Retiring Trident

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Retiring Trident average attrition rate of 1% per wave at of two sorties per aircraft per day, would have destroyed 56% of the percent of total USAF deployed force in 40 days; had it averaged 3% per wave, attrition would have been 92% of the force in the same period. See “Thunderbolts and Eggshells: Composite Air Operations during Desert Storm and Implications for USAF Doctrine and Force Structure”, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, September 1994, page 3. 282 On the US-led development of COMAO doctrine see “Thunderbolts and Eggshells”. 283 “RAF’s new surveillance aircraft takes to the skies”, Ministry of Defence, 27 May 2014. 284 Interview K, September 2014. 285 CentreForum analysis based on leaving the tanker outbound with full tanks at 1500nm from base / 1000nm from target with inbound tanking from 750nm from target. 286 “UK to study F-35C ‘buddy’ refuelling”, Philip Ewing, DoD Buzz Online Defense and Acquisition Journal, 15 August 2011. 287 CentreForum analysis. The number of strike aircraft required drives range; the more strike aircraft required, the fewer able to act as buddy-buddy tankers. Under some scenarios it is possible for a small number of strike aircraft to be extended to 1250nm radius of action without land-based AAR support, though we have not found a target set that would require this. 288 Using the C-2A Greyhound as an AAR tanker would represent a new role for the aircraft. Based on CentreForum analysis of available open-source performance data, it is estimated that a single C-2A could offload 10 – 12,000lb of fuel at 450nm from the carrier. Though AAR would represent a new role of the C-2, as the UK’s own experience in the rapid conversion of Hercules C1s to Hercules C1K tankers during the Falklands War shows, the requirements are well understood and it is unlikely to present a major technical challenge. Interview L, September 2014. See also “Short History of the RAF”, MoD London, Chapter 6, page 268. Accessed 20 January 2015. 289 CentreForum analysis; Interview M, November 2014. 290 This paper does not directly address nuclear strike missions against the People’s Republic of China, but the economic and military countervalue targets in China are predominately located within 500nm of the coast, so in the extremely unlikely event that the UK is attacking China alone, the UK would be operating in the same manner as the DPRK example. 291 3900ft is the airburst height for a 50Kt to maximise the area subjected to a 5 lb per square inch (psi) overpressure blast wave. 5-psi is the minimum overpressure needed to seriously damage or destroy unhardened buildings. 292 Data and mapping courtesy of Alex Wellerstien’s Nukemap 2.42 model. See: http://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=50&lat=51.499978&lng=-0.1329081&hob_opt=1&hob_psi=5&hob_ ft=3942&casualties=1&fallout=1&psi=20,5,1.5&zm=12 293 Data and mapping courtesy of Alex Wellerstien’s Nukemap 2.42 model. See: http://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?&kt=50&lat=51.499978&lng=-0.1329081&hob_opt=1&hob_psi=5&hob_ ft=3942&casualties=1&fallout=1&psi=20,5,1.5&zm=12 . 294 The Queen Elizabeth-class carry up to 36 F-35s each, which in all cases bar the very unlikely sovereign solo operations against the DPRK would operate in concert with land-based F-35Cs. As all DPRK targets are within 615nm radius of action of a carrier group operating safely in international waters, there is no need in the very unlikely UK-only DPRK scenarios for buddy-buddy refuelling, meaning that all of the aircraft can operate in the strike or strike support roles. 295 On the JDAM family weapons generally, see http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/missiles/jdam/ 296 This will be a test of the B61-12’s aerodynamic properties and guidance kit on the Tonopah Test Range rather than a warhead test. “Sandia National Laboratories completes wind tunnel testing of B61-12 bomb”, airforce-technology.com, 16 April 2014. 297 “Congress Fully Funds B61 Bomb”, Tom Z. Colina, Arms Control Today, Arms Control Association, March 2014. 298 Secondary damage is legal damage inflicted on legitimate military targets in the course of attacking another legitimate military target. For example, the destruction of a number of military oil tankers in a convoy as a result of the successful attack on a single tanker. 299 Collateral damage is damage inflicted on a civilian or civilian object (e.g. vehicle, building) in the 103
