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DS397 Saf Use Mod RRs with NUSSC comments 18-06-2010

DS397 Saf Use Mod RRs with NUSSC comments 18-06-2010

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7.2. Operational ExperienceSummarize the relevant operational experience during the execution of comparable irradiationexperiments in the past. Aspects to be mentioned are operational behaviour, loading andunloading experience and if applicable possible improvements made.8. HANDLING, DISMANTLING, TRANSPORT AND DISPOSALOutline of various handling procedures, both for normal and abnormal (e.g. target failure)conditions <strong>with</strong> description of (or reference to) special tools, containers which must beapplied.Specify the transport container and facilities to be used for internal or external transport andsummarize specific container criteria required by (inter-)national legislation.9. POST IRRADIATION EXAMINATIONDescription (summary) of post irradiation examination (dismantling mode, scientificmeasurements) of targets and/or the irradiation facility. Indicate if the PIE is scheduled to bedone at the institute or in another research institute.10. SAFETY ANALYSIS10.1. Failure analysisIn this section the consequences based on single failure principle of components, systems andinstruments are treated <strong>with</strong> respect to the possible hazards for personnel, the reactor facilityand the environment. The failure analyses must show that any such failure will not result inintolerable conventional and/or radiological hazards to personnel, in major disturbances in theoperation of reactor and (other) experimental facilities, in damage to the reactor orexperimental facilities or in reduced access to reactor, experimental facilities or reactorbuilding. The failure analyses will at least treat the following subjects:– Target failure;– Failure of (some) safety containment;– Cooling (system) failure;– Electrical power failure;– Instrumentation failures;– Utility failures;– (other) Component failures;– Operating errors;– Handling errors.10.2. Enveloping Design Base AccidentIn this section the consequences are treated of the worst combination of two simultaneouslyoccurring but mutually independent failure-failure (or failure-human error) situations. Allother systems and components not directly affected by the postulated failure, may be assumedto be functioning correctly. In this analysis, the total and sudden failure of structural52

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