Of course an objectmay be negatively def<strong>in</strong>ed, that is, as not someth<strong>in</strong>g else; but <strong>in</strong> orderthat such a def<strong>in</strong>ition have significance, it must give us positive knowledgeof what we are negatively def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. For if the object of <strong>in</strong>terest isnot some other object, then the judgment of difference is based uponpositive attributes which make its be<strong>in</strong>g the other object impossible;otherwise, there would be no sense <strong>in</strong> assert<strong>in</strong>g the difference. In oppositionto Mr. Bradley, therefore, we must argue that the ‘given’ is unique,not because it is given, but just because it possesses a certa<strong>in</strong> character.No brute fact is, as such, unique; it is a mean<strong>in</strong>g for us, or it is noth<strong>in</strong>g.The uniqueness of reality is to be found only <strong>in</strong> its determ<strong>in</strong>ate character,not <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate factual existence. 223A f<strong>in</strong>al objection to the position that reality is unapproachable bythought emerges from the preced<strong>in</strong>g discussion. Is it not logically impossiblefor those who ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that the real is <strong>in</strong>accessible by way ofideas to assume the position that the real is <strong>in</strong>dividual? Are not thesetwo contentions contradictory? The difficulty will be apparent from thefollow<strong>in</strong>g considerations. If the real is given us <strong>in</strong>dependently of thought<strong>and</strong> apart from its activity, then one would th<strong>in</strong>k that it must be representedonly <strong>in</strong> the form of particularity. For, as Professor Bosanquet hasrem<strong>in</strong>ded us, that which is supposed to come to us through abstract
90/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamsense perception could come only as the unrelated particular; for theessence of sense is isolation. Feel<strong>in</strong>g, uncontam<strong>in</strong>ated by thought, st<strong>and</strong>son the same level with the senses <strong>in</strong> this respect. 224 Hegel himself haspo<strong>in</strong>ted out that what I feel is only m<strong>in</strong>e, belongs peculiarly <strong>and</strong> exclusivelyto me, <strong>and</strong>, as mere feel<strong>in</strong>g, must forever rema<strong>in</strong> bound down tosubjectivity, to bare particularity. But it must not be forgotten that the<strong>in</strong>dividual necessarily implies some form of universality. And the questionat once arises, Whence does it get this form? If the assertion thathas just been made of the senses <strong>and</strong> the feel<strong>in</strong>gs be true, as experienceseems to teach that it is true, then universality cannot be produced bythem; untouched by thought, they give <strong>and</strong> can give only the particular.But if the universal character of the <strong>in</strong>dividual is the gift of thought,what justification can there be for the statement that the <strong>in</strong>dividual isunapproachable by thought? The contention seems to ignore the veryprocess by which the result has come to be. Thus there seems to be afundamental difficulty <strong>in</strong> the position which argues that the real is essentiallybeyond thought, <strong>and</strong> yet at the same time <strong>in</strong>sists that the <strong>in</strong>dividual,<strong>and</strong> only the <strong>in</strong>dividual, is the real. 225This difficulty may be accentuated by a somewhat detailed study ofthe <strong>in</strong>consistencies that appear <strong>in</strong> Professor Baillie’s criticism of Hegelas quoted above. The digression, if it be a digression <strong>in</strong>to which we shallthus be led, will perhaps throw some light on Hegel’s position by utiliz<strong>in</strong>ghis pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>in</strong> criticism of a position antagonistic to his own.It is quite easy to see that Professor Baillie’s criticism is vitallybound up with the assumption that the real immediacy of experiencecannot be mediated, <strong>and</strong>, consequently, lies beyond thought. 226 But it isnot easy to see just what is meant by such an immediacy. Sometimes itis spoken of as if it were the immediacy of sense-perception: for example,we are told that “wherever we have an object present to thesubject, there we have immediacy.” At other times, however, one is ledto believe that the immediacy of reality is the unatta<strong>in</strong>able goal of thoughtrather than its given po<strong>in</strong>t of departure. “Knowledge is not constructionbut reconstruction of Experience.... Experience aga<strong>in</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>,is the compact <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>exhaustible m<strong>in</strong>e of fact to which knowledge everrecurs, which it seeks to fathom, . . . the reproduction of which <strong>in</strong> itsimmediacy may be said to be its aim.” But <strong>in</strong> either case, whether theimmediacy of reality be the first given from which thought can be onlya process of abstraction, or the ideal towards which thought is an endless<strong>and</strong> essentially futile process of approximation, the conclusion that
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/91forces itself upon us is the same. And that conclusion is that the immediacyof experience, that immediacy which is reality, is of such a naturethat thought is necessarily excluded from it; it is an immediacy withwhich the categories of knowledge have absolutely noth<strong>in</strong>g to do. “Theimmediate <strong>in</strong> Experience, that immediate which is reality, is absolutelycont<strong>in</strong>uous with itself <strong>and</strong> admits of isolation <strong>in</strong> no sense whatever; theimmediacy is <strong>in</strong>dissoluble, otherwise Experience simply ceases to be.This s<strong>in</strong>gle immediacy of Experience we simply cannot have <strong>in</strong> knowledge;if so knowledge would not be knowledge but Experience.” “Thecomplete realization of the nature of the Absolute must rema<strong>in</strong> for knowledgeeven at its best an impossible achievement.” 227Now I venture to submit: (a) that such an immediate experience asProfessor Baillie here identifies with reality is not possible; <strong>and</strong> (b) that,if it were possible, it could at most be but subjective <strong>and</strong> particular. Letus beg<strong>in</strong> with the first of these contentions.(a) All that has been said above concern<strong>in</strong>g the impossibility ofconstru<strong>in</strong>g the uniqueness of the ‘given’ <strong>in</strong> terms of its merely factualaspect is applicable here. For what is this immediate experience butsuch an <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate ‘giver,’ whose <strong>in</strong>dividuality consists <strong>in</strong> the factthat it is so given? And what is such a unique given but a contradictio <strong>in</strong>adjecto? That which is merely given cannot possibly be unique, for ithas no relations <strong>in</strong> terms of which its uniqueness is to be def<strong>in</strong>ed. Thegiven is not <strong>in</strong> experience until it is at least recognized as a permanentsomewhat which is itself <strong>and</strong> not someth<strong>in</strong>g else; but when it is so recognized,it is no longer a merely <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate given. Experience certa<strong>in</strong>ly<strong>in</strong>volves more than bare abstract fact.To this may be added the follow<strong>in</strong>g considerations. The only experienceabout which we know anyth<strong>in</strong>g seems to possess at least a degreeof unity. Life is at any rate livable, society does actually exist, <strong>and</strong> itsmany chaotic aspects cannot bl<strong>in</strong>d us to the orderly character of itsbe<strong>in</strong>g. Not even the simplest act of sense-perception, not to mention themore complex processes of <strong>in</strong>tellectual <strong>and</strong> social activity, would bepossible were there no unity with<strong>in</strong> experience. But unity implies a unify<strong>in</strong>gpr<strong>in</strong>ciple, <strong>and</strong> the unitary whole gets its significance only as it isconstrued <strong>in</strong> the light of this pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. What makes of experience aunity? Can the organic nature of experience be expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> terms of thesenses, or the feel<strong>in</strong>gs, or the will? If <strong>in</strong> terms of the first, how refute theSophists? If <strong>in</strong> terms of the second, how refute the mystics? If <strong>in</strong> termsof the third, how refute Schopenhauer? Is it not true that experience is a
92/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamunity only by virtue of its pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of rationality; <strong>and</strong> that if any part ofexperience transcends or falls without this pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, it, by that veryfact, ceases to be aus e<strong>in</strong>em Stücke? The very conception of a unifiedexperience would seem to necessitate the assumption that <strong>in</strong> its lowest<strong>and</strong> vaguest stages, as well as <strong>in</strong> its highest <strong>and</strong> sub limest reaches, itsuniversal pr<strong>in</strong>ciple is active; <strong>and</strong> what this universal pr<strong>in</strong>ciple is seemsto be a question that hardly admits of debate when once it is clearly put.Now if such are the implications of experience, it is difficult to see whatmean<strong>in</strong>g can be given to Professor Baillie’s immediate experience fromwhich every rational category is excluded. In po<strong>in</strong>t of fact, it seems tobe too immediate to be experienced <strong>and</strong> so is essentially mean<strong>in</strong>gless.Whatever is <strong>in</strong> experience unquestionably must be experienced; but howanyth<strong>in</strong>g can be experienced without somehow be<strong>in</strong>g known, that is,without at least be<strong>in</strong>g recognized as itself <strong>and</strong> so be<strong>in</strong>g subjected to acategory, it is not easy to underst<strong>and</strong>. That which by its very nature is<strong>in</strong>capable of be<strong>in</strong>g represented <strong>in</strong> consciousness cannot enter <strong>in</strong>to therealm of possible experience; <strong>and</strong> to speak of an immediate experiencethat cannot be experienced seems to amount to an absurdity. Thereforeit would seem that Professor Baillie’s conception of an immediate experience,beyond the categories of knowledge, must be given up; it is Noth<strong>in</strong>gmore than a mere phantom, a contradiction <strong>in</strong> terms. 228(b) But, for the sake of the argument, let us grant the possibility ofthis experience <strong>in</strong> which thought can play no part. What is the predicament<strong>in</strong> which we f<strong>in</strong>d ourselves7 Simply, I th<strong>in</strong>k, conf<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> therealm of abstract particularity. For <strong>in</strong> what does that experience whichlies beyond thought consist, if not <strong>in</strong> an unrelated series of mean<strong>in</strong>glesssense-perceptions, or of <strong>in</strong>coherent feel<strong>in</strong>gs, or of bl<strong>in</strong>d volitions? Andwhat can such a series be but a disconnected array of discrete particulars?It is, of course, difficult to speculate concern<strong>in</strong>g the nature of thatwhich does not <strong>and</strong> cannot exist. But concern<strong>in</strong>g this experience withwhich we are here attempt<strong>in</strong>g to deal, we may be sure of this, that,whatever else may or may not be true of it, it certa<strong>in</strong>ly cannot be objective<strong>and</strong> universal <strong>in</strong> any <strong>in</strong>telligible sense of those words. The essenceof abstract sense is isolation <strong>and</strong> particularity, <strong>and</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> volition,qua abstract feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> volition, are entirely subjective <strong>and</strong> can be experiencedby no one under the sun save the subject who psychologicallypossesses them. How, then, can these abstractions be called universal,<strong>and</strong> how could an experience made up exclusively of them be, <strong>in</strong> anysense whatever, objective? To put the question is to answer it. And the
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/93question, c<strong>and</strong>idly faced, would seem to drive us to the conclusion thatan experience that lies beyond the categories of rationality must assumethe form of unrelated particularity. The prejudice, however, will noteasily down. There must be a datum of experience which is just eternallythere, <strong>and</strong> about which noth<strong>in</strong>g more can be said. It forever eludesour grasp when we attempt to seize it by th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g it; but no sane personcan deny its existence. Is not this datum given entirely <strong>in</strong>dependently ofthought’s activity? And yet can it be denied that it comes to us, no matterhow, as a part of our experience? Have we not here, then, an immediateexperience which is more than an unrelated particular, <strong>and</strong> which,nevertheless, is entirely beyond the categories of thought? Everybodyexperiences the given, <strong>and</strong> yet its immediacy cannot appear <strong>in</strong> knowledge.How does this very obvious fact square with the above assertionsconcern<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>herent absurdity of an immediate experience beyondthought?In the first place, attention should be directed here to a question offact. One seems forced to po<strong>in</strong>t out that, as a matter of fact, there is nofixed ‘datum’ of experience. The so-called ‘given’ differs for different<strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>and</strong> for the same <strong>in</strong>dividual at different times. In a very importantsense that which is given depends upon the purposes <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectualatta<strong>in</strong>ments of the one to whom it is given; <strong>and</strong> no one can doubtthat such a basis is relative <strong>and</strong> is constantly chang<strong>in</strong>g. To the hardpressedRichard on the battlefield the same horse would have been more of areality by far than to the lazy beggar of Mother Goose renown; <strong>and</strong> thesmall boy, bent on mischief, actually sees <strong>in</strong> the stone at his feet characteristicsquite different from what might appear to the eyes of the tra<strong>in</strong>edgeologist. Other illustrations of this fact will suggest themselves. Ofcourse this contention will not be misconstrued to mean that any phantasmthat may chance to run through the m<strong>in</strong>d actually does, for thatreason, have a place <strong>in</strong> existential reality, that the subject creates perceptualexperience. I certa<strong>in</strong>ly do not wish to m<strong>in</strong>imize the factual aspectof experience. The po<strong>in</strong>t upon which emphasis is here <strong>in</strong>tended tobe placed is that the ‘giver,’ apart from an experienc<strong>in</strong>g subject, is ablank abstraction, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>in</strong> relation to an experienc<strong>in</strong>g subject it ismore than a mere ‘given.’ The confusion upon which this doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the‘given’ rests is this: the object side of experience is taken from its context<strong>and</strong> then opposed to that experience as someth<strong>in</strong>g st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g overaga<strong>in</strong>st it <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent of it Berkeley has long s<strong>in</strong>ce po<strong>in</strong>ted out thefallacy here. In this discussion it is necessary for us to rid our m<strong>in</strong>ds of
94/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamthis confusion. As Professor Bosanquet sums up the po<strong>in</strong>t: “The given<strong>and</strong> its extension differ not absolutely but relatively; they are cont<strong>in</strong>uouswith each other, <strong>and</strong> the metaphor by which we speak of an extensionconceals from us that the so-called ‘given’ is no less artificial thanthat by which it is extended.” 229In the second place, this <strong>in</strong>sistence upon the ‘given’ l<strong>and</strong>s us <strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>surmountable difficulties.. However the position is stated, so long asthe immediate experience is too immediate for the categories of thought,it seems open to the above fatal objection that it must forever rema<strong>in</strong>particular <strong>and</strong> subjective. To say that reality is found <strong>in</strong> a pure <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>atedatum, an unaccountable residuum of be<strong>in</strong>g, is to open the wayfor an <strong>in</strong>flux of problems similar to those produced by Aristotle’s abstractseparation of form from matter, or by Kant’s differentiation betweenthe experienced phenomenon <strong>and</strong> its reality. It matters not that thedatum is thought of as the material out of which the universals of knowledgeare manufactured, or <strong>in</strong> which thought somehow f<strong>in</strong>ds the problemsthat determ<strong>in</strong>e its activity; the difficulties still rema<strong>in</strong>. How theuniversals of thought are manufactured out of that which is conf<strong>in</strong>ed todiscreet particularity is not easily discovered. Nor can one see at a glancehow that which lies beyond thought can really set a problem for thought.If our world were such, one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to th<strong>in</strong>k with Professor Roycethat it would be “too much of a bl<strong>in</strong>d problem for us even to be puzzledby its mean<strong>in</strong>gless presence.” 230 Those who <strong>in</strong>sist upon such an immediateexperience should show by what right they appeal to the <strong>in</strong>dividualas the real, <strong>and</strong> by what reason<strong>in</strong>g they succeed <strong>in</strong> transcend<strong>in</strong>g abstractparticularity with<strong>in</strong> this experience. For there is certa<strong>in</strong>ly a difficultyhere, <strong>and</strong> one that seems to be sufficiently weighty to cause the positionto be, if not entirely ab<strong>and</strong>oned, at least essentially modified.But Professor Baillie may possibly object that, so far as he is concerned,all this is beside the mark. He may assert that he has no thoughtof equat<strong>in</strong>g reality with an unchangeable datum of experience, or withthe abstract particular. His ma<strong>in</strong> contention, he may urge, is that realitycannot be exhausted by thought; thought is about reality, but cannotexhaust reality. The notions are not the reality of th<strong>in</strong>gs, “for these are<strong>in</strong>dividual, <strong>and</strong> a notion, however concrete, is . . . always a notion, i.e.,a universal.” 231 <strong>Reality</strong>, then, is not a chaotic state of immediacy, as hasbeen represented <strong>in</strong> the discussion above; on the contrary, it is a uniquewhole which, on account of its very uniqueness, lies beyond the possibilityof the universals of thought. It is not the start<strong>in</strong>g-po<strong>in</strong>t from which
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/95thought abstracts, but the goal at which it aims — a goal, however,essentially beyond it. In a word, the objector may say, not abstractunrelatedness but an organic unity that is super-rational — such is theimmediacy of that which may be called the real.This objection, however, does not <strong>in</strong> the least change the situation. Itmakes no difference whether the ‘immediate’ is the <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate given ofsense-perception with which thought works, or the unatta<strong>in</strong>able ideal towardswhich thought strives; from the logical po<strong>in</strong>t of view the two positionsare one <strong>and</strong> the same, <strong>and</strong> a justifiable criticism of the one holds of theother also. On this po<strong>in</strong>t Professor Baillie st<strong>and</strong>s condemned by his ownwords: “If reality is <strong>in</strong> any sense beyond knowledge it is of no importancewhere, <strong>in</strong> the history of knowledge, the separation is made. To make knowledgebear an essentially asymptotic relation to reality is <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple preciselythe same as to separate knowledge <strong>and</strong> reality absolutely from thestart. The only difference is that the former puts the separation far away at<strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ity — ’reality cannot be exhausted by thought’; the latter plants itdown at our feet — ’reality is outside knowledge.’ But this is a differencewhich is unimportant <strong>and</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gless: unimportant, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> both casesreality is beyond us, <strong>and</strong> the question of ‘when’ it becomes so does notconcern knowledge: mean<strong>in</strong>gless, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> both cases we can never saywhen knowledge actually has failed; the beyond is always a beyond <strong>in</strong>either case. The position referred to” (that is, the position expressed byLotze, for example, when he asserts that ‘reality is richer than thought’) “istherefore rooted <strong>in</strong> dualism, <strong>in</strong> spite of the apparent concession of the worthof knowledge up to a certa<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t. For it must accept the alternative: eitherknowledge does give the nature of reality, <strong>in</strong> which case the question ofamount <strong>and</strong> the time it takes to exhaust it is of no significance, s<strong>in</strong>ce thenature of reality is explicitly known <strong>and</strong> implicitly cognizable; or there is atthe outset a fundamental cleavage between the two, <strong>in</strong> which case at nopo<strong>in</strong>t does knowledge give reality.” 232 And if this be true, we are reduced tothe necessity of acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g that the separation between knowledge <strong>and</strong>reality, wherever the separation may appear, leads us <strong>in</strong>to the difficulties ofan <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate immediacy of experience.As Hegel views the matter, the way out of these difficulties is exactlythe reverse of the way <strong>in</strong>. We must def<strong>in</strong>e reality not as Substance but asSubject. That is to say, the real must be conceived of not as an <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ablesomewhat about which noth<strong>in</strong>g more can logically be said than that it justeternally is but as a thoroughly comprehensible system whose nature isexpressed <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>ternal rational organization. Even grant<strong>in</strong>g that the
96/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamcategories which are adequate to its nature may be read <strong>in</strong> terms of senseperception,or of bl<strong>in</strong>d will, or of pure cognition, or of abstract feel<strong>in</strong>g, stillwe must say, if we are not to talk mere nonsense, that the immediacy of thereal is the result of some sort of mediation <strong>and</strong> is <strong>in</strong>telligible by means ofcerta<strong>in</strong> categories which actually do express its essential nature. 233 Butsense-perception, bl<strong>in</strong>d will, pure cognition, mere feel<strong>in</strong>g, have no categoriesto offer us for the unification of experience: the true universal runsthrough them all, <strong>and</strong> it is the one reason which is the life of experience.Such is Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e, <strong>and</strong> he <strong>in</strong>sists that, if we are <strong>in</strong> earnest abouttranscend<strong>in</strong>g the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of the Critical Philosophy, that is, if we arereally <strong>in</strong> earnest when we deny the existence of a reality beyond the realm ofpossible experience, we must admit that no part of experience presents theenigmatic aspect of a mere abstract datum. For if that which is real is an<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate immediacy, an <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>able somewhat that lies beyond thought,where<strong>in</strong> does it differ from the abstract particular or the th<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-itself, orwhat earthly connection has it with actual concrete experience? Those whochampion the position ought to take it upon themselves to remove the difficulty,<strong>and</strong> to po<strong>in</strong>t out <strong>in</strong> what respects their solution differs from Hegel’sown. 234We may conclude this chapter with a brief summary of its ma<strong>in</strong> contentions.Hegel equates reality with experience, <strong>and</strong> not with abstract formalknowledge as Professor Baillie <strong>and</strong> Mr. McTaggart seem to th<strong>in</strong>k.When he asserts that the immediacy of reality is the immediacy of science,or that philosophy exhausts the nature of Spirit, he simply means to saythat reality is not an <strong>in</strong>soluble mystery, but is essentially an ideal construction.an <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>and</strong> organization of the so-called ‘given.’ The real forhim, therefore, is neither the abstract particular nor the blank universal; it isthe universal filled, the particular made significant, <strong>in</strong> a word, the <strong>in</strong>dividual.And the position that the real is <strong>in</strong>dividual, as he conceives thematter, necessarily <strong>in</strong>volves the admission that concrete thought is no lessextensive than the realm of concrete experience. For if any part of experiencelies truly beyond thought, it seems to be devoid of universal characteristics<strong>and</strong> so differs <strong>in</strong> no <strong>in</strong>telligible sense from the abstract particular; <strong>and</strong>it is the validity of this contention that he would ask the upholders of the‘pure experience’ theory to challenge. That the essential nature of whichcannot be fully expressed <strong>in</strong> terms of knowledge is an <strong>in</strong>comprehensibledatum which, by virtue of that fact, never appears <strong>in</strong> concrete experience.And experience, organized <strong>and</strong> rationalized experience, <strong>and</strong> reality areone.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/97Chapter V.The of the Absolute.Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the nature of the Absolute is a problem that is noteasy of solution. The fact that the Hegelians of the Left <strong>and</strong> of the Right,while appeal<strong>in</strong>g to the authority of the master <strong>in</strong> justification of theirrespective positions, reached antithetical conclusions with reference tothis problem is an <strong>in</strong>dication of its difficulty. But the result that we havealready atta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g chapter offers us a vantage-po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong>our discussion of the problem. We have shown that the unity of reality,accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hegel, is a unity that <strong>in</strong>cludes differences, <strong>and</strong> that thedifferences are essential to the unity. This po<strong>in</strong>t will, however, be ofmore direct <strong>in</strong>terest to us when we come to ask concern<strong>in</strong>g the relationof the Absolute <strong>and</strong> its differentiations. The problem immediately beforeus is to determ<strong>in</strong>e how this unity must be conceived, what morespecifically the nature of the unity is. The thesis which we shall defendis that the Hegelian doctr<strong>in</strong>e concern<strong>in</strong>g this unity is that it is spiritual,<strong>and</strong> that it exists as a self-conscious Personality. 235The po<strong>in</strong>t of departure for our discussion we shall f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the AbsoluteIdea. If we can determ<strong>in</strong>e the essential nature of the Idea, then wemay claim to have set forth Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the nature of the Absolute,s<strong>in</strong>ce the two terms are practically synonymous <strong>in</strong> his system. 236 IfHegel has given any direct proof at all that the Absolute is to be thoughtof as personal, it must be sought <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>vestigation of the Idea; <strong>and</strong>, onthe other h<strong>and</strong>, if it can be shown that the Idea is a self-conscious Individuality,it must be admitted that Hegel teaches the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of a personalAbsolute. We ask first, then, Is the category of the Absolute Idea,as def<strong>in</strong>ed for us <strong>in</strong> the Logic, equivalent to a Personality or self-consciousIndividuality?We have already po<strong>in</strong>ted out that Hegel teaches that the Idea is<strong>in</strong>dividual for it assumes the form of the Notion, <strong>and</strong> the form of theNotion is <strong>in</strong>dividuality. Even a glance at the Logic will <strong>in</strong>dicate thistruth: the Idea is the last category <strong>in</strong> the dialectical def<strong>in</strong>ition of theNotion. But this, <strong>in</strong> itself, proves noth<strong>in</strong>g more than that the Idea is aunity of differences, <strong>and</strong> that unity <strong>and</strong> differences are equally essential.This is a very important result, to be sure; it settles some vexed questionsconcern<strong>in</strong>g the Absolute <strong>and</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ite, as we shall see <strong>in</strong> the discussionof the relation of God to the world. But it still leaves unansweredthe problem of the nature of the unity among the differences.Does Hegel th<strong>in</strong>k of this unity as personal <strong>and</strong> self-conscious?
