Retiring Trident

Retiring Trident
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Notes
1 Capital programme cost in 2014 pounds based on £15 – 20bn (2006 pounds) cited in “Securing
Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review” (SDSR 10 ) paragraph
3.10, page 38, and inflated to 2014 values allowing a 30.4% optimism bias based on the Astute SSN
programme overspend. All prices in this paper are quoted in 2014 prices using the HM Treasury
deflator series as appropriate.
2 Based on the widely accepted £97bn though-life cost figure “‘In the firing line: an investigation into
the hidden cost of the supercarrier project and replacing Trident’, page 11, Greenpeace, September
2009, inflated to 2014 pounds.
3 “Dropping the Bomb: a post Trident future”, Toby Fenwick, CentreForum, London, March 2012.
4 Option 3a of the Duff Group report of 30 November 1978. See “Unacceptable Damage: Damage
Criteria in British Nuclear Planning”, John Ainslie, swordofdamocles.org, February 2013, page 15.
5 HMS Prince of Wales was initially slated to be put into mothballs or sold, but David Cameron
announced in September 2014 that both UK carriers would be brought into service. See “David
Cameron: HMS Prince of Wales will not be sold”, Independent, 5 September 2014.
6 See “Trident costs must come from MoD budget, Osborne says”, BBC News 30 July 2010. This
draws on the existing policy as outlined by Secretary of State for Defence (Francis Pym) on 28
October 1980. See “Trident Missiles” HC Deb 28 October 1980 volume 991 cc 183 – 85 at 185.
7 CentreForum analysis detailed in Table 3.
8 Currently, Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands and Turkey are DCA states intending to operate F-35A.
9 “Carrier Strike: The 2012 reversion decision”, National Audit Office, HC 63 Session 2013-14, 10
May 2013, paragraph 1.9, page 12 provides a figure of £2.0bn in 2012, which was deflated to
£2.1bn per ship in 2014.
10 “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2014 Update to Parliament”, www.gov.uk, 15
December 2014.
11 “Britain Struggles With Costs For New Frigates”, Andrew Chuter, defensenews.com, 9 November
2014.
12 Lot 5 Boeing P-8 Poseidon acquisition cost is quoted as $150m per aircraft per Captain Scott Dillon
US Navy at Farnborough 2014. See “Boeing P-8 May Have Inside Track in UK, Eventually”, Chris
Pocock, AINonline, 18 July 2014.
13 Dropping the Bomb: A Post-Trident Future, CentreForum, London, March 2012.
14 Trident Alternatives Review, Cabinet Office, London, 16 July 2013.
15 “Congress Fully Funds B61 Bomb”, Tom Z. Colina, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association,
March 2014
16 The purported Russian annexation of Crimea is widely held to be a violation of international law’s
restrictive approach to remedial secession, under which annexation can only be considered as a
remedy against oppression and violation of human rights of a minority population; there was no
evidence that the Ukrainian government has denied internal self-determination to the Crimea,
and therefore that remedial secession was the appropriate response. The “plebiscite” conducted
under Russian military occupation has no legal standing. See “What do Russian Lawyers Say about
Crimea?”, Anton Moiseienko, Opinio Juris, 24 September 2014; “Ukraine Insta-Symposium: Crimea,
Ukraine and Russia: Self-Determination, Intervention and International Law”, Kristin Hausler and
Robert McCorquodale, Opinio Juris, 10 March 2014.
17 See, e.g. “UK poised to place order for F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets”, Carola Hoyos, Financial Times,
24 Jan 14
18 Most recently detailed in Budget 2014, HC 1104, HM Treasury, March 2014
19 BASIC Trident Commission Concluding Report, BASIC, London, July 2014.
20 “Defending the Future not the Past”, Liberal Democrats, London, 21 February 2014.
21 SDSR10 paragraph 3.2, page 37 notes that ““no state currently has both the intent and the capability
to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK”.
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