BOX 7.5. Ethiopia’s Climate Resilient <strong>Green</strong> EconomyStrategy (CRGE)The Ethiopian government launched its Climate Resilient<strong>Green</strong> Economy Strategy (CRGE) in 2011 to support the5-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which aimsfor the country to obtain middle-income status by 2025,via carbon-neutral growth. This is an ambitious target,especially given the country’s high GDP growth rates, whichaveraged 10 percent between 2004 and 2013. The CRGEstands out as being a model strategy in bringing greeneconomy and climate resilient objectives to the forefrontof national economic planning. Indeed, on paper, it isdifficult to fault the CRGE, which, unlike green strategiesin many other countries, benefits from high-level supportand oversight. The CRGE Ministerial Steering Committeeoperates within the Prime Minister’s Office, and works inpartnership with the Ministry of Finance and EconomicDevelopment and the Environmental Protection Agency.In a similar way to the Korean <strong>Green</strong> Growth Strategy, theCRGE is made up of a portfolio of specific projects, acrossnumerous sectors. These include the fast-tracking ofsupport to develop the country’s hydro power resources, thescaling up of fuel-efficient cooking stoves in rural areas,efficiency improvements to the livestock value chain, andfinancing for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation andForest Degradation (REDD) projects (Federal DemocraticRepublic of Ethiopia, 2012). Although some policyinstruments have been legislated, including a FIT to supportinvestment in grid-connected renewable energy, most ofthe strategy will be delivered through direct investmentand spending from a central fund, managed by the Ministryof Finance and Economic Development. This fund, knownas the CRGE Facility, aims to mobilize $200 billion fromnational and international public and private sources over a20-year period and has already received international donorsupport, including $24 million from the U.K. government(GGGI, 2013). In terms of how these funds are spent,the government has established the Sectoral ReductionMechanism Framework, which purports to outline theprecise mechanisms of implementation, though it makesscant reference to clean technology innovation or the roleof SMEs. Indeed this highly centralized approach risksresulting in an inefficient distribution of resources if privatesector actors and investors are not systematically drawninto decision-making processes.Another risk is weak implementation or enforcement of thegovernment’s stated policies. It remains to be seen if theCRGE’s clear national vision and planning will be translatedinto lasting support for the private sector that is necessaryto develop green industries in Ethiopia.Governments often justify these subsidies onthe basis of welfare, for example for kerosenewhich remains an important fuel for domesticlighting in rural, off-grid, Africa. However,technical progress and cost reductions withsolar lighting technology mean that subsidiesfor kerosene are no longer justified, andin fact governments would be advised totax unsustainable fuels, further driving themarket for clean technology alternatives.Clean technology SMEs and investors thatdepend upon government policies andregulations for the size and strength of theirmarkets need to be aware of the risk of policydiscontinuity. There are two types of suchpolicy risks: prospective and retroactive risk.Prospective policy risk refers to the overalllevel of instability or uncertainly regarding acountry‘s enabling framework, upon whichclean technology SMEs may depend. In otherwords this is the risk that governments willmake frequent or irregular and unpredictablechanges in policies that may have a negativeimpact on project planning, thus pushing upthe cost of borrowing or the rate of returndemanded by investors. Retroactive policyrisk refers to changes in policy or regulationsthat affect existing projects, especially whenthey have an impact on business income.Indeed, retroactive changes to policiesthat financially support clean technologyinvestments has become a main barrierto scaling up private investment in therenewable energy sector (Micale et al., 2013).In the area of renewable energies, the mostwell-known risk relates to changes in thevalue of feed-in tariffs where, for example,the Spanish government issued a decreelimiting the rate of return on RET investmentsto 7.5 percent, effectively cutting the valueof tariff support by up to 25 percent forboth existing and future projects (PV Tech,2014). Such retroactive changes in keyfinancial instruments are what businessesand investors fear most as it can resultin a drop in forecast revenues, increaseborrowing costs and diminish the confidenceof investors, undermining market growthprospects. There are various circumstancesunder which such changes tend to occur,though the most are related to changes in thepolitical ideology of presiding governmentsand economic crises.80 <strong>Building</strong> <strong>Competitive</strong> <strong>Green</strong> <strong>Industries</strong>: The Climate and Clean Technology Opportunity for Developing Countries
