BOX 7.4. SMEs in Thailand’s Energy ConservationProgramThailand first made serious efforts to promote energyefficiency with its Energy Conservation Promotion Act of1992, which has since been revised and expanded. Thecenterpiece of this policy is the Energy ConservationPromotion (ECON) Fund, which is financed by a $0.001per liter charge on petroleum, raising about $50 millionper year, which is then invested into support for energyefficiency projects (Grüning et al., 2012). By 2012 theprogram was estimated to have resulted in a reductionin peak electricity demand of 2,600 MW and a cumulativesaving of 15,700 GWh of energy (Polycarp et al., 2013).The main policy elements of Thailand’s drive to increaseenergy efficiency include:• Renewable Purchase Obligations• Taxation on fossil fuel consumption, demarcated forinvestment in energy conservation (ECON)• Active involvement of multilateral and donororganizations for financing and technical assistance• Revolving fund for concessional loansThe ECON fund is used to support various agenciesimplementing energy conservation projects, as well asrenewable energy, R&D, training, and public awarenesscampaigns, through grants, subsidies, and tax incentivesand two dedicated funds for energy efficiency: theRevolving Fund and Energy Services Company (ESCO)fund. The revolving and ESCO funds provide credit tolocal banks that issue low-interest loans to projectdevelopers. The country’s support for energy efficiencyhas driven demand for efficient transport, lighting,air conditioning, and solar energy technologies, aswell as construction and insulation materials. Large,mostly foreign, corporations have taken the largestshare of the market in energy efficient technologies,which are mostly imported to Thailand. However,SMEs have obtained some market share through theretail, installation, and maintenance of energy efficientequipment, such as air conditioners, solar thermalsystems, and low-energy lighting systems.Another way in which SMEs have accessed the energyefficiency market is through the ESCO model, supportedby the ECON fund. Indeed most ESCOs are SMEs andsuffer from the same financial barriers as SMEs inother sectors, where banks have been less familiarwith the ESCO model and hence less willing to lend tothem, which in turn has limited their participation in therevolving fund (Polycarp et al., 2013).levies on pollution, waste production and/or theunsustainable consumption of natural resources.As an alternative to taxation, governments canutilize market-based mechanisms such as thetrade in emissions permits or credits, wherebyeconomic entities are subject to an emissions cap(absolute limit) which obliges actors to reduceemissions or waste, instead of simply punishingthem. However the cap on emissions must be tightand become more stringent over time, in order toset permit prices at a meaningful level. In supportof market mechanisms, taxation can be deployedas a “baseline instrument” to send the economicsignal, especially to major industrial emitters, thatinvestment in clean technology is an act of selfinterest(OECD, 2012).Here, the effectiveness of pollution taxationdepends upon strong and sustained politicalsupport so as to give clear signals that delayedinvestment in clean technology will result in highercosts. Although emissions trading and taxation ismostly targeted at large corporate players, SMEsstand to benefit directly from these policies asthey strengthen demand for technical solutions toreduce emissions and waste, much of which willcome from innovation-led SMEs and from thosecontracted to install, operate and maintain cleantechnology solutions. The case study on Thailand’sEnergy Conservation Program (see Box 7.4) refersto a mix of legal and regulatory instruments, aswell as an innovative financing mechanism, todrive the supply and demand for energy efficienttechnologies.In addition to the presence of economic incentives,the growth of clean technology SMEs also dependsupon a country’s “absorptive capacity” which is theresult of creative talent and a skilled workforceoperating within a favorable business environmentto enable experimentation and learning. Here, oneinstrument to attract relevant skills and talentsis to offer income tax benefits and/or subsidies totargeted individuals, the so-called “sticky cities”policy. This can be a low-cost, low-risk, optionfor governments and is of particular value to lessdeveloped countries that typically suffer a “braindrain” to richer counties. However reversing thistrend is a challenge and success depends uponconcerted efforts to attract a critical mass ofindividuals, working in a specific sector.78 <strong>Building</strong> <strong>Competitive</strong> <strong>Green</strong> <strong>Industries</strong>: The Climate and Clean Technology Opportunity for Developing Countries
