other-side-of-deception-victor-ostrovsky

282 / VICTOR OSTROVSKYThe next day, Sunday, October 20, McCloskey was in Washingtonto participate in the meetings of the Commission on National andCommunity Services. He stayed at the Hotel Phoenix Park, fromwhich he called the Secret Service at the White House. He was referredto Special Agent Allan Dillon at the Secret Service offices, 1050 ConnecticutAvenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.Pete faxed Dillon a copy of the memo he'd written after our meetingin Ottawa. The same day, he met with a former White House aidefrom the Ford era, named Don Penny, who gave him the spin on me. Iwas not at all surprised when McCloskey told me later what Pennyhad told him: that he'd heard about me from Senator Sam Nunn andother sources in the CIA who said that I was a traitor to Israel andtotally unreliable. And that if McCloskey associated with me, he'd beputting a target on his own back. As it turned out, Pete later spoke toNunn, but the senator could not recall talking about me. Meanwhile,a well-known Washington columnist, Rowland Evans, told Pete thathe'd asked his sources in the CIA about me several months earlier, andthey'd told him that I was "for real."McCloskey had an interview on October 22 with agent Terry Gallagherfrom the State Department Diplomatic Protection and then, thesame day, a meeting with Dillon from the Secret Service. On October24, the Secret Service asked to speak to me. They placed a formalrequest via the American embassy in Ottawa through CSIS (the Canadiansecurity service), and I met with a member of the Secret Service inthe presence of a member of CSIS.I told the man what I thought was going to take place, only omittingthat I'd obtained the information from an active member of theMossad. I did make it clear to him that I had a connection, which Imainly used to learn about impending personal danger.The information leaked to the media, and in a syndicated column,Jack Anderson presented the whole story. So did Jane Hunter in hernewsletter, which is a must for any Washingtonian specializing in theMiddle East.I was confident that by now the president was no longer in imminentdanger, although the less time he spent in Madrid, the better. Butthe decision to eliminate him would not be withdrawn; it would onlybe postponed. I had pointed out to the Secret Service agent that thepresident was extremely vulnerable aboard Air Force One, both toattack by a surface-to-air missile and to a piece of explosive luggagethat could be carried aboard by an unsuspecting reporter who didn'trealize that a segment of his recording or photographic equipment hadbeen switched for a deadly device.From Ephraim, I heard later that after the president had landed in>,fadrid, the American embassy there received a bomb threat on the$one, and that a section of the embassy was evacuated while thepresident was in the building. But the rest of the plan was called off,and even though the Spanish police received the names and descriptionsof the three supposed assassins, they were never let out of theholding facility in the Negev. Later, they were transferred to the Neszivvona . . research facility, where they were terminated.On October 31, the president was back in Washington and wasabout to visit his house in Kennebunkport, Maine, which had beendamaged in a storm that had devastated the entire coast. The SecretService put out a memo on November 1 that was distributed to AirForce One passengers. It said, "There is a very capable system in placeto beat terrorism from sabotaging the jet. However, if there is a weakspot, it would be with the personal belongings brought aboard the aircraftfrom the motorcade just before departure. . . ."