98/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamThe answer to this question is to be found <strong>in</strong> the triadic developmentwhich Hegel has given <strong>in</strong> that part of the Doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the Notion calledthe Idea. The triad which we f<strong>in</strong>d here consists of the categories of Life,Cognition (perhaps Consciousness would more nearly adequately conveyHegel’s mean<strong>in</strong>g), <strong>and</strong> the Absolute Idea. The movement, thoughconsiderably h<strong>in</strong>dered by puzzl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> bothersome details, is tolerablyclear <strong>in</strong> its ma<strong>in</strong> features; <strong>and</strong>, fortunately, it is only the ma<strong>in</strong> featureswith which we are here concerned. Let us follow this development.We ask first concern<strong>in</strong>g the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of the thesis. Here, under thecategory of Life, Hegel tells us that we have the Idea <strong>in</strong> its immediacybut <strong>in</strong> an immediacy which is not true. By this is meant, it would seem,that <strong>in</strong> the category of Life we get the first approximately explicit manifestationof the real nature of the Idea, but <strong>in</strong> a manner <strong>in</strong>adequate tothat nature. The category is approximately adequate to the Idea, becausewe have <strong>in</strong> it the first explicit appearance of a spiritual activity.Its <strong>in</strong>adequacy consists <strong>in</strong> the fact that it presupposes an oppositionbetween subjective <strong>and</strong> objective which it never succeeds <strong>in</strong> overcom<strong>in</strong>g.It is, <strong>in</strong>deed, true that the dialectical process with<strong>in</strong> this categoryconsists just <strong>in</strong> transcend<strong>in</strong>g this opposition: <strong>in</strong> the K<strong>in</strong>d (Gattung) theparticular liv<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g loses part of its immediacy <strong>and</strong> becomes, to adegree, objective <strong>and</strong> universal. Nevertheless, its particularity <strong>and</strong> universalitydo not completely co<strong>in</strong>cide. “Implicitly it is the universal orK<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>and</strong> yet immediately it exists as only.” 237 And just because of thiscontradiction, which is essential to it, the category of Life cannot furnishus with the ultimate synthesis of reality. In such a synthesis wecould have noth<strong>in</strong>g more than blank identity between the particular <strong>and</strong>the universal; the particular on this plane is not able to withst<strong>and</strong> theuniversal. “The animal never getssofar<strong>in</strong> its K<strong>in</strong>d as to have a tee<strong>in</strong>g ofitsown; it succumbs to the power of K<strong>in</strong>d.” 238 Thus we are forced tolook for the unity of the Idea <strong>in</strong> a category other than that of Life. Andthis br<strong>in</strong>gs us to the category which Hegel calls Cognition <strong>in</strong> general.Before pass<strong>in</strong>g on to the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of this category, it will be wellto pause here, <strong>and</strong> quote Hegel’s own words bear<strong>in</strong>g on the defect <strong>and</strong>the dialectical development of the category of Life as we have just attemptedto trace it. “The notion [of Life] <strong>and</strong> [its] reality do not thoroughlycorrespond to each other. The notion of Life is the soul, <strong>and</strong> thisnotion has the body for its reality. The soul is, as it were, <strong>in</strong>fused <strong>in</strong>to itscorporeity; <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> that way it is at first sentient only, <strong>and</strong> not yet freelyselfconscious. The process of Life consists <strong>in</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g the better of the
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/99immediacy with which it is still beset: <strong>and</strong> this process, which is itselfthreefold, results <strong>in</strong> the idea under the form of judgment, i.e., the idea asCognition.” 239In his discussion of the category of Cognition Hegel <strong>in</strong>dulges <strong>in</strong>numerous digressions, which serve only to obscure the outl<strong>in</strong>es of thedialectical advance. But, if we neglect the confus<strong>in</strong>g details, the goal atwhich the author is aim<strong>in</strong>g seems pretty clearly to be the category ofself-consciousness. And he reaches it <strong>in</strong> some such way as the follow<strong>in</strong>g.Leav<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d us the category of Life, as confessedly <strong>in</strong>adequateto the unity of the Idea, we turn first to the level of abstract cognitionproper, <strong>and</strong> exam<strong>in</strong>e its claims. 240 This category is at once seen to be<strong>in</strong>sufficient, <strong>and</strong> that for two reasons. In the first place, it presupposes asomewhat as given, upon which it impresses itself <strong>in</strong> a more or lessmechanical fashion; this is the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of the sciences, which busythemselves with the discovery of laws without be<strong>in</strong>g able to pass judgmentupon their ontological significance. 241 “The assimilation of thematter, therefore, as a datum, presents itself <strong>in</strong> the light of a reception ofit <strong>in</strong>to categories which at the same time rema<strong>in</strong> external to it, <strong>and</strong> whichmeet each other <strong>in</strong> the same style of diversity. Reason is here active, butit is reason <strong>in</strong> the shape of the underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The truth which suchCognition can reach will therefore be only f<strong>in</strong>ite.” 242 The second defectof abstract Cognition, which is an <strong>in</strong>evitable result of its abstractness, isthat it fails to do justice to the nature of the know<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>d; m<strong>in</strong>d isregarded from this po<strong>in</strong>t of view too much as an empty vessel to befilled from without. “The f<strong>in</strong>itude of Cognition lies <strong>in</strong> the presuppositionof a world already <strong>in</strong> existence, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the consequent view of theknow<strong>in</strong>g subject as a tabula rasa.” 243 For these reasons, therefore, wefail to f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Cognition proper release from the dualism <strong>in</strong> which thecategory of Life left us bound; we do not get here the unity for which weare seek<strong>in</strong>g. So we turn next to volition. Can Will supply us with asatisfactory synthesis? At first it seems that it might, s<strong>in</strong>ce from thispo<strong>in</strong>t of view the objective falls together with the subjective; objectivityis measured <strong>in</strong> terms of subjective ideals <strong>and</strong> aims. But this is just thedifficulty with the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t. Objectivity is too completely reduced tosubjective terms, <strong>and</strong> therefore really opposes itself to subjectivity; theobjective never, <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of fact, becomes subjective <strong>and</strong> the subjectivenever really loses itself <strong>in</strong> objectivity. Thus we are reduced to the eternalSollen of Fichte. “While Intelligence merely proposes to take the worldas it is, Will takes steps to make the world what it ought to be. Will
100/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamlooks upon the immediate <strong>and</strong> given present not as solid be<strong>in</strong>g, but asmere semblance without reality. It is here that we meet those contradictionswhich are so bewilder<strong>in</strong>g from the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of abstract morality.This position <strong>in</strong> its ‘practical’ bear<strong>in</strong>gs is the one taken by the philosophyof Kant, <strong>and</strong> even by that of Fichte. The Good, say these writers,has to be realized: we have to work <strong>in</strong> order to produce it: <strong>and</strong> Will isonly the Good actualiz<strong>in</strong>g itself. If the world then were as it ought to be,the action of Will would be at an end. The Will itself therefore requiresthat its end should not be realized. In these words, a correct expressionis given to the f<strong>in</strong>itude of Will.” 244 So once aga<strong>in</strong>, we are disappo<strong>in</strong>ted<strong>in</strong> our search for unity. “This Volition has, on the one h<strong>and</strong>, the certitudeof the noth<strong>in</strong>gness of the presupposed object; but, on the other, as f<strong>in</strong>ite,it at the same time presupposes the purposed End of the Good to be amere subjective idea, <strong>and</strong> the object to be <strong>in</strong>dependent.” 245 Volition presupposesa discrepancy between what is <strong>and</strong> what ought to be, a discrepancywhich, from the po<strong>in</strong>t of view of abstract volition, cannot beelim<strong>in</strong>ated; <strong>and</strong> so our unity is not yet atta<strong>in</strong>ed.But a way to that unity has been suggested. If we could secure aconjunction of what is <strong>and</strong> what ought to be, if, that is to say, we couldcomb<strong>in</strong>e the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ts of Cognition proper <strong>and</strong> Volition <strong>in</strong> a highersynthesis, then it would seem that we should have reached our goal. For<strong>in</strong> such a synthesis the subjective would be genu<strong>in</strong>ely objective, <strong>and</strong> theobjective would not st<strong>and</strong> over aga<strong>in</strong>st the subjective as someth<strong>in</strong>g foreignto it but would partake of its very nature. “The reconciliation isachieved, when Will <strong>in</strong> its result returns to the pre-supposition made byCognition. In other words, it consists <strong>in</strong> the unity of the theoretical <strong>and</strong>practical idea. Will knows the end to be its own, <strong>and</strong> Intelligence apprehendsthe world as the Notion actual.” 246This synthesis, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hegel, is found <strong>in</strong> the Absolute Idea. Itis here that we get our ultimate unity of the real. It will be well to letHegel speak for himself on this very vital po<strong>in</strong>t. “The truth of the Goodis laid down as the unity of the theoretical <strong>and</strong> practical idea <strong>in</strong> thedoctr<strong>in</strong>e that the Good is radically <strong>and</strong> really achieved, that the objectiveworld is <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> for itself the Idea, just as it at the same timeeternally lays itself down as End, <strong>and</strong> by action br<strong>in</strong>gs about its actuality.This Life which has returned to itself from the bias <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>itude ofCognition, <strong>and</strong> which by the activity of the Notion has become identicalwith it, is the Speculative or Absolute Idea.” 247 The follow<strong>in</strong>g passageis perhaps more explicit: “The Absolute Idea is, <strong>in</strong> the first place, the
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/101unity of the theoretical <strong>and</strong> the practical idea, <strong>and</strong> thus at the same timethe unity of the idea of Life with the idea of Cognition. In Cognition wehad the Idea <strong>in</strong> a biased, one-sided shape. The process of Cognition hasissued <strong>in</strong> the overthrow of this bias <strong>and</strong> the restoration of that unity,which as unity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> its immediacy, is <strong>in</strong> the first <strong>in</strong>stance the Idea ofLife. The defect of Life lies <strong>in</strong> its be<strong>in</strong>g the Idea only implicit or natural:whereas Cognition is <strong>in</strong> an equally one-sided way the merely consciousIdea, or the Idea for itself. The unity <strong>and</strong> truth of these two is the AbsoluteIdea which is both <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> for itself. Hitherto we have had theIdea <strong>in</strong> development through its various grades as our object, but nowthe Idea comes to be its own object.” 248The development that we have just traced seems pretty clearly outl<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>and</strong> the goal to which it has led us appears to be very well def<strong>in</strong>ed.The category of Life fails as a synthesis of reality, because it is not selfconscious;the categories of Cognition proper <strong>and</strong> Volition fail, becausethey are only one-sided representations of self-conscious life; the AbsoluteIdea succeeds, because it transcends the defects of these lower st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ts.And from this it seems only logical to conclude that the Ideasucceeds because it is the unity of Self-consciousness <strong>in</strong> its completion.“This unity is consequently the absolute <strong>and</strong> all truth, the Idea whichth<strong>in</strong>ks itself — <strong>and</strong> here at least as a th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g or Logical Idea.” 249 Onecan see no valid reason why we may not believe that Hegel is <strong>in</strong> earnestwhen he says, as above, that “the Idea comes to be its own object,” <strong>and</strong>that “its developed <strong>and</strong> genu<strong>in</strong>e actuality is to be as a subject <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> thatway as m<strong>in</strong>d.” 250 On the contrary, the dialectical development- hereseems to force us to the conclusion that the category of the AbsoluteIdea is really a Self-consciousness, a know<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> will<strong>in</strong>g Individual,who ‘comes home’ to Himself from His differentiations <strong>in</strong> which Hesees Himself mirrored as it were <strong>in</strong> His eternal essence, a Personalitywho exists <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> for Himself <strong>and</strong> realizes His ends <strong>in</strong> the phenomenalworld. For with<strong>in</strong> the unity of the Idea, Life, Cognition, <strong>and</strong> Volition areblended harmoniously together, <strong>and</strong> the life of knowledge <strong>and</strong> the life ofactivity are one. And Consciousness is the only category that gives ussuch a unity.Mr. McTaggart objects to the conclusion which we have here reached;he denies that it is the logical outcome of Hegel’s system. He readilygrants that, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the system, the unity of the Idea must be construed<strong>in</strong> terms of spirit; <strong>and</strong> he is ready not only to admit but to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>that the author believed it possible for spirit to exist only <strong>in</strong> the form
102/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamof personality. 251 But he contends that we have no right to <strong>in</strong>fer fromthese premises to the conclusion that this unity of the Idea is a personalunity. “It might be said of a College,” he urges, “with as much truth asit has been said of the Absolute, that it is a unity, that it is a unity ofspirit, <strong>and</strong> that none of that spirit exists except as personal.” 252This objection, however, seems to rest upon a false notion of thenature of the unity that is def<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the Idea. Hegel himself has told us,“The unity of God is always unity, but everyth<strong>in</strong>g depends upon theparticular nature of this unity; this po<strong>in</strong>t be<strong>in</strong>g disregarded, that uponwhich everyth<strong>in</strong>g depends is overlooked.” 253 Now it seems that Mr.McTaggart has misconceived the unity of the Idea; <strong>and</strong> consequently hiscriticism of our conclusion which is based upon this misconception is ofno significance. Let us see what can be said <strong>in</strong> justification of this statement.In the first place, it is important to notice that Mr. McTaggart th<strong>in</strong>ksof the Idea as absolutely identical with its differences: the unity, as heconceives of it, is noth<strong>in</strong>g more than its differentiations, <strong>and</strong> they arenoth<strong>in</strong>g more than it. For <strong>in</strong>stance, he says: “The <strong>in</strong>dividual has hisentire nature <strong>in</strong> the manifestation of this whole, as the whole, <strong>in</strong> turn, isnoth<strong>in</strong>g else but its manifestation <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals.” 254 Aga<strong>in</strong> he takes forgranted that Hegel “reaches <strong>in</strong> the category of Life a result from whichhe never departs <strong>in</strong> the subsequent categories — that the unity <strong>and</strong> pluralityare <strong>in</strong> an absolutely reciprocal relation, so that, while the pluralityis noth<strong>in</strong>g but the differentiation of the unity, the unity is noth<strong>in</strong>g but theunion of the plurality.” 255 And with this supposedly Hegelian position iscontrasted at considerable length Lotze’s view, that “the Absolute is tobe taken as someth<strong>in</strong>g more <strong>and</strong> deeper than the unity of its differentiations.”256 Thus Mr. McTaggart’s conception of the unity of the Idea ishardly mistakable; accord<strong>in</strong>g to him, this unity consists <strong>in</strong> the relationof abstract identity between the Idea <strong>and</strong> its differentiations.A criticism of the tenability of this doctr<strong>in</strong>e of identity will be undertakenlater on <strong>in</strong> this chapter. Our present purpose is to show that itis not, as Mr. McTaggart assumes it is, Hegel’s account of the unity ofthe Idea. But it will not be amiss, perhaps, to pause here for a moment topo<strong>in</strong>t out one or two difficulties <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> this <strong>in</strong>terpretation of thecritic. In the first place, if the unity <strong>and</strong> the differences of the Idea are <strong>in</strong>exact equilibrium, it is not quite evident that any room is left anywherefor that ‘simple <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>divisible element’ which Mr. McTaggart makesthe very qu<strong>in</strong>tessence of the personality of f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>and</strong> upon
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/103which he bases his argument for their immortality. 257 On this hypothesisit would appear that the f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>in</strong>dividual f<strong>in</strong>ds himself as sorely pressedas does the Absolute; for the personality of the former is <strong>in</strong> just as precariousa predicament as is that of the latter. 258 In the second place, it isdifficult to see where such a unity as Mr. McTaggart <strong>in</strong>sists upon becomesactual; there certa<strong>in</strong>ly is room to question whether it is ever actualized.If its actualization is possible, it would have to be <strong>in</strong> a state ofsociety which yet lies <strong>in</strong> the far distant future; certa<strong>in</strong>ly society has notyet atta<strong>in</strong>ed unto it. So it would appear to be a unity that ought to be butis not — a conception so vigorously criticized by Hegel. In the thirdplace <strong>and</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ally, the problem of the cont<strong>in</strong>gent, which on any idealistictheory short of pessimism is a puzzl<strong>in</strong>g one, becomes doubly so on Mr.McTaggart’s hypothesis. He seems logically bound to assert either thatthe f<strong>in</strong>ite is perfect, or that the imperfections of the f<strong>in</strong>ite, qua imperfections,belong to the essential nature of the Absolute; for the Absolute, itis to be remembered, is its differentiations. 259 To sum up the wholematter, Mr. McTaggart seems to be between the Scylla of a fictitiousunity <strong>and</strong> the Charybdis of differences that defy conjunction. His universalis one which, after it has succeeded <strong>in</strong> unify<strong>in</strong>g the universe, itselff<strong>in</strong>ds nowhere to lay its head; <strong>and</strong> his particulars tend either to vanishentirely <strong>in</strong>to the universal, or — this is the more imm<strong>in</strong>ent danger — tofly asunder <strong>and</strong> become discrete entities. And one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to th<strong>in</strong>kthat this is exactly the difficulty <strong>in</strong>to which, as Hegel po<strong>in</strong>ts out, Leibnitzfell — the difficulty, namely, of resolv<strong>in</strong>g the contradiction between anabsolutely self-centered <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>and</strong> a completely unify<strong>in</strong>g universalthat swamps its differences. 260But to return from this digression, let us ask concern<strong>in</strong>g the justificationof Mr. McTaggart’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of Hegel’s mean<strong>in</strong>g. The exactbalance which the critic supposes between the unity of the Idea <strong>and</strong> itsmanifestations is foreign to the author’s conception of the matter. In thefirst place, the dialectical movement, which we have above outl<strong>in</strong>ed,bears out this contention. Contrary to Mr. McTaggart’s assertion that <strong>in</strong>the category of Life Hegel reaches a result from which he never departs,namely, an ‘absolutely reciprocal relation’ between the unity <strong>and</strong> itsplurality, it may be argued that the development from the category ofLife to that of the Absolute Idea consists just <strong>in</strong> transcend<strong>in</strong>g this relationof identity, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> assert<strong>in</strong>g a unity which exists for itself with<strong>in</strong> itsdifferences. It would be hard to say <strong>in</strong> what respect the Idea is an advancebeyond the category of Life, if not <strong>in</strong> the fact that it unites with<strong>in</strong>
