Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...

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CHAPTER 6 Table 6.5: Three subgroups of authoritarian regime parties by legislative seat share Subgroup Fraction Legislative Seat Share Mean Variance 95% Conf. Int. Dominant/hegemonic parties 69.35% 75.78 11.93 (73.41,78.15) Parties under competitive auth. 22.88% 51.39 7.04 (48.90,53.88) Transitional cases 7.78% 19.57 7.55 (17.21,21.94) Note: The unit of observation is a country-year. Maximum-likelihood estimates of a 3-component mixture of Normal densities. by authoritarian regime parties across all dictatorships with multiple parties. A notable feature of the distribution in Figure 6.2 is that it appears to contain three qualitatively distinct groups of observations. Going from left to right, there first appears to be small subset of regime parties that only have a minority of legislative seats, next there is a larger group of parties that on average control a bare majority of legislative seats, and finally, there is a large group of regime parties that command a supermajority of legislative seats. In order to better understand and quantify the differences between these three groups, I fit to this data a mixture of three Normal densities. 31 As Table 6.5 summarizes and the density plots in Figure 6.2 illustrate, the three groups are reasonably well represented by Normal densities with mean seat shares of 19.57, 51.39, and 75.78. The estimates in Table 6.5 also indicate that the three groups are distinct: the 95% confidence intervals for the three means do not overlap. The largest of these subgroups contains roughly 69% of all observations and describes 31 Since the share of legislative seats is bounded between 0 and 1, the Normal distribution is not the most appropriate probability model for this setting; I adopt it primarily because its parameters are easily interpreted. On the estimation of finite mixture models, see McLachlan and Peel (2000). 46
CHAPTER 6 parties that on average control about three-fourths of all legislative seats. Two examples of well-known observations in this subgroup are the PRI in Mexico during the period between 1946 and 1987 and Golkar in Indonesia under Suharto (1971-1998). The observations in this subgroup thus correspond to a conceptual category that has been alternately referred to as dominant parties (Greene 2007; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Reuter and Gandhi 2010) or hegemonic parties (Magaloni 2006; Blaydes 2010). The second largest of these three groups has the mean legislative seat share of 51.39% and accounts for roughly one-fifth of all observations. In this group, the regime party has close to a bare majority or minority in the legislature. One prominent observations in this subgroup is the Kenya African National Union (KANU) after Daniel Arap Moi restored multiparty elections in 1992; KANU controlled 53% and 51% of legislative seats in the two terms between 1992 and 2002. Another example is the PRI which only controlled 52% and 48% of legislative seats in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies for parts of Carlos Salinas’s and Ernesto Zedillo’s presidencies. 32 As these cases illustrate, significant legislative opposition exists in this subgroup of regimes, even if it is divided. Hence the political setting under which regime parties in this subgroup operate may be conceptually characterized as “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2006) or “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002). The last of these three groups may seem somewhat perplexing: with the mean legislative seat share of only 19.57%, the authoritarian leader’s party is hardly in charge of the legislature. However, once we examine the observations corresponding to this group, we see that they primarily reflect temporary transitional scenarios, in which either a democracy just 32 This are the legislative terms of 1988-1990 and 1998-2000, respectively. 47
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Page 63: World Bank. 2008. World Development

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