Country ContextThere is limited empirical knowledge regarding therelationship between specific developing countrycontexts and the most effective instruments topromote clean technology industries. However,there are a number of national, economy-wide,conditions necessary to support clean technologyindustries, whether investors are domestic orforeign. These include a stable macroeconomicenvironment, meaning rational interest rates, tightcontrol over inflation and competitive exchangerates. More generally, countries should haveundergone, or be in pursuit of, reforms to simplifyand minimize the cost of business registrationand formalization, including decentralizedadministration, strong rule of law, contractenforcement, pro-business bankruptcy andre-entry rules. While these may appear obviousprerequisites that stand to benefit all industries,there can be profound contradictions between agovernment‘s sector-specific policies and the widereconomic and business framework, thus hinderingclean technology industries.When designing instruments to support cleantechnology industries, governments, in particular,should take into account their country‘sadministration and innovation capacities, in orderto pursue realistic goals and strategies (UNDESA,2011). This applies to education policies throughto IPR regimes, though the need to take intoaccount national development circumstances isperhaps most important when thinking aboutclean technology transfer. For countries withweaker capacities, it makes more sense to focuson attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and increating a role in global value chains, where jointventures with foreign firms are the best optionsfor securing technology transfer, in addition tosupporting local research capacities.An example of this is Egypt‘s Kuraymat IntegratedSolar Combined Cycle power plant, a gridconnectedproject including 20MW of concentratedsolar capacity, which became operational in June2011. Sixty percent of the value for the Kuraymatplant was captured by local SMEs through thesupply of civil works, mounting structure, tubes,electrical cables, grid connection, engineering,and procurement and construction responsibility.Many local SMEs obtained knowledge andskills regarding the design, construction andmaintenance of the solar plant, in the process ofworking with foreign firms (MEDREC, 2013).There is also a range of social and cultural barriersto the update of clean technologies that mayinhibit the growth of clean technology industries.These can include limited acceptance or trust inthe suitability or reliability of clean technologies,as well as consumer resistance on the basis ofaesthetic criteria, for example in the uptake ofroof-top rain water harvesting. Resistance at thecommunity level has also been experienced, forexample in efforts to encourage collectivized foodstorage in flood-prone areas. Tradition, socialesteem, pride and religious beliefs may also bea source of resistance to the uptake of climatetechnologies. However there are various optionsto address these barriers, including campaignsto disseminate information, educate and raiseawareness as well as public-private partnershipsand targeted assistance to promote early adoptersand technology front runners (Boldt et al., 2012).Policy Interaction and RiskIn addition to providing active, positive, supportfor clean technology markets via the menu ofinstruments detailed in tables in Appendix C,governments and regulators also need to ensurethat they remove or minimize any “negativeincentives,” that is, fiscal instruments, subsidiesor regulations that favor conventional energy andother “dirty tech” markets. Action to remove orreform such policies, thus reducing policy conflicts,is another key aspect of an enabling framework forclean technology SMEs.Negative incentives for clean technology SMEs indeveloping countries are likely to result from redtape and import taxation, as well as more sectorspecificregulations that restrict market access,such as monopoly status awarded to State utilitiesto generate electricity or operate water treatmentplants. For example, despite low levels of ruralelectrification, the Tanzanian utility TANESCOmaintained control over all grid and mini-gridpower generation up until the creation of the RuralEnergy Agency (REA) in 2008. Since then the REAhas supported small-scale independent powerproducers, thus opening up investment in smallscale hydro power and mini-grid technologies tosupply villages and rural areas (Uisso, 2011).Another source of policy conflict that underminesclean technology SMEs are subsidies issued tofossil fuels, which remain widespread in bothdeveloped and developing countries (Whitley, 2013).Chapter 7: Policy to Support Clean Technology SMEs79
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Building CompetitiveGreen Industrie
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ContentsForeword ..................
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AcknowledgmentsThis report was comm
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FIGURE E3. Top three regional oppor
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FIGURE E7. Areas for government sup
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Policy makers, in particular, must
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Other adaptation technologies (outs
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years, and heat and electricity fro
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