104/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamitself the theoretical <strong>and</strong> practical elements of the spiritual life. Andsuch a synthesis, as we have seen, is that of consciousness. If this is theresult to which Hegel leads us, then the unity of the Idea is more than itsdifferences, more than ‘the union of the plurality’; for it is <strong>in</strong>consistentwith the nature of consciousness to be noth<strong>in</strong>g more than its content.The Idea thus seems to be someth<strong>in</strong>g deeper than the mere conjunctionof its differentiations.Aga<strong>in</strong>, Mr. McTaggart’s position on this po<strong>in</strong>t is contrary to theresult of our previous chapter, that the real for Hegel is the <strong>in</strong>dividual. Ifthat result be true, then the Absolute Idea must be an actual synthesis ofconcrete differences, the differences exist<strong>in</strong>g for the synthesis <strong>and</strong> thesynthesis exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its differences <strong>and</strong> for itself — such a synthesis ascannot be found <strong>in</strong> any society (however closely unified) of self-consciousf<strong>in</strong>ite spirits. It belongs to the very nature of the <strong>in</strong>dividual thatits differences be more than the union of themselves, <strong>and</strong> that its unitybe more than the conjunction of its differentiations; <strong>in</strong> other words, abstractidentity of the particulars <strong>and</strong> the universal is foreign to the essenceof the concrete <strong>in</strong>dividual. If therefore we are right <strong>in</strong> our positionthat Hegel’s ultimate synthesis, the Absolute Idea, must be <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>its nature, we are also right <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that the synthesis is not identicalwith its differences. And that we are <strong>in</strong> the right here the whole first Partof our study bears witness.Mr. McTaggart’s difficulty here is traceable to his failure to appreciatethe significance of negation <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of thought. For theunity of the Idea is a negative unity, <strong>and</strong> as such is different from theunity that either destroys multiplicity or itself fails to exist. I shall letHegel state the matter: “As the Idea is (a) a process, it follows that suchan expression for the Absolute as unity of thought <strong>and</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g, of f<strong>in</strong>ite<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite, etc., is false; for unity expresses an abstract <strong>and</strong> merelyquiescent identity. As the Idea is (b) subjectivity, it follows that theexpression is equally false on another account. That unity of which itspeaks expresses a merely virtual or underly<strong>in</strong>g presence of the genu<strong>in</strong>eunity. The <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite would thus seem to be merely neutralized by the f<strong>in</strong>ite,the subjective by the objective, thought by be<strong>in</strong>g. But <strong>in</strong> the negativeunity of the Idea, the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite overlaps <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cludes the f<strong>in</strong>ite, thoughtoverlaps be<strong>in</strong>g, subjectivity overlaps objectivity. The unity of the Idea isthought, <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ity, <strong>and</strong> subjectivity, <strong>and</strong> is <strong>in</strong> consequence to be essentiallydist<strong>in</strong>guished from the Idea as substance, just as this overlapp<strong>in</strong>gsubjectivity, thought, or <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ity is to be dist<strong>in</strong>guished from the one-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/105sided subjectivity, one-sided thought, one-sided <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ity to which it descends<strong>in</strong> judg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> defil<strong>in</strong>g.’ 261 A study of this passage discloses thefact that the unity of the Idea, which is a negative unity, is not the unityof exact equilibrium.Mr. McTaggart has another objection to raise aga<strong>in</strong>st the thesis weare here ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. He not only asserts that the position which wehave attributed to Hegel is not logically <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> his system, — hedoes admit that the dialectic itself furnishes no positive disproof of it —but he also contends that the position is one which Hegel himself did nothold. He th<strong>in</strong>ks that Hegel explicitly repudiates the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of a personalAbsolute, <strong>and</strong> he bases his contention on the conclusion of thePhilosophy of Religion. 262 “It seems clear from the Philosophy of Religion,”he tells us, “that the truth of God’s nature, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hegel, isto be found <strong>in</strong> the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of the Holy Ghost.... And the K<strong>in</strong>gdom ofthe Holy Ghost appears to be not a person but a community.” 263Before pass<strong>in</strong>g on to exam<strong>in</strong>e the basis of this argument, I cannotrefra<strong>in</strong> from quot<strong>in</strong>g a few other passages from various contexts, whichseem to be <strong>in</strong> direct refutation of the contention which the critic is try<strong>in</strong>gto establish. I shall cite only those passages which have explicit referenceto the po<strong>in</strong>t. In the larger Logic at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the discussionof the Absolute Idea we read: “The Notion is not only soul but freesubjective Notion, which is for itself <strong>and</strong>, therefore, has personality —the practical objective Notion which is determ<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> for itself, <strong>and</strong>which, as person, is impenetrable atomic subjectivity.” 264 A page or twobelow, after hav<strong>in</strong>g spoken of the method as an immanent form of development,the author says: “The Method thus shows itself to be the Notionwhich knows itself, <strong>and</strong> which, as the Absolute, both subjective <strong>and</strong>objective, has itself for its own object.” 265 Aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> the smaller Logic:“It is true that God is necessity, or, as we may also put it, that He is theabsolute Th<strong>in</strong>g: He is however no less the absolute Person. That He isthe absolute Person, however, is a po<strong>in</strong>t which the philosophy of Sp<strong>in</strong>ozanever reached; <strong>and</strong> on that side it falls short of the true notion of Godwhich forms the content of religious consciousness <strong>in</strong> Christianity.” 266In the Philosophy of Religion we are told that “God is himself consciousness,He dist<strong>in</strong>guishes Himself from Himself with<strong>in</strong> Himself, <strong>and</strong>as consciousness He gives Himself as object for what we call the side ofconsciousness.” 267 And later <strong>in</strong> the same work occurs a passage whichseems to have been written designedly to meet a position like that whichMr. McTaggart attributes to Hegel: “The Div<strong>in</strong>e is not to be conceived
106/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamof merely as a universal thought, or as someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ward <strong>and</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>gpotential existence only; the objectify<strong>in</strong>g of the Div<strong>in</strong>e is not to be conceivedof simply as the objective form it takes <strong>in</strong> all men, for <strong>in</strong> that caseit would be conceived of simply as represent<strong>in</strong>g the manifold forms ofthe spiritual <strong>in</strong> general, <strong>and</strong> the development which the Absolute Spirithas <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> which has to advance till it reaches the form of what isthe form of immediacy, would not be conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> it.” 268 The fourteenthlecture on the ‘Proofs of the Existence of God’ has someth<strong>in</strong>g to say onthe po<strong>in</strong>t: “That man knows God implies, <strong>in</strong> accordance with the essentialidea of communion or fellowship, that there is a community of knowledge;that is to say, man knows God only <strong>in</strong> so far as God Himselfknows Himself <strong>in</strong> man. This knowledge is God’s self-consciousness,but it is at the same time a knowledge of God on the part of man, <strong>and</strong>this knowledge of God by man is a knowledge of man by God.” 269 F<strong>in</strong>ally,<strong>in</strong> the Introduction to the Philosophy of History we read: “It isOne Individuality which, presented <strong>in</strong> its essence as God, is honored <strong>and</strong>enjoyed <strong>in</strong> Religion; which is exhibited as an object of sensuous contemplation<strong>in</strong> Art; <strong>and</strong> is apprehended as an <strong>in</strong>tellectual conception <strong>in</strong>Philosophy.” 270 To these seem<strong>in</strong>gly quite explicit passages others mightbe added. 271 But enough have been quoted to establish at least a presumptionthat, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Hegel’s own statements on the po<strong>in</strong>t, God isnot a community of f<strong>in</strong>ite spirits but a Personality.We turn now to an exam<strong>in</strong>ation of the basis upon which Mr.McTaggart rests his contention. Does the dialectical movement <strong>in</strong> thePhilosophy of Religion, from the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of the Father, through theK<strong>in</strong>gdom of the Son, to the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of the Holy Ghost, justify theconclusion that Hegel conceives of God as noth<strong>in</strong>g more than a communityof f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>in</strong>dividuals? To this question I th<strong>in</strong>k a negative answermust be given. Let us follow this movement <strong>in</strong> some detail.There is no reason why we should not agree with Mr. McTaggartthat the three stages of the K<strong>in</strong>gdoms of the Father, of the Son, <strong>and</strong> ofthe Spirit form a dialectical triad. And from this, we also agree, it necessarilyfollows that, “if God is really personal, He must be personal <strong>in</strong>the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of Spirit.” 272 But one fails to see how these premises leadto the conclusion that the Spirit which manifests itself <strong>in</strong> the synthesishere cannot be a Personality, an Individual. To be sure we must admitthat God, on this show<strong>in</strong>g, is adequately represented only <strong>in</strong> a communityof spirits, s<strong>in</strong>ce the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of the Spirit is conceived of as such acommunity. And, of course, it w ould be absurd to contend that a com-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/107munity is, or can possibly be, a person. But it is difficult to see, so muchbe<strong>in</strong>g granted, how we are necessarily committed to the conclusion that<strong>in</strong> the K<strong>in</strong>gdom of the Spirit God must be impersonal, or that, whenadequately represented, He becomes absolutely identical with the spiritualcommunity <strong>in</strong> which He f<strong>in</strong>ds fullest expression. Such a conclusionis forced upon us only when we assume, with the critic, that God is justHis manifestations <strong>and</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g more. And on this assumption we couldnot logically conf<strong>in</strong>e the Absolute to any community of self-consciousspirits, — unless, <strong>in</strong>deed, we are will<strong>in</strong>g to endow all forms of nature with spiritual qualities; for Hegel unquestionably ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that Nature isGod’s manifestation of Himself. But the assumption is arbitrary <strong>and</strong>groundless, if our position concern<strong>in</strong>g the unity <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuality of theIdea is true.Furthermore, this triad, as <strong>in</strong>terpreted by Mr. McTaggart, differsessentially from other triads <strong>in</strong> the Logic <strong>and</strong> elsewhere. For his argumentnecessitates the assumption that the movement here consists <strong>in</strong> anattempt to get away from an entirely erroneous view of God’s nature toa true <strong>and</strong> fundamentally different view. For example, after <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>gthat the triad is a genu<strong>in</strong>e dialectical process <strong>and</strong> that, consequently, wemust look for an adequate expression of God’s nature only <strong>in</strong> the synthesis,he cont<strong>in</strong>ues: “If [God] were personal as manifested <strong>in</strong> the first<strong>and</strong> second K<strong>in</strong>gdoms, but not <strong>in</strong> the third, it would mean that He waspersonal when viewed <strong>in</strong>adequately, but not when viewed adequately —i.e., that He was not really personal.” 273 This is the critic’s <strong>in</strong>terpretationof the actual movement <strong>and</strong> result of the triad. This <strong>in</strong>terpretation,however, makes of the triad an exception. For usually <strong>in</strong> the dialecticaltriad there is a thread of connection runn<strong>in</strong>g from thesis to synthesis; thetwo are never separated by a chasm. But on Mr. McTaggart’s <strong>in</strong>terpretationof the triad before us, thesis <strong>and</strong> synthesis would seem to be torncompletely asunder; <strong>in</strong> the thesis, God is viewed as a Personality, while,<strong>in</strong> the synthesis, He is def<strong>in</strong>ed only as the abstract unity of the Church,<strong>and</strong> is personal <strong>in</strong> no sense whatsoever. Thus there is no connectionbetween thesis <strong>and</strong> synthesis: the synthesis is a mere negation of thethesis. If the synthesis is right, therefore, the thesis must be completelywrong, absolutely false — a fact which we have been <strong>in</strong> the habit ofth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g is not characteristic of a dialectical triad. Mr. McTaggart’sargument seems thus to make of the present triad an extraord<strong>in</strong>ary exception.In po<strong>in</strong>t of fact, the movement here is not away from personality to
108/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamimpersonality. The dialectic does force us to say that the Spiritual Communityis necessary to an adequate representation of the nature of God;but this is very far from say<strong>in</strong>g that God is the Community or that theCommunity is God. The critic does not refer to any passages <strong>in</strong> whichHegel speaks of this very significant, <strong>and</strong> withal very peculiar, turn <strong>in</strong>the dialectic advance; <strong>and</strong> I have been able to f<strong>in</strong>d none. I have, however,found one <strong>in</strong> which the identification <strong>in</strong> question seems to be denied,<strong>and</strong> it runs so: “This third sphere” (that is, the sphere of the K<strong>in</strong>gdomof the Spirit, the Spiritual Community) “represents the Idea <strong>in</strong> itsspecific character as <strong>in</strong>dividuality; but, to beg<strong>in</strong> with, it exhibits onlythe one <strong>in</strong>dividuality, the div<strong>in</strong>e universal <strong>in</strong>dividuality as it is <strong>in</strong>-<strong>and</strong>for-itself....Individuality as exclusive is for others immediacy, <strong>and</strong> isthe return from the other <strong>in</strong>to self. The <strong>in</strong>dividuality of the Div<strong>in</strong>e Idea,the Div<strong>in</strong>e Idea as a person (e<strong>in</strong> Mensch), first atta<strong>in</strong>s to completeness<strong>in</strong> actuality (Wirklichkeit), s<strong>in</strong>ce at first it has the many <strong>in</strong>dividuals confront<strong>in</strong>git, <strong>and</strong> br<strong>in</strong>gs these back <strong>in</strong>to the unity of Spirit, <strong>in</strong>to the Churchor Spiritual Community (Geme<strong>in</strong>de), <strong>and</strong> exists here as real universalself-consciousness.” 274 If I underst<strong>and</strong> what this means, it <strong>in</strong>dicates that,as Hegel himself views the matter, the third K<strong>in</strong>gdom, the K<strong>in</strong>gdom ofthe Spirit, is the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t where God is first viewed <strong>in</strong> His true Personality;for here it is that He is seen to be <strong>in</strong> vital <strong>and</strong> actual touch withmen <strong>and</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs. Thus it appears that the triad is not a movement fromthe conception of a personal to the conception of an impersonal God;but rather from an <strong>in</strong>adequate to an adequate representation of God aspersonal. He is not pure thought, exist<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d the world as it were <strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite space; this is the conception of the thesis. On the contrary, He isthat spiritual unity, that ‘real universal self-consciousness,’ realiz<strong>in</strong>gHis aims <strong>and</strong> purposes <strong>in</strong> the lives of f<strong>in</strong>ite self-conscious agents whoseaspirations are perfected <strong>and</strong> consummated <strong>in</strong> Him. In some such way itseems that the movement here must be understood.Another fact that militates aga<strong>in</strong>st Mr. McTaggart’s position on thispo<strong>in</strong>t — at any rate from the po<strong>in</strong>t of view of the present essay — is thatthe culm<strong>in</strong>ation of Hegel’s discussion of the Spiritual Community is thest<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of the Notion. The three phases with<strong>in</strong> this discussion Hegeldesignates as follows: (a) The conception of the Spiritual Community;(b) The realization of the Spiritual Community; <strong>and</strong> (c) The realizationof the spiritual <strong>in</strong> universal reality (Wirklichkeit). So far as our presentpurpose is concerned, the first two of these divisions may be dismissedwithout comment. The third, however, is of <strong>in</strong>terest especially when we
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/109learn that it “directly <strong>in</strong>volves the transformation <strong>and</strong> remodell<strong>in</strong>g of theSpiritual Community.” 275 It is divided <strong>in</strong>to a threefold movement, whichconsists <strong>in</strong> three different attitudes taken towards objectivity. Hegel statesthis movement <strong>in</strong> outl<strong>in</strong>e thus: “Objectivity as an external immediateworld, is the heart with its <strong>in</strong>terests; another form of objectivity is thatof reflection, of abstract thought, of Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g; <strong>and</strong> the third <strong>and</strong>true form of objectivity is the Notion. We have now to consider howSpirit realizes itself <strong>in</strong> these three elements.” 276 The development hereoutl<strong>in</strong>ed is not easily followed <strong>in</strong> detail. But it seems to consist <strong>in</strong> trac<strong>in</strong>gthe essential features of the faith of the Spiritual Community concern<strong>in</strong>gthe nature of the objective order, <strong>and</strong> the attitudes assumed towardssuch an objective order. In the first stage, the Spiritual Community hasopposed to it a worldly element, which seems to exist on its own account;there is here an opposition between the religious <strong>and</strong> the secular.In the second stage we sw<strong>in</strong>g to the other extreme, <strong>in</strong> which the objectiveis practically disregarded <strong>and</strong> the idea of God, be<strong>in</strong>g emptied ofcontent, is reduced to an abstraction; this is that “<strong>in</strong>ner self-enclosed lifewhich may <strong>in</strong>deed co-exist with calm, lofty, <strong>and</strong> pious aspirations, butmay as readily appear as hypocrisy or as vanity <strong>in</strong> its most extremeform.” 277 The first of these two stages Hegel calls the “servitude ofSpirit <strong>in</strong> the absolute region of freedom”; the second is “abstract subjectivity,subjective freedom without content.” 278 The f<strong>in</strong>al stage is, as wewould expect, the reconciliation of these two extremes. It discovers thatfreedom, real <strong>in</strong>telligible freedom, is to be found only <strong>in</strong> the objective,that objective <strong>and</strong> subjective, when they are adequately comprehended,fall together. This is the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of philosophy. “What we have f<strong>in</strong>allyto consider is that subjectivity develops the content out of itself,but it does this <strong>in</strong> accordance with necessity — it knows <strong>and</strong> recognizesthat the content is necessary, <strong>and</strong> that it is objective <strong>and</strong> exists <strong>in</strong><strong>and</strong>for-itself.This is the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of philosophy, accord<strong>in</strong>g to which thecontent takes refuge <strong>in</strong> the Notion, <strong>and</strong> by means of thought gets itsrestoration <strong>and</strong> justification.” 279 The objective with<strong>in</strong> the Community,therefore, must be known to be <strong>in</strong>-<strong>and</strong>-for-itself before the communityhas atta<strong>in</strong>ed complete <strong>and</strong> perfect actualization; <strong>and</strong> this knowledge isreached only when philosophic comprehension is substituted for <strong>in</strong>tuitivefaith. Thus we are once aga<strong>in</strong> brought to our former problem concern<strong>in</strong>gthe real nature of the Notion <strong>and</strong> its significance <strong>in</strong> Hegel’ssystem. If the form of the Notion is <strong>in</strong>dividuality, then it would seemthat, on the above show<strong>in</strong>g, the Spiritual Community is perfected only