Retiring Trident course of an attack on a legitimate military target. For example, this could include a civilian vehicle that was passing the military oil tanker convoy at the time of the attack. Collateral damage must be minimised at all times, and preferably avoided entirely. 300 Fallout is the dispersion of radioactive downwind of radioactive materials following a nuclear explosion. See “Communicating Nuclear Risk: Informing the Public about the Risks and Realities of Nuclear Terrorism”, Tonya L. Putnam, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) of the Institute of International Studies, Stanford University, 20 May 2002, note 4. 301 Rainout is rain washing radioactive materials from the atmosphere onto the ground following a nuclear explosion. See “Communicating Nuclear Risk”, note 4. 302 In line with the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion, paragraph 97, page 263. 303 The life-extension is proceeding under the Long Overhaul Period (Refuelling) (LOP(R)) programme. See, e.g., “Babcock successfully completes first-of-class MSC installation”, Babcock Media Release, 08 Jan 2014; “Trident Life Extension Could Cost the UK $2.3bn”, naval-technology.com, 11 November 2010 304 “Trident Alternatives Review”, paragraph 5.13, page 37. 305 For example, the magnesium stable member on which the guidance system rested proved susceptible to corrosion in extended RN service. See, “From Polaris to Trident”, page 70; generally, see “Dropping the Bomb”, footnote 34, page 18. 306 “Air Force Relieves Commanders Involved in Nuclear Weapons Incident” Fred W. Baker III, American Forces Press Service, Washington DC, 19 October 2007. 307 “Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures”, paragraphs 3.2.2.2, page 28, paragraph 3.2.5.2, page 32, and paragraph 3.3.1.2, page 37. 308 “US nuclear officer cheating scandal widens as top brass investigates”, The Guardian, 30 January 2014. 309 “Navy Expels 34 Sailors in Nuclear Cheating Scandal”, Sam LaGrone, USNI News, USNI.org, 20 August 2014. 310 “Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise”, US Department of Defense, Washington DC, 2 June 2014. 311 “Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise”, page 5. 312 “Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise”, page 42. 313 “Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise”, page 9. 314 See, e.g., “Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014”, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 70(6), November / December 2014, pages 97 – 115. 315 See, e.g., “Pakistan’s nuclear forces, 2011”, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 67(4), July / August 2011, pages 91 – 99. 316 See, e.g., “Saudi nuclear weapons ‘on order’ from Pakistan”, Mark Urban, BBC News, 6 November 2013. 317 See Appendix 2. 318 WMD-associated sites shown are: Iran: Arak (Research Reactor), Ardakan (Uranium Milling), Bandar Abbas (Uranium Milling), Bonab (Nuclear R&D for Agriculture), Fasa (Rudan Uranium Conversion Facility), Fordow (Uranium Enrichment), Ishfahan (Uranium Conversion Facility), Khondab (Heavy Water production), Mashhad (Uranium Enrichment), Natanz (Uranium Enrichment), Parchin (Explosives implosion tests), Saghand (Uranium mining), Tehran (Nuclear R&D); Israel: Dimona (Reprocessing / Weapons Production); Pakistan: Chagai 1 (Test Site), Chagai 2 (Test Site), Chashma (Nuclear Power Plant / Reprocessing), Dera Ghazi Khan (Uranium Conversion Facility), Golra Sharif (Uranium Enrichment), Kahuta (Uranium Enrichment, R&D), Khushab (Tritium Production), Kundian (Fuel Fabrication), Multan (Heavy Water Production), Sihala (Uranium Enrichment); Saudi Arabia: Al Sulayyil (IRBM base). Al Watah (IRBM base). Sources: Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI.org), CNS, IAEA. 319 A constraint on these operations would be the lack of fixed-wing UK MPA / MMA and AAR to support the fleet due to a lack of basing east of PJOB Diego Garcia, BIOT. However, this just underscores how unlikely this scenario is: it is virtually inconceivable that if the DPRK had developed the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead against the UK that allied powers would not also be 104
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Retiring Trident: An alternative pr
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Retiring Trident About the author T
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Retiring Trident :: Executive summa
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Retiring Trident wards future nucle
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Retiring Trident * In 2014 pounds u
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Retiring Trident COMAO CTOL CEP COD
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Retiring Trident QRA RAF RAAF RAN R
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Retiring Trident :: 1 - Introductio
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Retiring Trident clear weapons or
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Retiring Trident Continuous At-Sea
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Retiring Trident liant on an SNP co
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Retiring Trident :: 2 - Deterrence
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Retiring Trident Since the establis
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Retiring Trident the ICBM programme
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Retiring Trident Figure 2: Hypothet
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Retiring Trident is much to the cre
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Retiring Trident :: 3 - Critiquing
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Retiring Trident but it meant that
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Retiring Trident a lower-risk, quic
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Retiring Trident US Air Force (USAF
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Retiring Trident Does an F-35C nucl
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