pasted across the country. Shamir called the pre<strong>side</strong>nt's action "Am-Bush."Israeli messengers in all the communities across the United Statesimmediately went into high gear, launching attacks against the pre<strong>side</strong>nt.They fed the media an endless stream <strong>of</strong> criticism, while trying atthe same time to make it clear to Vice Pre<strong>side</strong>nt Dan Quayle that hewas still their sweetheart and that what the pre<strong>side</strong>nt was doing in noway affected their opinion <strong>of</strong> him.This love affair with a vice pre<strong>side</strong>nt was not a new thing; it hadbeen almost standard procedure ever since the creation <strong>of</strong> the state <strong>of</strong>Israel. Any time a pre<strong>side</strong>nt was not on the best <strong>of</strong> terms with Israel,the Jewish organizations were instructed to cozy up to the vice pre<strong>side</strong>nt.That was the case with Dwight Eisenhower, whom Israelregarded as the worst pre<strong>side</strong>nt in history (although, ironically, thevice pre<strong>side</strong>nt they regarded as a friend, namely Richard Nixon, himselfbecame an enemy once he was pre<strong>side</strong>nt). It was what lay behindthe strong support Israel and the Jewish community gave to LyndonJohnson, who almost doubled aid to Israel in his first year as pre<strong>side</strong>nt,after John Kennedy had come down hard on the Israeli nuclearprogram, believing it was a first and dangerous step in the proliferation<strong>of</strong> nuclear weapons in the region.That strategy was behind their hatred for Nixon and their admirationfor Gerald Ford. And then there was Jimmy Carter, whose wholeadministration was regarded as a big mistake as far as Israel was concerned,a mistake that had cost Israel the whole <strong>of</strong> the Sinai in returnfor a lukewarm peace with Egypt.And now there was this peace process, put forth by the countryclub idiot. The right-wingers' silent cry was to somehow stop the process,which they believed would lead to a compromise that wouldforce Israel to return more land. Refusing to believe that such a compromisewould ever be made, settlers in the Occupied Territories hadlaunched a new wave <strong>of</strong> construction, with the unrelenting help <strong>of</strong>Ariel Sharon, the minister <strong>of</strong> housing.A certain right-wing clique in the Mossad regarded the situation asa life-or-death crisis and decided to take matters into their own hands,to solve the problem once and for all. They believed that Shamirwould have ordered what they were about to do if he hadn't beengagged by politics. Like many <strong>other</strong>s before them, in countless countriesand administrations, they were going to do what the leadershipreally wanted but couldn't ask for, while at the same time leaving theleadership out <strong>of</strong> the loop-they were going to become Israeli versions<strong>of</strong> Colonel Oliver North, only on a much more lethal level.1\ATo this clique, it was clear what they must do. There was no doubtthat Bush would be out <strong>of</strong> his element on October 30 when he arrivedin Madrid to open the peace talks. This was going to be the most protectedevent <strong>of</strong> the year, with so many potential enemies meeting inone place. On top <strong>of</strong> that, there were all those who were against thetalks: the Palestinian extremists and the Iranians and the Libyans, notto mention the decimated Iraqis with their endless calls for revenge forthe Gulf War.The Spanish government had mobilized more than ten thousandpolice and civil guards. In addition, the American Secret Service, theSoviet KGB, and all the security services <strong>of</strong> all the countries involvedwould be on hand.The Madrid Royal Palace would be the safest place on the planetat the time, unless you had the security plans and could find a flaw inthem. That was exactly what the Mossad planned to do. It was clearfrom the start that the assassination would be blamed on the Palestinians-perhapsending once and for all their irritating resistance andmaking them the people most hated by all Americans.Three Palestinian extremists were taken by a Kidon unit from theirhiding place in Beirut and relocated incommunicado in a special detentionlocation in the Negev desert. The three were Beijdun Salameh,Mohammed Hussein, and Hussein Shahin.At the same time, various threats, some real and some not, weremade against the pe<strong>side</strong>nt. The Mossad clique added its share, inorder to more precisely define the threat as if it were coming from agroup affiliated with none <strong>other</strong> than Abu Nidal. They knew thatname carried with it a certain guarantee <strong>of</strong> getting attention and keepingit. So if something were to happen, the media would be quick toreact and say, "We knew about it, and don't forget where you saw itfirst."Several days before the event, it was leaked to the Spanish policethat the three terrorists were on their way to Madrid and that theywere probably planning some extravagant action. Since the Mossadhad all the security arrangements in hand, it would not be a problemfor this particular clique to bring the "killers" as close as they mightwant to the pre<strong>side</strong>nt and then stage a killing. In the ensuing confusion,the Mossad people would kill the "perpetrators," scoring yetan<strong>other</strong> <strong>victor</strong>y for the Mossad. They'd be very sorry that they hadn'tbeen able to save the pre<strong>side</strong>nt, but ~rotecting him was not their job tobegin with. With all the security forces involved and the assassinsdead, it would be very difficult to discover where the security breachhad been, except that several <strong>of</strong> the countries involved in the confer-
