Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

CHAPTER 6 opposed the proposed changes because “older officials were faced with the constant threat of replacement by younger men, while younger officials believed that the rules would prevent them from enjoying long careers at the top” (Tompson 1995, 244). In fact, some attribute Khrushchev’s fall to the party elite’s hostility to these policies (Tompson 2003, 22). The present model clarifies the political risk that reforms that reduce benefits to senior ranks within the party entail. By curtailing the benefits to party seniority, Khrushchev was threatening those ranks within the party who would otherwise have the largest stake in his survival – as long as their benefits are preserved. As in the simpler model earlier, a challenger who would like to attract defectors from the leader’s ruling coalition must offer a per-period benefit of at least (1−δ)u J i and (1−δ)uS i to any junior and senior party member, respectively. Because the seniors’ cost of party service is sunk, they have to be offered more than juniors to be willing to defect, u S i > uJ i . But note that party-based cooptation only protects the incumbent dictator against those challengers who might dismantle the party hierarchy after they come to office, as is typically thecaseafteraregimechangeorthearrivalofasubstantiallydifferentrulingcoalition. Party- based cooptation does not safeguard against challengers from within the party who propose to maintain or even increase the benefits to the senior ranks. After he removed Khrushchev from power in 1964, Brezhnev reversed Khrushchev’s cadre policies and instead emphasized the “stability of cadres”. This earned him the loyalty of the party’s senior membership but at the long-term cost of an ossified party structure, the emergence of local fiefdoms, and lack of incentives for a younger generation of party members to provide political service (Mawdsley and White 2000; Tompson 2003). 16 Geddes (1999b, 122) prominently observed 16 A major internal policy theme in Gorbachev’stenure as General Secretary was a correctionto this trend 22
CHAPTER 6 that single-party regimes “tend to be brought down by exogenous events rather than internal splits.” The present analysis helps us understand why single-party regimes remain resilient to elite defections in spite of frequent internal factionalism. The maintenance of an appropriate balance in promotion and retirement policies poses a distinct challenge in dominant party systems. Because these regimes have multiparty elections, disgruntled juniors who were passed up for a promotion and seniors who are being pressured into retirement may challenge the party as independents or opposition candidates. When, in attempts at party “renewal”, Lee Kuan Yew pressured senior party members into political retirement, he reluctantly kept the former government minister Toh Chin Chye as a member of parliament for the People’s Action Party because Toh could easily win his district as an independent. Only when the boundaries of his district had been redrawn could Toh be retired and even then he became one Lee’s most powerful critics (Mauzy and Milne 2002). Arelated concern shaped theprocess by which presidential candidates for Mexico’s ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party used to be unveiled: The incumbent president tactically delayed the announcement of the next PRI nominee as long as possible, so that all in- fluential cabinet members believed that they stood a chance. Otherwise they might have attempted to defect from the party with enough time to promote an independent candidacy, as Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas did in 1988 after he unsuccessfully tried to win the presidential nomination within the PRI (Castañeda 2000). Although the official nomination to the presidential candidacy guaranteed the chosen candidate the presidency – and was therefore technically apromotion–itimpliedpoliticalretirement formostoftheunsuccessful hopefuls. In fact, Mexico under the PRI provides an example of uniquely intertwined promotion (Bunce 1999; Mawdsley and White 2000; Rush 1991). 23
Page 1 and 2: Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties
Page 3 and 4: CHAPTER 6 and outside of authoritar
Page 5 and 6: CHAPTER 6 political coalitions and
Page 7 and 8: to counter opposition to the exerci
Page 9 and 10: CHAPTER 6 consists of parties under
Page 11 and 12: CHAPTER 6 borhoods, and public inst
Page 13 and 14: CHAPTER 6 have been administered by
Page 15 and 16: CHAPTER 6 Table 6.1: A comparison o
Page 17 and 18: CHAPTER 6 party service and benefit
Page 19 and 20: CHAPTER 6 generosity of the benefit
Page 21: elevance of the parameters b, w, an
Page 25 and 26: CHAPTER 6 or dismissal of thousands
Page 27 and 28: CHAPTER 6 service and benefits with
Page 29 and 30: u NS i CHAPTER 6 = b/(1−δ) is he
Page 31 and 32: CHAPTER 6 any party that is in the
Page 33 and 34: CHAPTER 6 appointments enhances inc
Page 35 and 36: CHAPTER 6 ality, suppose thattheinc
Page 37 and 38: CHAPTER 6 While both approaches fin
Page 39 and 40: ehind the regime’s stability (Mag
Page 41 and 42: Frequency 0 50 100 150 200 0 20 40
Page 43 and 44: CHAPTER 6 Table 6.3: Restrictions o
Page 45 and 46: Density 0 .005 .01 .015 .02 .025 CH
Page 47 and 48: CHAPTER 6 parties that on average c
Page 49 and 50: CHAPTER 6 Table 6.6: The effect of
Page 51 and 52: CHAPTER 6 I attempted a stronger te
Page 53 and 54: CHAPTER 6 - take advantage of natur
Page 55 and 56: Bibliography Abrami, Regina, Edmund
Page 57 and 58: Press. BIBLIOGRAPHY Dickson, Bruce
Page 59 and 60: tution. BIBLIOGRAPHY Huntington, Sa
Page 61 and 62: BIBLIOGRAPHY Central Committee and
Page 63: World Bank. 2008. World Development

Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?