Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...

CHAPTER 6
have been administered by the Organization Department of the party’s Central Commit-
tee and contain positions within the party, the government, the military, state controlled
enterprizes, and other politically sensitive entities (e.g. universities, professional and civic
associations). Although the nomenklatura system probably represents the most systematic
form of administrative formalization of benefits to party membership and service, the precise
content of nomenklatura lists and criteria for promotion to a position on the lists have been
rarely publicly stated. 10
Whatarethepoliticalconsequences ofsuchhierarchicalassignmentofserviceandbenefits
within authoritarian parties? Before examining in detail the role of recruitment, promotion,
and retirement policies that shape this feature of authoritarian parties, consider a simple
illustration of how hierarchical assignment of service and benefits contributes to the survival
of dictatorships. To keep this illustration as simple as possible, suppose that a dictator needs
the active support of two citizens in order to stay in power. Consider first cooptation within
the institutional structure of a regime party. To stay with the most rudimentary concept of
a hierarchical party structure, suppose that the party apparatus consists of only two ranks
of membership, junior and senior members. Juniors provide costly service for the regime
at the individual cost c > 0, whereas seniors enjoy the individual benefit b, b > c. For now,
assume that citizens live for two periods only; a junior automatically becomes a senior after
one period of service and all seniors retire after one period. Then, in any period and after
accounting for the costly service that juniors provide, the dictator’s total net expenditures
on the party are b−c.
I will refer to cooptation without an authoritarian party as cooptation via transfers.
10 On the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see Grzyma̷la-Busse (2002), Rigby (1988), and Voslensky
(1984); on China, see Landry (2008) and Shambaugh (2009); on Cuba see Domínguez (1978).
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