110/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamwhen its unity is actualized.It is to be noted, furthermore, that <strong>in</strong> philosophy <strong>and</strong> not <strong>in</strong> theSpiritual Community, as such, is to be found the true realization of theobject of Absolute Religion. The Spiritual Community, “<strong>in</strong> atta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>grealization <strong>in</strong> its spiritual reality,” falls <strong>in</strong>to “a condition of <strong>in</strong>ner disruption”;<strong>and</strong> so “its realization appears to be at the same time its disappearance.”280 “For us,” however, “philosophical knowledge has harmonizedthis discord,” <strong>and</strong> we have “rediscovered <strong>in</strong> revealed religion thetruth <strong>and</strong> the Idea.” 281 And from this it seems evident that the nature ofultimate reality is to be sought, not <strong>in</strong> the Spiritual Community, but <strong>in</strong>the Idea. We are thus sent back to the study of the dialectic for an answerto our question concern<strong>in</strong>g the Absolute; <strong>and</strong> we have already seenwhat answer the dialectic gives.The forego<strong>in</strong>g considerations force us to question the validity ofMr. McTaggart’s contention that, for Hegel, the Absolute is noth<strong>in</strong>gmore than a community of self-conscious spirits. But this <strong>in</strong>terpretationof Hegel may be traversed from another po<strong>in</strong>t of departure. I th<strong>in</strong>k thatit can be shown that a community of self-conscious persons — howeverclose the unity that b<strong>in</strong>ds them together — is not, <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s op<strong>in</strong>ion,<strong>and</strong> cannot be an adequate representation of the unity of the Idea. And itcan be shown <strong>in</strong> some such way as the follow<strong>in</strong>g.In one place Hegel tells us that the state is “the div<strong>in</strong>e Idea as itexists on earth.” 282 In another passage he speaks of the state as an ‘actualGod,’ <strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>es it as “the march of God <strong>in</strong> the world.” 283 In yetanother context he says: “It is <strong>in</strong> the organization of the state that theDiv<strong>in</strong>e has passed <strong>in</strong>to the sphere of actuality.” 284 Looked at from theother side, the state is conceived of by Hegel as the highest form ofhuman society. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the plan which is sketched <strong>in</strong> the Philosophyof M<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong> elaborated at length <strong>in</strong> the Philosophy of Right, thestate is viewed as the choicest product of the moral life, it is “the selfconsciousethical substance.” 285 The very highest po<strong>in</strong>t that the ObjectiveM<strong>in</strong>d can atta<strong>in</strong> unto <strong>in</strong> its striv<strong>in</strong>gs towards div<strong>in</strong>ity is the unity ofthe state; this is the most truly real form of social union. If now it can beshown that Hegel does not admit that Mr. McTaggart’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of acommunity of self-conscious be<strong>in</strong>gs is an adequate expression of theessential nature of the state, then we may safely conclude that he wouldnot admit that the total nature of reality is exhausted <strong>in</strong> such a community.Concern<strong>in</strong>g the unity of the state, this highest unity of society, Hegel’s
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/111position is expressed unequivocally <strong>in</strong> both the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d <strong>and</strong>the Philosophy of Right, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the latter at some length. Put <strong>in</strong> a word,his position amounts to an <strong>in</strong>sistence that the function of the pr<strong>in</strong>ce ormonarch is absolutely essential to the ideal state, that no state is completeapart from this personal expression of its unity, <strong>and</strong> that this conclusionis necessitated by a consideration of the idea or notion of thestate apart from accidental circumstances of time or place. The unity ofthe commonwealth, he urges, must be actualized <strong>in</strong> a personality beforeit becomes a real unity, or before the state is perfectly organized: therational articulation of the state dem<strong>and</strong>s this <strong>in</strong>carnation of its unity.“We usually speak of the three functions of the state,” says Hegel, “thelegislative, executive, <strong>and</strong> judicial. The legislative corresponds to universality,<strong>and</strong> the executive to particularity; but the judicial is not thethird element of the conception.” 286 This third element, we are immediatelytold, is to be found <strong>in</strong> the function of the pr<strong>in</strong>ce; this is the synthesisof the other two functions of the state, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> this they are broughttogether <strong>in</strong> a personal unity. Apart from this expression of the will of thestate <strong>in</strong> the will of the monarch the state is not organized accord<strong>in</strong>g tothe nature of the Notion.This is not merely an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t which Hegel happens to mention<strong>in</strong>cidentally <strong>in</strong> his theory of the state. It is one upon which he laysspecial emphasis. I shall quote some of these emphatic passages. “It iseasy for one to grasp the notion that the state is the self-determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong>completely sovereign will, whose judgment is f<strong>in</strong>al. It is more difficultto apprehend this ‘I will’ as a person.... This ‘I will’ constitutes thegreatest dist<strong>in</strong>ction between the ancient <strong>and</strong> the modern world, <strong>and</strong> somust have its peculiar niche <strong>in</strong> the great build<strong>in</strong>g of the state. It is to bedeplored that this characteristic should be viewed as someth<strong>in</strong>g merelyexternal, to be set aside or used at pleasure.” 287 Aga<strong>in</strong>: “The conceptionof monarch offers great difficulty to abstract reason<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> to the reflectivemethods of the underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g never getsbeyond isolated determ<strong>in</strong>ations, <strong>and</strong> ascribes merit to mere reasons, orf<strong>in</strong>ite po<strong>in</strong>ts of view <strong>and</strong> what can be derived from them. Thus the dignityof the monarch is represented as someth<strong>in</strong>g derivative not only <strong>in</strong> itsform but also <strong>in</strong> its essential character. But the conception of the monarchis not derivative, but purely self-orig<strong>in</strong>ated.” 288 Once more: “Personalityor subjectivity generally, as <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>and</strong> self-referr<strong>in</strong>g, has truthonly as a person or <strong>in</strong>dependent subject. This <strong>in</strong>dependent existencemust be one, <strong>and</strong> the truth which it has is of the most direct or immediate
112/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamk<strong>in</strong>d. The personality of the state is actualized only as person, the monarch.. . . A so-called moral person, a society, community (Geme<strong>in</strong>de),or family, be it as concrete as it may, possesses personality only as anelement <strong>and</strong> abstractly. It has not reached the truth of its existence. Butthe state is this very totality <strong>in</strong> which the moments of the conceptionga<strong>in</strong> reality <strong>in</strong> accordance with their peculiar truth.” 289 Aga<strong>in</strong>: “When apeople is not a patriarchal tribe, hav<strong>in</strong>g passed from the primitive conditionwhich made the forms of aristocracy <strong>and</strong> democracy possible,<strong>and</strong> is represented not as <strong>in</strong> a wilful <strong>and</strong> unorganized condition, but as aself-developed truly organic totality, <strong>in</strong> such a people sovereignty is thepersonality of the whole, <strong>and</strong> exists, too, <strong>in</strong> a reality which is proportionateto the conception, the person of the monarch.” 290 F<strong>in</strong>ally: “In thegovernment — regarded as organic totality — the sovereign power(pr<strong>in</strong>cipate) is subjectivity as the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite self-unity of the Notion <strong>in</strong> itsdevelopment; — the all-susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, all-decree<strong>in</strong>g will of the state, itshighest peak <strong>and</strong> all-pervasive unity. In the perfect form of the state, <strong>in</strong>which each <strong>and</strong> every element of the Notion has reached free existence,this subjectivity is not a so-called ‘moral person,’ or a decree issu<strong>in</strong>gfrom a majority (forms <strong>in</strong> which the unity of the decree<strong>in</strong>g will has notan actual existence), but an actual <strong>in</strong>dividual — the will of a decree<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>dividual~nonarchy. The monarchical constitution is therefore the constitutionof developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lowergrades of the development <strong>and</strong> realization of reason.” 291Now what do all these passages mean? 292 At least one stra<strong>in</strong> runsthrough them all; <strong>and</strong> that is, that the unity of the state, before it canbecome real <strong>and</strong> rational, must be embodied <strong>in</strong> an actual form, mustf<strong>in</strong>d expression <strong>in</strong> an actually existent person. The state which has notthe power of utter<strong>in</strong>g this ‘I will’ — it matters not how <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically<strong>in</strong>significant the ‘I will’ may be; it may mean noth<strong>in</strong>g more than thesimple sign<strong>in</strong>g of the name — is not a completely articulated organization:it lacks an essential function. No merely organic whole is a rationalexpression of the nature of the state; the unity must be embodied <strong>in</strong> apersonal form which has actual, concrete existence.This be<strong>in</strong>g true, we have good reason to deny that Mr. McTaggart’sconception of the unity of the ultimately real — a unity which, as wehave po<strong>in</strong>ted out, never really becomes actual — can legitimately beattributed to Hegel. Of course argument from analogy is always dangerous;<strong>and</strong> no claim is made here that we should be justified <strong>in</strong> draw<strong>in</strong>gpositive conclusions concern<strong>in</strong>g Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the unity of the Idea
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/113solely on the basis of his doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the unity of the state — though it is<strong>in</strong>dubitably true that the analogy is much more significant than one isapt to th<strong>in</strong>k, apart from a very careful read<strong>in</strong>g of the author’s statementson the po<strong>in</strong>t. But it does seem justifiable to conclude that, if an actualizedunity is essential to the very idea of the state, the unity of ultimatereality could not be an unrealized, <strong>and</strong>, one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to say, an unrealizableideal. If no community of <strong>in</strong>dividuals, however organically relatedthey may be, adequately expresses the rational organization of thestate — <strong>and</strong> this thesis Hegel unquestionably ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s — we can bepractically certa<strong>in</strong> that the synthesis of ultimate reality cannot be found<strong>in</strong> any community of self-conscious spirits, however organic or superorganicthat community may be <strong>and</strong> however deep its harmony. Theargument is a simple a fortiori one. Hegel emphatically asserts that agroup of <strong>in</strong>dividuals is not an adequate representation of this ‘actualGod’ on earth: surely, he would be the first to deny that it is a perfectrepresentation of the essential nature of the Absolute Idea. At any rate,the burden of proof seems-to be on those who deny the validity of thisconclusion. So we seem to have shown the <strong>in</strong>adequacy of Mr.McTaggart’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of Hegel from another po<strong>in</strong>t of departure. 293 Iam forced to believe, however. that such an objection would be verymuch mistaken. A careful read<strong>in</strong>g of the relevant portions of the Philosophyof Right will impress one with the fact that Hegel was really <strong>in</strong>earnest when he contends, as quoted above, that “the monarchical constitutionis the constitution of developed reason,” <strong>and</strong> that “all otherconstitutions belong to lower grades of the development <strong>and</strong> realizationof reason.” He apparently is firmly conv<strong>in</strong>ced that <strong>in</strong> his theory of thestate he is present<strong>in</strong>g the form that Spirit assumes <strong>in</strong> its most nearlyperfect <strong>in</strong>stitutional manifestation (see especially Werke, Bd. VIII, §§258,272, <strong>and</strong> 279). His own explicit statements bear witness to his s<strong>in</strong>cerity<strong>in</strong> the matter. To those quoted above we might add such as these: “Whenth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of the idea of the state, we must not have <strong>in</strong> our m<strong>in</strong>d anyparticular state, or particular <strong>in</strong>stitution, but must rather contemplatethe idea, this actual God, by itself.” (Ibid., §258.) “In the organizationof the state, that is to say, <strong>in</strong> constitutional monarchy, we must havebefore us noth<strong>in</strong>g except the <strong>in</strong>ner necessity of the idea. Every otherpo<strong>in</strong>t of view must disappear. The state must be regarded as a greatarchitectonic build<strong>in</strong>g, or the hieroglyph of reason, present<strong>in</strong>g itself <strong>in</strong>actuality. Everyth<strong>in</strong>g referr<strong>in</strong>g merely to utility, externality, etc., mustbe excluded from a philosophical treatment.” (Ibid., §279.) We thus
114/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamhave sufficient evidence, it would seem, to justify us <strong>in</strong> assert<strong>in</strong>g thatHegel gives us the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the state which he honestly believes ismost nearly the expression of the logical implications of his system.Even if we grant that he was prejudiced <strong>in</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g out this theory, as heundoubtedly was <strong>in</strong> details, still we must admit that he bases his theorymore or less directly on the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the Idea; <strong>and</strong> admitt<strong>in</strong>g so much,the above argument from analogy holds.Let us br<strong>in</strong>g together the results of our discussion. Our conclusionis that Hegel’s Absolute is an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite Consciousness, a Personality, whosynthesizes <strong>in</strong> His own experience the experiences of all. “An <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite<strong>in</strong>telligence, an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite spiritual pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, which is manifested <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>item<strong>in</strong>ds though not identical with them” — such, we agree with ProfessorAdamson, 294 is Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>e of ultimate reality. And this conclusionwe have based upon the dialectic movement <strong>in</strong> the triad of Life, Cognition,<strong>and</strong> the Absolute Idea, as well as upon direct statements that Hegelhas made regard<strong>in</strong>g the problem. The Hegelian Absolute, we have seen,cannot be identified with a community of self-conscious spirits, as Mr.McTaggart contends. There seems to be no justification for such an<strong>in</strong>terpretation of Hegel either <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>al triad of the Logic or <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>altriad under Absolute Religion. In the former we pass beyond the exactbalance between the unity <strong>and</strong> its differences to the category of selfconsciousness,where the unity exists for itself <strong>in</strong> its differentiations; <strong>in</strong>the latter we are ultimately brought back to the Idea <strong>and</strong> told to lookthere for the answer to our question about the nature of God. Furthermore,such a community of spirits as Mr. McTaggart imag<strong>in</strong>es we foundwould not be adequate to express even the nature of the state as Hegeldef<strong>in</strong>es it. Thus from another po<strong>in</strong>t of departure we were led to questionwhether such a community could adequately represent Hegel’s synthesisof ultimate reality. For it seemed that, if a personal unity is essentialto the nature of the state, we might justly conclude that the synthesis ofthe real, of which the state is only an imperfect copy, could hardly beless than a personal unity.This conclusion that the Absolute is a self-conscious Individuality,leads us to a further problem that we must here face. And that problemis concern<strong>in</strong>g the relation between such an Absolute <strong>and</strong> the world off<strong>in</strong>ite existence. Grant<strong>in</strong>g that the Absolute is a self-conscious Personality,<strong>in</strong> what relation must we say that He st<strong>and</strong>s to our own f<strong>in</strong>ite world?The rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g portion of this chapter will be taken up with an attemptto answer this question.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/115A first glance at the problem might lead one to conclude that onlytwo solutions of it are possible, <strong>and</strong> that either solution is fatal to thedoctr<strong>in</strong>e of the personality of the Absolute. For it would seem that wemust admit either that there is or that there is not an Other to the Absolute.And with this admission we f<strong>in</strong>d ourselves <strong>in</strong> a dilemma. For, onthe one h<strong>and</strong>, if there be <strong>in</strong> the universe someth<strong>in</strong>g besides the Absolute,an Other that has the least degree of reality <strong>in</strong> its own right, then itapparently follows that the Absolute is limited by this Other, is, <strong>in</strong> otherwords, not the Absolute. “The slightest suspicion of pluralism, them<strong>in</strong>usest wiggle of <strong>in</strong>dependence of any one of its parts from the controlof the totality would ru<strong>in</strong> it. Absolute unity brooks no degrees, — aswell might you claim absolute purity for a glass of water because itconta<strong>in</strong>s but a s<strong>in</strong>gle little cholera-germ. The <strong>in</strong>dependence, however<strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itesimal, of a part, however small, would be to the Absolute as fatalas a cholera-germ.” 295 On the other h<strong>and</strong>, if there be no Other to theAbsolute, if there be noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the universe that can claim reality on itsown account apart from its relation to the Absolute, then pantheism isour only conclusion. Evidently, if our theory merges everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to theAbsolute, it is noth<strong>in</strong>g short of pantheism. So it would seem that thedoctr<strong>in</strong>e of a personal Absolute leaves us either <strong>in</strong> contradiction withourselves or <strong>in</strong> a pantheistic metaphysics; <strong>and</strong> from this dilemma thereseems to be no way of escape.Perhaps it is hardly necessary to say that Hegel wastes no words <strong>in</strong>argu<strong>in</strong>g for a limited Absolute; he does not fall <strong>in</strong>to self-contradictionon this po<strong>in</strong>t. For him the Absolute is the only true reality; all else has itsreality, not <strong>in</strong> itself, but <strong>in</strong> the Absolute. Concern<strong>in</strong>g Hegel’s positionhere there can, presumably, be no question. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, thereneed be no hesitancy whatsoever <strong>in</strong> assert<strong>in</strong>g that, <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s own m<strong>in</strong>dat any rate, his system is not pantheistic. Pantheism he often denouncesas a mistaken theory of reality; he constantly urges that to conceive ofthe Absolute as the One <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> which all particularity loses its significanceis completely erroneous. Whatever may be the relation that heteaches exists between the Absolute <strong>and</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>ite world, it certa<strong>in</strong>ly isnot the relation of identity, which, <strong>in</strong> his op<strong>in</strong>ion, exists between theSp<strong>in</strong>ozistic Substance <strong>and</strong> its Accidents: <strong>in</strong>deed, it is just <strong>in</strong> contradist<strong>in</strong>ctionto this doctr<strong>in</strong>e of Sp<strong>in</strong>oza that Hegel is at pa<strong>in</strong>s to def<strong>in</strong>e hisown. As Hegel views the matter, then, neither pantheism nor a f<strong>in</strong>iteGod is the conclusion to be drawn <strong>in</strong> answer to our problem.But how does he f<strong>in</strong>d a way of esape from the dilemma? In both the
