Retiring Trident

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Retiring Trident holds. Nonetheless, the case for the UK’s global interests to be covered by global expeditionary capabilities remains clear, as shown in the UK contributions to operations in Libya, support to the French in Mali, renewed operations against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 23 in Iraq, and humanitarian operations in Iraqi Kurdistan and South Sudan since 2010 – in addition to on-going operations in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, continued austerity and the implementation of the cuts to the UK’s conventional forces that were outlined in the SDSR10 have left the UK with both a scale problem and a number of critical capability gaps – for example, long-range Maritime Patrol Aircraft / Multi-Mission Aircraft (MPA / MMA). 24 Rather, current geopolitical trends place a premium on the UK’s conventional expeditionary capabilities. These offer the capability to reassure our allies, work in concert with our European Union (EU) partners regionally and in the wider EU neighbourhood, to intervene in small-scale conflicts worldwide without relying on the USA, or alongside the USA in larger scale operations. In the UK’s resource-constrained environment, funds invested in Trident will come at the expense of the conventional forces. This opportunity cost means that Trident replacement needs to demonstrate that it is a better investment in Britain’s security than a similar amount split between a credible minimum independent nuclear deterrent and the UK’s conventional forces. US – UK Mutual Defence Agreement Following joint work on the US-led WWII Manhattan Project that developed the atomic weapons used against Japan in 1945, the United States Congress passed the MacMahon Act that excluded the UK and Canada from nuclear weapon developments in 1946. Following the Soviet Union’s successful launch of Sputnik and the UK’s successful thermonuclear test in 1957, 25 the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) eased MacMahon Act restrictions on the UK. All subsequent British nuclear weapons have been based on American designs, and are constructed at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) facilities at Aldermaston and Burghfield, Berkshire. 26 Proposed for renewal until 31 December 2024 by President Obama in July 2014, 27 the MDA facilitates the sharing of technical warhead information, nuclear materials and non-nuclear weapons components. 28 As such, the MDA complies with Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as MDA cooperation does not involve the transfer of nu- 15
Retiring Trident clear weapons or “other nuclear explosive devices” between NPT-recognised nuclear weapons states (NWS). 29 Consequently, the US could provide similar design assistance to the UK for a future free-fall weapon. Fiscal realities: continued UK austerity to 2020 UK Budget 2014 provided confirmation that further fiscal consolidation will be required in the 2015 – 20 Parliament. Departmental current spending will fall from £317.8bn in 2014-15 to £289.1bn in 2018/19 – a 9.9% reduction in real terms over the forecast period. 30 If, as expected, the departmental budgets of Health, Education and International Development are protected, this fall of £28.7bn in current spending will fall disproportionately on non-protected departments. Labour plans slower fiscal consolidation, but it would be very unlikely that Labour would prioritise Ministry of Defence (MoD) spending over ameliorating coalition welfare cuts. The largest of these unprotected budgets is the MoD, which accounts for 16% of unprotected current spending. 31 This matters, as spare current spending budget could be vired to make good a capital shortfall, but further cuts to the MoD’s current spending makes any such current spending headroom unlikely. Recent work from the Royal United Service Institute’s (RUSI) Professor Malcolm Chalmers 32 confirms this, and demonstrates that not only is it unlikely that the UK will meet NATO’s 2% of GDP spending target in 2015/16, but that if current plans are assumed, it is unlikely that the UK will meet the 2% target in any year of the 2015 – 20 Parliament. 33 Indeed, if another five years’ austerity cuts are imposed, the UK defence budget will fall to around 1.5% of GDP by 2020/21. 34 This would translate into effectively a “flat cash” budget though the next Parliament, with spending in cash terms rising from £35.4bn in 2015/16 to just £35.8bn in 2020/21, some £10.8bn (23.2%) lower than the 2% NATO target implies. Budget 2014 projects Public Sector Gross Investment (PSGI) to increase by £1.7bn (4.5%) between 2015/16 and 2019/20, 35 but even in the unlikely event that all of this increased capital spending were provided to the MoD, it would still not be enough to cover the full costs of the Successor-class SSBNs which is expected to cost £21.5 – 29.8bn between 2016 and 2032. A more realistic scenario is that this small increase in PSGI covers the previously announced policy of a 1% increase in the MoD equipment programme in the 2015 – 20 Parliament that would add £0.3bn per annum to the MoD’s equipment budget by 2019/20. Thus, though departmental spending totals will not become clear until the 2016 Spending Review, as the Successor–class SSBN programme is likely 16
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Retiring Trident

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