Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...
Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...
Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...
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Me<strong>an</strong> Ruling Coalition Age<br />
in Years<br />
5 10 15 20 25 30<br />
CHAPTER 6<br />
0−9 10−19 20−29 30−39 40−49 50−59 60−69 70−79 80−89 90−99<br />
Me<strong>an</strong> Legislative Seat Share<br />
Me<strong>an</strong> Ruling Coalition Age Linear Fit<br />
Figure 6.3: <strong>The</strong> <strong>as</strong>sociation between legislative seat share <strong>an</strong>d the age of authoritari<strong>an</strong> ruling<br />
coalitions, 1946-2008.<br />
Inordertoillustratethis<strong>as</strong>sociation, Iplottheme<strong>an</strong>ageofauthoritari<strong>an</strong>rulingcoalitions<br />
against the me<strong>an</strong> share of legislative seats that the coalition’s regime party controlled in<br />
Figure 6.3. To simplify the presentation, the latter qu<strong>an</strong>tity is grouped into ten equally<br />
spaced intervals. We see that dictatorships with regime parties that control a supermajority<br />
of legislative seats survive on average almost <strong>as</strong> long <strong>as</strong> those with single parties.<br />
To summarize, the findings of this empirical <strong>an</strong>alysis are consistent with the implications<br />
of my theoretical <strong>an</strong>alysis in Section 6.1. We see that the empirical <strong>as</strong>sociation between<br />
dictatorships withsingleparties<strong>an</strong>dthesurvival oftheregimesthatmaintainthemisrobust.<br />
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