Retiring Trident

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Retiring Trident 249 From the 1950s onwards, British policy has been based on the assumption that there would be at least 24 hours “strategic warning”. See, e.g., “Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942 – 2002”, Jeremy Stocker, Routledge, London, 2004, page 91. 250 ORPs were constructed for the V-Force on the V-Force main bases and dispersal sites. Despite not having been used for nuclear QRA since mid-1969, ORPs are still evident on Google Earth imagery of RAF Cranwell (runway 22), RAF Conningsby (runway 25), RAF Honington (runway 27), RAF Leeming (runway 34), RAF Marham (runway 24), RAF Scampton (runway 05), RAF Valley (runway 32), RAF Waddington (runway 20), RAF Wattisham (runway 05), RAF Wittering (runway 26) and RNAS Yeovilton (runway 27). 251 “RAF Mildenhall to close amid other Europe consolidations” Stars and Stripes, John Vandiver, 8 January 2015. 252 Around 80 RAF personnel and 200 civilian staff operate the BMEWS radar system at RAF Fylingdales. See “RAF Fylingdales: About Us” UK MoD, accessed 15 January 2015. A “UK alone” scenario assumes that the UK would not have access to US missile launch warning from the Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS) through intelligence sharing channels; given that this would be warning of a nuclear missile launch, and with it, an existential threat to the UK it is unlikely that the US would deny the UK SEWS data. On SEWS, see “Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellites”, Fact Sheet, USAF, 11 February 2014. 253 RAF Marham is 1514nm from Moscow, and 833 nm from Kaliningrad. Based on “Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence”, page 91, this translates in a little over 10 minutes warning for a missile launch in the Moscow area and more than 4.2 minutes for a Kaliningrad launch, as Kaliningrad is further than the 650nm for a 1000nm range missile fired on a “low” profile. Distances courtesy of the Great Circle Mapper (www.gcmap.com), copyright © Karl L. Swartz. 254 In the V-Force dispersal plan, some dispersal airfields would host four V-bombers, others would host only two. The ORPs were sized accordingly, with RAF Valley’s ORP on runway 32 an example of a two aircraft ORP, whereas RAF Marham has a four aircraft ORP on runway 24. 255 Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) nuclear-armed V-Force aircraft in the 1960s would be airborne within 2 minutes, 30 seconds of an order to launch. See “A Short History of the RAF”, MoD, London, page 234. 256 The RAF’s 14 Voyager KC 2 and KC 3 tankers are based on the Airbus A330-200 airliner and are operated under a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) deal with AirTanker PLC. Currently, RAF Voyagers do not currently have the capability to receive fuel in flight, significantly limiting the number of strike sorties they are able to support at 2500nm radius. 257 Local V-Force exercises (i.e. a single station) were regularly conducted as Exercise MICK. Full-force dispersal exercises were organised under the name Exercise MICKY FINN. “International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis”, pages 189 – 190. For the whole force deployment exercise 26 – 29 October 1964, see “RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces”, page 338. Dispersed operations were required to be self-sustaining for up to 28 days. 258 Boom refuelling is typically twice to three times as fast as probe and drogue refuelling. Airbus quotes maximum fuel flow rates of 4,600 litres / minute from their Air Refuelling Boom System on A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transports, and 2,250 litres / minute (centreline) and 1,500 litres / minute (wing pods) for their A400M probe and drogue tankers. See “A400M: The Versatile Airlifter for the 21st Century”, Airbus Defence & Space accessed 20 January 2015; “Aerial Refuelling Boom System (ARBS)”, Airbus Defence & Space accessed 20 January 2015. 259 “The RAAF adds new tanking capability: A key step in building out its reach, range and sustainability”, Robbin Laird, sldinfo.com, 14 March 2014 260 “Airbus Military A330 MRTT refuels second A330 MRTT”, Marcel van Leeuwen, www.aviationews. eu, 18 May 2010. 261 “UK Rivet Joints cleared for ‘boom-and-receptacle’ aerial refuelling”, Gareth Jennings, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, London, 7 July 2014. 262 “UK Rivet Joints cleared for ‘boom-and-receptacle’ aerial refuelling”, Gareth Jennings, 7 July 2014. 263 The USN predominately uses probe-and-drogue in-flight refuelling, and therefore the F-35B STOVL and F-35C CATOBAR JSF variants are probe-and-drogue equipped. However, as the F-35A will be numerically the most common variant, demand for boom-equipped tankers for tactical aircraft in Europe is unlikely to decline. 101
Retiring Trident 264 UK E-3D Sentry AWACS aircraft are (together with their French equivalents) the only receivers worldwide routinely configured to receive fuel from both flying boom or hose and drogueequipped tankers. Given the differential refuelling rates, flying boom refuelling is almost always preferred if a choice is available, but E-3D crews are required to remain proficient in both techniques. 265 Operation EL DORADO CANYON, was conducted by UK based USAF and carrier-based USN and USMC units early in the morning of 15 April 1986 against targets in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya. The USAF’s 18 F-111F Aardvarks and five supporting EF-111A Ravens flew from the UK via the Atlantic and the Straits of Gibraltar after transits of French, Italian and Spanish airspace were denied. See “Raid on Libya, Operation El Dorado Canyon”, Judy G. Endicott, in “Short of War USAF Contingency Operations 1947-1997”, USAF Historical Studies Office, pages 145 – 155, map page 147, discussion page 148. 266 See “Raid on Libya, Operation El Dorado Canyon”, page 148. 267 The Iberian detour forced the USAF to move a significant number of tankers to the UK from the USA at short notice, and appears to have caused some operational frictions as the then-new KC- 10A Extender tankers were unfamiliar to most of the F-111F / EF-111A crews. See “Raid on Libya, Operation El Dorado Canyon”, page 151. 268 “Cameron: UK Will Operate 2 Aircraft Carriers”, Andrew Chuter, DefenseNews.com, 5 September 2014. 269 CATOBAR configured aircraft carriers can of course field organic tankers rather than relying on buddy-buddy refuelling from range-limited strike-fighters. Lockheed Martin has periodically proposed rerolling surplus ex-USN S-3 Viking carrier ASW aircraft for AAR and COD roles (see e.g., “How”, Defence Industry Daily, 15 April 2014; “ADEX 2013: Lockheed Martin offers refurbished Viking aircraft to Korean and US navies”, Gareth Jennings, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 October 2013). 270 When lofted from 45kft at Mach 1.6, 85% of theoretical maximum range is estimated at 40.9km. CentreForum analysis with assistance from Dr Jeffrey Lewis, Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, Monterey, California. See worked example at Annex 3. 271 Assumes current a typical 4 th generation fighter RCS of c. 5m 2 and F-35 head-on aspect RCS of c. 0.0015m 2 . Detection range data via Dr. Carlo Kopp, www.ausairpower.net/APA-Engagement-Fire-Control.html. 272 This analysis is based on radar tracking of the F-35Cs, and ignores infra-red (heat) guided missiles or IR search systems, as these systems suffer from atmospheric attenuation, largely due to water vapour in the atmosphere and are typically restricted to shorter range (
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