The Litvinenko Inquiry

Part 4 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Why would anyone wish to kill Alexander Litvinenko?
bouncy condescension grated upon Putin. When Putin took decisions that clashed
with Berezovski’s interests, Berezovski instructed the national TV station under his
control to criticise Putin. Berezovski quickly lost the contest. Putin told him directly
that no businessman, however high and mighty, was going to determine public
policy any longer.” 15
4.21 Mr Berezovsky left Russia at the end of 2000 and became a political exile in London,
where he claimed, and was ultimately granted, asylum. I heard evidence from Professor
Service, Mr Goldfarb and others that, following his arrival in London, Mr Berezovsky
used his great wealth to become a vocal critic of President Putin, and to fund others
to do likewise. It was also clear that Mr Litvinenko played a leading role in this respect
– as Professor Service put it, “Berezovski encouraged and financed emigres who
shared his hostility to Putin, and Litvinenko was the most prominent and ebullient of
them.” 16 Another of this group of emigres in Mr Berezovsky’s circle was the Chechen
leader Akhmed Zakayev. As I have mentioned above, Mr Litvinenko and Mr Zakayev
became very close friends, and their two families lived so close to each other that they
regarded themselves as neighbours.
4.22 I will turn shortly to consider the various activities upon which Mr Litvinenko became
engaged during this period, and the causes that he espoused. Before doing so,
however, it is worth noting a point that Mr Goldfarb made in evidence, namely that
Mr Litvinenko was putting himself at risk simply by associating with two men who
were, as he put it, “demonised by Russian propaganda as arch enemies.” Extradition
requests in respect of both Mr Berezovsky and Mr Zakayev were vigorously pursued
by the Russian government. Mr Zakayev was, in Mr Goldfarb’s words, “characterised
by [the] Russian foreign minister as [the] Russian Osama Bin Laden and accused of
gross terrorism,” while Mr Berezovsky was, “depicted by the Russian propaganda as
somebody who sponsors terrorism.” Mr Goldfarb said that, “an association with Boris
and with Zakayev … was [a] kind of kiss of death, if you want”. 17
4.23 I note, of course, that this is no more than a contextual matter, and that Mr Goldfarb is
not (and would not, I think, claim to be) a neutral commentator on these events. But
the point that he makes has a resonance with a point made by Professor Service in
the expert report that he prepared:
“Some kind of action by the FSB against Berezovski and his associates, especially
Litvinenko, was made likely by their sustained media campaign against the Putin
administration. The form of such action could not be predicted.” 18
4.24 I also note that, on the evidence I have heard, there appear to have been at least two
occasions during this period on which Mr Litvinenko became involved in potentially
dangerous incidents as a consequence of his connection with Mr Berezovsky.
4.25 First, in 2003, MrLitvinenko was one of those in MrBerezovsky’s entourage who became
involved with a man named Mr Terluk. Mr Litvinenko made a lengthy contemporaneous
statement about these events for the purposes of Mr Berezovsky’s asylum appeal,
which I have admitted into evidence. 19 According to that statement, Mr Terluk claimed
in 2003 to have been instructed by an official from the Russian Embassy in London
15
INQ019146 (page 24 paragraph 75)
16
INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77)
17
Goldfarb 26/122
18
INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 79)
19
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