It took me several days to get used to being a free man again. I wasnever again going to be a puppet on a string, for anyone. I was goingto participate only in things that I knew would hurt the Mossad. Iknew now that the Mossad was a deadly machine without a purpose,and if Ephraim was not going to work with me the way I wanted, hecould go to hell and I would do it on my own. I made it clear that Iwould not cooperate in any more activities unless they were directlydetrimental to the success <strong>of</strong> the Mossad.He wanted to know whether I would continue to work with theEgyptians, and I told him I would not unless it was to pass on informationto them that could hurt the Mossad. I would, however, continuemy activities with the Jordanians, since I thought that it couldhelp bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict between Israel andJordan. If the Mossad succeeded in bringing down King Hussein, therewould never, ever be peace in the region. The fundamentalists wouldprevail, and that would be the end <strong>of</strong> that.I also said that I would be happy to provide information to theBritish and to make contact with the French. As it turned out, that didnot happen for some time.I contacted the Jordanians and arranged a meeting with Albert inOttawa. At first, he was reluctant to come, fearing a trap, but he eventuallyagreed and was supposed to arrive in Ottawa in mid-September.I contacted a local gallery owner, a Mr. Koyman, who had several galleriesin Ottawa, Toronto, and Montreal. I brought him some samples<strong>of</strong> my work. He had them framed and began to sell them through hismain gallery in Ottawa, at the Rideau Center. At the same time, Iwrote in any <strong>of</strong>ficial documents that I was a security adviser to foreigncountries. That was the truth; I'd started work on an analysis paper <strong>of</strong>the political situation in the Middle East and the significance <strong>of</strong> theTIIE OTHER 5II)F OF DEC EPTIOY / 20;' various political activities in the area, mainly analyzing what wasI behind the statements <strong>of</strong> Israeli politicians. This paper would allowthe Jordanians thereafter to plot their decision making on a realisticplcture <strong>of</strong> the political arena, and not on what some farfetched, overpaid,and one-<strong>side</strong>d American media analysts said. If you turned onvour teievision set at anv , given - time.,vou'd , hear them babble on andI1 on about how they saw the picture, while it was clear to anyone witha brain that they were feeding on one an<strong>other</strong>.Albert came to Ottawa, and I gave him a two-week crash coursein how to analyze the analysts. In many Arab capitals, the leadersI were delivering a lot <strong>of</strong> rhetoric for internal consumption but at theI same time eating up what the so-called experts were saying aboutwhat <strong>other</strong> Arab leaders were saying. For some reason, they'd stoppedrelying on their own common sense.Albert was starting to press me for the Israeli spy ring that I'dpromised him, and he also had a request. His people were extremelyanxious because <strong>of</strong> the forthcoming change in government in Israel.Since the Israeli election about two years previously had been completelyindecisive, the two major parties (left-leaning Labor and rightleaningLikud) had agreed to a unity government in which their leaderswould share power in rotation.It was decided that Shimon Peres, then leader <strong>of</strong> the Labor Party,would be the prime minister for the first two-year term, and thatYitzhak Shamir, leader <strong>of</strong> the right-wing Likud Party, would be theforeign minister. Then after two years, Shamir would become primeminister, and Peres would be foreign minister. Yitzhak Rabin, thenumber two <strong>of</strong> the Labor Party at the time, was to be minister <strong>of</strong>defense for the full term. The time was approaching when Shamirwould become prime minister. They wanted me to come to Ammanand analyze what that would mean to them. They were happy with-.my written analysis, but for this occasion, they wanted me there.As far as they were concerned, there was no reason for me not towant to come. They'd treated me well when I was there, and they'dupheld their end <strong>of</strong> the bargain in every way. I agreed but said that Iwould need a few days to set the date. After all, what was the point incoming if I didn't have all the information needed for the analysis? I~lso wanted to get Ephraim to help me set up that spy ring we hadtalked about, or at least get a list <strong>of</strong> people and give the Jordaniansseveral operational options.After Albert left on September 30, Ephraim arrived. We had severalmeetings in his hotel room at the Holiday Inn. He said that thingswere getting a little turbulent back home and that he would have to
stay there for some time now, so Eli was going to be my contact man.He'd be arriving in town on Friday, October 3. I knew Eli from theacademy; he was an instructor there during my first course, and we'dhad a good relationship. I had had no idea that he was part <strong>of</strong> this,and if I'd had to guess, I'd never have picked him. I'd always regardedhim as a hard-line right-winger.Eli was very happy to be in Canada; he was there as a tourist andwas staying in the Holiday Inn on Queen Street (later to become theRadisson Hotel). As far as Bella was concerned, I was meeting withsome people on business.We placed ads in several Jewish papers and one in the Hebrewlanguagepapers in the United States and Canada. We were calling forIsraelis with a military combat background to work for a securitycompany named International Combat Services (ICS). We gave a post<strong>of</strong>fice box in Ottawa as an address and within days were inundatedwith letters from Israelis across the continent and from Israel, givingtheir resumes in Hebrew to a strange company they didn't know. Theygave us their names, addresses, and military rank, and many were notshy about putting in their exact military background, names and locations<strong>of</strong> their military units, and their special training. That in itselfwas a fountain <strong>of</strong> knowledge that would normally take a well-trainedand well-oiled intelligence apparatus to collect. There was no doubtthat some <strong>of</strong> the information was bogus and some <strong>of</strong> the writers wereboasting connections or experience they didn't have, but from what Iknew <strong>of</strong> the naval command and <strong>other</strong> units in the military, I couldtell that the majority <strong>of</strong> it was right on the nose.Eli took most <strong>of</strong> the letters with him and had them faxed toEphraim, who was to prepare