ence, such as Syria, were regarded as countries that assisted terrorists.With that in mind, it would be a foregone conclusion where thebreach was.As far as this Mossad clique was concerned, it was a win-win situation.Ephraim called me on Tuesday, October 1. I could sense from thetone <strong>of</strong> his voice that he was extremely stressed. "They're out to killBush," he said. At first, I didn't understand what he was talkingabout. I thought he meant that they were going to ruin the pre<strong>side</strong>nt.I'd already heard <strong>of</strong> several books that were in the making on theman, and there was a smear campaign regarding his alleged involvementin the Iran-Contra affair (which I knew personally to be fake)."What's new about that? They've been out to get him for a longtime.""I mean really kill, as in assassinate.""What are you talking about? You can't be serious. They wouldnever dare do something like that.""Don't go naive on me now," he said. "They're going to do it duringthe Madrid peace talks.""Why don't you call the CIA and tell them? I mean, this isn't justsome little operation you don't want to be involved in.""I'll call whoever I have in the European intelligence services. Idon't have friends in the American, not people I can trust, anyway.""So what do you want me to do?""We are going to do what we can at our end. But nothing we willdo will become public. I want you to make this thing public. If theyknow that the Americans know about it, there is a good chance theywill not go ahead."I knew that what he said was correct. If I could draw attention toit and make it public, that would do more to stop them than all theintelligence agencies put together. The trick would be to make it publicwithout coming on like some lunatic with yet an<strong>other</strong> conspiracy theory.I would have to say something in a relatively small forum andhope it would get out. If that didn't work, I'd contact some reporters Iknew and give them the lowdown.4s it happened, I was invited to be a speaker at a luncheon held atthe Parliament buildings in Ottawa for a group called the Middle EastDiscussion Group. It's a loosely formed think tank supported by theNational Council on Canadian-Arab Relations, headed by a formerLiberal MP named Ian Watson. The aim <strong>of</strong> this group is to informmembers <strong>of</strong> Parliament and the diplomatic community on issues thatmight not be freely accessed by the media and to promote dialog onthe Middle East.The luncheon was attended by some twenty members <strong>of</strong> the thinktank and a few MPs. I made a short presentation in which I explainedthe goals <strong>of</strong> the Mossad and the danger it presented to any peace initiativein the region. I also said that in my opinion, as things stood, theonly chance the Middle East had for peace would be the cutting <strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong>financial aid to Israel by the United States. I emphasized that a largechunk <strong>of</strong> this aid finds its way to the West Bank and the settlements,which were probably the biggest stumbling block to the peace initiative.Then 1 opened the floor to questions.I was asked what the Mossad would do to stop the process thatwas now taking place. I said that from sources I had, and based on myknowledge <strong>of</strong> the Mossad, I would not be at all surprised if there wasa plot right at this moment to kill the pre<strong>side</strong>nt <strong>of</strong> the United Statesand to throw the blame on some extreme Palestinian group.Later, I learned that one <strong>of</strong> the people at the luncheon had calledan ex-congressman from California, Pete McCloskey. The substance <strong>of</strong>what I'd said was conveyed to him, and since McCloskey was an oldand close friend <strong>of</strong> the pre<strong>side</strong>nt's, the caller felt that he might want totake some action.On October 15, McCloskey called me and introduced himself. Hesaid that he'd heard from a friend what I'd said about the pre<strong>side</strong>ntand wanted to know if in my opinion there was a real threat, or wasthis only a metaphor <strong>of</strong> some kind, to make a point? I made it clear tohim that there was no metaphor involved and that I was dead seriousregarding the threat to the pre<strong>side</strong>nt. I also said that I believed thatexposing this threat might be enough to eliminate it, since to carry itout would then become too risky.He said he could come to Ottawa within a few days and asked meif I'd be willing to meet with him. I saw no reason why not, and wemade an appointment for October 19, which was a weekend.I met Pete at the Westin Hotel, and we walked over to a small c<strong>of</strong>feeshop where we sat for several hours. He asked me questions fromevery possible angle, trying to understand what I was talking about. Icould see that he was looking for information he could present thatwould make the threat realistic. There was no way I could tell himthat I'd gotten the information straight from the horse's mouth, but Ihad to let him know that I was not completely disconnected from theMossad. That in itself was a risk; it was the first time I'd allowed thisto come out. I felt compelled, however, by the stakes involved.
