ISSUE 125 : Jul/Aug - 1997 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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MANOEUVRE FROM THE SEA – THE FORGOTTEN FORCE MULTIPLIER 51as part of a total capability. Indeed, in the amphibiouscontext the total Ship-to-Shore requirement must beassessed, in order that a balanced capability,encompassing all air and surface resources, can bedeveloped. It is envisaged that the same would be trueof C4I as well as many other common-userrequirements.This is perhaps, not as formidable a task as mightfirst appear but would require that the utility ofManoeuvre from the Sea be essentially acknowledgedas a strategic capability and that the profile ofAmphibious Warfare be significantly raised byaffording it the level of strategic importance that itmerits. It would then be possible to develop an ADFconcept of Amphibious operations, which capitalisedon the flexibility afforded by such operations.In terms of resources, the ADF has longmaintained a limited amphibious capability, throughthe employment of such Naval units as HMASTobruk, HMAS Jervis Bay, the LCHs and NLE,whilst Army has maintained the LCM 8s andLARCs. However, it is in regard to the acquisitionand development of their successors, such as the twonewly acquired LSTs (HMAS Kanimbla andManoora), that all factors pertaining to theiremployment must be considered to ensure that interms of Manoeuvre from the Sea, a total capability isdeveloped. It should be noted that a significant Jointcapability existed prior to the dis-establishment of theAustralian Amphibious Squadron, when theSquadron was located in Brisbane with 6 Bde. Theproximity of HMAS Moreton to Enoggera ArmyBarracks enabled a considerable level of joint trainingand staff planning to be conducted. This resulted in ahigh level of interoperability and rapport beingachieved between all involved Army and Navalelements.ConclusionThe progression by many countries, towards amore responsive and integrated Joint Forcecomprising a balanced force structure is indicative ofthe reliance now being placed upon the mobility andspeed of response, afforded by Manoeuvre Warfareand in particular Manoeuvre from the Sea. In terms ofmaximising military options available to the ADF, ineither responding to, or pre-empting an incursion ontoAustralian territory, it is considered that the versatilityand Force Multiplier effect afforded by Manoeuvrefrom the Sea, is a capability that the ADF can nolonger afford to ignore. The ability to conduct limitedamphibious operations in set piece scenarios has beenconsistently proven by the ADF since Exercise K81but its full potential as a highly versatile andresponsive “Modus Operandi” has yet to be realised.However, for the ADF to acquire such a capability,will require that the development of AmphibiousWarfare be taken out of the Single Service arena andits future development guided by an appropriateAmphibious Authority.The window of opportunity to develop this latentcapability is now open and should be taken.The concept of Manoeuvre from the Sea as afunction of short warning conflict and or contingencysituations would provide the ADF with an enhancedcapability to respond effectively to a wide variety ofpossible scenarios. Manoeuvre from the Sea affordsthe Joint Force Commander with the ability to use thecoastal flank of a landward AO for manoeuvre,whereby elements of his force can be inserted,reinforced or redeployed from the sea. That hisForward Support Base can range hundreds ofkilometres along a coastline in 24 hours to supportoperations ashore speaks volumes for the flexibilityand logistic sustainment such a capability provides. Interms of any increase to Defence involvement withinthe region, the same attributes remain valid andindeed are enhanced by the significant forcemultiplier effect such capabilities would bring tomany areas of the region. This is especially true ofisolated areas that are lacking in infrastructure andsupport facilities. It is therefore considered to be ofthe utmost strategic importance that the versatility andlatent capability of a Sea-borne Joint Force capable ofproviding either military or humanitarian assistance,be recognised. The ability to undertake suchoperations, is however dependent upon theavailability of appropriate naval and other assignedforces, with suitable amphibious and C4I capability.Whilst landing craft will always be required for themovement of heavier equipment and logistic resupplyashore, either through a Port or over a suitable beachas a LOTS operation, the primary means ofmovement ashore will be by helicopter. Helicoptersprovide the Commander with the most versatile andresponsive movement capability but requires that allof the helicopter force is suitably marinised, so thatthey are able to support operations ashore on a fluidand highly responsive basis. Under these broaderconditions Amphibious operations would be similarto Airmobile operations, except that they would bemounted and supported, from the sea. A high level ofamphibious planning and training would however berequired to ensure that such operations could beplanned and conducted on a fluid and responsivebasis. Whilst this capability may not be relevant to
52AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997every future ADF contingency, it is considered that asthe “classic Joint Operation,” Manoeuvre from theSea provides the ADF with a sound basis forconducting a number of ADF Joint Operations. Asarguably the most complex of all Joint Operationsand requiring the greatest levels of integration at alllevels, this capability is regarded as vital. Manoeuvrefrom the Sea should therefore be adopted as a keyADF strategic capability, to ensure that the ADF isable to respond quickly and effectively to anypotential contingency that might arise within theregion in the foreseeable future.“Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategicasset that a sea power possesses”.(Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart , Deterrence orDefence (1960))NOTES1. BR 1806 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine CH 4.2. Weekend Australian, May 18 1996, Rethinking our Defence,Paul Dibb.3. Blitzkrieg from the Sea: Maneuver Warfare and AmphibiousOperations, Captain Richard S. Moore. United States MarineCorps, Naval War College, Newport, RI (May 1983).4. Operational Maneuver from the Sea, by General Charles C.Krulak, Commandant General United States Marine Corps.Proceedings (January 1997).5. The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine CH 3.6. The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine CH 5.This article first appeared in the Journal of the Australian NavalInstitute.Lieutenant Commander John Robinson joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1985, after 18 years service with the Royal Marines(RM). During his Royal Marines service he served as an Instructor at Commando School RM (1968-1971), Commanded SupportWeapons Troops (Anti-Tank) in 40 Cdo RM (1971 -1973), and (Mortar) 42 Cdo RM ( 1973 - 1976).Qualified as Primary Forward Air Controller to 3 Commando Brigade RM, and appointed OC 611 TACP (1976-1979), CommandedRM Security Detachment Clyde Submarine Base Scotland (1979-1980). Appointed Second-in-Command and Operations Officer,Commachio Company (CT), Arbroath, Scotland (1980-1982). Posted on Exchange to AJWE as RM Amphibious Instructor(1982-1984). On return to UK, he was posted as Adjutant and Second in Command of Royal Marines, Deal, UK (1985).He has undertaken operational tours of duty in The Middle East, Northern Ireland and Belize and training exercises in many othercountries around the world. Since joining the RAN he has served with JEPS (1986-1988) (1992), graduated from the Naval StaffCollege (1988), appointed to Directorate of Naval Operations (DNO) as Staff Officer Joint Warfare (SOJW) then as Director JointWarfare Navy (DJW-N) (1988-1991). Appointed to Directorate of Submarine Policy and Warfare (DSMPW) as Assistant Director(ADSMPW) (Jan 1993 - Dec 1996).Lieutenant Commander Robinson is currently serving as the Staff Officer Support Forces in DGFD (Sea) with special responsibilityfor Joint Project 2048 - LPA Watercraft.
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ISSUE 125 : Jul/Aug - 1997 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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