116/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamPhilosophy of Religion <strong>and</strong> the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d, Hegel tells us thathe is not unaware that his theory may be misconstrued as pantheistic;<strong>and</strong> he is careful to po<strong>in</strong>t out the oversight on which the misconstructionrests. The po<strong>in</strong>t he makes is this: the <strong>in</strong>terpretation overlooks the dist<strong>in</strong>ctionbetween the Absolute as Substance <strong>and</strong> the Absolute as Subject.“Those who say that speculative philosophy is pantheism generallyknow noth<strong>in</strong>g of this dist<strong>in</strong>ction; they overlook the ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t, as theyalways do, <strong>and</strong> they disparage philosophy by represent<strong>in</strong>g it as differentfrom what it really is.” 296 This dist<strong>in</strong>ction be<strong>in</strong>g forgotten, unity is construedto mean only abstract identity. “In accordance with that superficialitywith which the polemic aga<strong>in</strong>st philosophy is carried on, it isadded, moreover, that philosophy is a system of Identity.... But thosewho speak of the philosophy of Identity mean abstract unity, unity <strong>in</strong>general, <strong>and</strong> pay no attention to that upon which alone all depends;namely, the essential nature of this unity, <strong>and</strong> whether it is def<strong>in</strong>ed asSubstance or Spirit.... What is of importance is the difference <strong>in</strong> thecharacter of the unity. The unity of God is always unity, but everyth<strong>in</strong>gdepends upon the particular nature of the unity; this po<strong>in</strong>t be<strong>in</strong>g disregarded,that upon which everyth<strong>in</strong>g depends is overlooked.” 297 It is,then, <strong>in</strong> the nature of the unity that Hegel expects to f<strong>in</strong>d a way out ofthe difficulty.Of course the unity which Hegel is here emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g is the unity ofthe Notion. This unity of the Notion it is which he th<strong>in</strong>ks satisfactorilyexpla<strong>in</strong>s the relation of the Absolute to the world of particularity. Thisis evident from a glance at the Logic. For it is this unity of the Notionthat is the culm<strong>in</strong>ation of the dialectical development of the categories<strong>and</strong> receives complete expression <strong>in</strong> the category of categories, the AbsoluteIdea. This unity it is, therefore, that is the ultimate expression ofreality, the f<strong>in</strong>al statement of the relation between God <strong>and</strong> the world.What, now, is this unity of the Notion? If the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of Hegelgiven <strong>in</strong> the present study is not fundamentally false <strong>and</strong> all of our argumentsup to this po<strong>in</strong>t totally vicious, it seems that we are forced to saythat the unity of the Notion is the category of self-consciousness.This is the conclusion that is forced upon us by the Phenomenologyof Spirit; the Notion is the life of m<strong>in</strong>d. Likewise, the Logic teaches usthe same lesson: s<strong>in</strong>ce the Absolute Idea is the ultimate expression of theunity of the Notion, it follows, if the Absolute Idea is a self-consciousIndividual, that the unity of the Notion, that unity which expla<strong>in</strong>s thenature of reality, must be self-consciousness. Indeed, this seems to be
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/117just the po<strong>in</strong>t that Hegel has <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> numerous passages <strong>in</strong> the Historyof Philosophy, the Philosophy of Religion, the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d,<strong>and</strong> elsewhere, <strong>in</strong> which he draws a dist<strong>in</strong>ction, as he does <strong>in</strong> the passagescited above, between the def<strong>in</strong>ition of the Absolute as Substance<strong>and</strong> his own conception of the Absolute as Spirit, or Subject, <strong>and</strong> urgesthat the latter def<strong>in</strong>ition offers the only way of escape from pantheism <strong>in</strong>our metaphysics. It is <strong>in</strong> the category of self-consciousness, therefore,that we are to look for an exemplification of the unity of the Notion.Let us try to see how this category aids us <strong>in</strong> our present problem.In attempt<strong>in</strong>g to do this, we shall first briefly analyze self-consciousnessto discover its fundamental characteristics; <strong>and</strong> then we shall, on thebasis of this analysis, see what must be our conclusions concern<strong>in</strong>g anAbsolute Consciousness. For it seems certa<strong>in</strong> that, if we are to argue atall concern<strong>in</strong>g a personal Absolute, we must rest the discussion on ananalysis of f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness; there is no other basis of discussion. Atany rate, this is what Hegel does, as the Phenomenology shows; <strong>and</strong> weare <strong>in</strong>terested primarily <strong>in</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g forth his doctr<strong>in</strong>es <strong>and</strong> their justification.Whatever other characteristics f<strong>in</strong>ite self-consciousness may have,there are three which can hardly be called <strong>in</strong> question. The first of theseis that consciousness always has a content. By that I mean that there isalways someth<strong>in</strong>g other than the consciousness itself, which exists asthe object of it. Apart from this objective reference consciousness is theveriest abstraction. 298The second characteristic of consciousness is that it always <strong>in</strong>cludesits content as someth<strong>in</strong>g essentially its own. The content is not receivedby consciousness as if it were a stranger to be momentarily enterta<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>and</strong> then lost forever: on the contrary, the content is the very life of theconsciousness that possesses it. As Hegel would say, spirit f<strong>in</strong>ds theobject to be bone of its bone <strong>and</strong> flesh of its flesh, <strong>and</strong> so all alienationbetween the two has disappeared. This characteristic of the consciouslife needs some emphasis; we have so formed the habit of th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g thatthe content is an element foreign to consciousness, that we are prone toforget the abstraction that is responsible for the habit. It requires only alittle reflection, however, to br<strong>in</strong>g to light the vital unity that exists betweenconsciousness <strong>and</strong> its content — a unity that is absolutely fundamentalto the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of each. The last characteristic of consciousnessthat I would call attention to is this: consciousness is never identicalwith, but is always someth<strong>in</strong>g more than, its content. Notwithst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g
118/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamthe fact that the content is always received by consciousness as its veryown, as its other self <strong>in</strong> fact, still there is a dist<strong>in</strong>ction between the twothat never disappears; consciousness <strong>and</strong> its content never fall together<strong>in</strong> an undifferentiated identity.The fundamental importance of these three characteristics of consciousness,as well as their vital <strong>in</strong>terconnectedness, may be emphasizedby a brief analysis of self-consciousness. It is evident that as aself-conscious be<strong>in</strong>g I am of a two-fold nature. In the first place, I am abundle of sensations, feel<strong>in</strong>gs, impulses, desires, volitions, <strong>and</strong> ideas.This is the object-self. And from this po<strong>in</strong>t of view I am eternally chang<strong>in</strong>g.At any moment of my existence I am never what I have been, orshall be, at any other moment. At one <strong>in</strong>stant I am a center of impulses<strong>and</strong> passions; at another, a centre of ideas <strong>and</strong> ideals. To-day I am a selfof pleasures; tomorrow, a self of pa<strong>in</strong>s. An everlast<strong>in</strong>g panorama ofchange, a veritable Heracleitean flux — this is what the objectself reallyis. But there is another fact about this self-consciousness that must betaken <strong>in</strong>to account; so far we have considered only one side of it. It istrue that I am eternally chang<strong>in</strong>g, that I am not what I have been heretofore,<strong>and</strong> that I shall never be aga<strong>in</strong> just what I am now. And yet, paradoxicalas it may sound, what I have been I am, <strong>and</strong> what I am I shall be.Underly<strong>in</strong>g the panorama of change, deeper than the self that is <strong>in</strong> anever-ceas<strong>in</strong>g process of transformation, is another self that gives unity<strong>and</strong> coherence to the process. This is the subject-self. And this it is thatmakes education, spiritual development <strong>in</strong> general, possible; without itour experience would be at best but a chaos of mean<strong>in</strong>gless sensations<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>coherent desires. These two aspects or phases seem to be present<strong>in</strong> all self-consciousness. Take a cross-section of consciousness at anymoment, <strong>and</strong> you will discover that it is of this two-fold nature. Even <strong>in</strong>our moments of most <strong>in</strong>tense <strong>in</strong>trospection, when we enter as <strong>in</strong>timatelyas possible <strong>in</strong>to ourselves, we f<strong>in</strong>d that this duality is present; <strong>in</strong>deed,one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to say, it is then that its presence is most strongly impressedupon us.It is to be noticed, moreover, that the duality is absolutely essentialto self-consciousness. Not only do we f<strong>in</strong>d it actually present <strong>in</strong> selfconsciousness;the implication of experience is that it must exist so longas consciousness itself exists. For selfconsciousness is just this duality:the subject-self <strong>and</strong> the objectself exist only as they co-exist. This factmay be illustrated by the consciousness that we possess just as we arefall<strong>in</strong>g asleep. In proportion as this duality is overcome does the wak<strong>in</strong>g
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/119consciousness s<strong>in</strong>k away; <strong>and</strong> it rapidly returns when the attention becomesfixed upon some object <strong>and</strong> the duality, unknown <strong>and</strong> unexperienced<strong>in</strong> the l<strong>and</strong> of dreams, is restored. And normal wak<strong>in</strong>g consciousnessillustrates the same truth. He is most truly self-conscious who s<strong>in</strong>kshimself, as we say, <strong>in</strong> the object that occupies the focus of consciousness;this is the ethical import of the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of self-abnegation. 299 Butthis s<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of the self <strong>in</strong> the object attended to does not destroy thedifference between the self <strong>and</strong> the object; rather does it <strong>in</strong>tensify theduality. For the object absorbs attention only <strong>in</strong> proportion as it harmonizeswith a set of purposes <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests that are themselves clearlydef<strong>in</strong>ed. To take a concrete case, let us suppose that I am <strong>in</strong>tensely <strong>in</strong>terested<strong>in</strong> a botanical specimen. Here there is evidently a unity of subject<strong>and</strong> object; <strong>in</strong>deed, it would be difficult to differentiate the two, <strong>and</strong> thedifficulty would <strong>in</strong>crease with the <strong>in</strong>crease of my <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the specimen.And yet, clearly, there is a difference. The specimen grasps my<strong>in</strong>terest only as it makes its appeal to a self whose centre of be<strong>in</strong>g ismore or less clearly def<strong>in</strong>ed; <strong>and</strong> the more significant the hold of thespecimen on my attention, the deeper <strong>and</strong> more significant must havebeen my tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the science of botany. If I am a mere tyro <strong>in</strong> botanical<strong>in</strong>vestigations, the specimen would not make the same appeal as itwould were I thoroughly versed <strong>in</strong> the subject; <strong>and</strong> the difference is that<strong>in</strong> the former case the appeal would be made to a less thoroughly developedself. The unity, <strong>and</strong> consequently the duality, is not as clearly def<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>in</strong> the former case as <strong>in</strong> the latter. The very unity of consciousnessthus seems to be organically bound up with this dual relation of subject<strong>and</strong> object.And from this follows immediately a further result. S<strong>in</strong>ce this dualityis essential to consciousness, these two phases of subject <strong>and</strong> objectcannot fall <strong>in</strong>to identity with each other. Take any case of consciousnessthat you please, whether it be consciousness of objects <strong>in</strong> the mental or<strong>in</strong> the physical world. Do you f<strong>in</strong>d there a co<strong>in</strong>cidence between subject<strong>and</strong> object? Certa<strong>in</strong>ly not. The object is never its own consciousness;there is, <strong>and</strong> can be, no identity between them. It is <strong>in</strong>consistent with thevery nature of consciousness that these two phases collapse <strong>in</strong>to identity.As Professor Royce says, “When we are aware only of unity, itappears that we then become aware of noth<strong>in</strong>g at all.” 300 The presuppositionof consciousness is that there shall be someth<strong>in</strong>g, an object <strong>in</strong> thephysical world, an object <strong>in</strong> the mental world, someth<strong>in</strong>g other than theconsciousness itself, of which the consciousness shall be. The two can-
120/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamnot be identical with each other.But this essential duality with<strong>in</strong> consciousness must not be misconstruedas a dualism. In his famous deduction of the categories, Kantunfortunately speaks too much as if the subjectself were superimposedon the object-self as someth<strong>in</strong>g essentially foreign to it. But the reallesson he has to teach us <strong>in</strong> that deduction is a deeper one. And thatlesson is that the unity <strong>and</strong> the differences with<strong>in</strong> conscious experienceare really one, that there is no chasm between them. It is true that thedata which constitute the object-self seem to be facts drawn from aworld external to that self, or, at any rate, external to the synthetic unitythat b<strong>in</strong>ds these data <strong>in</strong>to a unitary <strong>and</strong> organic whole. But both of thesepositions fall before criticism, for the data are vitally concerned <strong>in</strong> theirown organization. We must admit that Kant has once for all shown us,at least by implication if not explicitly, that the object-self is not foreignto the subject-self: the data of the Sensibility <strong>and</strong> the categories of theUnderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g are common expressions of one fundamental pr<strong>in</strong>ciple.And this implication of the Kantian philosophy becomes explicit <strong>in</strong> Hegel.The burden of the Phenomenology, as we saw <strong>in</strong> our first chapter, isthat these two selves are organically bound up with each other, <strong>and</strong> that,if we are to speak accurately, we must call them, not two selves, butonly two po<strong>in</strong>ts of view from which we look at the one self — subjectobject.And it seems that we are forced to say that this is the verdict ofexperience. Consequently, to view these two phases of consciousness <strong>in</strong>isolation is to view them abstractly. Of course, this abstraction is perfectlyjustifiable, <strong>in</strong>deed, necessary from the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of the particularsciences; but it is dangerous for metaphysics. Whether the emphasis isplaced upon the subject or the object is a matter of <strong>in</strong>difference so far asthe metaphysical difficulty <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> their separation is concerned;metaphysically, they are not separable. The data of the object-self gettheir reality only when organized by the categories of the subject-self;<strong>and</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the categories are essentially those data, otherwiseit is <strong>in</strong>comprehensible how the organization could possibly takeplace. Thus the separation between the two is overreached <strong>and</strong> the twofall together. They are different, <strong>and</strong> yet they are one such seems to bethe paradoxical relation exist<strong>in</strong>g between the two sides of consciousness.The results of our analysis of f<strong>in</strong>ite self-consciousness are these.The characteristics of consciousness are that it has a content, that itdiffers from this content, <strong>and</strong> yet at the same time is one with it. More-
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/121over, each of these is a condition that must be met, if consciousness is toexist at all. If the content is removed, then of course consciousness isdestroyed, because there is noth<strong>in</strong>g of which the consciousness couldbe. Likewise, if consciousness <strong>and</strong> its content are identified, consciousnessceases, for the identification simply amounts to the removal of thecontent; <strong>and</strong> here aga<strong>in</strong> the essential duality is done away with. F<strong>in</strong>ally,if a chasm is made between consciousness <strong>and</strong> its content, consciousnessaga<strong>in</strong> is made impossible; when an impassable barrier is erectedbetween the two, the duality upon which consciousness depends is oncemore removed. 301 This three-fold condition is the presupposition of allf<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness.Now it would seem that, on the basis of this analysis of f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness,we should be justified <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g assertionsconcern<strong>in</strong>g an Absolute Consciousness. In the first place, such a Consciousnesswould necessarily have a content; that is, there would haveto be an Other of which the Absolute is conscious. In the second place,this Other would not be regarded by the Absolute as someth<strong>in</strong>g foreignor external, <strong>in</strong> the sense that it lay genu<strong>in</strong>ely outside of the Absolute;rather would it be possessed as an essential element with<strong>in</strong> the Absolute.And, lastly, the Absolute would necessarily differentiate this Otherfrom itself <strong>in</strong> such a way as to preserve the duality that we have found tobe essential to the conscious life. And our justification for mak<strong>in</strong>g theseassertions concern<strong>in</strong>g an Absolute Consciousness is simply that thesecharacteristics which we have attributed to the Absolute are those thatexperience shows us to be fundamental to all consciousness as we knowit; <strong>and</strong> unless we are to reduce our discussions to mean<strong>in</strong>gless logomachy,we must test them by concrete experience. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly it seems that wemust assume that the conditions prerequisite to f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness mustbe fulfilled <strong>in</strong> an Absolute Consciousness.What now must be our answer to the dilemma with which we beganour discussion? In the first place, it would seem that we have found away of escape from pantheism <strong>in</strong> our doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the Absolute. For solong as we ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the self-consciousness of the Absolute, we are forcedto ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> also that the Absolute <strong>and</strong> the world are differentiated fromeach other. Really, pantheism is logically possible only to the metaphysicianwho denies the self-consciousness of the Absolute. For pantheism,if it means anyth<strong>in</strong>g, means identity between the Absolute <strong>and</strong> theworld of f<strong>in</strong>ite existence; whatever form the theory may take, it ultimatelyreduces everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the universe to an undifferentiated unity
122/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamwith the all-<strong>in</strong>clusive One. But, if the Absolute be regarded as a selfconsciousIndividual, this abstract identity becomes impossible; because,as our analysis of the category has disclosed, consciousness always dem<strong>and</strong>sa content from which it is differentiated. Destruction of this dualityis the destruction of the possibility of consciousness. Therefore notheory that ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that the Absolute is Self-Consciousness can legitimatelybe accused of pantheism so long as it is consistent. 302But have we escaped the other horn of our dilemma? Our own argumenthas forced us to admit that an Other to the Absolute is essential;<strong>in</strong>deed, it is this fact that relieves us from any fears concern<strong>in</strong>g pantheismas the outcome of our doctr<strong>in</strong>e. And have we not virtually limitedthe Absolute by posit<strong>in</strong>g this Other, which our analysis of consciousnesshas compelled us to assume is necessary? The answer to this objectionis <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> what we have just been say<strong>in</strong>g about the fact that thetwo extremes of the equation of consciousness are not foreign to eachother; <strong>and</strong> it might perhaps be sufficient simply to po<strong>in</strong>t to this fact <strong>in</strong>meet<strong>in</strong>g the objection. But, s<strong>in</strong>ce this criticism aga<strong>in</strong>st the doctr<strong>in</strong>e ofthe personality of the Absolute is so general, <strong>and</strong> that, too, amongstIdealists of a certa<strong>in</strong> type, it seems well <strong>in</strong> conclud<strong>in</strong>g this discussion todevote some attention to it.I have chosen Mr. McTaggart as the representative of this type ofcriticism, because his objections are advanced immediately <strong>in</strong> connectionwith a study of Hegel’s system. 303 His views can best be expressed<strong>in</strong> his own words: “The Absolute is a unity of system, <strong>and</strong> not a unity ofcentre, <strong>and</strong> the element of unity <strong>in</strong> it cannot be a simple <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>divisiblepo<strong>in</strong>t, like that of the f<strong>in</strong>ite self. For if the unity is of this sort, then, byvirtue of its simplicity <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>divisibility, it excludes its differentiationfrom itself <strong>in</strong> one sense, while <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>in</strong> another. But the Absolutecannot exclude its differentiations from itself <strong>in</strong> any sense.... Thereis noth<strong>in</strong>g outside of the Absolute. And it would therefore be impossiblefor it to exclude its differentiations from itself <strong>in</strong> any sense. For <strong>in</strong> as faras they are not <strong>in</strong> it, they are absolutely wrong. 304In order to evaluate this objection, we must aga<strong>in</strong> look at consciousness<strong>and</strong> ask concern<strong>in</strong>g its real nature. As we have already po<strong>in</strong>ted out,consciousness always dem<strong>and</strong>s a content with which it is never identical;without such a content consciousness is noth<strong>in</strong>g but an empty abstraction.Consciousness presupposes differentiations, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> some senseit is true that these differentiations are excluded from it. But this is notthe whole story; there is another aspect of the conscious life that we
