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national populism and slovak – hungarian relations in - MEK

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Zsolt GálNational Populism <strong>and</strong> Slovak – Hungarian Relations <strong>in</strong> Slovakia 2006 – 2009. Forum M<strong>in</strong>ority Research Institute Šamorín – Somorja, 2009government <strong>and</strong> public <strong>in</strong>stitutions that had to be disencumbered later on (e.g.various health service establishments).There were three pr<strong>in</strong>cipal sources of implicit <strong>in</strong>debtedness: first,gr<strong>and</strong>iose <strong>in</strong>vestment projects f<strong>in</strong>anced from loans with government guaranteessuch as construction of highways, the Gabèíkovo hydroelectric powerplant or the Mochovce nuclear power plant; second, soft budgetary restrictionsapplied by government <strong>and</strong> quasi-government <strong>in</strong>stitutions as well asby state-run <strong>and</strong> privatized banks; last but not least, one must not forgetabout poor law enforceability <strong>and</strong> flawed bankruptcy legislation. Table 3shows a rapid growth <strong>in</strong> the volume of classified (i.e. overdue) claims thatoccurred as the result of soft budgetary restrictions <strong>and</strong> poor rule of law<strong>in</strong>stitutions.Table 3Implicit form of fiscal expansion: growth <strong>in</strong> total volume of overdue claims<strong>in</strong> Slovakia between 1995 <strong>and</strong> 1999 (billion SKK) Note: * As of September 30, 1999.Source: “Poh¾adávky po lehote splatnosti v SR” [‘Overdue Claims <strong>in</strong> the Slovak Republic],Trend No. 15/2000, April 12, 2000, 4A.Classified loans accumulated by Slovak banks turned out to be the greatestsource of debt. Dur<strong>in</strong>g subsequent consolidation of the country’s bank<strong>in</strong>gsector, a substantial part of this debt was converted <strong>in</strong>to public debt; thecosts of consolidation (1999–2000) exceeded 200 billion crowns (€6.64 billion)<strong>and</strong> were five times higher than revenues generated by privatizationof banks. 11 These costs did not <strong>in</strong>flate public f<strong>in</strong>ance deficits <strong>and</strong> public debtuntil 1999–2001; but although this <strong>in</strong>dicator of expansive fiscal policy wasmanifested belatedly, it was a direct consequence of implicit deficits producedby the previous Vladimír Meèiar adm<strong>in</strong>istration that ruled between1994 <strong>and</strong> 1998. The second <strong>in</strong>dicator of populist policies <strong>in</strong>dicated the economicgrowth’s unsusta<strong>in</strong>able nature from the very outset. “The deficit ofthe current account <strong>in</strong> the period of 1996–1998 averaged 10% of GDP <strong>and</strong>194

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