While policy change is not always and necessarilybad for business (indeed sometimes it iswelcomed), changes especially to instrumentsthat provide financial support to investmentsmust be developed in consultation with theaffected businesses and investors. Ideally changeshould be implemented gradually, after plenty ofwarning. Indeed, sudden and unexpected changesin policy are likely to cause most damage,especially when foreign companies and investorsare involved.Finally, it is important to bear in mind thechallenges surrounding the implementation,enforcement and regulation of any giveninstrument. In many developing countriesthis issue presents the greatest risk, whereeven well designed legal frameworks andfinancial mechanisms can fall victim to poorimplementation or compliance. Regulatorypolicies, such as import tariff waivers designedto support clean technology sectors, cancreate incentives for corruption as does thedemarcation of government funds to supportnascent industries. Indeed, 26 percent of thesolar energy firms surveyed in India (see Chapter4) identified corruption as a major barrier facingthe development of their business, with 22percent pointing to unfavorable customs andtrade regulations. In order to reduce the riskof rendering supportive instruments obsoletebecause of poor enforcement, governments andother stakeholders must sustain capacity buildingprograms, combined with reforms that allowfor greater transparency, reporting and auditingprocesses throughout public administration. Box7.5 discusses some of these issues, with regardto Ethiopia’s Climate Resilient <strong>Green</strong> EconomyStrategy.In the least developed countries and those withmajor resource constraints, governments andother stakeholders are advised to identify cleantechnology “sweet spots” in order to maximizethe co-benefits of economic growth and climateresilient development or greater energy access.This is of particular importance in countrieswhose greenhouse gas emissions are of globalinsignificance, such as in most Sub-SaharanAfrican countries, where there is a far greaterneed for economic development than climatechange mitigation. In such countries, instrumentsthat support clean technology sectors should beintegrated into national development strategies,BOX 7.6 Climate Smart Agriculture—a potential “sweetspot” industry offering environmental and social cobenefits?As discussed in the previous chapter, CSA is more aproduct of behavior change than hard technologicalchange; hence, policy support should be geared moretowards shifting farming away from unsustainablepractices. However the widespread uptake of CSApolicies by governments provides some opportunitiesfor SMEs (including small holder farmers) throughdemand for drip irrigation, food storage and similartechnologies. In order to design a policy frameworkto stimulate CSA, there is wide agreement on thefundamental need for effective coordination betweennational agricultural development plans, food securityand climate change (FAO, 2010). Since these are oftenthe domain of different Ministries, such coordination isa challenge.In terms of specific instruments to support CSA, theFAO identifies three key mechanisms: reformed credit,insurance and payments for environmental services,all of which should be designed to incentivize farmersto adopt CSA practices. First of all, commercial creditand insurance sold to farmers needs to be reformedin order to incentivize the use of crop residues andrestoration projects, which usually involve withdrawingland from short-term production, in order to obtaingreater longer-term productivities from increasednatural fertility. Traditional credit and insuranceproducts do not encourage such practices and viewthese ecological investments as negative financialtrade-offs. Governments are also able to legislatepayments for environmental services, in support of thetransition to CSA. Payment for environmental services,such as the mitigation of climate change, has beensuccessful in the forestry sector and is a service thatsmallholder farmers can easily provide, as a means tocompensate for the short-term productivity losses thatoften result from CSA practices.Many countries have already proposed the use of theseinstruments through national strategy or planningprocesses, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers(PRSPs), National Action Plans for Adaptation (NAPAs),Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) orTechnology Needs Assessments (TNAs) for climatechange. In addition to highlighting the ecologicalbenefits of CSA, governments and other stakeholderscould explore the potential benefit of CSA as a drivingforce for local SMEs supplying clean technologies,adding, where necessary, political support to the CSAagenda.Chapter 7: Policy to Support Clean Technology SMEs81
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Building CompetitiveGreen Industrie
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ContentsForeword ..................
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AcknowledgmentsThis report was comm
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FIGURE E3. Top three regional oppor
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Other adaptation technologies (outs
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