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There are many friends and ex-colle
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numbers of credit cards-Visa, Maste
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attempting to warn the command cent
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"This one's different, trust me," Y
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"16 / VICTOR OS'lRVSKYters like thi
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well. He turned to face me, one han
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Ireached the academj- and ran into
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have the right to your opinions. Bu
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"They want to talk to you." He nodd
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It was almost midnight when I pulle
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"What are you telling me?""They wan
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THF O l l i t K Sll>t O F DICFPTIO\
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I looked at the man. "No, I guess n
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Twenty-four hours had passed, and s
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THE OlHER SlDC OF DECEPI.IOS / 59ti
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There was a knock on the door. Ephr
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66 / VICTOR OSTROVSKYgoing on, or s
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PLO offices. That false sense of se
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THE OTHER 5IIIF OF DkLFPTIOU / 75bl
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I.HE OTHER SIlIt Ot 1)ECEI'I.IOT /
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arrested was not that I wasn't bein
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"I don't think so. His name is Avra
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"But how can I? What do you want me
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ealize how bad things are in your m
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The game plan was simple. I would g
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direction of the bench I had just l
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106 / VICTOR OSTROVSKY"Thanks again
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110 / VICTOR O\TKO\'SKYBecause of t
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commandos were charged with the tas
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there, and no one was coming or goi
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step at a time. What we are startin
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THE OTHER SII>E OF I>FCFI'IION / 12
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Ephraim was not in his room first t
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134 / VICTOR OSTROVSKY"Let's make l
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138 / VICTOR OSTROVSKItelling you i
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"We have done that for thousands of
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in charge of security. The guard in
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Ephraim was supposed to have delive
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THE OTHER SIDE OF DECEI'TION / 155p
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He opened his attach6 case and took
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166 / VICTOR OSTROVSKY THF OTHER SI
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THE OTHER SIDE OF UECEI'TIOU / 171F
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spare. I ordered coffee and toast f
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Territories surrounded by well-arme
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T I PAGE: My certiffc~tcof gradi~nr
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- Page 111 and 112: 200 / VICTOR OSTROVSKl* * *We took
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- Page 117 and 118: 212 / VICTOR OSTROVSKY"If you have
- Page 119 and 120: "So what do want me to do?""Like I
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- Page 125 and 126: were to purchase the simulators out
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- Page 131 and 132: I'm here and you're there. It would
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- Page 135 and 136: 248 / \'ICTOR OSTROVSKYToward the e
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- Page 139 and 140: I was extremely tense and found it
- Page 141 and 142: I decided to leave on the stroke of
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- Page 147 and 148: of his wits. As it turned out, he'd
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- Page 157 and 158: 292 / NOTES"Loral Wins Contract for
- Page 159 and 160: AnnaTomforde, "SPD Win Schleswig-Ho
- Page 161 and 162: Richard Norton-Taylor, "UK: America
- Page 163 and 164: 304 // 305Egypt (cont.)Victor's int
- Page 165 and 166: INDEXINDEXLarnaka, Cyprus, 3-8Ldrry
- Page 167 and 168: 312 / IUDEXRabin, Yitzhak, 207 Sawa