a list that I could take with me toAmman. It would consist <strong>of</strong> seven names that I could use. And if thisthing actually materialized, and we recruited them, then the Jordanianswould have good information, but not information that wouldendanger the state <strong>of</strong> Israel.I was getting ready for the trip. Ephraim had insisted that I leaveon October 20. He said that two <strong>of</strong> the three Kidon teams were on iceafter the Vanunu case and the third was on standby. Also, because thatwas the day Shamir and Peres were to exchange jobs, it would take atleast forty-eight hours to get approval for any Kidon activity shouldsomething go wrong with me. At the time, he wouldn't expand on theVanunu case. Only months later, after the Vanunu affair was a matter<strong>of</strong> public record, did I hear more about it from Uri.As it turned out, there was quite a rift on the matter betweenShamir (then still foreign minister) and Peres (then prime minister).Mordechai Vanunu was a technician in the Israeli secret nuclear facilityin Dimona. He knew Israel was developing nuclear weapons andrealized that, even though Israel appeared to be a sane democracy, itwould not take much for some extremist leader to lose his cool andplunge the Middle East and the world into nuclear war. Moreover, thegame <strong>of</strong> hide-and-seek that Israel was playing b<strong>other</strong>ed him. As longas the West took Israel's denials at face value and pretended it had nopro<strong>of</strong> that Israel had nuclear weapons, the West would not have totake steps to stop the proliferation.Vanunu decided to expose the facts and force the world toacknowledge it and therefore act on it. He took some fifty photographsin<strong>side</strong> the secret facility and, after leaving the country forAustralia, contacted the London Sunday Times. The paper broughthim to London, planning, first, to publish the revelations and, second,to put Vanunu in front <strong>of</strong> the media to answer questions that wouldreinforce his credibility. Prime Minister Peres, who'd learned <strong>of</strong> theaffair and realized that there was no way to put the genie back in thebottle, wanted to take advantage <strong>of</strong> the situation. He would verify tothe world. and esueciallv the Arab world. where several countries werebusy developing <strong>other</strong> weapons <strong>of</strong> mass destruction such as poison gasand bacterial weapons, that Israel did indeed have the capability toannihilate them. He wanted to let the story run but also to get Vanunuback to Israel before he could answer further questions so that there'dstill be doubt about the story's credibility. That way, he figured he'dkill two birds with one stone: The world would have " eood reason t<strong>of</strong>ear Israel, and at the same time, Israel could keep denying it possessednuclear capability because the man behind the story would not bearound to verify it. Shamir advocated a different plan; he wantedVanunu and his story killed.Peres realized that there was a hesitation on the part <strong>of</strong> the newspapersto run the story, mainly because they feared being duped. Tohelp ensure that the story would run, Peres called the editors <strong>of</strong> theIsraeli papers and asked them to keep the story in low pr<strong>of</strong>ile, hopingthat word <strong>of</strong> his request would reach the British publisher and proveto him that it was a serious story. After all, no less than the prime minister<strong>of</strong> Israel wanted it kept quiet! At the same time, Shamir contactedhis friend Robert Maxwell, the British media tycoon, and had him runa story in his paper that would tarnish Vanunu's credibility and exposehim as a charlatan. He also wanted the man's photo in the paper, sothat Vanunu, who was not a pr<strong>of</strong>essional in the spook business, wouldpanic.The Sunday Times ended up publishing the story on October 5, a
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There are many friends and ex-colle
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numbers of credit cards-Visa, Maste
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attempting to warn the command cent
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"This one's different, trust me," Y
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"16 / VICTOR OS'lRVSKYters like thi
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well. He turned to face me, one han
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Ireached the academj- and ran into
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have the right to your opinions. Bu
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"They want to talk to you." He nodd
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It was almost midnight when I pulle
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"What are you telling me?""They wan
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THF O l l i t K Sll>t O F DICFPTIO\
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I looked at the man. "No, I guess n
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Twenty-four hours had passed, and s
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THE OlHER SlDC OF DECEPI.IOS / 59ti
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There was a knock on the door. Ephr
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66 / VICTOR OSTROVSKYgoing on, or s
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PLO offices. That false sense of se
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THE OTHER 5IIIF OF DkLFPTIOU / 75bl
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I.HE OTHER SIlIt Ot 1)ECEI'I.IOT /
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arrested was not that I wasn't bein
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"I don't think so. His name is Avra
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"But how can I? What do you want me
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ealize how bad things are in your m
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The game plan was simple. I would g
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direction of the bench I had just l
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106 / VICTOR OSTROVSKY"Thanks again
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110 / VICTOR O\TKO\'SKYBecause of t
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- Page 157 and 158: 292 / NOTES"Loral Wins Contract for
- Page 159 and 160: AnnaTomforde, "SPD Win Schleswig-Ho
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INDEXINDEXLarnaka, Cyprus, 3-8Ldrry
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312 / IUDEXRabin, Yitzhak, 207 Sawa