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/123cannot afford to overlook. Consciousness not only excludes its differentiations,it also <strong>in</strong>cludes them. The exclusion is never absolute; the contentis a vital part of the consciousness; <strong>in</strong> a very important sense it isthe consciousness. Consciousness overreaches the dist<strong>in</strong>ction betweenitself <strong>and</strong> its content <strong>and</strong> takes the content up <strong>in</strong>to itself, so that thecontent, though different from, yet is one with the consciousness. AsEdward Caird aptly puts it, “The self can be conscious of itself as sodist<strong>in</strong>guished <strong>and</strong> related, only <strong>in</strong> so far as it overreaches the dist<strong>in</strong>ctionbetween itself <strong>and</strong> its object.” 305 Thus it is that the self or consciousnessmay be said both to <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>and</strong> exclude its object; <strong>and</strong> the fact of <strong>in</strong>clusionis complementary to the fact of exclusion. Inclusion does not meanthe abstract identity of subject-self <strong>and</strong> object-self; nor, on the otherh<strong>and</strong>, does exclusion mean their abstract opposition. Consciousness <strong>in</strong>cludesits various differentiations, because they are its differentiations;it excludes them, because they are its differentiations. Inclusion <strong>and</strong>exclusion are only different names for the same fact, just as are theconcave <strong>and</strong> convex sides of a curved l<strong>in</strong>e.If, now, we are to argue on the basis of f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness concern<strong>in</strong>gthe nature of Absolute Consciousness — <strong>and</strong>, I repeat, I knowof no other basis on which to argue — it would seem that we are forcedto conclude that such a Consciousness, grant<strong>in</strong>g its existence, wouldnecessarily at once <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>and</strong> exclude its differentiations. Every object<strong>in</strong> the world would be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> such a Consciousness, because everyobject <strong>in</strong> the world would be an object for such a Consciousness. Butthe <strong>in</strong>clusion would not, could not, be that of identity. For every object<strong>in</strong> the world would have to be excluded from such a Consciousness,s<strong>in</strong>ce no object <strong>in</strong> the world would actually be that Consciousness. 306And the exclusion could not be abstract opposition; the differentiationswould still be differentiations of the consciousness for which they exist.The Absolute Consciousness, like all other consciousness, would beconf<strong>in</strong>ed to the circle of its own differentiations: this we seem forced toadmit. But the differentiations of the Absolute, like the differentiationsof f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness, would be differentiations still: this also we seemedforced to admit. And with this we have admitted the <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>and</strong> theexclusion of the differentiations of an absolute Consciousness. As Hegelremarks, “God is Himself consciousness, He dist<strong>in</strong>guishes Himself fromHimself with<strong>in</strong> Himself, <strong>and</strong> as consciousness He gives Himself as objectfor what we call the side of consciousness.” 307 This is exactly whatevery f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness does <strong>in</strong> its own limited way: it gives itself as
124/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamobject, dist<strong>in</strong>guishes itself from itself with<strong>in</strong> itself, <strong>and</strong> is at once knower<strong>and</strong> known, possessor <strong>and</strong> possessed, subject <strong>and</strong> object. Such seems tobe the paradox of consciousness as such; there is noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>herentlycontradictory or absurd about it — unless, <strong>in</strong>deed, consciousness itselfis an absurdity.Thus we are forced to say that Mr. McTaggart’s objection to thedoctr<strong>in</strong>e of a personal Absolute rests upon a misconstruction of the trueimport of the category of self-consciousness. The objection st<strong>and</strong>s orfalls with the contention that, if the Absolute were to exclude its differentiationsfrom itself, those differentiations would either cease to be realor st<strong>and</strong> as a limitation to the Absolute. Now this contention holds onlyon the condition that the Absolute is forced to oppose to itself its differentiationsas someth<strong>in</strong>g entirely beyond <strong>and</strong> foreign to it. But it is thevery nature of consciousness not to do this, if our analysis has beencorrect. For as we have repeatedly seen, perhaps to the po<strong>in</strong>t of wear<strong>in</strong>ess,consciousness is a duality with<strong>in</strong> unity; <strong>and</strong> if you destroy eitherthe unity or the duality, you utterly annihilate the conscious life. And itseems evident that, if you construct a chasm between consciousness <strong>and</strong>its differentiations, you do irreparable violence to the unity between thetwo. At your touch both consciousness <strong>and</strong> its differentiations vanish<strong>in</strong>to noth<strong>in</strong>gness. There is no mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> talk<strong>in</strong>g about the exclusion ofsometh<strong>in</strong>g by consciousness, unless that someth<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> consciousness;for consciousness excludes its differentiations just by virtueof the fact that it <strong>in</strong>cludes them. To argue, therefore, that an AbsoluteConsciousness is impossible because it cannot abstractly oppose itselfto its differentiations is exactly as conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g as it would be to arguethat f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness is impossible because it cannot do the same.You could argue either way <strong>in</strong>differently <strong>and</strong> with equal success <strong>in</strong> bothcases; for your dem<strong>and</strong> s<strong>in</strong>s aga<strong>in</strong>st the presupposition of all consciousness.Of course an Absolute Consciousness is impossible, provided it isso by def<strong>in</strong>ition; but why def<strong>in</strong>e it so? It seems to be no more <strong>in</strong>herentlyabsurd than f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness, <strong>and</strong> there can be no question that f<strong>in</strong>iteconsciousness is an actuality.It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to notice that this objection of Mr. McTaggart is<strong>in</strong>consistent with his own analysis of f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness. Speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>another context of the f<strong>in</strong>ite self, which he grants is ‘sufficiently paradoxical,’he says: “What does it <strong>in</strong>cluded Everyth<strong>in</strong>g of which it is conscious.What does it exclude? Equally — everyth<strong>in</strong>g of which it is conscious.What can it say is not <strong>in</strong>side it? Noth<strong>in</strong>g. What can it say is not
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/125outside it? A s<strong>in</strong>gle abstraction. And any attempt to remove the paradoxdestroys the self. For the two sides are <strong>in</strong>evitably connected. If we try tomake it a dist<strong>in</strong>ct <strong>in</strong>dividual by separat<strong>in</strong>g it from all other th<strong>in</strong>gs, itloses all content of which it can be conscious, <strong>and</strong> so loses the very<strong>in</strong>dividuality which we started by try<strong>in</strong>g to preserve. If, on the otherh<strong>and</strong>, we try to save its content by emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>clusion at theexpense of the exclusion, then the consciousness vanishes, <strong>and</strong>, s<strong>in</strong>cethe self has no contents but the objects of which it is conscious, thecontent vanishes also.” 308 Now I submit that, if Mr. McTaggart st<strong>and</strong>sconsistently by the position here stated he cannot argue that consciousness,whether f<strong>in</strong>ite or absolute, can exclude its differentiations <strong>in</strong> anysense <strong>in</strong> which it does not at the same time <strong>and</strong> ipso facto <strong>in</strong>clude them.And this is the ground upon which his objection aga<strong>in</strong>st the doctr<strong>in</strong>e ofa personal Absolute, as I comprehend it, rests. To say that the f<strong>in</strong>ite selfexcludes its differentiations <strong>in</strong> a manner that would be impossible to theAbsolute assumes the very po<strong>in</strong>t at issue, <strong>and</strong> so begs the whole question.Does the f<strong>in</strong>ite self exclude its differentiations <strong>in</strong> a manner impossiblefor the Absolute? Certa<strong>in</strong>ly not, if we are will<strong>in</strong>g to accept Mr.McTaggart’s analysis of f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness. The f<strong>in</strong>ite self, he tells us,<strong>in</strong>cludes everyth<strong>in</strong>g of which it is conscious, <strong>and</strong> it excludes everyth<strong>in</strong>gthat it <strong>in</strong>cludes. But, be it noted, it does not cease to <strong>in</strong>clude because itexcludes: <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>and</strong> exclusion, we are told, are ‘<strong>in</strong>evitably connected.’If, now, f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness at once <strong>in</strong>cludes <strong>and</strong> excludes its differentiations,is there anyth<strong>in</strong>g absurd <strong>in</strong> the position that Absolute Consciousnessmay do the same? If the f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness is a differentiationof the Absolute just because of its paradoxical nature — <strong>and</strong> this,we must remember, is the basis upon which Mr. McTaggart rests hisargument for the immortality of the <strong>in</strong>dividual — may it not be that theAbsolute itself embodies this paradox par excellence? If <strong>in</strong>clusion <strong>and</strong>exclusion by consciousness are correlative terms, why is it impossiblefor a perfect Consciousness to <strong>in</strong>clude everyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the universe <strong>and</strong>yet at the same time <strong>and</strong> just for that reason exclude it? Why, <strong>in</strong> short,would it be necessary for the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>and</strong> perfect self to fail just <strong>in</strong> thatrespect which constitutes the very essence of the f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>and</strong> imperfectself? Argu<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this ve<strong>in</strong> appears to be an approach to absurdity; <strong>and</strong>yet this seems to be the position <strong>in</strong>to which Mr. McTaggart is forced byhis own analysis of consciousness. 309The whole difficulty with Mr. McTaggart’s position may be put <strong>in</strong>very brief compass. His objection rests upon the disjunction with which
126/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamwe began: either pantheism or a f<strong>in</strong>ite God, either abstract identity betweenthe absolute <strong>and</strong> its differentiations or a limited Absolute. Butthis disjunction depends upon an abstract view of the nature of consciousness.For it implies that consciousness must be either identicalwith or abstractly opposed to its differentiations, that the Absolute eitheris the world or must regard the world as someth<strong>in</strong>g essentially foreignto itself. This disjunction, however, pla<strong>in</strong>ly flies <strong>in</strong> the face of experience.As we have tried to show, <strong>and</strong> as Mr. McTaggart himself haspo<strong>in</strong>ted out, consciousness <strong>and</strong> its differentiations are neither identicalnor yet opposed to each other: they are ‘<strong>in</strong>evitably connected,’ <strong>and</strong> eachlives <strong>in</strong> the life of the other. And when we make a violent separationbetween them, or assume a position that implies this separation, weshould not forget the fact that the possibility of f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness, aswell as the possibility of an Absolute Consciousness is thereby denied— simply because we then have done away with the presupposition ofall consciousness. And this suggests to us that it would be well to <strong>in</strong>vestigateexperience further, before we commit ourselves to a position thatleads to such s<strong>in</strong>gularly disastrous results. This essential unity of theAbsolute <strong>and</strong> its Other Hegel emphasizes <strong>in</strong> his exposition of the philosophicalimport of the Christian dogma of the Incarnation. 310 In thisdogma we have expressed <strong>in</strong> religious terms the philosophical truth that“the div<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> human natures are not implicitly different.” In JesusChrist is manifested the Universal, God; the cont<strong>in</strong>gent <strong>and</strong> accidentalcircumstances of temporal life are disregarded by Him. “Who is mymother <strong>and</strong> my brother?” “Let the dead bury their dead.” But Christ isnot only God; he is also the Son of Man, the Man of Sorrows. In hisdeath we have evidence of the fact that He shares the common fate of allhuman be<strong>in</strong>gs; <strong>in</strong>deed, “<strong>in</strong> Him humanity was carried to its furthestpo<strong>in</strong>t,” s<strong>in</strong>ce he died the aggravated death of the evil-doer. This Personality,which reaches to the glories of the Inf<strong>in</strong>ite, touches also, by virtueof its div<strong>in</strong>ity, the lowest abyss of the f<strong>in</strong>ite. The true lesson of the Incarnation,Hegel would seem to say, is that God is not high <strong>and</strong> lifted upbeyond the world of time <strong>and</strong> place; but that He is also here, <strong>and</strong> that itis only here that He f<strong>in</strong>ds full <strong>and</strong> complete expression. God’s Other isHis own very Self, <strong>and</strong> not an existence beyond Him.In conclusion, then, we may say that, as Hegel views the matter, thepuzzle of God’s relation to the world is to a considerable extent one ofour own mak<strong>in</strong>g. By a process of abstraction we separate God from theworld, <strong>and</strong> then proceed to ask how we are ever to get them together
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/127aga<strong>in</strong>; we destroy their essential <strong>in</strong>terconnectedness, <strong>and</strong> then raise thecry that their relation to each other is to us <strong>in</strong>comprehensible. Consequently,we must either take refuge <strong>in</strong> an impotent faith or be content torema<strong>in</strong> sceptics <strong>and</strong> agnostics. “The ‘reflective’ underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g beg<strong>in</strong>sby reject<strong>in</strong>g all systems <strong>and</strong> modes of conception, which, whether theyspr<strong>in</strong>g from heart, imag<strong>in</strong>ation, or speculation, express the <strong>in</strong>terconnectionof God <strong>and</strong> the world: <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to have God pure <strong>in</strong> faith orconsciousness, he is as essence parted from appearance, as <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite fromthe f<strong>in</strong>ite. But, after this partition, the conviction arises also that theappearance has a relation to the essence, the f<strong>in</strong>ite to the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite, <strong>and</strong> soon: <strong>and</strong> thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of thisrelation. It is <strong>in</strong> the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affairlies, <strong>and</strong> that causes this relation to be called <strong>in</strong>comprehensible by theagnostic.” 311 Hegel’s own solution of the problem, which he proceeds tooutl<strong>in</strong>e for us <strong>in</strong> the paragraph from which this passage is taken, is to befound on a plane which transcends the po<strong>in</strong>t of view of the ‘reflectiveunderst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g’; <strong>and</strong> his solution consists really <strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out that theseparation that gives rise to the problem is the result of abstract th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.This more concrete st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t he calls the Notion of the speculativeReason, which is, <strong>in</strong> the last analysis, the category of self-consciousness.Notes1 This statement may be easily misconstrued <strong>and</strong> should be hedgedabout with reservations. S<strong>in</strong>ce, however, these reservations are to bedeveloped later, I content myself here with merely call<strong>in</strong>g attention tothe fact. As we shall see below, the assertion that Hegel deals <strong>in</strong> theLogic with thought <strong>in</strong> abstraction is not equivalent to the assertionthat he there deals with abstract thought. The reader is asked k<strong>in</strong>dlyto regard the above statement as a prelim<strong>in</strong>ary one. to be read <strong>in</strong> thelight of what is to follow.2 Werke, Bd. II, p. 6.3 Ibid., p. 21.4 Ibid., p. 64.5 Ibid., p. 67.6 Cf. The Orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Significance of Hegel’s Logic, Chapters VI, VII.7 Phänomenologie des Geistes. p. ciii.8 Op. cit., pp. 19–20.9 Werke Bd. III. p. 32.
128/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>gham10 Enc., §25.11 Philosophical Review Vol. VI, p. 500.12 Hegel und se<strong>in</strong>e Zeit, p. 255.13 Ibid., p. 256.14 Professor Baillie identifies absolute knowledge with Absolute M<strong>in</strong>d(cf. Hegel’s Logic, pp. 186 ff.). urg<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong> the category of absoluteknowledge “the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of Absolute M<strong>in</strong>d has been fully <strong>and</strong>unequivocally adopted” (ibid., p. 189). This identification seems tome, however, to contribute only to confusion. The po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>in</strong>terest toHegel <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenology is the removal of the opposition whichat first appears to exist between consciousness <strong>and</strong> its content. Andthis he does <strong>in</strong> the category of absolute knowledge. But when this isaccomplished, we have not passed beyond the realm of f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousnessat all; we have only seen f<strong>in</strong>ite consciousness <strong>in</strong> its trueimport. The st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of absolute knowledge is implicit <strong>in</strong> all f<strong>in</strong>iteconsciousness; this fact Professor Baillie <strong>in</strong>sists upon (see ibid., pp.190 ff.). Why, then, baldly identify the category with the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>tof the Absolute? If we <strong>in</strong>sist on the identification here, we at leastshift the emphasis from the po<strong>in</strong>t to be emphasized, namely, that thispenetration of its object by consciousness is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> every stageof consciousness from the sensuous up. It may be that absolute knowledgeimplies the existence of Absolute M<strong>in</strong>d, but this is another matter;it is simply a confusion of the po<strong>in</strong>t at issue here to identify thetwo.15 Werke. Bd. V, pp. 324–325.16 Metaphysics, Bk. I, Chap. vii. §88.17 See Haym’s criticism of Hegel on this po<strong>in</strong>t, op. cit., pp. 235 ff.18 Enc., §41. lecture-note (2).19 Loc. cit.20 Werke, Bd. IV, p. 127.21 Enc §60, lecture-note (2).22 Werke, Bd. VIII p. 63 (Philosophy of Right, trans., p. 37).23 Philosophical Review, Vol. 1, p. 135.24 See Professor Bosanquet’s discussion on this po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> Proceed<strong>in</strong>gsof the Aristotelian Society, 1905–1906, Vol. VI, pp. 237 ff.25 Werke. Bd. V, p. 237.26 Werke. Bd. I, p. 178.27 Bk. III, Chap. i. §309.28 Werke, Bd. VIII. p. 34 (Philosophy of Right, trans. p. 11).
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/12929 Philosophical Review, Vol. VI, p. 502.30 Enc., §19.31 Werke, Bd. III, p. 26.32 Ibid. p. 33.33 Enc., §215.34 Studies <strong>in</strong> the Hegelian Dialectic, §14. Compare with this conceptionof thought Lotze’s view of thought’s first activity as the processby means of which the immediately given impressions of sense areconverted <strong>in</strong>to ideas (Logic, trans., Vol., pp. 13 ff).35 Cognition is ‘f<strong>in</strong>ite’ because its content has the appearance of adatum, a ‘given,’ <strong>in</strong>dependent of it <strong>and</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> its own right. Fromthe st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of the ‘Notion,’ however, the content is no longer regardedas a foreign element; it is rationalized. (Cf. Werke, Bd. V, pp.266–268.)36 Werke Bd. XII, pp. 267–268 (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol.III, p. 163).37 Logic, Bk. III, chap. i, §308.38 Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of Logic, p. 533.39 See Bosanquet’s Logic. Vol. I. pp. 63 ff.40 Enc. §163, lecture-note (I).41 Werke, Bd. XV, p. 516 (trans., Vol. III, p. 441).42 Enc. §379.43 Enc., §11.44 Ibid., §24.45 Werke, Bd. IX, p. 12.46 Werke, Bd. VIII, p. 33 (trans., p. II).47 Enc., §471.48 Studies <strong>in</strong> the Hegelian Dialectic §104.49 Loc. cit.50 See, <strong>in</strong> this connection, an article entitled “Experience <strong>and</strong> <strong>Thought</strong>”by Professor Creighton <strong>in</strong> The Philosophical Review, Vol. XV, pp.482 ff. “Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g or rationality is not limited to the process of abstractcognition, but it <strong>in</strong>cludes feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> will, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the course ofits development carries these along with it. There is, of course, nosuch th<strong>in</strong>g as what we have called abstract cognition; but the differentmoments are all united <strong>in</strong> the concrete experience which we mayname the life of thought” (pp. 487–488).´51 Cf. especially op. cit., §206.52 Cf. Appearance <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong>, Chap. xv.
