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Chapter 6 Why Authoritarian Parties? The Regime Party as an ...

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CHAPTER 6<br />

<strong>an</strong>d retirement policies within a domin<strong>an</strong>t party regime. Due to a constitutionally m<strong>an</strong>dated<br />

one-term limit for all elected posts, a ch<strong>an</strong>ge in the administration every six <strong>an</strong>d, at the<br />

municipal level, three years implied the re-<strong>as</strong>signment or retirement for not only elected<br />

politici<strong>an</strong>s but also for thous<strong>an</strong>ds of government employees who held a position due their<br />

political or clientelistic <strong>as</strong>sociation with a politici<strong>an</strong> in <strong>an</strong> elected post. Thus in the 1960s,<br />

accordingtoBr<strong>an</strong>denburg(1964,157), everysix-year administrationwitnessed “aturnoverof<br />

approximately 18,000elective offices<strong>an</strong>d25,000appointive posts.” <strong>The</strong>coupling ofthefixed,<br />

term-b<strong>as</strong>edtimehorizonwiththePRI’s politicaldomin<strong>an</strong>ce inMexico resulted in<strong>as</strong>ystem of<br />

upward <strong>an</strong>d downward political mobility that w<strong>as</strong> distinctively interlocked. <strong>The</strong> expectation<br />

of such mobility is consistent with the present model’s emph<strong>as</strong>is on <strong>an</strong> appropriate bal<strong>an</strong>ce<br />

in the provision of incentives for political party service between the promise of promotion<br />

<strong>an</strong>d a positive rate of political retirement. In the c<strong>as</strong>e of Mexico, the nature of this incentive-<br />

preserving bal<strong>an</strong>ce is eloquently summarized by Grindle (1977, 42):<br />

“<strong>The</strong> six-year procession often resembles a national game of musical chairs in<br />

which the same actors may reappear in different positions; new players are freely<br />

admitted, however, <strong>an</strong>d the number of chairs may be enlarged to accommodate<br />

some of them. Those who fail to find a chair <strong>an</strong>d must leave the game do so<br />

knowingly they have the possibility of reentering it at a later date.”<br />

Note, however, thatthe<strong>an</strong>alysis above doesnotrequire that theregime’s leadership retire<br />

on a regular b<strong>as</strong>is or even with a positive probability, <strong>as</strong> w<strong>as</strong> the c<strong>as</strong>e in Mexico under the<br />

PRI. This w<strong>as</strong> a unique feature of the Mexic<strong>an</strong> dictatorship, which I addressed in <strong>Chapter</strong> 4,<br />

<strong>an</strong>d which the present model does not account for. 17 Nonetheless, the regular re-<strong>as</strong>signment<br />

17 In <strong>Chapter</strong> 4, I suggested that Mexic<strong>an</strong> presidential term limits were a rather unique form of intertem-<br />

24

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