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Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...

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u NS<br />

i<br />

CHAPTER 6<br />

= b/(1−δ) is her payoff after a promotion. <strong>The</strong> modified party service constraint (6.7)<br />

<strong>as</strong>ks that u J i ≥ u NJ<br />

i . Intuitively, incentives for party membership <strong>an</strong>d the provision of the<br />

<strong>as</strong>sociated costly service are stronger when the likelihood q of obtaining benefits equivalent<br />

to party seniority outside the party is minimal.<br />

<strong>The</strong> present expl<strong>an</strong>ation also suggests that – even thought dictatorships with single par-<br />

ties may maintain deeper <strong>an</strong>d more extensive political control over their societies th<strong>an</strong> dicta-<br />

torships with domin<strong>an</strong>t parties – the underlying political logic is identical. Thus one extreme<br />

may be exemplified by the Soviet nomenklatura system whose essence, according to Rigby<br />

(1988, 523), w<strong>as</strong> to “consciously m<strong>an</strong>age every area of socially relev<strong>an</strong>t activity, outside a<br />

closely circumscribed private sphere, through <strong>an</strong> array of hierarchically structured formal<br />

org<strong>an</strong>izations, all coordinated <strong>an</strong>d directed at the center <strong>an</strong>d at successively lower levels by<br />

the apparatus of the Communist <strong>Party</strong>.” When Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms com-<br />

promised the Chinese Communist <strong>Party</strong>’s ability to maintain such control in the emerging<br />

private sector, Ji<strong>an</strong>g Zemin recommended that private entrepreneurs be allowed to join the<br />

CCP <strong>an</strong>d encouraged the formation of gr<strong>as</strong>sroots party org<strong>an</strong>izations within private corpo-<br />

rations (Dickson 2003).<br />

On the other h<strong>an</strong>d, party control over key economic <strong>an</strong>d social appointments in dictator-<br />

ships with domin<strong>an</strong>t <strong>an</strong>d hegemonic parties is typically less formalized <strong>an</strong>d perv<strong>as</strong>ive th<strong>an</strong><br />

in dictatorships with single parties. <strong>The</strong>se regimes primarily rely on a bloated public sec-<br />

tor for the distribution of politically administered patronage (Blaydes 2010; Magaloni 2006;<br />

V<strong>an</strong> de Walle 2001) <strong>as</strong> well <strong>as</strong> the regulation <strong>an</strong>d co-ownership of the private sector. In<br />

Singapore, to take one example, the sole legal trade union since 1968 is the pro-government<br />

National Trade Union Congress <strong>an</strong>dthe government maintains political influence throughout<br />

29

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