130/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>gham53 Microcosmus. Bk. VIII, Chap. i. §8.54 Mr. Bradley would seem to th<strong>in</strong>k that discussion on this po<strong>in</strong>t is amatter of term<strong>in</strong>ology. For example, <strong>in</strong> Appearance <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong>. hesays that. if one chooses. One may call that fuller experience, whichis an adequate synthesis of the real, thought. “But,” he adds. “if anyoneelse prefers another term, such as feel<strong>in</strong>g or will, he would beequally justified. For the result is a whole state which both <strong>in</strong>cludes<strong>and</strong> goes beyond each element; <strong>and</strong> to speak of it as simply one ofthem seems play<strong>in</strong>g with phrases.” (p. 171). I am persuaded. however,that the po<strong>in</strong>t is more fundamental than such an attitude <strong>in</strong>dicates.And I am also persuaded that he who would escape the conclusionthat the abstract particular has a part <strong>in</strong> ultimate reality mustultimately concede Hegel’s contention, — always provided we are <strong>in</strong>earnest about equat<strong>in</strong>g reality with experience. See Hegel, Werke,Bd. XI. pp. 129–130.55 Hegelianism <strong>and</strong> Personality, pp. 133–134. I quote from the secondedition. Cf. also McTaggart, op. cit., ibid §§194 ff. To mediate the‘this,’ he asserts, would be to destroy it. Cf. Lotze, Logic, Book III,Chap. i. §308.56 Philosophy of Lotze, p. 273. Cf. Bosanquet. Logic. Vol. II, p. 207:“In an absolute tautology which excludes or omits difference, identityitself disappears <strong>and</strong> the judgment vanishes with it.”57 Enc., §573.58 Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Dialectic. §181.59 Werke, Bd. II, pp. 16–17.60 Enc., §78.61 Werke, Bd. III, p. 56.62 Enc., §65.63 Cf. ibid., §70.64 Cf. Werke, Bd. XV, pp. 496 ff. (Hist. of Philos., trans. Vol. III, pp.420 ff.).65 Werke Bd. XI, p. 158 (Philos. of Relig., trans., Vol. I, p. 162).66 Werke, Bd. II, p. 16.67 Ibid., p. 14.68 Werke, Bd. XV, pp. 597–598 (Hist. of Philos., trans., Vol. III, p.525).69 Werke, Bd. XIII, p. 55 (Hist. of Philos., trans., Vol. I, p. 41).70 Werke Bd. II, p. 101. Quoted by A. W. Crawford, Philosophy of P.H. Jacobi, p. 43.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/13171 Ibid., p. 59. See N. Wilde, Friedrich He<strong>in</strong>rich Jacobi, pp. 63 ff.72 Werke Bd. XV, p. 549 (Hist. of Philos., trans., Vol. III, p. 475).73 Werke Bd. III, p. 53. See <strong>in</strong> this connection Wallace, Prolegomena,p. 45; also Levy-Bruhl, La Philosophie de Jacobi, pp. 257–258.74 Werke Bd. XI, p. 52 (Philos. of Relig., trans., Vol. I, p. 51).75 Werke, Bd. XV, p. 551 (Hist. of Philos., trans., Vol. III, p. 477).76 Enc §63. See also Werke, Bd. XV, pp. 489 ff. (Hist. of Philos.,trans., Vol. III, pp. 413 ff.).77 Werke, Bd. XV, pp. 362–363 (Hist. of Philos., trans., Vol. III, pp.282–283).78 Ibid., p. 498 (ibid., p. 422).79 Enc., §62.80 Werke, Bd. XVII, pp. 10 ff.; Enc., §50.81 Werke, Bd. XI, pp. 58–59 (Philos. of Relig., trans., Vol. I, p. 58).82 Enc., §74.83 Ibid.84 Cf. Werke, Bd. V, pp. 328 ff.85 Enc., §12.86 Enc.. §552.87 Werke, Bd. II, p. 44; see also pp. 43, 45.88 Enc., §442.89 Enc., §50.90 Werke, Bd. V, p. 330.91 Werke Bd. III, pp. 38–39.92 Werke Bd. V, p. 331; notice also immediately follow<strong>in</strong>g pages.93 Cf. Enc., §173.94 Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of Logic, p.118.95 Cf. Bosanquet, Logic Vol. 1, pp. 293 ff.96 It might be objected here that such a judgment as ‘The soul is not anelephant gives us no positive knowledge whatsoever. I grant that theobjection is true, but I deny its relevancy, s<strong>in</strong>ce we are here deal<strong>in</strong>gwith significant judgments. This so-called judgment s<strong>in</strong>s aga<strong>in</strong>st thepresupposition of all judgment, <strong>and</strong> consequently is really no judgment.From the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of epistemology, the <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite judgment doesnot exist.97 Werke, Bd. III, p. 7.98 Ibid.99 In this connection see Professor G. H. Sab<strong>in</strong>e, “The Concreteness of<strong>Thought</strong>,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. XVI, pp. 154–169.
132/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>gham100 Cf. Hegel und se<strong>in</strong>e Zeit, p. 331.101 Will to Believe, p. 273.102 Logische Undersuchungen, Bd. I, p. 56. I translate from the thirdedition.103 Cf. Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Dialectic, §§8, 9, 109, 117, etc.104 Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of Logic, p. 138.105 Ibid., p. 140.106 Enc., §24.107 Ibid., §162.108 Cf. Werke, bd. V, p. 231. Notice also Hegel’s frequent statementsconcern<strong>in</strong>g the cont<strong>in</strong>gent.109 A word should be said here to prevent a possible misconception.This co<strong>in</strong>cidence of logic <strong>and</strong> metaphysics must not be construed tomean that the logical categories, as universals, destroy the particularityof be<strong>in</strong>g. The identification is not supposed to deny the realityof the factual side of existence; it does not do away with ‘existentialreality.’ That this is Hegel’s position will be developed below, whenhe come to ask concern<strong>in</strong>g the relation that Hegel conceives to existbetween these two phases of experience. One should never forgetthat, <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s view of the matter, the Logic has to be supplementedby the Philosophy of Nature <strong>and</strong> the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d.110 Werke, Bd. III, pp. 31–32.111 Ibid., p. 57. These two quotations from the Logic are given byProfessor McGilvary <strong>in</strong> his admirable discussion on “The PresuppositionQuestion <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s Logic,” The Philosophical Review, Vol.VI, pp. 497 ff. This discussion seems to me to put the question beyonddispute. If the reader is <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> this problem <strong>and</strong> desires anexhaustive discussion of it, he could not do better than to turn upthose pages.112 Werke,. Bd. II. pp. 28–29. In this connection the follow<strong>in</strong>g passagefrom the Philosophische Propaedeutik is significant: “Science presupposesthat the separation of itself from the realm of truth has beendone away with, that Spirit no longer belongs to mere phenomena, asis the case <strong>in</strong> the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of consciousness . . . Science does not seekthe truth; it is <strong>in</strong> the truth, <strong>in</strong>deed, it is the truth itself” (Werke, Bd.XVIII, p. 94). And this presupposition we have seen to be the actualresult of the Phenomenology.113 Vera, Introduction a la Philosophie de Hegel, pp. 179–180.114 Werke, Bd. III, p. 44.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/133115 Ibid., p. 33.116 Enc., §19.117 Ibid., §82.118 Werke, Bd. III, pp. 33–34.119 Cf. ibid., pp. 24–25; see also Enc., §160.120 Enc., §160: also §164.121 Enc., §133, lecture-note.122 Cf. Werke, Bd. II, p. 35; also Enc., §82.123 See <strong>in</strong> this connection Caird, Hegel, p. 157; Wallace, Prolegomenato Hegel’s Logic, pp. 302 ff.; <strong>and</strong> McGilvary, op. cit., pp. 504–507.124 Enc., §160. See also §43, lecture-note.125 Werke, Bd. III, pp. 7–8.126 There are two further po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> connection with the Logic, which,though they are hardly relevant to our present purpose, should not bepassed over <strong>in</strong> silence. I refer to the problems concern<strong>in</strong>g the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gof the Logic <strong>and</strong> its empirical basis. One or two general remarkshere will have to suffice.Concern<strong>in</strong>g the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the Logic, it may be said withoutfear of successful contradiction that the first of the categories is not al<strong>in</strong>eal descendant from the conclusion of the Phenomenology the Phenomenologyis not the presupposition of the Logic <strong>in</strong> this sense. Tobe sure, the category of Be<strong>in</strong>g must be viewed <strong>in</strong> the light of thePhenomenology for without the development of the PhenomenologyBe<strong>in</strong>g would hardly be possible as a concrete category. And <strong>in</strong> thisrespect the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the Logic is a mediated immediacy, as Hegelhimself suggests. (Cf. Werke, Bd. III, pp. 58, 59 ) But when we turnfrom the Phenomenology <strong>and</strong> look upon the development of the logicalcategories as such, Be<strong>in</strong>g becomes very abstract. Thus viewed, itis not on a level with absolute knowledge, but rather, one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>edto say. with the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the Phenomenology: <strong>in</strong> the realm of theLogic, Be<strong>in</strong>g is what Sensuous Consciousness is <strong>in</strong> the Phenomenology— the most abstract <strong>and</strong> unmediated st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t. In a word,then, we may say that the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the Logic, viewed as such, isabstract <strong>and</strong> immediate; but that it must be regarded as <strong>in</strong> a sensemediated, s<strong>in</strong>ce it presupposes the entire development of the Phenomenology.(For further discussion of this problem see ProfessorMcGilvary <strong>and</strong> Mr. McTaggart. Mr. McTaggart’s position entirelyignores the Phenomenology, <strong>and</strong> so does not take account of the mediatedaspect of Be<strong>in</strong>g.
134/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamIt has been objected that Hegel illogically smuggles experience<strong>in</strong>to the Logic as the basis of its development. (Cf. Trendelenburg,op. cit., pp. 36 ff.; <strong>and</strong> Haym, op. cit., pp. 318 ff.) This objectionseems to be groundless. Of course the basis of the Logic is experience,but Hegel is not <strong>in</strong>consistent <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g it so. As we have po<strong>in</strong>tedout above, the presupposition of the Logic is concrete experience; forit is with concrete experience that the Phenomenology has to do. Toassert, therefore, that the Logic deals with blank universals, <strong>and</strong> thatit gets its only plausibility by dragg<strong>in</strong>g experience <strong>in</strong> at the back doorafter hav<strong>in</strong>g ostentatiously kicked it out at the front, is to show pla<strong>in</strong>lythat the real problem <strong>and</strong> presupposition of the Logic have been misconceived.The objection is an admirable illustration of the danger<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> an attempt to criticize the Logic taken apart from its context<strong>in</strong> the system. And so far as one can see, Mr. McTaggart’s answerto Trendelenburg’s objection illustrates the same danger. (Cf.op. cit., §§30–43 ) If one were compelled to conf<strong>in</strong>e oneself to thesmaller Logic for data on the problem — as Mr. McTaggart does —one feels that the verdict would have to be <strong>in</strong> favor of Trendelenburg’sposition. It seems more than doubtful whether Mr. McTaggart’s argumentis adequate to meet the objection aga<strong>in</strong>st which it is advanced,simply because it fails to take the right po<strong>in</strong>t of departure. Personally,I cannot see that the argument has at all succeeded <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>gthe po<strong>in</strong>t at issue; <strong>and</strong>, strik<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> where it does, it seems to me tobe hopelessly defective. In po<strong>in</strong>t of fact, however, both objector <strong>and</strong>defender are beat<strong>in</strong>g the air. For both the objection <strong>and</strong> the defensefail to take any account of the author’s real position, which can beseen only <strong>in</strong> the light of the Phenomenology.127 Pp.111–113.128 Werke, Bd. V, pp.342–343.129 Enc., §244.130 Cf. The Pathway to <strong>Reality</strong>, Vol. II, pp. 68–69.131 Cf. Werke, Bd. VIl, i. pp. 25 ff.’ Werke, Bd. V, p. 44; Enc., §43,lecture-note.132 Cf. Werke, Bd. V, p. 341. See also Enc., §244, lecture-note.133 History of Modern Philosophy, trans., p. 489.134 See op. cit., p. 181.135 Hegel und se<strong>in</strong>e Zeit, p. 255.136 Cf. Gesch. d. n. Philosophie, Bd. VIII, i, p. 574.137 This po<strong>in</strong>t should never be forgotten <strong>in</strong> connection with Hegel’s
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/135system. He never denied the necessity of a science of nature <strong>and</strong> ascience of social values.138 Hegel tells us that “the other philosophical sciences, the Philosophyof Nature <strong>and</strong> the Philosophy of M<strong>in</strong>d, take the place, as it were,of an Applied Logic, <strong>and</strong> that Logic is the soul which animates themboth” (Enc. §24. lecture-note (2)).139 Op. cit., p. 305.140 Cf. Werke, Bd. V. p. 342.141 Enc., §43.142 Werke, Bd. V, p. 318.143 Cf. La Logique de Hegel, pp. 116 ff.144 Op. cit.. §27.145 Doubtless Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison would object here, as he teasobjected elsewhere, that it is time to leave off try<strong>in</strong>g to defend Hegelaga<strong>in</strong>st adverse criticism by compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g that he has been misunderstood.And there is ground for the objection — though one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>edto doubt whether it has been the misfortune of any other philosopherto be more universally misunderstood. The assertion unsupported byevidence, however, is puerile. My only excuse for reassert<strong>in</strong>g it hereis that, if this study has not erred from the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, the statementloses its dogmatic character <strong>and</strong> assumes for itself a basis of justification.For it is my purpose to establish the assertion <strong>in</strong> the light ofthe conclusions we have already reached, <strong>and</strong> to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that itsjustification rests upon the validity of those conclusions.146 Pp, 117–118. I quote from the second edition.147 Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 121.148 Werke, Bd. III, p. 33.149 Cf. op. cit.. pp. 573–576.150 Hegelianism <strong>and</strong> Personality, pp. 126–127.151 It should be noted that Hegel’s frequent ‘snort of contempt’ is reservedexclusively for the category of Be<strong>in</strong>g which presumes to exhaustthe nature of ultimate reality.152 For the quotations here given, see op. cit., pp. 128–134.153 For justification of this assertion concern<strong>in</strong>g Hegel, I refer the readerto the follow<strong>in</strong>g chapter of this study. There can be no question concern<strong>in</strong>gProfessor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s position. In the Scottish Philosophy(p. 170) he very emphatically tells us that “the particular asparticular — the mere self-identical unqualified particular — nowhereexists; it is the abstraction of a logic not wholly clear about its
136/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamown procedure. And the th<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>-itself is simply the fallacy of themere particular <strong>in</strong> another form. The mere particular <strong>and</strong> the mereuniversal are alike abstractions of the m<strong>in</strong>d; what exists is the <strong>in</strong>dividual.”And when we <strong>in</strong>quire further as to what we are to underst<strong>and</strong>by the <strong>in</strong>dividual, we are <strong>in</strong>formed that it is “a particular that isalso universal, or, from the other side, it is a universal — a set ofuniversals — particularized.” Or, <strong>in</strong> other words, it is “identity throughdifference,” “difference subsumed <strong>in</strong>to identity.” I shall po<strong>in</strong>t out laterthat this is exactly Hegel’s conception of the real, namely, a universalparticularized, or, as he himself puts it (´Enc., §167), “a universalwhich is <strong>in</strong>dividualized.” As regards the ultimate nature of the systemof reality, Hegel <strong>and</strong> his critic may disagree; but they are <strong>in</strong> fullaccord that that which is real can be neither an abstract particularnora blank universal, but must be a particularized universal.154 A word concern<strong>in</strong>g Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s <strong>in</strong>consistency onthis po<strong>in</strong>t may not be amiss. In From Kant to Hegel, by way of criticismof Fichte’s implicit assumption that the object is someth<strong>in</strong>g morethan its manifestations, we read: “The noumenon is always a fullerknowledge as yet unreached by us, <strong>and</strong> so each category has its ownvalidity <strong>and</strong> function. But it is not an unatta<strong>in</strong>able reality, <strong>and</strong> toexalt this useful dist<strong>in</strong>ction of thought <strong>in</strong>to a barrier which thought isunable to surmount is simply to fall down <strong>and</strong> worship our own abstractions.A philosophy which rema<strong>in</strong>s entangled <strong>in</strong> this oppositionmust <strong>in</strong>evitably end <strong>in</strong> the paradox that the real is what cannot beknown” (pp. 46–47). A passage of similar import occurs <strong>in</strong> the ScottishPhilosophy, pp. 173–174. One is at a loss to know how to reconcilethese passages with the one <strong>in</strong> Hegelianism <strong>and</strong> Personality (pp.137–138), <strong>in</strong> which the op<strong>in</strong>ions of Trendelenburg <strong>and</strong> Mr. Bradley,to the effect that the real is <strong>in</strong>accessible by way of ideas, are quotedwith approval. Perhaps the <strong>in</strong>consistency here is due to a change ofview on the part of the author. I have presumed to call attention to it,because it concerns such a vital epistemological problem.155 Microcosmos, Book VIII, Chapter 1, §8. The quotation is from thetranslation of the fourth edition.156 Enc., §19. See the lecture-note also.157 Enc., §24. lecture-note (l). The doctr<strong>in</strong>e of thought upheld by Hegelis discussed throughout this entire chapter on the ‘Prelim<strong>in</strong>ary Notion.’158 The writer has no desire to defend the letter of Hegel’s system; the
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/137preced<strong>in</strong>g discussion simply aims to be faithful to the spirit of hissystem. It is true that the time has come to leave off try<strong>in</strong>g to defendHegel by compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g that he has been misunderstood. But it is alsotrue that the time has come when the critics of Hegel’s doctr<strong>in</strong>es shouldpenetrate beneath the formality of his philosophy <strong>and</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g to thesurface its basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples. Were this done. there would be much lessuseless <strong>and</strong> valueless criticism than one f<strong>in</strong>ds at present. In many<strong>in</strong>stances criticisms st<strong>and</strong> self-refuted, if only their presuppositionsare disclosed.159 See <strong>in</strong> this connection Hegel’s own words quoted above (Chapter1) from the Encyclopaedia, section 573. There Hegel states as pla<strong>in</strong>lyas possible that there is a marked difference between abstract identity<strong>and</strong> his doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the unity of the Notion. And upon this differencehe rests his case.160 Abstractness of thought <strong>and</strong> the attempt to deduce existence fromit were early repulsive to Hegel. Cf. ´Werke, Bd. 1. pp. 119 ff.; alsoKuno Fischer, op. cit., pp. 267–268.161 Cf. Werke, Bd. VlI. i, pp. 16–17.162 Werke, Bd. III, p. 35.163 Werke, Bd. 1, p. 178.164 Werke, Bd. V, p. 329.165 Logic, Vol. I, pp. 2–3.166 In the present chapter I use the terms experience <strong>and</strong> reality <strong>in</strong>terchangeably.This, I th<strong>in</strong>k, is true to the spirit of Hegel’s system.167 Werke, Bd. IV, p. 3.168 Werke, Bd. VII, I, p. 15.169 Werke, Bd. II, p. 15.170 Werke, Bd. V, p. 20.171 Cf. Enc., §§22, 112, etc.; also the preface to the Phenomenology.172 Readers will bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that the term thought is used throughoutthis discussion <strong>in</strong> the mean<strong>in</strong>g attached to it by Hegel.173 Cf. Werke, Bd. VII, I, pp. 16–17.174 Werke, Bd. XVIII, p. 90.175 Werke, Bd. xv, p. 389 (History of Philosophy, trans, Vol. III, p.309).176 Enc., §74.177 I may be permitted <strong>in</strong> this connection to record my feel<strong>in</strong>g that the<strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ate act of will upon which free-willists of a certa<strong>in</strong> typeare wont to <strong>in</strong>sist <strong>in</strong> their arguments for freedom is noth<strong>in</strong>g but such
