national populism and slovak â hungarian relations in - MEK

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Annex – Kálmán PetõczNational Populism and Slovak – Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006 – 2009. Forum Minority Research Institute Šamorín – Somorja, 2009tion of bridges over borderline rivers that are inevitable to facilitate furthereconomic growth of border areas and strengthen friendly ties between theirinhabitants because these bridges might serve as the starting point of enemytroops’ offensive against Slovakia.At the same time, these arguments serve as tools of paralyzing the politicalopposition through creating an atmosphere in which virtually no relevantpolitical force dares assume a non-ideological position on any issueconcerning ethnic Hungarians in order to avoid being ostracized by the others.As a result, most political players’ views on Slovak–Hungarian disputesslowly drift to the ‘centre’. Consequently, almost every quarrel that is initiatedby Slovak national populists and provokes any kind of reaction fromethnic Hungarians is interpreted by centrist mainstream of the country’spolitical elite and journalistic community as a clash of ‘two nationalisms’.On the other hand, arguments initiated by ethnic Hungarians are ‘obvious’without further consideration (i.e. ethnic Hungarians are responsible). Sucha shift toward the ‘centre’ inevitably opens a broad manoeuvring space forhardcore national populists on both sides of the Danube River.Any organizations, institutions or groups of individuals in Slovakia orabroad that either openly side with ethnic Hungarians or dare criticize governmentdue to different reasons immediately become suspicious as well.The following three reactions by Prime Minister Robert Fico and his politicalallies provide typical examples of this pattern.After the socialist faction of the European Parliament decided on July5, 2006, to initiate the procedure leading to suspension of SMER-SD associatedmembership in the Party of European Socialists on grounds of itsgovernment alliance with the nationalist SNS, Fico immediately pointed afinger at “supranational corporations and monopolies that are afraid of losingtheir profits in Slovakia” as well as on Hungarian MEPs who wereallegedly unable to get over the fact that SMK–MKP was no longer in government.In August 2008 when the Open Society Foundation published the findingsof a survey that revealed negative views of 14–15 year-old primaryschool pupils on ethnic Hungarians and their use of Hungarian language,government officials labelled the survey as manipulated and serving theinterests of foreign customers.In the same month when a non-governmental organization called FairplayAlliance criticized SMER-SD for having concluded non-standardadvantageous tenancy for its headquarters in Bratislava, the party’s reactiondid not focus on responding to the essence of criticism and clarifying thecontract’s background but pointing out that Fair-play Alliance was financed278
Most Frequent Stereotypes Concerning Slovak–Hungarian Relations...by George Soros, American entrepreneur and philanthropist ofJewish–Hungarian descent. If impartial observers considered the reaction’scontext, including the prime minister’s effort to pronounce Soros’s name sothat it sounded as Hungarian as possible (something like Szõrös, which doesnot correspond to the truth), they would have difficulties resisting the feelingthat the criticized subject tried to defend itself by pointing the finger atall ‘enemies’ of Slovakia, i.e. Hungarians, Americans (?), Jews (?) and nongovernmentalorganizations siding with the Hungarians.The truth is that the entire concept of autonomy as well as the word‘autonomy’ itself is excessively demonized in Slovakia along with politicianswho utter the word even in the most informal conversation. An equallydemonized issue is that of ‘abolishing’ Beneš decrees. Slovak nationalpopulists strive to create an impression as if ethnic Hungarian politicians(i.e. SMK–MKP leaders) questioned Beneš decrees as such by using thefollowing assertion: ‘They want to question the results of World War II,which is a clear attack on sovereignty of the Slovak state.’More than one hundred decrees issued in the course of World War IIby exile Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš served primarily the purposeof ensuring legal continuity of the Czechoslovak Republic between 1938and 1945. No one has ever questioned Beneš decrees as such. SMK–MKPleaders are merely concerned about a dozen or so of those decrees that ledto several years of discrimination and stigmatization of ethnic Hungariancitizens based on the principle of collective guilt. The issue is that moresensitive for ethnic Hungarians who live in a state that de facto continuesto view them as traitors and war criminals. Although Slovak authoritiesadmit themselves that Beneš decrees are legally ‘consumed’ (i.e. they cannotconstitute new legal relations and cannot become the source of newdecisions by executive and judicial organs), they continue to remain an integralpart of Slovakia’s legal system.So, the state’s relation to one quite sizeable category of its citizensremains unresolved, especially after the National Council of the SlovakRepublic in September 2007 passed a resolution by which it repeatedly subscribedto Beneš decrees. Another interesting question that remains unansweredis whether government has the moral right to expect unconditionalloyalty of the group of its own citizens from which it refuses to lift thesymbolic stigma of collective guilt. A paradoxical and bizarrely comicalaspect of the entire issue is the fact that passing the resolution on Benešdecrees was initiated by the Slovak National Party, a party that openly subscribesto the legacy of the wartime Slovak State from the period of1939–1944. Legally speaking, it is quite impossible to subscribe to theNational Populism and Slovak – Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006 – 2009. Forum Minority Research Institute Šamorín – Somorja, 2009279
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NATIONAL POPULISMAND SLOVAK - HUNGA
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National Populism and Slovak - Hung
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NatioNal PoPulismaNd slovak - HuNga
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ContentIntroduction................
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ContentZsolt Gál: Argentina on the
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iNtroductioNPolitical development i
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Introductionweapons, such as exposi
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Peter uèeò:Approaching National P
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Approaching National Populismpopula
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Approaching National Populismdirect
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Approaching National Populismnation
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Approaching National Populismmakes
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Approaching National PopulismThe fo
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Approaching National Populismas Slo
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Approaching National Populismenemie
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Approaching National PopulismWhat o
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Peter UèeòNational Populism and S
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Grigorij MesežnikovNational Populi
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Kálmán PetõczNational Populism a
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Zsolt GálNational Populism and Slo
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Miroslav KocúrNational Populism an
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List of abbreviationsNational Popul
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AuthorsNational Populism and Slovak
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AuthorsNational Populism and Slovak
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Political development in Central Eu
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