ISSUE 125 : Jul/Aug - 1997 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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THE PLACE OF THE SURFACE COMBATANT IN REGIONAL NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 1975-96 57Table 2. Regional surface combatants 1985 - numbers and average ageFrigates Corvettes Fast attack Large patrol Coastal patrol(average age) (average age) craft - missile craft craft(average age) (average age) (average age)Brunei - - 3 (6) - 6 (6)Indonesia 12 (20) - 4 (5) 16 a (22) 8 (9)Malaysia 4 (7) - 8 (9) 27 (17) -Philippines 7 (42) 10 (41)- - 13 (19) 73 (11)Singapore - - 6 (12) 6 (14) 12 (4)Thailand 6 (27) - 6 (7) 25 (19) 33 (8)a. Four of these vessels were listed as corvettes in 1975Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 1985–86of the four Soviet fleets. Out of area deploymentswere frequent and of particular concern to theASEAN nations was the Soviet use of Cam RanhBay in Vietnam as a naval and air base, and thepossibility that India might allow similar basingprivileges in the Nicobar or Andaman Islands near theentrance to the Strait of Malacca. Though the Sovietdeployments could be seen as strategically defensiveand were not overtly aggressive, doubts over theirintentions remained and these were not allayed byclear demonstrations of a willingness to use force.Incidents such as the destruction of a Korean airlinerby Soviet air defences in 1983 simply served tofurther strain relations and strengthen the case forregional military expenditure.Over a similar period a parallel maritimeexpansion became apparent in the Chinese Navy(PLA-N). After years of concentration on coastalcraft, in the early 1970s the PLA-N began to alter itsforce structure, curtailing patrol boat constructionwhile accelerating the building of larger surfacecombatants such as the ‘Luda’ class guided missiledestroyers. Though these developments could be seensimply as a direct response to Soviet moves, theincrease in Chinese capability also had obviousimplications for the wider region. Throughout the1980s the Chinese were able to maintain relativelylarge production runs of destroyers and frigates.Though still of comparatively uncomplicated designs,by fitting both indigenous and foreign sourcedequipment these vessels were able to field crediblecapabilities in many areas of naval warfare. Like theSoviets, the Chinese also demonstrated theirwillingness to use force and employed their warshipsin action against the Vietnamese on several occasionsduring the 1980s.Even in isolation these developments would nodoubt have caused a regional response. However,they were combined with clear signals from theUnited States that it expected regional nations to takeadequate measures for their own defence, thereduction or elimination of insurgent threats tointernal security, and the growing economic strengthof the region. Perhaps even more significant, were themajor changes in maritime regimes brought about bythe 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention,under which most regional nations gained extensiveoffshore resource zones.Most recently the region has witnessed the effectsof the collapse of the Soviet Union and in particularthe wholesale deterioration of the ex-Soviet Pacificfleet. Though this is a change of major strategicsignificance and has virtually removed the possibilityof a threat from that direction, in Asia-Pacific terms itmust be seen in the context of the PLA-N’simproving capacity to project power into disputedterritorial waters and the perceived draw down ofUnited States forces in the region. In the opinion ofmany analysts the previous, and relativelycomfortable, bipolar balance of power has beenreplaced by an atmosphere of uncertainty. The oftenexpressed fear is that a power vacuum now exists,with the region in consequence becoming morecomplex, multipolar and increasingly volatile. Eventsover the past year in the South China Sea 3 and TaiwanStrait 4 do nothing to contradict this view and anyconflict that does occur in the future will almostcertainly have a dominant maritime dimension.
58AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>125</strong> JULY/AUGUST <strong>1997</strong>Changes in Security EmphasisThe net effect of the influences noted has been achange in security emphasis, and in particular a moveaway from the threat of internal insurgency and landassault and towards self-reliance in maritime security.The balance of defence budgets has undoubtedlytilted towards maritime capabilities and this has had adirect impact on the types of platforms and systemsbeing acquired. These transformations can beidentified throughout the Asia-Pacific region, but areespecially apparent within South-East Asia.Singapore’s continuing economic growth forexample, has allowed the acquisition of modernweapons in all three branches of the defence forces,but after years as the ‘third man’ the progressiveexpansion of the maritime forces is particularlynotable. Indeed it has recently been observed that,with the possible exception of the Philippines andBrunei, all ASEAN navies now possess assets thathave allowed a shift from the more traditional tobroader maritime tasks. 5The role of navies as a national symbol is wellknown within the region and there is no doubt anelement of international prestige and status in regionalnaval development. Nevertheless, the surfacecombatants in service today show a vast improvementin capability over those of only twenty years ago.This is apparent not only in terms of weaponry, butalso in an increased ability to gather, process and acton information. Especially when integrated withmaritime patrol aircraft and national strategicsystems, a modern vessel of frigate size is able tomaintain an operational horizon out to at least 200miles. Moreover, through advances in data handlingand automation a contemporary warship normallyoffers far easier handling than its predecessors,making their introduction into regional inventories farless intimidating and in many functions reducing thetime required to achieve operational effectiveness.Though there remain what have been aptly describedas ‘supermarket’ style acquisitions – for exampleIndonesia’s procurement of a large number of ex-EastGerman vessels in 1993 – capability expansion ingeneral reflects operational realities and considerableadvances have been made in the formulation ofindigenous strategy and doctrine.Regionally, one of the first imperatives has beento include the protection of offshore assets andresources in addition to the traditional defence ofports and coastlines. Though this responsibility doesnot necessarily require highly capable ships, it doesrequire units able to readily respond to third partydetections, maintain a presence and demonstrategraduated force if necessary. Earlier force structureswere for the most part unsuitable, since inadequatelong-range sensors, low-endurance and poor seakeepingqualities meant that patrol boats could notventure far from a friendly coast and would certainlybe ineffective in the boundary regions of an exclusiveeconomic zone (EEZ). The acquisition of largersurface units provides a more versatile alternative,allowing most of these limitations to be addressedwhile also providing for the better surveillanceinherent in a more stable platform and the option of ahelicopter capability.In this context Malaysia is a particularly goodexample of a nation attempting to cope with theproblem of a territory fragmented by water and withmaritime forces trying to fulfil both naval andcoastguard roles. Prior to the 1980s the RoyalMalaysian Navy (RMN) possessed only a fewfrigates and missile-armed fast attack craft. Though inpractical terms simply the nucleus of a warfightingforce, in conjunction with a force of riverine patrolcraft this was sufficient while the Western alliancemaintained its naval presence. However, afterMalaysia had declared her 200 nm EEZ in 1980, theRMN found itself handed responsibility for policingthis vast area in addition to the defence of sovereignterritory. Funds became available for expansion andnew capabilities and for a brief period in the mid-1980s the RMN was the fastest growing navy in Asia.The acquisition of new capabilities has not beenwithout difficulties but the RMN has at least beenassisted in its expansion by the more general nationalplan to industrialise. Navies are technologicallyorientated and like other regional navies the RMN hasfound that the continuing push for industrialisationbrings with it an improving capacity to operate andmaintain sophisticated systems. The dilemma offinding a proper balance between the constabularyand warfighting roles remains but a partial solution isbeing sought in the RMN’s current plan for a largebuy of offshore patrol vessels. 6 These craft will becapable of a flexible and graduated response, fittedwith a full combat system, helicopter and guns, butretaining space and weight for anti-ship and antiaircraftmissiles.With less extensive littoral zones Singapore’smaritime security problems tend to be less complexthan those of Malaysia. Yet Singapore has long feltthat its small size, and hence lack of defensive depth,requires the ability to detect and challenge potentialthreats well beyond its borders. Patrol boats armed
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ISSUE 125 : Jul/Aug - 1997 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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