138/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghaman abstract particular. It matters not that they try to make their positionplausible by splitt<strong>in</strong>g the world <strong>in</strong>to a medley of mean<strong>in</strong>glesspossibilities <strong>in</strong> order to f<strong>in</strong>d a haven for the would-be category of‘chance’; the difficulties still rema<strong>in</strong>. For is it possible to attach anymean<strong>in</strong>g to this notion of ‘chance’? Is it anyth<strong>in</strong>g more than an expressionof ignorance? Of course, the <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ist will answer thatit means mere negativity. But to the question as to what is here meantby negativity noth<strong>in</strong>g more satisfactory than a tautological answer isgiven. And even grant<strong>in</strong>g that, as Professor James asserts, chance “isa purely negative <strong>and</strong> relative term, giv<strong>in</strong>g us no <strong>in</strong>formation aboutthat of which it is predicated, except that it happens to be disconnectedwith someth<strong>in</strong>g else” (Will to Believe, pp. 151–154), <strong>and</strong> grant<strong>in</strong>gfurther that a mean<strong>in</strong>g can be attached to the term as thus def<strong>in</strong>ed,what about the event of volition that is supposed to be made possibleby it? Can it be anyth<strong>in</strong>g more than an event which has absolutely norelation to the series <strong>in</strong> which it occurs, <strong>and</strong> so an event that is only anabstract unrelated particular? It would seem to be an event <strong>in</strong> timethat, apparently, takes place with other events <strong>and</strong> yet possesses noreal, <strong>in</strong>telligible relation to them. What such an event could possiblybe one is at a loss to conceive. It presents the rather odd appearanceof be<strong>in</strong>g one among other unrelated absolutes — s<strong>in</strong>ce every voluntaryact is presumably the result of ‘chance’ — with<strong>in</strong> the limits of af<strong>in</strong>ite experience; <strong>and</strong> it would be difficult to th<strong>in</strong>k of a bigger nest ofcontradictions than is revealed by such an unsightly state of affairs.178 Werke, Bd. XIII, p. 112 (History of Philosophy, trans., Vol. I, p.95).179 An appreciation of the difference between the universal of cognition,the formal concept. <strong>and</strong> the Hegelian doctr<strong>in</strong>e of universality,the Notion, is absolutely fundamental to an underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of thepresent justification of Hegel. It is unfortunate that we have no terms<strong>in</strong> English to express, explicitly. this difference.180 Hegel’s Logic, pp. 339 ff.181 Ibid., p. 373.182 See <strong>in</strong> this connection the entire twelfth section of the smaller Logic.There Hegel po<strong>in</strong>ts out how thought cannot rest <strong>in</strong> its ‘unrealizeduniversality’ apart from the facts.183 See E. H. Holl<strong>and</strong>s, “The Relation of Science to Concrete Experience.”The Philosophical Review, Vol. XV, pp. 614–626.184 Studies <strong>in</strong> the Hegelian Dialectic, §181.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/139185 Ibid., §189.186 Ibid., §193.187 Ibid., §203.188 Ibid., §206.189 Werke, Bd. IX, p. 12.190 Enc §471.191 Enc., §133, lecture note.192 Werke, Bd. VIII, p. 34 (Philosophy of Right, trans., p. II).193 Werke, Bd. XIII, p. 68 (History of Philosophy, trans., Vol. I, p.54).194 Logic, Vol. I, pp. 62–63.195 Enc., §163.196 The above is not <strong>in</strong>tended as a criticism of the discipl<strong>in</strong>ary value offormal logic as a course of study. The criticism is directed at formallogic as a theory of knowledge. Undoubtedly. formal logic has a discipl<strong>in</strong>aryvalue; but there can be no question about its abstractness.197 Cf. Vol. I, pp. 63 ff.198 For an elaboration of this doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the concreteness or thought,see the article by Professor Sab<strong>in</strong>e, already referred to. (The PhilosophicalReview, Vol. XVI, pp. 154–169.)199 Cf. Werke, Bd. XVII, p 30.200 Cf. Werke, Bd. v.; also Enc., I. 150 ff.201 Enc., §163, lecture-note (I).202 Werke, Bd. VIII., §270 (Philosophy of Right, trans.. p. 270).203 Enc., §181.204 See the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.205 Cf. Enc., §160 ff.; also Werke, Bd. V.206 Cf. Werke, Bd. V, p. 31.207 Cf. Enc., §193.208 Ibid., §213.209 Ibid., §163.210 Werke, Bd. V, p. 58.211 Enc., §171.212 Ibid., §163, lecture-note (2).213 Ibid., §164.214 Ibid., §192, lecture-note.215 “Transition <strong>in</strong>to someth<strong>in</strong>g else is the dialectical process with<strong>in</strong> therange of Be<strong>in</strong>g: reflection (br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g else <strong>in</strong>to light), <strong>in</strong> therange of Essence. The movement of the Notion is development: by
140/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamwhich that only is explicit which is already implicitly present.” (Enc.,§161, lecture-note.)216 Enc., §20. Quoted <strong>in</strong> Hegelianism <strong>and</strong> Personality. p. 137.217 Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. II, p. 230.218 Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of Logic, pp. 63, 69.219 Enc., §167.220 See Professor Pr<strong>in</strong>gle-Pattison’s emphatic words on this po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong>Scottish Philosophy, p. 170.221 Conception of God, p. 258.222 Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of Logic, p. 64.223 As I underst<strong>and</strong> Hegel, this is just the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple upon which he is<strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g when he makes immediacy <strong>and</strong> mediation conterm<strong>in</strong>ous. Forhim there is no ‘given’: a bare fact, or datum, is as pure an abstractionas is the unrelated particular with which he would identify it. Seehere Professor Sab<strong>in</strong>e, “The Concreteness of <strong>Thought</strong>,” The PhilosophicalReview, Vol. XVI, pp. 155–156.224 Mr. McTaggart looks for the synthesis <strong>in</strong> emotion as opposed tofeel<strong>in</strong>g (Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Cosmology, §§282 ff.). But this seemshardly to meet the difficulty — that is, if you abstract emotion fromits rational pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of unity; for such abstract emotion could hardlyfurnish us with the synthesis for which we are seek<strong>in</strong>g.225 It might be well for those who uphold the doctr<strong>in</strong>e that is hereobjected to if they would study more carefully the TranscendentalDeduction of the Categories <strong>in</strong> the Critique of Pure Reason Kant’sone lesson there is that the categories are essential to immediate experience.226 Cf. Hegel’s Logic, pp. 340 ff. for the criticism <strong>and</strong> the passageshere cited.227 Ibid.. p. 373.228 Students of Kant will see here simply an attempt to apply the lessonof the Transcendental Deduction.229 Logic, Vol. I, p. 77.230 The World <strong>and</strong> the Individual. first series, pp. 55–56.231 Hegel’s Logic, p. 348.232 An Idealistic Construction of Exprience, pp. 67–68. It will benoticed that this passage is a very tell<strong>in</strong>g criticism of the po<strong>in</strong>t ofview advocated <strong>in</strong> the entire last chapter of Hegel’s Logic; <strong>and</strong>, if theone is true, it would seem that the other must be false. So far as I amaware, the author has passed over this contradiction <strong>in</strong> silence.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/141233 Is not the search for an adequate representation of the nature ofsuch a comprehensible whole the task of philosophy? And if such atask is <strong>in</strong>herently impossible, is, <strong>in</strong>deed, absurd, then is philosophyworth the pa<strong>in</strong>s? Seek<strong>in</strong>g an ideal which is essentially unatta<strong>in</strong>able.but which, were it miraculously atta<strong>in</strong>ed, would annihilate us, seemson the face of it to be a rather profitless, or it may be dangerous,bus<strong>in</strong>ess; chas<strong>in</strong>g the ra<strong>in</strong>bow for the bag of gold at its end wouldappeal more strongly to the timorous. Hegel humorously remarksthat, on this theory, “thought is capable of comprehend<strong>in</strong>g one th<strong>in</strong>gonly, its <strong>in</strong>capacity to grasp the truth <strong>and</strong> see <strong>in</strong>to it, <strong>and</strong> of prov<strong>in</strong>g toitself its own noth<strong>in</strong>gness, with the result that suicide is its highestvocation.” (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. III. p. 161.)234 See Mr. Bradley’s statements on this po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> Appearance <strong>and</strong><strong>Reality</strong>, pp. 167 ff. Mr. Bradley <strong>and</strong> Hegel have practically the sameideas on the problem, the difference be<strong>in</strong>g that Mr. Bradley <strong>in</strong>sists onnarrow<strong>in</strong>g the term thought to what Hegel would call ‘f<strong>in</strong>ite’ thought.Hegel would seem to have the advantage over Mr. Bradley <strong>in</strong> thisrespect at least, namely, that he does give us an <strong>in</strong>telligible unity ofreality whereas Mr. Bradley leaves his Absolute <strong>in</strong> a rather confused<strong>and</strong> chaotic condition. And one is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to suspect that Hegel’sadvantage emerges from this difference <strong>in</strong> doctr<strong>in</strong>e concern<strong>in</strong>g thenature of thought.235 I use the term ‘personality’ as synonymous with selfhood or selfconsciousness.236 It may be said that <strong>in</strong> a sense Hegel makes a dist<strong>in</strong>ction between theterms Idea <strong>and</strong> God, giv<strong>in</strong>g to the latter a religious color<strong>in</strong>g. But he<strong>in</strong>sists over <strong>and</strong> over aga<strong>in</strong> that the object of philosophy <strong>and</strong> the objectof religion do not differ from each other, but are essentially thesame. For speculative reason the terms Idea, God. <strong>and</strong> the Absoluteare synonymous. (Cf. Leighton, The Philosophical Review, Vol. V,pp. 609–610. Cf. Hegel Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. 1, p. 19;Vol. II, p. 348.)237 Enc. §221, lecture-note.238 Ibid.239 Enc. §216, lecture-note.240 This st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t will not be confused with the more comprehensiveone also called Cognition <strong>in</strong> the translation — of which it is simplythe first stage. Volition be<strong>in</strong>g the second.241 At present the particular sciences make no claim to this ability;
142/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamgenerally speak<strong>in</strong>g, they see quite clearly that ontological problemsdo not fall with<strong>in</strong> their sphere. But this has not always been true.242 Enc., §226.243 Ibid., lecture-note.244 Enc., §234, lecture-note.245 Enc., §233.246 Enc., §234, lecture note.247 Enc.. §235.248 Enc., §236, lecture note.249 Ibid.250 Enc., §213.251 Cf. Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Cosmology, Chapter II; also Chapter III,§63.252 Ibid., §63.253 Werke, Bd. XI, p. 97 (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. I, p.100).254 Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Dialectic, §186.255 Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Cosmology, §35.256 Ibid. This idea is expressed <strong>in</strong> §§51, 63, etc.257 Cf. ibid., §§85 ff.258 Mr. McTaggart escapes this difficulty by <strong>in</strong>consistently mak<strong>in</strong>gthe f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>in</strong>dividual more than a mere manifestation of the whole;there is someth<strong>in</strong>g unique about the <strong>in</strong>dividual, after all, that fallsoutside the unity that b<strong>in</strong>ds him to others.259 It is only fair to mention that Mr. McTaggart anticipates this charge<strong>and</strong> denies its justice (§§38–39). In spite of this, however, I urge itbecause it seems to me that it becomes unwarranted only when theconception of an absolutely reciprocal relation between the Absolute<strong>and</strong> its differentiations is def<strong>in</strong>itely ab<strong>and</strong>oned.260 Enc., §194.261 Enc., §215.262 Cf. Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Cosmology, §§214–218.263 Ibid., §63.264 Werke, Bd. V, pp. 317–318.265 Ibid., p. 320; see also p. 339.266 Enc., §151, lecture note.267 Werke, Bd. XII, p. 192 (trans., Vol. II, p. 329).268 Ibid., p. 284 (trans., Vol. III, p. 74).269 Ibid., p. 496 (trans., Vol. III, p. 303). Curiously enough Mr.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/143McTaggart cites this passage <strong>in</strong> support of his <strong>in</strong>terpretation (Cosmology,§224).270 Werke, Bd. IX, p. 66 (trans., p. 55).271 See especially the Introduction to the third volume of the largerLogic.272 Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Cosmology. §216.273 Ibid.274 Werke, Bd. XII, p. 309 (Philosophy of Religion. trans., Vol. III,pp. 100–101).275 Ibid., p. 340 (trans., ibid., p. 134).276 Ibid., p. 341 (trans., ibid., p. 135).277 Ibid., p. 346 (trans., ibid. p., 141).278 Ibid., p. 350 (trans. Ibid., p. 145).279 Ibid.280 Ibid., p. 354 (trans., ibid., p. 149).281 Ibid., p. 355 (trans., ibid., p. 151).282 Philosophy of History, trans., p. 41.283 Werke, Bd. VIII, §258 (Philosophy of Right, trans., p. 247).284 Werke Bd. XII, p. 343 (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. III, p.138).285 Enc. §535.286 Werke, Bd. VIII, §272 (Philosophy of Right, trans., p. 277).287 Ibid. §279 (trans., pp. 290–291).288 Ibid. (trans., pp. 287–288).289 Ibid., (trans., p. 287).290 Ibid., (trans., p. 289).291 Enc. §542.292 Of course, no attempt is made here either to give an exhaustiveaccount of Hegel’s conception of the state or to defend his theory.What we are <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> is simply to po<strong>in</strong>t out his <strong>in</strong>sistence on therational necessity of a personal ruler.293 It may be objected that all this talk about the unity of the state isbeside the issue. In develop<strong>in</strong>g this doctr<strong>in</strong>e of the state, it may besaid, Hegel was only try<strong>in</strong>g to justify the then exist<strong>in</strong>g government ofhis own country; his elaborate arguments were wrought out primarily<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terests of the Prussian monarchy, <strong>and</strong> not from the objectivepo<strong>in</strong>t of view of the Idea. Therefore, it may be concluded, thesearguments have absolutely noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with the logic of Hegel’ssystem, <strong>and</strong> any <strong>in</strong>terpretation that takes serious account of them is
144/Gustavus Watts Cunn<strong>in</strong>ghamuseless.294 Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 281.295 James, Pragmatism, p. 160.296 Werke, Bd. XI, p. 93 (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. I, p. 96).297 Ibid., p. 97 (trans., ibid., pp. 99–100).298 I use the terms ‘content, <strong>and</strong> ‘objective reference’ as synonymous.An objection might be raised to this use of the terms. But perhaps theobjection would rest upon a misconception of my mean<strong>in</strong>g. What Ihave <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d when I say ‘content’ of consciousness is simply thatobject, or group of objects, whatever it may be, to which the consciousnessrefers. And this I take to be practically what one wouldmean by the ‘objective reference’ of consciousness. If my mean<strong>in</strong>g isclear, I do not care to dispute about the use of words.299 It seems to me false psychology <strong>and</strong> vicious logic to identity selfconsciousness<strong>and</strong> the feel<strong>in</strong>g of self as opposed to a not-self as ProfessorTaylor does <strong>in</strong> his argument aga<strong>in</strong>st the selfhood of the Absolute(Elements of Metaphysics, pp. 336. 343–345). Awareness ofself as contrasted with a not-self, so far as I can see, is not at allessential to self-consciousness. It is a matter of common speech thata man is most truly his own self when he is least conscious of a moreor less disconcert<strong>in</strong>g not-self. The logical problem of selfhood, orself-consciousness, is one th<strong>in</strong>g; the psychological problem of theorig<strong>in</strong> of the sense of self as opposed to an other is another th<strong>in</strong>g.300 Outl<strong>in</strong>es of Psychology, p. 90.301 It appears to me that the ‘w<strong>and</strong>er<strong>in</strong>g adjective’ theory of idealistsof Mr. Bradley’s type approaches dangerously near this catastrophe.302 This, I should say. is sufficient answer to all such criticism as thatwhich Professor James is persistently mak<strong>in</strong>g of what he cells ‘absolutism.’Over <strong>and</strong> over aga<strong>in</strong> throughout his works he takes it forgranted that the ‘absolutist’ must reduce the entire world of f<strong>in</strong>iteexistence <strong>in</strong>to an undifferentiated identity with the Absolute; <strong>and</strong> hisobjections to the position all rest on the simple assertion that such areduction cannot take place, s<strong>in</strong>ce the perseity of the f<strong>in</strong>ite is morethan a state of consciousness for the Absolute. But this is not theposition of the ‘absolutist’ who upholds the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of a self-consciousAbsolute. Indeed, such a position is impossible for him. Forhis argument that the Absolute is self-conscious precludes an effort(even if he had any <strong>in</strong>tention of mak<strong>in</strong>g one) to reduce the f<strong>in</strong>ite worldto an identity with the Absolute.
<strong>Thought</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reality</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hegel’s <strong>System</strong>/145303 Professor Taylor has advanced practically the same objections asthose of Mr. McTaggart. See Elements of Metaphysics, pp. 343 ff.304 Studies <strong>in</strong> Hegelian Cosmology, §86; see also §66.305 Hegel, p. 182.306 What would constitute <strong>in</strong>dividuality, or th<strong>in</strong>g-ness, from the st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>tof the Absolute is a problem that dem<strong>and</strong>s separate discussion.I have no <strong>in</strong>tention of solv<strong>in</strong>g it off h<strong>and</strong> by the use of the term ‘object’here.307 Werke, Bd. XIII. p. 192 (Philosophy of Religion. trans., Vol. II, p.329).308 Op. cit., §27.309 One is led to suspect that the <strong>in</strong>consistency <strong>in</strong> Mr. McTaggart’sposition here is due primarily to a confusion that arises from histerms ‘<strong>in</strong>clusion’ <strong>and</strong> ‘exclusion.’ Apparently, he does not alwayssucceed <strong>in</strong> divest<strong>in</strong>g the terms of their spatial reference. When heenlarges on the impossibility of the Absolute’s ‘exclud<strong>in</strong>g’ its differentiationsfrom itself, he seems to th<strong>in</strong>k of the latter as existentiallydist<strong>in</strong>ct from the former <strong>and</strong> as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> contrast with it as a limit<strong>in</strong>gother. This confusion may be due to the fact that Mr. McTaggarthardly gets beyond the category of substance <strong>in</strong> his theory of theultimately real: <strong>in</strong>dividuality he is <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to def<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> terms of a bitof be<strong>in</strong>g that is <strong>in</strong>dividual solely by virtue of its factual existence.310 Cf. the third part of the Philosophy of Religion, especially the lastof the second general division of the discussion. In these passagesHegel treats of the essential nature of man <strong>and</strong> shows us that man’sessential nature is to be found <strong>in</strong> his community with God.311 Enc., §573.