ISSUE 125 : Jul/Aug - 1997 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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PSYOPS BEYOND 2000: COORDINATING THE MESSAGE 45The Malayan LessonThe importance of a fully coordinated psyopscampaign was clearly illustrated during the MalayanEmergency of 1948-60. During this campaign thesuccessful coordination of psyops objectives withnational military and civilian activities brought aboutthe demise of the communist-inspired Malaya RacesLiberation Army (MRLA).Initially the psyops effort against the MRLA wasdriven by revenge, as many friends and relatives ofofficials and planters had been murdered by thecommunists 6 . The police and military wereencouraged to kill the insurgents or, if possible,capture them for later trial and execution.Understandably this only stiffened the resolve of theterrorists as it gave them no alternative but to fight.This situation was also exploited by the communistleadership who used photos of dead MRLA membersto inspire the rank and file to avenge these deaths 7 .In September 1950 Hugh Carleton Greene 8 wasappointed Director of Emergency InformationServices – Malaya. Greene is credited withintroducing the surrender and rewards policy whichwas crucial to the success of the campaign. Thepolicy allowed for insurgents to voluntarily surrenderthemselves to the security forces and be absolvedfrom prosecution regardless of their crimes. Rewardsfor information given by the public had been in placesince the beginning of the emergency, but Greeneinsisted that special rewards be offered to namedinsurgents for helping other insurgents to escape theMRLA 9 .At first there was great opposition to the policy,but gradually it gained acceptance as officials came tounderstand the psychological impact of the policy.The surrender and rewards policy provided a way outfor disenchanted communists. This policy, combinedwith an effective food denial campaign andaggressive patrolling, reduced the communists to arabble more concerned with survival than withrevolution.Another strategic/operational psyops tool isterminology. In 1952, despite much politicalopposition, the Psywar Section 10 persuaded theauthorities to refer to the MRLA as the CommunistTerrorist Organisation (CTO). In one move thecommunists had gone from being a “LiberationArmy” to being a terrorist organisation, with all theassociated imagery and horror that the word“terrorist” conjures up in people. Also, the conflictwas always referred to as an emergency, with martiallaw never being declared. The military acted insupport of the police who retained primacy forcounter-terrorist activities. Therefore the terroristswere never given the legitimacy of being an army atwar. Instead the terrorists were outlaws fighting thepolice (who were ably assisted by the military).The final ingredient for success was theestablishment of joint civilian and military commandwith a unified purpose and common goals 11 . Bygiving clear psychological direction to the emergencythe British were able to seize and hold the moral highground which kept the communists from gaininglarge-scale support.This coordination of psychological aims and goalsserves as a reminder today that psychologicalcoordination must occur at the highest levels, for it isoften the psychological dimension of a campaign thatdecides how all other activities will follow. It is veryunlikely that the level of psychological success inMalaya could have been achieved if psyops had beenorganised at the tactical level alone. Without a unifiedpsychological approach, military victories at thetactical level could be squandered because of the lackof support or understanding at the strategic andoperational level by the population we seek to serve.A Failure to CoordinateThe dangers of failing to coordinate psyops weremade all too clear in Somalia following thecommencement of the second UN Operation inSomalia (UNOSOM II). During the operation US andUN officials never fully coordinated their “nationbuilding”activities 12 which resulted in a breakdown incommunication between the UN and the US forces.Elements from the US 4th Psyop Group were taskedwith producing and distributing psyops material insupport of the operation, and there came a pointwhere US officials decided that the actions of warlordGeneral Mohamed Farah Aideed could no longer betolerated. The psyops elements were then tasked tocarry out “character assassination” of Aideed in theirpsyops products.The problem was that at that time the UN wasprivately still negotiating with Aideed, and thesecontradicting activities only served to undermine eachother. Later, US President Bill Clinton, whilstmeeting with the families of the US Rangers killed inthe disastrous firefight against Aideed’s forces inOctober 1993, said that he was surprised that the UNwas still pursuing Aideed 13 . This constant inability ofthe US and the UN to coordinate their activities or to
46AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997implement a clear process for reconciliation inSomalia prompted the Somali people to view the UNand US actions as hostile. 14 The moral high groundhad been lost, and with it the support of the Somalipeople.ConclusionThis article has argued for the creation of a JointPsyops Unit within the ADF that would provide thenecessary psyops guidance and coordination that isrequired by doctrine but has been missing to date. Theproposed restructure of the Army has recognised theneed for psyops, but has given priority to tacticalpsyops over strategic and operational psyops. Thuswe are potentially left with the tail that wags the dog,and if this situation is not corrected pysops coulddevolve into a farce.Australian Army psyops have come a long way inthe last seven years. Thanks to much research,justification, planning and implementation we nowhave two tac psyops platoons that may be replaced bya greater number of smaller tac psyops teams. Theproposed allocation of psyops teams to each taskforce would be more beneficial than the existingsystem of having a tac psyops platoon per divisionbecause the task force commander would have aneffective behavioural-modification tool at his disposalthat could quickly be brought to hand. However, thetac psyops teams need direction, support and coordination,hence the need for the JPU.The ADF needs to remember that psyops is acomplete weapon system, not a collection ofweapons. Without higher control psyops couldcontradict itself and would run the risk of causingmore harm than good. By completing the structurewith a Joint Psyops Unit the ADF would complete theweapon that, in the eyes of Sun Tzu, is the acme ofmilitary achievement.NOTES1. Clavell, J. (Ed), The Art of War by Sun Tzu, Hodder andStoughton, 1981, p.7.2. R.H.S. Crossman, “Psychological Warfare”, in AustralianArmy Journal, No. 49, June 1953, p.11.3. Captain M.J. Davies, “Psychological Operations: Victoria PerMentem”, in Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 78September/October 1989, pp.16-22.4. MLW 1-2-10, Psychological Operations, 1987, para 301b.5. Major J.V. Rosenfeld and Colonel P.G. Warfe, “Moral andPhilosophical Challenges of a Medical Peacekeeping Missionin Rwanda”, in Australian Defence Force Journal, 118May/June 1996, p.39.6. Derry, A. Emergency in Malaya – The PsychologicalDimension, Psychological Operations Section – Joint WarfareWing, National Defence College UK, 1982, p.2.7. Ibid. p.3.8. Later Sir Hugh Greene, Director General of the BBC 1960-69.9. Derry, op cit., pp.3-4.10. During this period Psychological Operations were referred to as“Psywar” (Psychological Warfare). This term has fallen out offavour as it is seen as being limited to referring to thoseactivities solely aimed at the enemy, and it does not embracethe notion that psychological operations can be conductedagainst neutral and friendly audiences as well.11. Pimlott, J, (Ed) British Military Operations 1945-1984,Hamlyn/Bison, London, 1984, p.54.12. Clarke W. and Herbst J., “Somalia and the Future ofHumanitarian Intervention”, in Foreign Affairs, No.2,March/April 1996, pp.72-73.13. Ibid., p.72.14. Cloughley B., “Peace in Mind”, in James International DefenceReview, 3/1996, p.59.Corporal Cameron Jamison enlisted in the Army Reserve as an Infantryman in 1983 and later joined the ARA as an Air Dispatcher.In 1992 he transferred to Aust Int Corps. He has returned to the ARes and is currently posted to 2nd Division Intelligence Companyas a Psyops Specialist. He is in the final year of a BA (Communications) at UWS – Nepean.
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ISSUE 125 : Jul/Aug - 1997 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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