"ONE-A-PENNY, IWO \-PI NM . . ."of air power means air assets must be retainedunder the highest practical level of centralisedcommand and control, and that they must becommanded by a leader experienced in the applicationof air power. Air forces, in fact, areadamant about this because historical experiencealso showed that the impact of unity ofair power has even greater consequences fomilitary effectiveness than the impact of unity• of the other combat powers. Similarly, experienceand logical analysis showed that airpower, divided, produces disproportionatelylarge reductions in military effectiveness incomparison with the effects of disunity in landor sea power. Aviators understood this adverseconsequence and they argued tenaciously forthe "invisibility of air power", a termsynonymous with unity of air power: bothterms mean that air power assumes its greateststrength when it is applied holistically as adistinct entity, rather than simply in a collectionof roles. Air power theorists and practitionersarrived at this conclusion for a number ofreasons, and these self-same reasons also exemplifyunity as the cardinal tenet of air power.These reasons warrant further analysis.Air power can be employed in a number ofstrategies at any one time, but it can only do sosuccessfully if its forces are unified under appropriatecommand. At the introduction to thisarticle the suggestion was made that support forthe other services was only one of the strategiesavailable to air power. There are two otherdistinct but interactive aerial strategies whichhave direct application for air forces andwhich, in their own right, can have direct andindependent influence on the outcome of thewar. One is to attack an enemy's war fightingcapacity; that is, to inflict moral or materialdamage directly on his homeland. The second isto oppose and defeat his air forces. Thesestrategies are termed Strategic Strike and AirSuperiority respectively. The three strategies ofair power are not independent actions wherebyone follows another in some battle campaignsequence — all three are interactive and, inreality, would be pursued simultaneously. Theirhierarchy of importance at a particular time,which can be termed air power employmentdoctrine, must be determined in the light ofstrategic as well as tactical considerations. 2 Forthis reason it must be determined by a supremecommander taking the advice of a commanderwith full knowledge of air power employment,which for Australia can only be a RAAFofficer.The second reason for unifying air power isthat unity achieves the greatest advantage airpower has to offer, which is the ability to concentrateits force rapidly in time and space.Whether to mount offensive actions against anenemy or defend against his initiatives, airpower's strength lies in its innate ability to concentratevast amounts of firepower in combat.Concentration enables a force to be decisive. Ifneed be, the whole weight of the air power forcecan be employed together against a single mostimportant target, or alternatively, against anarray of lesser targets. Used properly, whichmeans in accordance with the correct employmentdoctrine and concentrated in time andspace, air power can be singularly decisive in affectingthe outcome of the war, rather thanmerely influencing the land and sea battle bypiecemeal application.The ability to use concurrent aerial strategiesand to concentrate air forces rapidly indicate acompletely different perspective of time andspace within which air power is employed incomparison with land and sea power. The differencesare substantial and deserve closer examinationif we are to fully understand theaviator's concern over misuse of air assetswhich could lead to division of air power anddiminution of its effect. If we look at the traditionalevolution of command and control ofweapons systems the relative perspectives oftime and space will be more evident.Firstly, any extent of military command andcontrol is commensurate with the combatradius of action of the weapons system involved.For example, the combat radius of action ofan infantry platoon, depending on the timeframe, is a day's march or the trajectory rangeof small arms munitions. Therefore it wouldmake no sense to take divisional artilleryweapons, with ranges of 50 kilometres or moreand divide them up under command at battalionlevel or lower. As we know this is notdone; artillery assets are commanded at thehighest possible (divisional) level, where the'big picture' is more evident.What sense then does it make to break up, intopenny packets, a force with a combat radiusof action of hundreds and perhaps thousandsof kilometres, which can be used against avariety of targets by re-roling or re-equipping,and which can have a 'big picture' of strategic