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Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...

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CHAPTER 6<br />

service <strong>an</strong>d benefits within authoritari<strong>an</strong> parties. <strong>The</strong> <strong>as</strong>sumption of only two party r<strong>an</strong>ks is<br />

probably the starkest departure from real-world partis<strong>an</strong> hierarchies. This is a simplification<br />

whose sole purpose is to facilitate our examination of the incentives that emerge within<br />

party hierarchies by keeping our <strong>an</strong>alysis tractable. This <strong>as</strong>sumption c<strong>an</strong> be e<strong>as</strong>ily relaxed:<br />

we c<strong>an</strong> view the present setting <strong>as</strong> a partial model of career incentives across <strong>an</strong>y two levels<br />

of a multi-level party hierarchy. For inst<strong>an</strong>ce, our partial <strong>an</strong>alysis implies that, in order to<br />

provide sufficient incentives for party membership <strong>an</strong>d costly service by the junior r<strong>an</strong>ks,<br />

the ch<strong>an</strong>ces of promotion only have to be positive, not necessarily certain. When applied to<br />

<strong>an</strong>y two levels of the party hierarchy, this result explains the pyramid-shaped structure of<br />

party apparatusesthat we typically observe inauthoritari<strong>an</strong>parties. 19 Similarly, we saw that<br />

after a junior party member provides costly service, she acquires <strong>an</strong> interest in the regime’s<br />

perpetuation. When applied across <strong>an</strong>y two levels of the party hierarchy, this insight implies<br />

that a stake in the regime’s survival compounds with a member’s r<strong>an</strong>k in the party hierarchy.<br />

6.1.2 Political Control over Appointments<br />

M<strong>an</strong>y single-party dictatorships appear to have <strong>as</strong>pired after total political <strong>an</strong>d social control<br />

of their societies. As articulated by Benito Mussolini’s (1935, 30) “everything in the State,<br />

nothing outside the State, nothing against the State” (Mussolini 1935, 30), the presumed<br />

political ambition of these regimes w<strong>as</strong> a complete fusion of the state, the party, <strong>an</strong>d the<br />

society. Cl<strong>as</strong>sic works on totalitari<strong>an</strong>ism have attributed this tendency to the social atomiza-<br />

tion of modern m<strong>as</strong>s societies (Arendt 1951, 308-17) <strong>an</strong>d the emergence of all-encomp<strong>as</strong>sing<br />

ideologies whose ultimate goal w<strong>as</strong> to tr<strong>an</strong>sform the hum<strong>an</strong> nature (Friedrich <strong>an</strong>d Brzezin-<br />

19 See e.g. Brownlee (2007, <strong>Chapter</strong> 2), Hinnebusch (2002, <strong>Chapter</strong> 4), L<strong>an</strong>dry (2008), <strong>an</strong>d Staar (1988).<br />

27

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