national populism and slovak – hungarian relations in - MEK

Slovakia since 2004...the situation and defeated Bugár by a thin margin in the March 31 party ballot,most probably with the help from Duray’s wing.The public, the media and the political scene immediately reacted to thechange in SMK–MKP leadership by alleging its potential radicalization;some KDH leaders even proposed to “place [SMK–MKP] under a quarantinefor some time”. The media began to portray Bugár almost as a martyr,without giving a serious thought to the fact that his ousting might havebeen caused by natural and even logical processes. They ad nauseam repeatedphrases that did not fully correspond to the truth, for instance that Durayhad become the second most powerful man in SMK–MKP; in fact, Durayheld the post of the party’s number two, i.e. executive vice-chairman, duringBugár’s tenure while he was ‘demoted’ to a regular vice-chairman atthe March congress. True, Duray continued in his habit of commenting onrelevant Slovak issues for Hungarian media and at various cultural andpolitical events organized in Hungary, further irritating the Slovak public;however, he was doing nothing more than he used to do when Bugár wasat the helm.The problem was that Pál Csáky was not prepared to take over powerwithin SMK–MKP. He did not come up with any clear, thought-out strategyto tackle the problems based on which he had criticized Bugár. Insteadof patiently and steadfastly working on winning over the public opinion inSlovakia as well as in Hungary, Csáky often reacted peevishly or evasivelyto journalists’ questions, setting most Slovak media against himself. 10Without proper previous preparation, he accentuated issues in the publicdiscourse that irritated not only the SNS but the entire political scene inSlovakia.Here, we should point out that highlighting the issue of autonomy orcriticizing the lingering implications of Beneš decrees (or, more precisely,those of the decrees that enacted the principle of the Hungarians’ collectiveguilt for the events of 1938–1944) cannot be called a provocation, let alonean act of extremism, by itself. After all, both these issues formed an integralpart of programs of all parties representing ethnic Hungarians between1990 and 1998; after they merged to create SMK–MKP in 1998, theseissues were incorporated into the new party’s program. As far as the autonomyissue goes, one should note that whenever political representatives ofethnic Hungarians spoke of some forms of autonomy (i.e. minority self-governance),they always referred to already existing western European models.Nevertheless, accentuating these issues in Slovakia’s political atmosphereof 2007 had two effects: first, the entire diapason of Slovak partiesNational Populism and Slovak – Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006 – 2009. Forum Minority Research Institute Šamorín – Somorja, 200973